It seems like every time the proxies want witnesses to make a change, they write a BSIP for the witnesses to make the change.

The witnesses are already voted in and have the ability to change the feed/mssr however they like, if proxies do not like what a witness is doing, they can just vote him out.

BSIP stands for BitShares Improvement Proposal and changing parameters is not an improvement/feature, it is simply a tuning of numbers.

In fact, it is much better if witnesses decide parameters on their own (AND on their own opinion), this way we are more robust to decisions that could be destructive to Bitshares because some witnesses will disagree and tune their parameters accordingly


Please share your thoughts.

No, witnesses are the employees of the system, they're supposed to do things based on the consensus of the community, not based on their own decision.

BSIP and the voting is the way for the community to reach consensus.

I don't think "whether you want margin call orders be eaten" is a senseful question.

I'd like to answer some senseful questions:

1.what do you think is a good way for the system to handle black swan?
2.do you want bitCNY peg more exactly? and how?

my answer:
1. as has been discussed a lot, the current global setting operation is not satisfactory, it is like system suicide, we need better way to handle black swan, one key point is not to stop smartcoin borrowing operation.

I am considering to draft a BSIP to request witnesses to ensure the feed price be higher than the global settlement price, to avoid the global settlement to happen.

2. YES
one way is dynamic MCR with the negative feedback mechanism, but as shown in https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/pull/1324, this need a bugfix and hard fork that will happen in June, 2019.

in short term, what we can do is continue to reduce MSSR, from 1.1 to 1.05, to 1.02 or even to 1.

if the feed price is the market price and black swan is surely avoided, I don't care whether the margin call orders be earten or not.

短期内可用的手段似乎唯有继续调低MSSR。

先让1.05飞几天，再调到1.02如何？

bitCNY 承担了一部分保值需求，比如之前ICO的几个团队都是因为这个原因持有 bitCNY
但是这部分需求又会降低bitCNY的流动性，特别是在现在爆仓压力很大时对这部分 bitCNY 的释放显得更迫切。

既然如此，我觉得可以由理事会直接发行一种IOU CNY 代替 bitCNY 来实现保值需求。
因为 BTS 系统是有盈利的，承诺用收入获得的 bitCNY 按1:1回购 IOU CNY应该就能基本满足。
另外可以用盈利的部分按月支付IOU CNY 持有者利息，进一步刺激这种需求。

而对应的 IOU USD 除了可以代替保值的需求，还可以用来给 worker 发工资，免得像现在这样定期咋盘买美元发工资，尽量减少理事会参与市场操作的可能性。

理事会的收入太少，支撑不起大体量的资产

In order to do B we need https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/pull/1324 and hardfork or unintended margin calls will be(or not) triggered.

got it, thanks.

cny的供应量的确是束缚bts的绳索了，蟹老板的提议的确能缓解现状，但是，保证提案能通过的票权基本上都在大户手上，建议再好，也有可能通过不了，要知道，不是每一个大佬都为了bts整体利益着想。大家也都看到了，拥有1.4亿票的alt，现在就像个孩子气的任性的暴君，在整个bts改革发展中，有着生杀予夺的权力。而bitcrab现在代理的票数好像不到3000万。希望在发起提案的同时，蟹老板能在社区普遍呼吁下，把社区的票争取一下，让大家设置投票代理为bitcrab，聚沙成塔，社区的小散也能贡献自己一份力量。

首先，alt也许有时候有些想法有点极端，但并不是不讲理，不可说服的人，其次，即便争取不到alt的支持，也不意味着提案没机会通过，事在人为。总之面对当前的困境要积极想办法，而且要尽量把解决方案想得全面，稳妥些。

现在强清补偿已经设为2%，基本上可以确保bitCNY不会出现高于2%的折价，即便MCR有较大幅度的降低也不用太担心会引起bitCNY高折价。

社区苦bitCNY短缺久矣！

在动态MCR一时半会儿难以实施的情况下，参照修改MSSR的流程，通过起草BSIP+投票+见证人执行，降低MCR到1.5或者1.4如何？

当前爆仓单里最低抵押率1.508，如果降低MCR到1.5，那么所有的爆仓单都会消失。

然后在同等的风险条件下（指债仓抵押率离MCR的距离）可提供的bitCNY增加了16.7%。

那么这样的调整有没有增加系统性的风险？例如，有没有增加黑天鹅风险？

现在bitCNY溢价超过11%，bitCNY持有者吃爆仓单的意愿很低，如果BTS价格持续下跌，爆仓单的量会继续增加但很难被吃掉，当前的全局清算价 - 0.1784很难继续降低。

而如果调低MCR, 会增加bitCNY的供应，有望减小bitCNY的溢价，不断吃掉爆仓单的可能性更大。

还有，关键的一点是，社区基本在“喂价要高于黑天鹅保护价以避免发生黑天鹅”这一点上已经达成比较强的共识，最坏的结果是，BTS价格继续大幅下跌，喂价停留在黑天鹅保护价上，bitCNY由于抵押不足出现明显贬值。

但，不管是否降MCR，这样的情况都可能发生，甚至可以说，降MCR降低了这样的事情发生的可能性，因为降低MCR后增多的bitCNY供应有望增加消除掉一些爆仓单的可能性。