赞成降低MSSR以及把强清补偿和抵押率挂钩。

打个比方，BTS好比一架飞机，多方总是想让它飞起来，空方总是想把它拉下来。

如果真的飞起来了，多方获利，如果飞了一半被拉下来了，空方获利。

作为一个自带杠杆的系统，BTS有一系列的规则来保证风险及时得到释放。同时这套规则也决定了多方和空方的获利路径。

现在总体看，规则过于保守，对空方过分有利，需要不断修改，当然是在保证“风险及时得到释放”的前提下。

不然，BTS就是一架永远也飞不起来的飞机。

飞起来需要引入更多资金和用户，同意，但这跟修改规则不矛盾。

I agree 2&3

FFS bitcrab, I thought BitShares was supposed to be decentralised.

You adjust all the parameters to suit your whale positions.

you run the open market operations (a major conflict of interest.)

you got the committee to change force settlement on BitCNY to 5%(supposedly temporarily) when all other bitassets are 1%

now you want to change MSSR for your own ends.

lets just rename it Crabshares

you can also suggest.

decentralized does not mean no one can try to push some change. and now I am just collecting opinion on this topic.

recently in China community someone suggest to lower MSSR of bitCNY, I'd like to have a public discuss and opinion survey on this topic.

thanks to the new feature target CR and the good market depth, recently most of the time the bitCNY margin called orders are eaten instantly at the price close to market price, when the price fall down to very low point, some margin called order are stay there for long time without being completely, and normally at this time the bitCNY premium is more than 10%.

when margin called orders stay there, then the sell order price will keep falling down when the feed price come down, shorters always can sell to make the feed price even lower and the buy back from DEX, this process make the price even lower.

so is it possible to lesson the positive feedback by lower the MSSR?

I think it's possible, as lower MSSR can reduce the profit expectation of shorting.

more ideas and opinions are welcome to clarify this.

proxy bitcrab unvote witness roelandp as the feed price keeps 2% more lower than the BTS price in DEX.

we need to pay more attention on DEX, DEX is decentralized and more transparent than CEX, and BTS/bitCNY pair in DEX has the biggest BTS volume on the earth, it's easy to do bitCNY/fiat CNY conversion, DEX price should be the base reference for CNY price feeding.

the margin call rule is designed to release risk in time, not to provide chance for shorters to make profit, if there are too much chances for shorters, shorters will take the money from longers and keep on shorting, this will hurt the whole ecosystem, the suggestion is not to change the basic logic of a financial system with leverage, but to provide more convenience to longers, and then give more power for the ecosystem to grow.

within "the highest price" model, shorters can also short, but need to pull down the prices in all the involved exchanges and then can make the feed price down, and debt positions are protected from targeting activities or unusual events, all this encourages longers.

and this will help to make DEX the main long-short the war field, this also benefit the field.

recently CNY are in high devaluation expectation, in DEX the bitUSD/bitCNY ratio are alway higher than 7, but the bitUSD/bitCNY fee price ratio are still always lower than 6.88, clearly many witness still use the officially published USD/CNY ratio to do price conversion, but this is far from market reality and the algorithm need to be upgraded.

to speed up the upgrade of price feeding, proxy bitcrab begin to unvote the witness that behave unsatisfactory in price feeding.

in current check point, DEX latest BTS price:0.766bitCNY, bitCNY premium 7.3%, reference price:0.822 CNY.
the median feed price is 0.8087 at the point, please don't say "my price is close to the median so works well" , the median price is not good now and what we try to do is to change this.

delegate-1.lafona always feed too low price in the recent several check, so now proxy bitcrab unvote the witness temporarily.



magicwallet is planning to provide a feed price monitor page, to show data from each witness in a candle chart, then it will be easy to see which witness provide good price feeding and which does not.

Quote from: bitcrab on August 12, 2018, 04:35:25 am

Quote from: binggo on August 12, 2018, 04:19:19 am

是否在喂价脚本算法中对“最高价”与“中值价”进行对比，防止偏离实际或者过于离谱的“最高价"出现？

比如：某个交易所禁止了充提，把价格刷高了。

不认为很有必要，禁止冲提价格只会偏低，而且过于离谱的“最高价”通常只能维持很短时间，也不会伤害谁。

我知道巨蟹希望BTS变成高价币，但是您能提出来采用最高喂价这种方案，我真的觉得您是疯了！甚至觉得只考虑一时的高价，而忽视了BTS长远的发展。
7月31日，xn-delegate发出来的喂价是1.6元，而其他人发布的大概都是1.1元左右。如果采用1.6元，则有些人可以马上抵押出大量的bitcny从而提现走人，回头任由剩下的BTS爆掉。而如果当时的喂价有人刷出来是2.6元甚至260元呢？甚至有人不想干了，直接刷出来几亿元的喂价呢？马上抵押出天量的cny，从此管你BTS是死是活。
而除了有人刻意喂高价之外，还有可能遭遇黑客攻击等等可能。而采用喂价中间价格，则除非有超过14个喂价同时不正常才行，大大提高了系统的稳健性。

我建议的“最高价”方案，是建议每个见证人喂交易所里的最高价格，不是说取见证人里喂价最高的那个。
当然，价格防火墙也是需要的。

是否在喂价脚本算法中对“最高价”与“中值价”进行对比，防止偏离实际或者过于离谱的“最高价"出现？

比如：某个交易所禁止了充提，把价格刷高了。

不认为很有必要，禁止冲提价格只会偏低，而且过于离谱的“最高价”通常只能维持很短时间，也不会伤害谁。