I purchased 100 bitEUR at 2021-08-26 06:04:06. The activity ID is 1.11.1166201642. However, the balance is gone at the moment so I cannot sell it. What is going on?

https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/block/61427928/7

#8: UPDATE MARGIN   Show raw json
Funding account   yoshimizu-sano
Collateral change   -16,540.23515 BTS
Debt change   -101.7482 bitEUR
Fee   0.48260 BTS 

The question is who gets to decide who are good and who are bad, if it's code to decide, how to define the rules so that good behaviors and bad behaviors can be identified, and bugs are avoided. It's not only what to do, but how to do.

I put forward the following thesis:
let's measure the engagement based on the expenses incurred on the selected list of fees.

I proposed to reward:
* trading on strictly defined tokens (decided by the committee) - here is voting power for everyone
* some of the above-mentioned fees specify specific gateways and reward them for running a business based on BitShares
* the third point concerns remuneration of the dev-team (core & ui) on the basis of the WP community accepted
This is how I see the starting point for further considerations.

Of course, there is a technical question of how to approach it, but at this stage I am interested in the opinion on this approach to Vote Power and nothing else.
What are loopholes?
What could you add to make it even better to measure?

BitShares distinguishes 68 different types of fees, there is a lot to choose from.

In this approach, Voting Power comes directly from building BitShares and its active use. I can't imagine anything more pure.


//
~ maybe Vote Power could be some sort of Vesting balance, but without claim option and with Vote Power decay

Thank you for your answer.
I am primarily interested in your opinion about gamification, I proposed as resistance to threats and a natural selection of people with greater voting power.
I am not sure if the proposed method of measuring engagement is good enough.
I would love to know your proposal of such a measurement and the loopholes you see in it.

"Governance powered by engagement"

A.) Vision

I believe the best intentions and the best vision have people who actively build BitShares and people who actively use it. These people should have the greatest influence on how BitShares develops in the future. In other words, you must have "skin in the game" or "dirty hands". Outsiders won't have any influence on our platform until they naturally deserve it. Too often I have heard criticism and advice from people who don't even know how it works, or hardly ever use it.
Traders are basically customers, each company must listen to its customers and in order to grow.
Another group are those who build this "framework", that is programmers and gateways. We can measure the effectiveness of programmers by accepting their projects (i.e. accepting a vision for further development)
We can also measure the effectiveness of the gates by the number of customers they have (turnover on their tokens). I would exclude all the rest as an uninvolved or even dangerous group → CEX, ~ Justin Sun, Custodial Wallets



B.) We have the following problems to solve and we all know examples of where they occur:

1) Preventing CEX exchanges from voting, as well as other wallets holding other people's tokens
2) Hostile takeover by purchasing large amounts of tokens and attempting to forcefully change the existing community
3) buying votes
4) manipulating other people's opinions by providing incomplete information

C.) Proposal to solve the problem.

1) The right to vote gives a separate token, eg VOTE
2) The VOTE token's voice strength decreases over time. Parameters for discussion.
3) The VOTE token cannot be exchanged for other tokens or transferred to another account.
4.) 1 token = 1 vote
for all categories separately
- Witnesses
- Committee
- WP
- BSIP

D) The VOTE token is airdroped on the accounts in proportion to the costs incurred for only selected transaction fees.

a.) *trading fees
b.) fees incurred on WP if accepted by the community
c.) *issue asset (I mean the issue of eg GATEWAY.BTC in exchange for a deposit, to further strengthen the business, on tokens also approved by Committee)
d.) *feed price fee
e.) and maybe some other fee ....

*applies only to a specific list of tokens accepted by the committee

Notes on point "D"

Certainly, some fees, such as those incurred for a transfer, should be excluded because of the fact that CEX exchanges pay the most.
In addition, the remuneration received by people during the work on WP should be taken into account. It will certainly be difficult to calculate the appropriate factor, it should be high enough to appreciate this work, but also not to create hegemony. Some statistical analysis should be performed before such a conversion is applied.

E.) In fact, we do not want a lot of people to vote, we want people who have an opinion on a given topic or want to speak on a given matter to vote. Therefore, it could be done quite classically.

1.) New projects under WP are visible in the chain from the first day of the month and their maturity date is at the end of that month. There is a month for everyone to get to know the project and discuss it. There is no room for unexpected votes that no one knows about, as new WPs are always 1 day of the month.
2.) We always vote for or against.
3.) WP pass by most votes 50% (or 2/3 for discussion)
4.) only LTM account can become proxy, as long as we want the proxy to still exist?

Notes on point "E"
I am not really sure if the proxy is a good idea. It kindles emotions of a political nature, and I don't know if it serves us well. We certainly want whoever is involved to vote, but not everyone has to. I guess this approach filters out a lot of random and manipulated votes and leaves only the ones that are really involved. Moreover, it does not exclude the impact on other people via social media who may want to imitate our votes and opinions, but it excludes the votes of people not involved in social media, or those with whom we do not have direct contact.

In this way, the number of voters will certainly be smaller, but for the same reason the discussion between them will certainly be of better quality.

Many thanks to the k-witness Witness for restoring this market!

Voted!
GoBitShres!

#BitShares2020
#DeFi

At the same time, I propose to increase Force Settlement Delay to 48 hours. The risk of changing prices during this period may somewhat stop the tendency to use this feature frequently and get people to buy straight from the market.

Quote from: fractalnode on April 17, 2020, 10:00:44 am

BAIP2 can be helpful during short price drops.
But to fight the abuse of Force Settlement, a good tool is to Delay its execution.
That's why I am asking you to start this tool and increase Settlement Delay from 24h to 42h

delay won't work because there are no bts on the market.Noone willing to sell BTS against biteur.
So the only possibility to accuire more BTS via debt is force settlement.
Delay won't change anything on a non liquid market


Short price drops are also not a problem in biteur.
CR's there are over 4.5

I'm not saying that this is the only possible way.
I claim that this is an important ingredient in the fight against abuse of this functionality. We still have settlement offset available, but this should be as small as possible.
That is why I think that if we increase the Delay to 42h and additionally raise the Settlement Offset, e.g. to 2% 3% (max), it can bring favorable results.

Delay introduces an additional risk element to consider if you want to use this feature. Within 2 days a lot can happen with the price, which is why more people may want to buy BTS from the market at the current market price or slightly higher → and here arbirage occurs, which is why the price increases on CEX


in less than a month we have halving, and with the increasing price of BTC
BAIP2 is irrelevant for situations where Force Settlement is abused

besides, we have 4 popular MPA tokens
let the different settings show us what works best