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Just don't register to vote and you never get called in the first place.
I don't really think that running the very backbone of bitshares in a t2micro is a good practice at all, even if it seems to run "fine".
Witnesses should always be ready and able to deal with sudden increases in resources required by the network, and this is not possible with a t2micro.
What happens if a spam attack strike on bts? That low-end server will not be able to bear the attack.
What if all the witnesses run on a t2micro? Bitshares network dies.
And you can not even assume a priori that you will be always ready to manage your instance in time to mitigate an attack.
What if you are outside and can not connect to your servers or server's hosting? What if you are just sleeping?
Witnesses should always look at what could be the next required resources and their servers should always be capable of sustain a lot more requests that the current ones.
...
So no, the witness pay should not be only barely enough to pay the server's rent.
It should be high, to put more weight and responsability to the witnesses and to push them to do an exellent job.
I keep saying it and will say it again.
We need relative orders that allow orders to be placed in relation to the feed price and then move with it.
If you had a script that did that, but you had to pay a transaction fee when the price drifted by some value from the original, would you use it?
It can be implemented using your own server (I'd make a worker to write the tool and split it with xeroc for using his library). But without a hardfork and some serious coding, it isn't immediately implementable on the chain.
I'm against this because put a lot of trust in the publishing feeds and risk on the system since witness could easily manipulate the feed and run with a lot of money. Also this can easily be work around using third part tools or bots.
I keep saying it and will say it again.
We need relative orders that allow orders to be placed in relation to the feed price and then move with it.
I haven't have any communication with him, and he haven't published any feeds. What status now? @maqifrnswa
I'd suggest everyone review some of the discussion and analysis that took place 7 months ago on these topics.
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,16143.msg206715.html#msg206715
There's a good bit of valuable information there.
because witnesses have to pay for servers and so on. more witnesses = less money for them.Almost .. All witnesses are paid a fixed amount of BTS.
More witnesses means more costs for the DAC.
locked >>> get_object 1.3.120
get_object 1.3.120
[{
"id": "1.3.120",
"symbol": "EUR",
"precision": 4,
"issuer": "1.2.0",
"options": {
"max_supply": "1000000000000000",
"market_fee_percent": 0,
"max_market_fee": "1000000000000000",
"issuer_permissions": 511,
"flags": 128,
"core_exchange_rate": {
"base": {
"amount": 12,
"asset_id": "1.3.120"
},
"quote": {
"amount": 37854,
"asset_id": "1.3.0"
}
},
"whitelist_authorities": [],
"blacklist_authorities": [],
"whitelist_markets": [],
"blacklist_markets": [],
"description": "1 euro",
"extensions": []
},
"dynamic_asset_data_id": "2.3.120",
"bitasset_data_id": "2.4.20"
}
]
locked >>> get_object 2.4.20
...
"current_feed": {
"settlement_price": {
"base": {
"amount": 6,
"asset_id": "1.3.120"
},
"quote": {
"amount": 19867,
"asset_id": "1.3.0"
}
},
"maintenance_collateral_ratio": 1750,
"maximum_short_squeeze_ratio": 1100,
"core_exchange_rate": {
"base": {
"amount": 12,
"asset_id": "1.3.120"
},
"quote": {
"amount": 37854,
"asset_id": "1.3.0"
}
}
},
"current_feed_publication_time": "2015-12-02T04:35:06",
"options": {
"feed_lifetime_sec": 86400,
"minimum_feeds": 7,
"force_settlement_delay_sec": 86400,
"force_settlement_offset_percent": 0,
"maximum_force_settlement_volume": 2000,
"short_backing_asset": "1.3.0",
"extensions": []
},
"force_settled_volume": 0,
"is_prediction_market": false,
"settlement_price": {
"base": {
"amount": 0,
"asset_id": "1.3.0"
},
"quote": {
"amount": 0,
"asset_id": "1.3.0"
}
},
"settlement_fund": 0
}
]
Changing feed Params is like a country revaluing its currency. Bad idea. Instant 2% loss to everyone who was playing by the rules.this is true, another reason why I think this should be done through committee as it has to weigh the pros and cons of the change
Benefit: Margin calls should be avoided unless absolutely necessary since it takes smartcoins out of circulation when the market is too thin to begin with. The most accurate/liquid market should be used to establish when a market call occurs, and at this moment the feed is a best. Feed is 100% SQP.
If you want to avoid margin calls, why not just reduce the margin call limit? Instead of triggering at 175% collateralization, trigger at 150% or lower.
Its my understanding that SQP is on its way out, so perhaps we shouldn't be designing around it. But in any event I think this SQP limit should not be reduced to 1000. If smartcoins are designed to trade at a premium, selling the smartcoin at the feed is the worst deal you should ever expect to get. Margin call orders, as they approach <100% collateralization are the most urgently needed to fill. You don't put the most urgent need at the least desirable price. It may never get filled.
I'd suggested elsewhere having margin call only trigger if the feed crosses your limit. Like BTS-0.9 Only then would it reach out and try to fill the order, but it's restricted by a limit, again like BTS-0.9 ; As the feed moves beyond your margin call limit, the urgency to fill the order is greater. The limit could start at 0% of the feed once triggered, and slowly extend out, up to 10% or more as it approaches black swan <100% collateralization.
I wasn't attempting to propose any particular solution, merely to point out that if you want a to encourage liquidity it must be paid for by someone.
Furthermore, I am contemplating a solution to this that doesn't involve dilution. Think about sharing a cut of all future BitUSD fees with those who provide liquidity in that market early on.
The early participants to the market are the ones who give it life, the late comers don't benefit from the fees. In other words, make BitUSD a "profit center" where the profits go to those who make it a successful business.
I don't see that as being a viable solution. You talk about revenue from fees as if it were substantial enough to encourage participation. They simply aren't. Bitshares is too small, and its prospects are meager at best.
(or something else). Proceeds from the short wall sales go straight back in to collateral. Whenever the community is happy, the worker can stop and the multisig account can just be sitting short. That account can sit short indefinitely, essentially another reserve account. It can be margin called or force settled, it's fine and doesn't matter -- its roll was to generate smartcoins and any remaining BTS is out of circulation. Another worker proposal can allow the trustees of the account to close out the debt and refund remaining BTS to the reserve account (or fund jumpstarting another market).
