Quote from: bobmaloney on September 27, 2015, 08:43:18 pm

Quote

3. Keep as much distance as possible from existing political regimes as long as functionally possible.
http://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/why-silicon-valley-should-not-normalize-relations-washington-dc

I don't really agree. I think you need as many allies as you can get in as many governments as you can reach. Power is power, whether it's in government, church, corporate, or clan.

Do you want to be ideologically pure and lose because your competitor made some alliance to give themselves an unfair advantage over your business? If what you are doing is important enough to the world then losing might not be an option.

This suggestion was made in the spirit of what Rodgers outlined and predicted (and what eventually came to be for Silicon Valley) in his white paper.

I'm not suggesting a kind of naive appeal to remain "pure" - but rather - only an attempt to remain as "pure" as possible, as long as possible, which I see as the most pragmatic approach toward making a paradigm changing platform.

This suggestion is made with what I consider the very valid assumption that any alliance with governments will require negotiation that will necessarily include technical and functional compromise - let's delay that as long as reasonably possible in order to make the maximum possible difference - and to set any negotiation (or, better yet - a feigned and slowly delayed negotiation) at a point in time where the odds be ever in our favor 

I do not think any government involvement at this point of time - or anytime soon (excluding FMV), will offer any ROI for what our goals should be - which would be little more than subsidizing the 2nd vacation homes, mistresses and drug addictions of a few lobbyists and politicos at great financial and political/value cost.

If any political alliances are ever needed, let them be something grown from the ground up - due to necessity and on an as-needed basis.

Any premature attempt to design alliances and government coordination as part of our foundation and we might as well throw in the towel, because we have already lost.

It seems to me that when 2.0 goes live, the incentive will quickly be realized for proxies to pay for voting power.
This is where the inevitable politics of BTS 2.0 will become increasingly transparent, IMO.

What might be the possibilities of political deals regarding vote-swaps and quid pro quo among witness approvals, platform proposals, etc.
I suppose high value platform proposals will be the most obvious and likely sources to be first to attempt this type of method to manipulate approvals.

Obviously, community oversight will be necessary to deal with bad actors, but how quickly will the community be able to rally/communicate for prompt action?

Is this worry valid?

If so, I think this is an area we should put effort into considering, whether it is worth concern, the possible likelihood, and if so – what should be done to counter it.

Bytemasters response on the mumble was basically:
* Witnesses are posting their reputation as collateral.  If you don't htikn a person has enough reputation for you to trust them, dont vote for them
* Requiring large collaterals, as with the proposal where the highest collateral posted gets autovotes, turns DPoS into normal PoS, where large holders stake to secure the network. 


That said, I like the idea of a SMALL collateral being posted.  Similar to what we had where paid delegates in the old system paid a fee to register, which could recover a couple weeks of their cost if they did nothing.

If collateral is required, might that imply liability?

Isn't that something they were hoping to remove from the equation with the separation of delegate tasks?

Wouldn't it be simpler to request the exchanges suspend BTS deposits and withdrawals on the 13th?

This way their internal exchange can stay functioning and there should be issues while they upgrade to 2.0 as well.

 

Because accounts are transferrable and we already have "parent/child" relationships via the owner/active authorities the concept of "subaccounts" has become meaningless.

A sub-account use to mean... "dan.bitshares" was owned by bitshares for ever and always.   Under graphene the control of "dan.bitshares" is transferrable and therefore no relationship between "dan.bitshares" and "bitshares" can be said to exist.

With some clever GUI designs we can show that account "dan.bitshares" has an "owner authority" of "bitshares".   But "dan.bitshares" might also be owned by account "cryptonomex" or perhaps a multi-sig authority.

I'm confused about this.

Does this mean fanboy.bitshares could eventually be owned by somebody like Preston Byrne and the owner of bitshares would have no ability to revoke it?

Have the sub.accounts (as practiced in 1.0) been abandoned for technical reasons or is it being traded for the ability to have a transferable DNS-type system?

If so, I would argue that, being primarily a financially focused platform - more importance lay in being able to reliably assume approved relationships between parent/child accounts - much like domain names in relation to email addresses (such as fanboy.bitshares and bitshares OR dan@cryptonomex.com and cryptonomex.com) - than lay in being able to resell or transfer sub.account style names, which would seem to behave more like TLD's.

Maybe add even more personal questions about their views on crypto, what they hope to help achieve, etc.

How did they find bitcoin, bitshares, etc.

Do they like long walks on the beach...you know...

Are sub.accounts going to be possible in 2.0?

If so:

1a. Will the premium account of "maloney" offer a premium umbrella for its sub.accounts, or will each sub.account need to purchase a premium account (ie- bob.maloney, cousin-eddie.maloney, bills.maloney, savings.maloney)

2. What if I own a business? (ie- larrypage.google down to the lowly employees... thx1138.google)

3. Would it be possible to develop a method to determine between personal/family and business accounts? (Maybe the total # of sub.accounts available?)



A little outside the box and into the more distant future:

Could it ever be possible for an account owner to grant permissions for sub.accounts to be generated where the original account owner would not have access to the sub.accounts private key? (some kind of non-hierarchical structure would be required, I assume)
 
Maybe with the ability of the original account holder to remove the sub.account if abusive, but have the assets of that sub.account sent to another predetermined account (preset by the sub.accounts creator) upon close by original account owner.