Simply adding a smartcoin isn't that impressive a feat for a centralized exchange, I'd fully support these bounties for CEX which allow borrowing bitCNY using BTS from the CEX interface resulting in BTS returning from CEX to the BTS DEX whilst providing BTS buy pressure and bitCNY liquidity within the CEX. Alternatively, if these large exchanges are convinced to create a BTS DEX gateway or bridge, that'd be far more valuable than a single token being added to a CEX.

https://www.bitshares.foundation/workers/2017-10-compliance Already covers this topic, no? "$50,000 worth of BTS in each case we convince an exchange (i.e. Kraken, bitstamp, coinbase, bitcoin.de) to list any asset (pair) that is primarily hosted on BitShares."

I don't think 'Bitfinex' should count, aren't they behind Tether & thus a direct competitor? If Tether collapses then won't Bitfinex too?

Binance doesn't charge for addition anymore, couldn't a community based application suffice?

Excuse the noob question but can ppl in China still buy bitCNY with CNY?

If not wouldn't it be better if ppl in CHina could swap their CNY cash by giving it to merchants using PalmPay? Like paying extra with their groceries and the merchants would top their balance so to speak? That would be really decentralized...

Quote from: pc on October 17, 2018, 06:33:07 pm

BSIP-18 doesn't guarantee recovery either. If BTS continues to go down, neither solution will help.

@abit 's suggestion is better than BSIP-18 because it limits the damage to only the undercollateralized positions, while leaving the rest of the market intact.

Exactly, that's why I like it.

Quote from: abit

IMHO, in % sense, collateral requirements should be increased while market is bullish; then when market turns to bearish, there will be more spaces to release risks.

Interesting, I understand that logic, but am surprised to see you say it, since doing so would dis-incentivize trading and shorting in particular. Wasn't it you that said 175% collateral was too much in bullish conditions?

I know I've seen bitcrab and others talk favorably about allowing CR to go < 100% and "not to penalize debt holders", but I believe we should use the carrot and the stick to keep them trading by the rules, which help to keep the ecosystem safe and fair for all.

Quote from: bitcrab on October 11, 2018, 11:05:43 am

大跌行情，外盘领跌，外盘价低于内盘价。

因为bitUSD溢价基本是靠比较内外盘价格来计算，所以这种情况下，算法认为bitUSD有折价，开始向下调喂价。

于是，要么引起不断爆仓，要么内盘把价格砸下去让算法觉得bitUSD有溢价，保持喂价。

不是说不能接受爆仓或者内盘价格下跌，但问题是，这种情况下通过简单比较内外盘价格来判断溢价是有问题的。

需要发展更好的算法来判断溢价/折价。

没感觉有问题呀。
当出现差价，如果搬砖不能搬平，那么就是存在折价了。

So, let me summarize my understanding. We basically have three parameters available that we can use
towards fulfilling our optimization criteria:

* settlement price (price feed) - This is the price that is used for margin calls as well as force settlements.
* MSSR - the max premium a shorter needs to pay (from market) in case of margin call
* MCR - The minimum collateral necessary for call positions, if lower -> margin call

Essentially, we can apply a "feedback loop" on all of them, either by "derailing the price feed", tuning MSSR or MCR.
The main motivation for "detailing the price feed" is because the MSSR as well as the MCR are lower bounded by 100.1%
and thus cannot go lower. A "tuning" of the price feed could lead to reduction of the premium beyond what could be
possible by tuning MSSR or MCR.

Now, the question (at least to me) is, where is the "premium" and how can we lower it, best?

I would like to see how well this approach would work:

* Feed: price feed with a fixed 1% offset from the "fair price" (fixed tuning) - this way, we allow bitasset buyers to outcompete margin calls and have margin calls provide liquidity at 1% 'discount'
* MSSR: at 100% if premium >=0%, else (100-premium*penalty)% if premium <0 (feedback) - this way, we cause margin calls to raise the price in case there is a discount - "penalty" would cause the margin call to pay a premium
* MCR: dynamic MCR at     max(130, 170 - 40 * (premium/5%))% (feedback) - this way, we have a MCR of 170% in case of 0% premium which groes if the premium is <0% and shrinks towards 130% (linearily) in case of premium >0%

The only thing that I am not sure about is if this approach may not lead to more and more margin calls piling up at the settlement
price with not incentive provided to sell into them - unless the external "premium" is negative ...

Thoughts?

Define "hurt"? Debt positions are attached with responsibilities, we can't deny it.

When smartcoin is oversupplied (which is reflected as trading below par value), actually borrowing more will hurt the peg thus we can say it hurts the ecosystem. In this case, in order to encourage people to borrower less, there need to be methods to reduce debt or keep debt at a certain level.
* the original approach is to encourage people to force-settle, in this case, a positive offset does the opposite;
* the BSIP42 approach (as well as a MCR adjustment approach) is to force the least collateralized positions to be margin called

Either way the cost is paid by the debt position owners.

When smartcoin is under-supplied, to maintain the peg, we encourage people to borrow more. In this case, force-settlement doesn't help and thus should be discouraged. People are still possible to buy from market at fair price even if force-settlement is disabled. The offset doesn't really matter here.

Peter's idea is actually manually setting a MSSR, then dynamically adjusting price feed, so there is a feedback.
Xeroc's MCR-based idea is also dynamically adjusting MCR, so it's also based on feedback.