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Messages - bitcrab

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991
这是一个牵一发而动全身的体系。

如果:

喂价算法都经过比较好的优化,当bitCNY折价较低时(比如0.5%,最高不超过1%)不向下调喂价。

内外盘充分联动,当内盘拉盘时或者外盘砸盘时搬砖会迅速把价差降到足够低。

那么当初的设计目标是可以达成的。

当然,以上两条现在还都没有完全满足,但是也离得不远。

如果现在走回头路,限定喂价底线,那么也许可以解除暂时的痛苦,但是锚定的目标基本就没有保证了,不光是承兑商等相关利益方收到损害,又怎么去推广智能货币呢。

所以,不如齐心协力,忍受一时痛苦,尽快促成以上两个条件的达成。

当内盘价格高过外盘太多时去搬砖,推动见证人更新算法,都是在为目标的达成作贡献。

眼前的,通过这样的努力让喂价提高,让今晚的清算无利可图,OK?

992
没事到这里投投票吧。
虽然希望渺茫,但还是尽力争取一下,https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27362.0

993
内盘能不能传导到外盘属于市场的问题,而不是有没有意义的问题,因为内盘市场并没有做到能够吸引大资金关注的程度,起码这个市场的空间在,有空间就有活性,有活性就能带来流动量与关注度,但是不能把这个市场最基本的空间属性给压缩了。

抵押者看似风险小了,只不过是风险时间延长了而已,该爆的还是被爆,低于外盘喂价的反馈更是让抵押者根本不知道安全抵押率在哪,跟去年的强清一模一样。

通缩才是主要问题,溢价导致的直接是入金不流畅。

而通胀并不是什么大问题,越是低迷,越需要适度的通胀来维系物价,不至于过度贬值造成螺旋效应,5%又能怎么样,何况内盘价格最多也就超过外盘喂价2%多一点,可能还超不过QC价格,何况这些流通量还是在实际法币价格的基础上抵押出来的,外盘低迷,不代表内盘也要跟着低迷,锚定资产区这么多交易对。

留出上面的空间给市场。

内盘可以不低迷啊,你充个2000万bitCNY进来,马上就不低迷了啊。

还5%又能怎样,1%都已经不可容忍,没兴趣玩印钞票的游戏。



994
喂价理论上可以低于市场价,但是却必须考虑到强清防护。
当前CNY强清补偿是5%,USD强清补偿是1%。
那就要求CNY喂价不得低于市场价*96%,USD喂价不得低于市场价,这样既防护了强清,也算是最大限度支持了负反馈,可算作不完美的权宜之计。
如何?

不好,想要保留喂价反馈与防止被恶意强清须采用最高价法,最高价法灵活性更大一些,即使每个人的参数不一,对最后出来的喂价结果影响不会太大,只存在喂价反馈什么时候会超过或低于外盘喂价的问题,也就是喂价反馈进场与出场的时机问题,留给市场自由竞争的空间更大,即使不想承认,最高价法已经是妥协中的最好办法。

即使不低于市场价的96%,依然存在喂价向下反馈压制内盘向上空间的问题,也属于变相的恶意强清,不属于市场自身调节。

喂价反馈在外盘喂价上升时属于几乎不动的情况,即使动也远低于以前外盘喂价上升速度,一旦内盘价格一时超过外盘,就会反馈爆仓,形成空间严重压缩。

抵押低于外盘喂价被爆了无话可说,被喂价反馈爆了这就属于被计划,高于外盘喂价时候的向下反馈还能接受。

最好舍弃锚定精度的想法,没有强大的外汇储备与经济实力想控制汇率基本不可能,但是抵押者不是筹码。

另外,左右堵窟窿是堵不住的,问题出在喂价反馈上,不是出在强清上,提高强清补偿也不能彻底解决喂价反馈本身的问题。

现在的这个体系,需要内盘与外盘联动,如果内盘对价格的拉升不能传导到外盘,那么这种拉升本身就没多大意义。被压缩就被压缩呗。

当然,现在内盘与外盘联动的程度还比较低,需要提高。

抵押者本来就需要承担各种风险,现在抵押者承担的风险,比起719之前已经小多了。

995
General Discussion / Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« on: November 06, 2018, 03:38:56 pm »
if it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.

So you are now breaking the peg for bitcny which was so important to you at all cost?

I know this is not a perfect solution to solve the current issue and may break the peg, is there any better way? how about to increase the force settlement offset?

996
喂价理论上可以低于市场价,但是却必须考虑到强清防护。
当前CNY强清补偿是5%,USD强清补偿是1%。
那就要求CNY喂价不得低于市场价*96%,USD喂价不得低于市场价,这样既防护了强清,也算是最大限度支持了负反馈,可算作不完美的权宜之计。
如何?

997
General Discussion / Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« on: November 06, 2018, 02:38:38 pm »
if it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.

998
General Discussion / Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« on: November 06, 2018, 02:09:07 pm »
I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?
Well, that is a consequence of BSIP42 and not of settlements per se.
Multiple solutions to that have been proposed already among which are:
- let the price feed reflect the actual pricing again and do negative feedback through MCR
- introduce a distinct price for settlements (though I believe that would allow exploting BSIP42)

The proposal to remove one of the strongest reasons for bitassets to have a "floor"-price isn't easy for me to understand.

the force settlement is already a problem for long time, that's why the bitCNY offset is set to 5%. BSIP42 just make the problem apparent.

maybe the MCR solution can make things better, but I think it will cost at least several months for it to come, in this period we just let the debt position owner be put into the risk of being exploited?

999
General Discussion / Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« on: November 06, 2018, 01:50:20 pm »
Chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborate

Force settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.
But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.

I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?


1000
General Discussion / Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« on: November 06, 2018, 01:48:07 pm »
You are turning a free market into a centrally planned economy

what you called free market is a forrest where beasts can kill and eat people.

the real free market is a common infrastructure, it need careful design and will evolve with consensus.

1001
General Discussion / suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« on: November 06, 2018, 10:12:29 am »
at this moment the settlement price is lower than latest price in bitCNY market. which means the debt positions are in risk to be force sold in a under market price.



it is not acceptable.

bitCNY is in good liquidity, if bitCNY want to convert bitCNY to BTS he can just trade in the market, here the force settlement here is not necessary but sometimes provide chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners.

I suggest to disable force settlement for bitCNY.

kindly let me know your opinion.

1002
General Discussion / price feeding review
« on: November 06, 2018, 03:57:47 am »
price feeding become more critical after the BSIP42 implementation.

currently the feed price in CNY is 4.5% lower than the latest price, in the past several days the gap was even bigger.


according to the negative feedback logic, it's possible and acceptable that the feed price be lower than the latest price, but we still need to review whether there are some flaws here that may hurt the ecosystem.

there are always some price gap between DEX and CEX, if the gap is not big enough, we can not expect the gap be removed by arbitrage,if the CEX price keeps a little lower than DEX price, the negative feedback algorithm may respond and reduce the feed price, in some extreme situation the reducing feed price may trigger continuous margin call which is not so necessary.

while reducing feed price directly lead to margin call that force sell, increasing feed price do not lead to force buy, witnesses need to be more careful while reducing the feed price.

I suggest that we can introduce a "protect discount limit" in the price feeding algorithm, if the smartcoin discount is not bigger than this limit, algorithm does not start the negative feedback process.

that's why gdex-witness updated the algorithm as below:

Code: [Select]
Pdex:BTS price in DEX in smartcoin
Pf: current feed price
premium: current premium

scale=1;
get Pdex, Pf, premium;

while True:
   
   get Pdex, Pf, premium;
   if 0.3%>premium>-0.5%: ##just adopt the current median if the absolute premium is low enough.
       feed price = Pf;
   else:
       feed price = Pf*(1+premium*scale);
   time.sleep(120); ##update every 2 minutes.

I also suggest that each witness publish the price feed algorithm, which can help proxies to review and evaluate the witness work.


1003
this worker is to pay for what the lobbyist had done for listing, I feel the lobbyist may need to open other worker proposal to pay exchange the listing fee.

to me it is OK for a top50 CEX charge 8 BTC to list BTS, open bitCNY and bitUSD market with more than 3 pairs for each.

1004
support!

I believe this is a powerful solution and meet the requirement of the ecosystem.

1005
喂价低于爆仓价不是什么不可接受的事件,本质上无非是相当于为了收缩供应而提高了抵押率,这在BSIP42描述里边都是说明白了的。

也别在这扯什么自由市场可以解决锚定精度的迷梦,BSIP42之前的智能货币锚定如何大家都见过。

金融市场是一种需要仔细设计的公共产品。

现在需要仔细讨论的是,如何对负反馈的算法进行更多优化,以解决出现的一些缺陷和问题。

负反馈喂价的前提假设是:

1.BTS的真实法币价格由BTS/智能货币之外的BTS交易对价格而来。
2.BTS/智能货币与其他的BTS交易对之间的价格有较紧密的联动关系,价差可迅速由搬砖抹平。

在真实的市场中,由于搬砖需要成本,常常可以观察到不同的交易对之间有着“不太小”的价差。

而且,通常内盘的交易者持有BTS的意愿更强,这也容易导致内盘的BTS价格略高于外盘价格。

在极端的情况下,可能发生外盘砸盘->外盘价略低于内盘->喂价下跌->内盘价下跌->外盘继续砸盘的恶性循环,这对生态是一种伤害。

为了避免这种伤害,建议对智能货币的折价有一个小范围的容忍,折价在这个范围内的,不启动喂价下调。

直觉这个范围应该在0.5%上下,最高不超过1%。


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