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Messages - tonyk

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76
General Discussion / Re: If Rootstock succeeds, bitshares would be copied/forked
« on: March 22, 2016, 07:56:39 pm »
Quote from: kingslanding on March 22, 2016, 03:02:01 pm
There's a difference between Rootstock and the likes of OMNI and XCP.  Both OMNI and XCP have their own coins and independent goals separate from bitcoin.  Rootstock is an extension of bitcoin.  It will have the backing of the bitcoin community.

It's a white paper, vaporware.  We always hear those arguments when a project gets started.  I remember hearing about that for Ethereum and even Bitshares. 
They plan a limited release of their testnet to partners by the end of April and to the public by September.  It may not happen by those dates, but it's highly probable something will come out w/ the amount of money they got.

Rootstock itself will not match Bitshares' performance.  It doesn't have to.  It's going after a different market and has to be just good enough.  All it has to do is prove that sidechains work.  Once that happens, bitcoin's network effect will take over.  It wants Ethereum to do well because it ports into Rootstock's smart contracts.

Once the sidechains flood-gates open, I see people looking at the top 2.0 projects to fork as a quick way to build bitcoin into a new evolved entity.  Great performance will be absorbed.

Sidechains is a ceiling waiting to be broken.

If the white paper turns to be indeed doable and I mean doable within 1 year.... BTS cannot do much really.
Their side chain approach is really trustless! What is the best we (BTS) can offer?
"Sidechain done/depending on Highly trusted group of individuals. Trusted by who?...well trusted by us."

77
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: March 22, 2016, 07:29:12 pm »
Quote from: roadscape on March 22, 2016, 02:24:45 pm
tonyk Your proposed changes make sense, but continuous monitoring is much more complex than sampling*. What does it capture that sampling can't? And what if samples were e.g. 15 mins apart?

@roadscape
OK, how about a middle ground - taking the snapshot every 10 (20, 30 whatever) minutes BUT also reading the filled orders in that period and using them for the calculation[effectively adding them to the orderbook like they were not filled]?
We can do 2 diff things - either credit them for the whole time period or really check when they were placed and  filled and credit them with the correct real time they were on the book.

####
thisTimeIntervalStart = now() - 10 min
For each filled order in time [now, thisTimeIntervalStart]
      T = OrderFillTime - max(OrderPlacementTime,  thisTimeIntervalStart)
       order_total = size of the Filled Order
####
---------------------------------------
As much as do not like using the feed price either.... very often currently we have
feed price 100BTS/USD
best bid 107
best ask 112

So the question is - do we really want to give a subsidy to this bid price at 7% above the peg? For me personally the answer is NO.

----------------------------------------
Quote from: abit on March 22, 2016, 05:15:50 pm
By the way, if we're going to do this in USD/BTS market, no need to subsidize buy (BTS) side imo due to force settlement already provides liquidity. However, technically we can implement it as a parameter so it can be disabled in some markets, but enabled in other markets.

Very good points and approach. + 1

------------------
@tbone
I finally found a post of yours I agree on all counts. The only thing about this layered approach is that it adds more complexity. Not impossibly high coding wise I guess[at worst they will have to run main code 3 times and check for orders in that interval [P<=2%;  2% < P < =5%;  5% < P <=20%], but lets se what the real coders think.

78
General Discussion / Re: [ANN] New Money project & SOLCERT token
« on: March 22, 2016, 09:19:15 am »
This is just another example of the

"Doing the things the crazy, the Ronny way"

 [I realy realy hope not!] but judging by the explanation... if I send my funds now, but fail to send an email [or ronny somehow fails to read it on time  ;)] other people will get the tokens before me.... and I will be credited as of the time my EMAIL is read ...and be charged say 2.5 BTS/Solarcert

Tell me I read the instructions wrong!


"Whomever is sending the orders first by e-mail to escrow holder Ronny Boesing ronny@ccedk.com including transaction ID of when funds have been sent, will be given the amount available at the price of the tier in question."

"What English is this is", btw, I never read about any tier being in question, questionable...or mentioned before that statement ...:)

79
General Discussion / Re: If Rootstock succeeds, bitshares would be copied/forked
« on: March 22, 2016, 06:27:44 am »
Quote from: kingslanding on March 22, 2016, 05:04:23 am
I read the white paper on Rootstock:
http://www.rootstock.io/#white-paper

I think it has a good chance of succeeding.  It has a key dev on their term via Sergio Lerner and now is getting large funding from the likes of the Digital Currency Group (ie. Barry Silbert):
http://www.coindesk.com/smart-contract-1-million-bitcoin-rootstock/

It's a game changer for bitcoin.  It's solves scalability, enables micro-transactions, gives it turing-complete capabilities, etc.  It would threaten Ethereum because there's no need to go through their network. 

So why would anyone then use Bitshares?  Just create a sidechain based on Rootstock, fork Bitshares and wham!  You just instantly created a bitcoin trading platform that can do 100k txn/sec and has all the other great BTS features.

The only way to head this off is to get a bitcoin sidechain working for bitshares before Rootstock takes hold.  Bitshares has zero network effect right now, so a migration to a copied bitshares w/ bitcoin security wouldn't be hard to imagine.

I know bytemaster believes bitshares should let others get sidechains going, but it would be a mistake if there's no immediate plan for someone to do so.  We've all discussed the positive game-changing effect a bitcoin sidechain would have on bitshares.  But there's now a threat that I think makes it imperative.

Honestly...this is now a white paper.
It is wish list...wish list for all good that can happen to Bitcoin.

80
General Discussion / Re: Bitshares price discussion
« on: March 22, 2016, 01:23:05 am »
In hindsight!!! ...
share dropping BTS on PTS is the most stupid idea ever, beating 'the newly minted 500Mil BTS in the merger' by wide wide margin

81
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [Worker Proposal] Blockchain Explorer and API Development
« on: March 22, 2016, 01:06:20 am »
Quote from: tonyk on March 21, 2016, 06:34:40 pm
I have a stupid request:
can the sells be in red and the buys in green? It is the other way around now.
....
Can we have the settlement price the same direction as the rest of the prices on any given page? Example:
http://cryptofresh.com/a/GOLD
Price top of the page 218,000 (aka BTS/GOLD)
Settlement price 0.00000458  GOLD/BTS
Thanks for doing it man!

82
General Discussion / Re: A case for Demurrage bitUSD (dUSD)
« on: March 22, 2016, 12:17:02 am »
Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 22, 2016, 12:05:02 am
So I think I would be more in favour of competing solely on negative fees....shorts would need a larger upfront fee to be motivated?

Actually one of the most important issues this is trying to address is the one time-ness of the fee at the moment of the sale.
My thinking is this stepping in the shorters shoes - "OK I got 7% premium for selling my bitUSD, and what difference does it makes when I have to buy the bitUSD, in order to close my position, at about the same 7% premium ?"

83
General Discussion / Re: A case for Demurrage bitUSD (dUSD)
« on: March 21, 2016, 11:29:03 pm »
Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 21, 2016, 11:15:45 pm
So as a BitUSD buyer competing at 1-1, if I offer 2% on 100 BitUSD that means I am willing to pay $102 of BTS for $100 BitUSD. (The extra $2 going specifically to the person who sold/shorted me the 100 BitUSD)

Correct!

Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 21, 2016, 11:15:45 pm
...]&[/u] I'll pay 2% per annum in interest for the duration I hold dUSD, gradually reducing my dUSD, which will be distributed proportionally among all shorts?
Partially correct .This is a bit more complicated.
You will pay the weighted interest determined by all trades.
So for example if:
- there is another trade say at month #6 for another 100 dUSD at 1% you will be paying from that moment on:
1.5% annually  = (100 dUSD @ 2% + 100 dUSD @ 1%)/ 200 dUSD

additionally if 50 dUSD short is closed, we will start removing amounts from the highest interest first going to lower ones (i.e. start with the 2% in this case) and you will pay from then on:
 (50 dUSD @ 2% + 100 dUSD @ 1%) / 150 dUSD


84
General Discussion / Re: Bitshares price discussion
« on: March 21, 2016, 11:04:25 pm »
Quote from: Tuck Fheman on March 21, 2016, 11:03:07 pm
It's time to play, "Who's Dumping First?"!

Will it be ...

A) A Dev
B) JonnyBitShares
C) The Unknown Dumpster
D) All of the above

;)

I will take *angel* account

85
General Discussion / Re: A case for Demurrage bitUSD (dUSD)
« on: March 21, 2016, 10:51:42 pm »
Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 21, 2016, 10:39:53 pm
Quote from: tonyk on March 21, 2016, 09:43:22 pm
Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 21, 2016, 09:32:01 pm

In this system can people short to themselves (Yield Harvest) and earn interest thereby driving the dUSD yield down & make it less effective?


When you short to yourself you neither gain nor lose anything. THe money collected as a negative interest on your dUSD go imidiatly into reducing your short dUSD position.


Thanks for the reply. Next question. Does this favour short term traders?

For example, person A might want 1000 BitUSD intending to hold it for a few months and be willing to pay 5% per annum to shorters.  Person B might want 1000 BitUSD because BTC is crashing but he intends to hold it only for a few hours or a few days so can offer 30% interest per annum but that is effectively only $1 or a 0.1% fee. It seems this would always favour the person intending to hold for the shortest time even though they are less valuable?

Whereas if they competed on negative fees at 1-1, the one who was really willing to pay the most to the short would win?

This is a part that is indeed poorly explained in the OP.

So in a  matched trade 1)the dUSD buyer do pays directly the interest [here as a fee of say 1.5% to this exact dUSD seller] and 2) the 'interest' paid and the amount of the tx is included in the calculation of the actual interest rate for the future.

Example:
There is one and only trade at 2% interest for 1 dUSD
-The dUSD buyer pays 1.02 worth of BTS for 1 dUSD at the time of the transaction
-If the buyer holds this 1 dUSD for one year it will be gradually reduced to 0.98 dUSD [while at the same time all short positions [proportionally] will be reduced by 0.02 dUSD].

86
General Discussion / Re: Bitshares price discussion
« on: March 21, 2016, 10:38:36 pm »
Are we seeing Ander's famous 3rd wave?

"Wave 3: Wave three is usually the largest and most powerful wave in a trend (although some research suggests that in commodity markets, wave five is the largest). The news is now positive and fundamental analysts start to raise earnings estimates. Prices rise quickly, corrections are short-lived and shallow. Anyone looking to "get in on a pullback" will likely miss the boat. As wave three starts, the news is probably still bearish, and most market players remain negative; but by wave three's midpoint, "the crowd" will often join the new bullish trend. Wave three often extends wave one by a ratio of Golden Ratio "

87
General Discussion / Re: A case for Demurrage bitUSD (dUSD)
« on: March 21, 2016, 09:43:22 pm »
Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 21, 2016, 09:32:01 pm

In this system can people short to themselves (Yield Harvest) and earn interest thereby driving the dUSD yield down & make it less effective?


When you short to yourself you neither gain nor lose anything. THe money collected as a negative interest on your dUSD go imidiatly into reducing your short dUSD position.

Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 21, 2016, 09:32:01 pm

BTS has been in a fairly long general downtrend/flat so there is not a lot of shorting demand, dUSD interest paid to shorts would help this, however... When BitUSD started, BTSX enjoyed a good uptrend and the reverse was true. What happens in the scenario when there is excesss demand to short BitAssets, how is BitAsset demand incentivized? 


Glad you asked. The system easily/smoothly goes into paying interest on dUSD when the short demand is less than short supply (more people willing to  short dUSD than people wanting to have dUSD). Effectively paying interest on dUSD.
 :)

88
General Discussion / A case for Demurrage bitUSD (dUSD)
« on: March 21, 2016, 09:12:16 pm »
In the design of the current bitUSD a believe exists that the shorter is the one taking a loan. This is a very arguable hypothesis. He is indeed providing the collateral but he is doing that and also providing the product - a stable coin with a price equal to 1 dollar. Isn't it the  bitUSD user (the bitUSD long) who is actually taking the product with guaranteed stable price for which someone else risks something and provides collateral?

If we accept this to be the case indeed there is a excellent  possibility for a new bitUSD [ dUSD - DemurrageUSD] existing in parallel to the current bitUSD that provides interest to the shorter!


Below is one way this could be done.

-The dUSD : BTS market the sell buys always happen at the peg 1:1. dUSD buyer compete by offering interest rate to the shorter.
-The dUSD seller receives the rate for its individual sell (say 2%)
- This sell is added (volume * percent) to the long term interest rate paid to the dUSD shorts.(1)

-Every maintenance interval the current average rate is taken from the long positions amount and added [given to the shorts by reducing their short position dUSD owned back to the system]
-Every dUSD position closed reduces the interest by removing (volume* highest percent in (1) ) from the global weighted interest percent calculation.
- Forced settlement still exists and is even with very short wait time - 30 min - 1h.
+++++++++++++++

Main benefit - much tighter peg!!!!
Why?
Shorts are highly incentivized to create dUSD and in fact actually get paid for the product they provide.
Shorts will not sell below the peg because the buyer can buy below the peg and immediately settle for a gain.

Note
dUSD will not be used for long term saving but with tighter peg in the majority of cases will be excellent for trading. 5% interest is not a big deal if you need the dUSD for trade happening in from a few minutes upto several months.


?

89
General Discussion / Re: Competiting at 1-1 on negative fees?
« on: March 21, 2016, 08:11:40 pm »
I am trying to formulate the content of my

"A case for Demurrage bitUSD" thread.

It has some common elements (as well as some differences) from what you are thinking about in this OP, so I for one do not find it 'dumb' on the opposite I have extended much further some of the ideas expressed here.

 :)

90
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: March 21, 2016, 07:41:03 pm »
Quote from: roadscape on March 21, 2016, 06:58:00 pm
Thanks guys for summing it up. It looks like @tonyk has the only developed idea, but it might take me longer to fully comprehend it than to offer my own. I'll begin with what I think might be the easiest/most accessible way to score market makers and if it makes sense we can meet in the middle:

For each subsidized marketScore the remaining (i.e. eligible) orders, and sum up *per side/account*, every hour:

 - Let P = "center point" of the market. (Feed price? Center of spread?)
 - Take a snapshot of the order book
 - Ignore all orders (a) more than 5% away from P or (b) less than 60 minutes old



 - score = (order_size / side_total) * (1 + distance_bonus)
   - order_total = size of the sell (ask or bid side).
   - side_total = sum of all eligible orders on the ask or bid side
   - distance_bonus = ((max_distance - distance) / max_distance) (0% off feed = 1 ; 5% off feed = 0)

If we wanted to force balanced market making, then the final score per account is MIN(bid_score, ask_score).

(At this point, we could also discard any scores that are, say, below 25th percentile.)

100% of the reward per hour is split proportionally to the scores in this round. Payouts occur every 7 days.

-------

You get the optimal reward only if your bid/ask is balanced. One side can be smaller and closer to the peg yet still be balanced. Reward is based on your relative ownership of the eligible part of the bid/ask walls. Scalable bonus for how tight your walls are (up to 100% bonus for trading at the center of the market).

This could work, with a few modifications.

*Modified part in italic in the original proposal if not explicitly quoted here
1)
" every hour:

 - Let P = "center point" of the market. (Feed price? Center of spread?)
 - Take a snapshot of the order book
 - Ignore all orders (a) more than 5% away from P or (b) less than 60 minutes old
"

becomes:
Every Time a new order is placed in that market:

 - Let P = "center point" of the market. (Feed price? Center of spread?)
 - Take a snapshot of the order book
 - Ignore all orders (a) more than 5% away from P
 - ignore the newly placed order

T = time since last snapshot

2)
score = (order_size / side_total) * (1 + distance_bonus) * T

3)
order_total = MIN (size of the sell (ask or bid side), maxOrder bitUSD)
maxOrder = the max order that qualifies for a bonus
 *[ we do not want orders for 50, 000 USD  existing for small periods of time to take away all the bonuses]; we can start with something like maxOrder =  500-1000 USD

//EDIT
NB depending how filled orders are handled in bts a solution how exactly to do this must be made BUT:
If any order is filled due to this newly placed order, the filled order(s) should be included in the calculations above for that round of rewards

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