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Messages - CoinHoarder

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61
General Discussion / Re: Bitshares 3.0 - It Is Time
« on: June 27, 2016, 04:40:37 am »
The only major issue with bitshares right now is volume.

As the saying goes... "The first step is admitting you have a problem."

Liquidity is an obvious problem, of which there seems to be consensus amongst shareholders that we need to correct it.

However, you need to also admit that at this time dPoS is holding Bitshares back. You also need to admit that the Larimers/co-conspirators have rubbed the cryptocurrency community the wrong way.

My proposal fixes several problems- not just the liquidity problem.

62
General Discussion / Re: Bitshares 3.0 - It Is Time
« on: June 27, 2016, 01:37:37 am »
OK, I am pretty much done with the OP pending any other thoughts jumping into my head (or feedback from replies).

Coinhoder,

I will give my input.

Bitshares model is pretty stable.......n is innovative by itself......what bitshares have we can call it 3.0, 4.0....whatever......
Too much people looking for problems because a lot ofcoins had huge pumps n Bitshares "only" made 50% in the last few days.....
I follow a lot of data about bitshares n other projects n can safely say bitshares can explode at any time, it will, it has everything needed to make crypto scene shake hard. be patient about ROI.

This reasoning was not developed based on the past 3 days of market indications, but instead from a year and a half of market indications, and two years worth of many discussions/debates with Bitshares' antagonists on Bitcointalk.

No offense, but the lazy mantra of "Bitshares will explode at any time" and "Liquidity will increase with adoption" has been used for two years with no to little effect. It is time to take matters into our own hands, and realize there are issues with Bitshares that we need to fix.

63
General Discussion / Re: Bitshares 3.0 - It Is Time
« on: June 27, 2016, 01:08:50 am »
Who is Bitshares target market?  Investors, businesses, individuals, to use the dex?

Will changing the algorithm bring non crpyto people to actually use the dex?  I'm not sure the average person cares to understand how the back end works.

Sorry, my OP is incomplete. Please wait for me to add all components. That is only 1 piece to the pie, which is intended to help the existing cryptocurrency community get behind Bitshares. That is... the large portion that has written it off simply because of dPoS.

Also, we should just forget about attracting non-crypto folk to  the decentralized crypto currency exchange that is BTD for now. For one, it doesn't make sense to try to attract non-crypto users to a decentralized crypto exchange, and  Ethereum has proven that targeting investors within the cryptocurrency community can result in a billion+ value token.

64
General Discussion / Bitshares 3.0 - It Is Time
« on: June 27, 2016, 12:36:56 am »
Faith in Bitshares is feigning. That is proven by the value of the BTS token, the lessening involvement/enthusiasm of the community on these forums, Bytemaster moving on to other projects, and the overall cryptocurrency community's attitude about Bitshares.

It is time for BTS 3.0 - This is my plan to save Bitshares.

1. One of the biggest gripes about Bitshares is that consensus is obtained through dPoS. I suggest lessening Bitshares' reliance on DPoS. I am not suggesting we abandon dPoS entirely, but instead reduce its power by adding an auxiliary PoW component to the consensus algorithm. In other words, both the delegates and PoW miners will have a chance to find the next block. The PoW miners will have a 60% chance to fine the next block, and the delegates will have a 40% chance to find the next block. The percentages are arbitrary, as long as PoW is valued above the chances of the delegates to find the next block. This way, even if someone were able to commit a 51% attack on the dPoS chain, then Bitshares chain would still be secured via PoW.
1a. The logic behind the overall cryptocurrency community's dislike of dPoS is that a 51% attack can be prolonged indefinitely for very cheap once the attacker obtains 51% of the network. However, a 51% on a PoW chain requires a lot of money (electricity) to sustain an attack indefinitely. By implementing #1, IMO, a lot of people in the cryptocurrency community would reconsider Bitshares, because a lot of them immediately write it off simply because it is dPoS/PoS-based.

2. Liquidity needs to be bolstered on the DEX. There are three proposals, of which the community has to choose from. If the liquidity problem is not solved, then I posit Bitshares will never succeed. It is considered in this community as a "chicken and egg" problem, but it is not, and there are things we can do about it! After a lot of thought, I have reversed course over my opinion about TonyK's proposal, so I suggest that we adopt a combination of TonyK's proposal, a variation of Bytemaster's proposal (but more along the way it was tweaked towards the end of the thread), and ZERO trading fees for an indefinite amount of time.. Their proposals are less economically risky, and more straightforward than mine is. Before another cryptocurrency comes along and eats our lunch, we need to get serious about bolstering liquidity.
2a. TonyK's Proposal - https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,21409.0.html
2b. Bytemaster's Proposal - https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,21544.0.html
2c. My Proposal - https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?action=post;quote=276084;topic=21197.45
2d. No trading fees for an indefinite amount of time. Once a sufficient amount of volume on the DEX is obtained, then the shareholders can revisit trading fees via voting.

3. The Bitshares' community's enthusiasm needs to be bolstered, and money needs to be raised for development. I suggest doing this in two ways:
3a. Creating a road map for future development (IE, We will implement parts 1, 2a, 2b, and 2d of this proposal). This will give them a renewed enthusiasm for the project.
3b. Increasing the value of the BTS token.
3c. Bitshares 3.0 will be a fork of Bitshares Graphene, and it will be distributed evenly:
3c1. 40% By taking a snapshot of BTS chain. Reasoning: snapshots increase the value of the BTS token.
3c2. 60% By doing an IPO. Reasoning: This is the time of the IPOs... projects are raising millions of dollars (DAO, etc). We can raise a lot of money for development, and bring in new skin/investors to the game that will be vested in Bitshares' success.
3c3. The reasoning for weighting the IPO more than the snapshot: At the same time as accomplishing the main goals (raising money for development, and restoring the Bitshares community's enthusiasm via a higher price per share), we can reduce one of the other biggest gripes about Bitshares by reducing the Larimer's/insiders stake in Bitshares. Let's stop beating around the bush. The Larimer's have done a great service to the community for their participation, hard work, and ideas, but at some point we need to come to the realization that a lot of people don't like how they have handled a lot of issues throughout Bitshares' history, and their large voting power influence. Since only 40% of Bitshares 3.0 will be created by BTS snap shot, then they would need to pay money to sustain their voting power (which in turn goes directly towards development of BTS 3.0, so shareholders win either way.) This will bolster enthusiasm/acceptance both inside our community and outside our community, as there those that feel this way in both.
3c4. Alternatively, we could 100% snapshot BTS, but then we would need to figure out a way to pay for development. For example, the NXT 2.0 (Ardor) idea has really increased Nxt value:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1518497.0
http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/nxt/

4. Some are not be able to get past Smartcoins. They will not trust them, think they will fail, and fail to see the benefits compared to holding the real assets themselves (not bitBTC, or open.BTC, but actual BTC). We should cater to these individuals. If SuperNext and B&C Exchange can solve this problem, and incorporate real assets into a DEX, then so can Bitshares. Actual token trading should be incorporated into Bitshares 3.0, and we should let the market decide which is more important- actual token trading or smartcoins.
4a. Implementing this feature protects Bitshares against possible competitors by implementing Bitshares' competitor's main features, while maintaining Bitshare's original features (leveraged trading). There is literally nothing to lose.

65
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: June 21, 2016, 04:56:56 pm »
 +5% +5%

What is happening with this? Bitshares really needs this or something like it.

I still think my idea is better, but something is better than nothing. Last time I discussed my idea with forum members, I was never convinced that it wouldn't work. The main antagonists mainly slapped their knees and said "Nubits = bad". However, they wrongly deduced that my idea is anything like Nubits... because it isn't. It is quite different from Nubits in numerous ways. For instance, Nubits' recent derailing of their peg would not of happened with my proposal.

1.   Bitshares autonomously issues new BTS tokens, specifically for the purpose of funding liquidity operations.
2.   Bitshares shorts every committee-issued SmartCoin, and puts them up for sale at an arbitrary percentage over the price feed, while at the same time putting up buy orders at the same arbitrary percentage below the peg. Autonomous liquidity is provided for both sides of the markets.
3.   The percentage the SmartCoins are sold over (and under) the price feed, the amount of liquidity provided for each SmartCoin market and the amount of collateral is determined by the committee. Thus, it can be adjusted whenever the community deems it is necessary.
4.   Considering that the autonomous liquidity is provided at an arbitrary amount above (and below) the peg, Bitshares will make a profit each time these autonomous liquidity operations are utilized. Thus, the amount of funds available for these liquidity operations will grow in time without the need for any more dilution. This profit can be used to provide more liquidity, or it can be burned as the community sees fit.
5.   If the liquidity pool for any certain SmartCoin is running low, Bitshares can autonomously issue more BTS tokens so that the amount of liquidity provided (which is again set by the committee) is maintained.
     a.   This step would only be necessary if:
              i.   The committee adds more SmartCoins (such as bitAPPLE, bitGOOGLE, etc.) to the DEX.
             ii.   On the off chance that the market making operations are unprofitable due to market trends. Market making operations cannot be guaranteed to be profitable.
6.   Instant liquidity is observed across all SmartCoin markets, effectively bootstrapping DEX liquidity and fixing one of Bitshares’ most glaring problems.
7.   As “natural liquidity” (liquidity provided by actual users) grows, the committee can lower the amount of liquidity provided autonomously. Effectively, this proposal works as training wheels on a bicycle. As soon as the DEX has sufficient “natural liquidity”, all autonomous liquidity operations can cease and the BTS/SmartCoins that were printed can be burned.
     a.   Autonomous liquidity operations can be ceased on a market-by-market basis, as inherently some markets will be dynamically more liquid than others.

66
The block time is not an issue, as mostly real-time game play can take place off-chain. The blockchain only needs to be used to permanently record the hand histories and cryptographic proofs that the game was fair.

However, there are other major complications with decentralized poker, such as the efficiency of mental poker algorithms, and how to deal with collusion, bots and multi-accounting. After much research, I came up with one of the few solutions (in my opinion the most ideal solution) to the latter, but no one was enthused as it is quite different to the current norms when it comes to poker and cryptocurrency. https://www.docdroid.net/dmo52Ag/bitshares-poker-brainstorm-v02.pdf.html

67
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: March 18, 2016, 12:48:07 am »
My response to earlier xeroc's post is pretty close to a pseudo code... reposting will not help reducing the pages from 12...quite the opposite.

I think your psuedo code is a good starting point.

All numbers/percent are parameters adjustable by the committee (for the bitAssets).

To qualify for the reward (calculated and paid  every 7 days).
1.An account must have the best bid (or ask) for min 5% of the time.[combined for all qualified orders of his during those 7 days]
To qualify:
2.A sell order should be no more than 6% above the peg; a buy order should be no more than 1% from the peg price.
3. The order should be the best bid or ask. (1)
4.The order should be for min of 150 bitUSD [it can be bigger but if the order is  for bigger amount, credit is given for max of 150 biUSD] (2)

Every 7 day the script is run and the funds are divided between accounts having placed qualified MM orders:
- proportional to the time the orders were on the order book and met all other criteria above.
- for the full 150 bitUSD and/or following rule (2)

(1)Orders (say N=10 times) N times smaller than the market maker's order at better prices do not violate the best bid/ask condition.
(2.)The MM in regular stock market place both bid and ask orders to qualify; if we want to give the reward for just a single side we have to weight the order toward the other side of the order book, or some other way. Say MM1 places just a buy order - it is given credit only for the sum of sell orders falling within the max spread (5% spread max in the example above)


Quote
Nasdaq is incentivizing the display of orders for (a) 500 shares at the best bid and 500 shares at the best offer, 30% of the time, and (b) 2500 shares at no wider than 2% of the best bid and 2500 shares at no wider than 2% of the best offer, 90% of the time.  I don't think we need to specify a minimum number of shares or what % of the time they need to satisfy the above conditions, but perhaps we could simply make the reward proportional to the length of time MMs have orders on the books, the size of the orders, and the distance from the price feed.  And maybe we should require that orders be on the book for a minimum period of time, as some have already suggested. 


I don't however agree that there should be a 150 bitUSD limit for an order to gain points for the reward. Isn't a 1000 bitUSD order more valuable to BTS shareholders (and users) than a 150 bitUSD order? It seems wrong.. the person providing more liquidity should earn a bigger portion of the rewards.

68
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: March 11, 2016, 04:38:22 am »
I assume the algorithm can take into account a 4th factor - buy/sell order imbalances - to reward market makers more for placing orders on the weak side of the book.  So 4 factors now include:

1. order size
2. time on book
3. proximity to best bid/ask
4. strong/weak side of book

Thoughts about coding this @abit, @xeroc?

The fourth factor seems "gameable". Someone could place a large amount on the opposite position that their order is on, for a small cost (just a cancel order fee,) effectively boosting their portion of the liquidity pool for fairly cheap. To combat this and other issues consider adding the following restrictions:

A. There should be a maximum percentage away from the price feed that someone can qualify for these awards. This ensures that the funds they put on the books will be at risk of market making (which can be profitable and unprofitable). This makes sure they are providing useful liquidity to shareholders. After all, shareholders are paying for the liquidity fund.
B. A minimum amount of time for each user to have orders on the books in each trading pair separately is also necessary to combat this. Requirement A makes sure they are providing useful liquidity, and subject to market making risks.  Requirement B makes sure that they are providing that useful liquidity and subject to market making risks for a reasonable amount of time. It makes sure they are not "farming" the liquidity fund using the method I described above right before the "snapshots" for rewards are taken.

This would need to start with strict restrictions, which shareholders loosen up until a good compromise as to liquidity, spread, and costs is found. All parameters should be able to be easily tweaked.

@CoinHoarder, with #1-3, there is already incentive to place orders on either side of the book.  Nasdaq's incentives require placing orders on both the bid and the ask, presumably to promote balance.  Which kind of makes sense, although the point of #4 above is to further recognize that in some market conditions it is more risky to be on one side of the book than the other.  So the point is to provide more incentive to be on the riskier i.e. weak side in order to avoid a situation where market makers pull their orders in fear of getting steamrolled.  At the end of the day, if a market maker wants to put larger orders on the weak side of the book, then that is a good thing and they should earn more.  If they choose not to, then they will earn less and that is up to them.  I don't see what is gameable about this in particular.  If you still disagree with that, can you explain further?

I agree that #4 is useful and should be a part of the equation. I think restrictions should still be implemented in the "liquidity reward system" to increase shareholder's acceptance of the proposal, increase its usefulness to non-participating users (not participating in the "reward system",) and decrease the chances it can be gamed. I feel like implementing restrictions would help in all of those areas.

Let me ask you this. Why should someone be allowed to place an order 50% away from the peg and earn any points towards the "reward system"? or 40%? or 30%? How useful are orders that far away from the peg, really? And why would shareholders want some of the funds going to those who place such useless orders? Obviously, some restrictions need to be in place.

Furthermore, it can't simply be a 25%/25%/25%/25% split for each of the criterion. We need to analyze each criteria separately, and deem which should count for more or less weight. Personally, without thinking about it too deeply,  I feel like #3 is more important than #1 is more important than #2 is more important than #4, but this would need a lot of debate to land on something most can agree on.

By the way, I would imagine that determining which side of the book, if any, is weak at any given time is not a trivial matter.  Although it really shouldn't be too difficult to take into account a short time-frame running average of cumulative trades at the ask vs. trades at the bid, and perhaps also comparing short-term price delta to medium-term price delta.  I would imagine that ultimately people will create bots to most effectively take advantage of these reward factors, which is fine because that means they are putting liquidity where we need it most.  Thoughts?
It should not be a problem determining what side of the book is weak. There is a graph of the market depth in the client, so the data points seem to be there and retrievable, but I am not a BTS API expert. @xeroc probably knows?

69
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: March 09, 2016, 04:26:49 am »
I assume the algorithm can take into account a 4th factor - buy/sell order imbalances - to reward market makers more for placing orders on the weak side of the book.  So 4 factors now include:

1. order size
2. time on book
3. proximity to best bid/ask
4. strong/weak side of book

Thoughts about coding this @abit, @xeroc?

The fourth factor seems "gameable". Someone could place a large amount on the opposite position that their order is on, for a small cost (just a cancel order fee,) effectively boosting their portion of the liquidity pool for fairly cheap. To combat this and other issues consider adding the following restrictions:

A. There should be a maximum percentage away from the price feed that someone can qualify for these awards. This ensures that the funds they put on the books will be at risk of market making (which can be profitable and unprofitable). This makes sure they are providing useful liquidity to shareholders. After all, shareholders are paying for the liquidity fund.
B. A minimum amount of time for each user to have orders on the books in each trading pair separately is also necessary to combat this. Requirement A makes sure they are providing useful liquidity, and subject to market making risks.  Requirement B makes sure that they are providing that useful liquidity and subject to market making risks for a reasonable amount of time. It makes sure they are not "farming" the liquidity fund using the method I described above right before the "snapshots" for rewards are taken.

This would need to start with strict restrictions, which shareholders loosen up until a good compromise as to liquidity, spread, and costs is found. All parameters should be able to be easily tweaked.

70
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: March 04, 2016, 04:46:15 am »
We just need to boost bitUSD first, THEN boost OTHER_ASSET:bitUSD pairs, but not make all kinds of xyz:bts pairs as these are much less attractive for non-crypto users. Just like what tonyk has proposed. If we don't already have a stable currency, trading on other commodities is nightmare.
I still disagree that bitUSD is Bitshare's savior. Bitshares could easily go after currently untapped markets of an unlimited amount of derivatives. Whether it be gold, silver, oil, GOOG, AAPL, NASDAQ, etc... That market is untapped in the cryptosphere right now. A year from now this market will be competitive due to all of the blockchain's with scripting capabilities. This market is Bitshares' for the taking right now, but a year or so from now who knows. Bitshares needs to be known by its primary original innovation... Bitassets.

bitUSD is important, but the actual innovation is BitAssets as a whole. I understand that by subsidizing liquidity on bitUSD, the liquidity somewhat trickles down to other bitAssets. However, I think you overestimate just how much it will effect those markets. Bitshares should be securing markets that are easily secured, and the bitUSD market already has several competitors.

If dilution was ever necessary, it is for a proposal such as this. It greatly improves already existing features... one of Bitshare's core features. Adding hundreds of features will not make Bitshares automatically succeed. Look at NXT and Bitshares as-is for this proof. The features need to be implemented sufficiently. Smartcoins are not sufficient as they currently exist. The market has been telling Bitshares that for two years now.

This proposal is perfect in that worker proposals need to keep being approved to continue liquidity efforts. The dilution to fund this feature is not forced on shareholders for the rest of eternity. Try it out- shareholders have little to lose as a whole, but so much more to gain. If it doesn't work then shareholders can stop approving workers for these purposes. Alternatively, if it does work, as markets gain a sufficient amount of liquidity we can cut back on the liquidity incentives market-by-market.

Either way, the dilution for trying this proposal is not permanent... whether shareholder decide to stop dilution for incentive to those who provide liquidity or the proposal is successful and dilution is stopped anyways. It is truly a win-win for a small price to pay for 1 worker. If it doesn't work then we never have to try it again and a lesson would have been learned.

Sidechains are not the answer. Prediction Markets are not the answer. A Bond Market is not the answer. Liquidity on our already existing DEX is the answer. Bitshares' original killer app Bitassets finally approaching the countdown to blast off is the answer.

71
General Discussion / Re: Trustless, Decentralized Bond Market Draft
« on: March 01, 2016, 04:46:55 am »
[    ] killer app
[ x ] nice feature
[    ] should be high up on the priority list

72
General Discussion / Re: bitSHARES - As True Shares and Not a Currency!
« on: February 26, 2016, 06:46:00 pm »
@abit Thank you for fully explaining one of the arguments I was trying to make upthread... I was too lazy to do so. :)

Yes, this works - good job with the reasoning, I thought it was impossible outright... What a lot of effort for the exchange to go to, though? And imagine trying to telegraph that to users!
You are right, it does take some work to set this up. This was why I thought someone could monopolize the market by being the first mover in developing something such as this. Considering market activity centralized around the most liquid exchange, it would likely not be worth it for someone to design and develop a competing system.

Regarding conceptualizing it to the users... I don't think they need to. It is really not much different from poloBTS as it exists now. Either way you are subject to inherent risks of a centralized exchange.

73
General Discussion / Re: NXT forks BitShares 2.O mojo! goes for scalability
« on: February 25, 2016, 07:20:12 am »
Meh, I'm not done here.

The funny thing is.... you guys are "smart enough to know Litecoin was dying wayyyyy before I did," but you're not smart enough to see that Bitshares is dying. Now, THAT is funny.

BTW, I never said you were new to crypto.  I said your account was "relatively new" (IIRC) but did not check my memory was shown to be wrong. I made a correction in that post.

Who is deluded here?  Really?  ...  No one here said they knew LTC was dying before you, just that it isn't some brilliant insight into CCs.  Why do you think people want to fork and try TonyK's idea?  It isn't because they think BitShares is going to the moon.  Again... your thoughts are so inconsistent.  It makes it hard to listen to you, because you never put forth ideas..  just ALL over the map. It is always nonsense like the above.

lol... I have posted a ton of ideas over the years. You clowns disregard them. That is not my fault.

Forking Bitshares is not a solution to the problem. It is another step towards death.

74
General Discussion / Re: NXT forks BitShares 2.O mojo! goes for scalability
« on: February 25, 2016, 07:11:57 am »
Meh, I'm not done here.

The funny thing is.... you guys are "smart enough to know Litecoin was dying wayyyyy before I did," but you're not smart enough to see that Bitshares is dying. Now, THAT is funny.

@gamey Looking through your post count, you have not posted anything of substance for quite a while. Sorry that I try to critique and analyze things rather than cheerlead and groupthink with every post.

I am the one doing the groupthinking? Siding with BM nowadays is an unpopular opinion. Yet, I am the delusional one... It is cool nowadays to attack anything he proposes and says.

75
General Discussion / Re: NXT forks BitShares 2.O mojo! goes for scalability
« on: February 25, 2016, 07:05:51 am »
.....

Except I said it back when it was controversial... https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=662058.400

2014. Such controversy.  ::)

I was after Charlie in early 2013 ... and that was too late.

I can has autograph?

I am just pointing out I am not new around the crypto scene as Gamey had declared up-thread...

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