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Messages - tbone

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16
Thanks to those who commented on what I wrote.  I have little time for detailed response but it's clear there is a wider perspective here which I did not consider.

But I will reinforce one idea in-particular: Substantial revenue for paying BTS and bitAsset interest can be made via "Market Fees".  This alleviates the risk of reserve pool managing short positions (or even touching the reserve pool at all).  One advantage is that "Market Fees" are produced in *that* asset (ie: bitUSD market fees come out in bitUSD, and etc).  The transaction fee schedule then remains, in effect, an anti-spam measure and does not take away from the existing referral system.  Plus there is no in-between step of converting BTS from transaction fees into the currency of choice.

Now, I do believe the market fees must be kept small to keep Bitshares a competitive trading platform.  Something like 0.05 to 0.1% is probably okay???  Would need broader community feedback and analysis.


EDIT: I really do think revenue sharing from exchange activity is important...  Does this phrase ring a bell?:
  • "BitShares - Your share in the Decentralized Exchange"
Let's make that statement a reality.

To alleviate your concerns, keep in mind that this thread is NOT proposing to have the reserve pool manage any short positions.  You must be thinking of the other thread where it was proposed to pay witnesses/workers in bitUSD by automatically converting BTS into bitUSD by shorting with a pre-determined collateral level, etc.  That was a good idea, but the proposal in this thread makes it largely unnecessary.

Also, keep in mind that this proposal does NOT aim to change the fees paid by users.  It only aims to realign the allocation of collected fees between the network and the referral program.  The purpose is to a) pay an interest rate of return on bitAssets in order to drive demand for bitAssets to levels not seen since we had interest payments in Bitshares 1.0  and b) pay a dividend on BTS held in LTM accounts in order to drive further demand for BTS and to incentivize more LTMs.  Amazingly this is all done without adding any dilution.  In fact, it will make bitshares substantially more deflationary than before.

This is by far the most bullish development for bitshares in my 2 years of following the project.  And I think now for the first time, the referral program will be very effective.

17

50% - network
20% - referral
20% - bitAsset interest
10% - LTM dividend


sounds like a plan. who can do it? @kenCode 's team? should we request a quote?

edit: peerplays' dividend code is free to use as far as I know

Fantastic.  Hopefully we can get a quote ASAP.  In the meantime, I hope we'll get some input from others such as @xeroc, @Chris4210, @JonnyBitcoin , @bitcrab, @alt

We also need to know more precisely what the monthly collected fees have been since inception of Bitshares 2.0.  I asked in the dev channel and @Taconator has graciously offered to help within a week if no one else has already helped by then. 

 

18
I agree with @fav that this should not become a debate about whether referral programs have merit, because it's a proven fact that they can be incredibly powerful.  However, OPs idea cannot be realized without modification of the existing program. So that clearly has to be a part of this conversation. Not to mention, we know the referral program has issues that need to be addressed.  So this may also be a very good opportunity to make the referral program more sensible and effective...while simultaneously making it possible to pay interest to bitAsset holders, as well s fav's great new idea of paying a dividend to LTM accounts.  All without dilution.

I think one of the problems with the referral program is that with the current split there will always be great resistance to raising fees since the network only gets 20% of any increase. The current split also dampens the ability to vote in worker proposals as well as reduces deflation, which are both factors that reduce demand for BTS.  This is a losing proposition for everyone including referrers.

If we can shift the split such that the network gets a much higher percentage, that would immediately make the network much more profitable.  In that scenario, we would have a) increased deflation, or b) an easier time voting in worker proposals, or c) some combination thereof.  And there would be less resistance to the idea of raising fees.  All of this means greater demand for BTS.

Imagine now that in addition to the above, we can also offer an interest rate of return on bitAssets AND a dividend on BTS for LTM accounts.  And again, without any dilution.  We can do all of this if we allocate the fees differently.  Here's my proposed split: 

50% - network
20% - referral
20% - bitAsset interest
10% - LTM dividend

I also propose that the referrer gets the 20% on ALL fees, even on fees paid by LTM users (which i'm 90% sure referrers currently get 0% of).  In addition, I propose that the referrer keeps 100% of the LTM fee.

Overall, I think a fee allocation like this would be a MASSIVE win for all parties involved.  Thoughts?

19
 +5%   What you're doing is appreciated, @virtualgrowth!

20
General Discussion / Re: Some questions re Bit20
« on: April 08, 2017, 08:46:46 pm »
Right, yeah.

But my point is that it seems extremely unlikely that anyone interested in crypto (that would be by definition and until/if this sort of thing is maintream, 100% of users) would take a short position with BTWTY.

If you believe in crypto, then it seems like a wise bet to make that the top 20 of all cryptos (and a dynamically list of 20 top cryptos as that) will never devalue much against fiat.

In other words, close to zero incentive to short.

A real market maker will hedge his position on external markets.  So when he shorts BTWTY, he will buy corresponding amounts of the constituent assets on an exchange like Poloniex.  By doing so, he doesn't care which direction the market goes.   His profit comes from the spread.  In other words, he buys at the bid and sells at the ask and earns the difference.  We need more sophisticated market makers like this and should incentivize them.

21
By the way, we really should not contemplate reducing the network's current 20% share of the fees.  That would be inflationary, which would decrease demand for BTS.  It would also make it more difficult to fund worker proposals.  If anything, we should increase the network's share, which would be deflationary and would also make it easier to fund worker proposals.  Both factors would help increase demand for BTS and help compound the effect of offering interest by contributing even more to the virtuous circle.

22
@Customminer -- I'm not sure over what period time those fees were accumulated.  But it can't possibly be since inception of BTS 2.0.  I don't even think that pool includes all fees currently being collected.  I mean, where is BTS on that list?  The overwhelming majority of fees are collected in BTS, not those other assets, right?  So we need some clarification as to what that pool is, exactly. 

But in the meantime, looking at the top 20 "most fees paid" list on cryptofresh, it appears we've generated at least ~17M BTS in fees since BTS 2.0 launched.  That's about 1M BTS per month.  Actually, it's more since this is only the top 20 accounts in terms of fees paid.  So I think it's pretty close to my guess of 1.2M BTS monthly.  Not to mention, the current monthly rate of fee collection should be higher than the monthly average over the last 18 months considering the substantial growth in transactions we've been experiencing.  On the other hand, a lot of the fees listed below may be from creating assets and therefore more "one-time" in nature (or at least more irregular). 

Anyway, this is just a bunch of guess work.  We need to know the actual rate of monthly fee collection.  But if my guess is even close, then this idea of redirecting a portion of referral rewards could fund substantial bitAsset demand without having to increase fees.  Even if I'm off by an order of magnitude, then this could still be worth pursuing considering, as @fav mentioned, it could kick off a virtuous cycle that could end up being substantial.





23
I love the idea of being able to offer an interest rate of return on bitAssets.  OP's idea of redirecting some of the referral program's share of fees is an interesting way to accomplish it without reducing deflation (i.e. increasing inflation).  The question is how much of the desired effect will be realized if we reduce the referral program's share of fees from 80% to 60%?  To know that, we really need to know how much we're currently collecting in fees. 

But let's just say for argument's sake we're currently collecting $10,000 (or ~1.2M BTS) in fees per month.  20% of that (redirected from the referral program) would be $2,000 per month or $24,000 per year.  That would support 1% annual percentage rate on $2,400,000 worth of bitAssets.  Or 2% APR on $1,200,000.  Or 4% APR on $600,000.   

Each of those potential outcomes would represent a substantial increase in bitAsset demand.  But the numbers are based on a guesstimated 1.2M BTS per month in fees.  Is that even close to reality?  If so, we could be onto something here.  In which case the next question would be how to implement this.  It sounds like we would need the dividend feature. 


24
No offense, but what you're describing doesn't just sound complicated, but actually is unnecessarily complicated. 

I couldn't be offended even if you said it is stupid. It is your observation and I respect that.


And it also doesn't achieve the goal of having witness payouts get automatically and seamlessly converted from BTS to bitUSD before disbursing to witnesses.


When you have a pool that self maintains preset balance it is ease to set up automatic payments from it. The main problem is how to "converted from BTS to bitUSD seamlessly" taking in consideration market forces.


It's not a problem to take market forces into consideration.  That's what the feed price is for.  It gives you the conversion rate at any given time. 

I really doubt there is any reason why conversion of BTS to bitUSD prior to paying witnesses/workers can't be automated.  But I hope @xeroc and @kenCode will chime in to help corroborate the overall feasibility of what we're talking about trying to accomplish here.


25
I thought about this many times. Let me share this recent one.

Block rewards and workers are payed from reserve fund. Obvious solution would be that reserve fund gets ability to pay in MPA assets.
I am not familiar how hard proposed change would be, but for the purpose of this brainstorm lets pretend it is feasible.

It is already discussed many time so I wont repeat, but reserve fund should not be maintainer of collateral positions because it is not able to cope with market forces. But it could borrow MPAs from shareholders and traders which can. It could borrow on market established interest rate (like 5% meme) let the market decide, up to some figure, for instance two year worth of expenses(adjustable by comity).
Interests would be payed from reserve fund in BTS at feed price on hourly bases like vesting balances. The long position could be settled at any time from the reserve fund in BTS at current feed price. Everyone who want to settle MPAs could get current feed price worth of BTS from reserve fund, within 24 hour to prior notice as already defined (settle option). These acquired MPAs could burn the dept, so dept account could also have negative balance. The fact that this market opportunity has limited supply should provide additional incentive for borrowers. The liquidity would be increased slowly at a peace of about 2000 bitUSD/day.

Two years worth of expenses in bitUSD, at current price, is about 1.32 mil. It is impossible to make any predictions, but such a change could easily double the BTS price in short time.  There is inbuilt fluctuating factor in every price, including witness pay and workers price. With bitUSD price denomination for witness and workers pay, I am confident it could at least cancel additional interest expenses.
Also improve liquidity, get market adjust BTS supply, get more incentive for witness and workers, provide more transparent pricing and steady stream of fresh MPAs liquidity.

My feeling is this idea isn't simple enough to understand. A more simple and elegant implementation would be preferred.

I know it sounds little complicated but for the sake of an argument let me support it with example, how it would look like in UI, I suppose everyone is familiar with it.

Like we have "borrow" button, we could also have "lend" button. When it is pressed, new window pop up with option to fill amount and interest rate.
It could be the same as borrow option, a slider and manual fill , with same mechanics and comments like "you don't have sufficient funds", etc..
Block chain will fill order, the one with lowest interest rate (upper interest rate limit set buy commity), until upper fund limit is reached (also set by commity). After upper fund limit is reached, blockchain will fill lowest interest rate orders and borrow back upper ones.   

So for example, lets assume, upper interest rate limit is set to 20% and upper fund limit is set to 1mil bitUSD.
If I want to lend 100 bitUSD with interest rate of 5%, my order would be filled, if upper fund limit isn't reached.
After upper fund limit is reached, if there's any 40 bitUSD offered with 4.8% interest rate and my long has highest interest rate, my long would be borrowed back to me for 40 bitUSD in bitUSD, and 60 bitUSD maintained.
All the time my long position exists I would be payed bitUSD interest, from reserve fund denominated in BTS(at feed price) which will show in vesting balances. At any time I could decide to lower my interest rate, and if I decide to exit my long (partially or fully), I would be payed bitUSD worth of BTS at feed price.

Edit:
The critical part not mentioned could be as follows. When order is filled you are practically "locked" until someones outbids you or you decide to settle long position. Possible margin call would automatically trigger long settle option.

No offense, but what you're describing doesn't just sound complicated, but actually is unnecessarily complicated.  And it also doesn't achieve the goal of having witness payouts get automatically and seamlessly converted from BTS to bitUSD before disbursing to witnesses.

26
General Discussion / Re: btsbots wallet release v0.0.1
« on: April 06, 2017, 01:01:56 am »
currently only get price from polo for: OPEN.ETH, OPEN.DASH, OPEN.STEEM, OPEN.MAID
I will add OPEN.LTC, OPEN.OMNI soon,
but I can't find OPEN.LSK

I can't find OPEN.LSK

I think the problem is that the symbol for Lisk was changed to LSK, but on OpenLedger the symbol is still LISK. 

27
I agree with @JonnyBitcoin.  This should be as simple as possible.  Some things are complicated and that is just unavoidable.  But in this case, why introduce unnecessary complication by inserting a middleman that needs to be paid interest, etc etc?  Why can't the reserve pool just short bitUSD with pre-set levels of collateral?  In that scenario, just as in yours, long positions can be settled out of the reserve pool at the feed price. 

As far as coping with market forces, remember, we're not talking about having the reserve pool short as much bitUSD as demand calls for.  So, we won't have to worry about carefully regulating the supply of bitUSD (as steem must do with SBD) depending on total current circulation, current market conditions, etc.  We're talking about shorting only a limited amount of bitUSD, just enough to pay witnesses and workers.  The idea here is just to create a base supply of bitUSD that will help stimulate activity in bitUSD markets and boost confidence in individual participants to also short bitUSD into existence.

This is a strategic initiative.  It can start with bitUSD and later (or even immediately) expand to bitCNY and ultimately other bitAssets for which we want to produce a base supply to help spin up active markets in those bitAssets.  When liquidity in one bitAsset is sufficient, we can move on to the next and continue doing that as long as there is a bitAsset market that we want to jumpstart.

If we want to improve liquidity much sooner than later (and turn the screws on the coming competition), we should take @JonnyBitcoin's proposal very seriously and consider taking action ASAP.

28
@Thom: you make some good points regarding payment intervals, tracking of who produced how many blocks, etc. Such details would have to be worked out, but I doubt those things present a major technical challenge.

As for having a fallback, I agree.  My suggestion was to make the % of pay in bitAssets a parameter that the committee can set anywhere from 0-100, so they can turn it all the way on, all the way off, or anything in between.

Regardless of what % is paid in bitAssets vs. BTS, I think it makes sense for witness pay to be specified in terms of bitUSD for the reasons cited by OP and others (i.e. greater simplicity, predictability, ease of evaluation, etc.).  And I think workers should have to submit their proposals with the cost denominated in bitUSD for the same reasons.

I agree, it would be great to get input from @xeroc and @kenCode regarding the cost and ease of implementing OPs idea.



@iHashFury:  Who said witnesses are dumping BTS to cover costs?   That's not even relevant to this proposal.  The question is, what will they do with bitUSD if they get paid in that bitAsset.  Will they horde the bitUSD, or will they be more likely to exchange them for BTS?  I suspect much more the latter than the former...which is what this proposal expects and wants to happen.

29
In my last post I highlighted some of the tremendous benefits of paying workers/witnesses in the bitAsset currency of their choice.  So what are the downsides?  I can't really think of any.  It doesn't create inflation.  Worst case scenario, all bitAssets are force settled by workers/witnesses and all of the associated collateral simply goes right back into the reserve pool.

What about the cost to implement it?  I have no idea what the cost would be.  But I can't imagine it would be prohibitive, especially relative to the benefits derived.  Maybe someone could give us a ballpark estimate of the development cost, just so we have a rough idea.  Below is a list to help jump start a determination of specifically what items need to be coded. 



We would need to create/modify parameters for committee to specify:
     o level of witness pay in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS
     o % of witness/worker pay that should be made using bitAssets
     o which bitAssets are eligible to be chosen by witnesses/workers for their pay
     o collateral level to be used when automatically creating bitAssets used for payments

It will also be necessary to enable:
     o witnessses to specify which eligible bitAsset currency they would like to be paid in
     o workers to specify worker proposal price in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS

30
This idea should be seriously considered and I urge everyone to read this thread from the start, it only takes a short amount of time to review.  But anyway, here are my thoughts on the matter:

If we want people to take bitAssets seriously and to use them, then we should set the example.  That means paying workers and witnesses in the bitAsset currency of their choice.   Additionally, by paying in bitUSD, bitCNY, etc. it would make the income earned by witnesses and workers far more predictable.  It also means individual worker proposals would be much easier for voters to evaluate. 

Another huge benefit is that this would create a base supply of bitAssets, stimulate bitAsset market activity, and give greater encouragement and confidence for people to borrow/short even more bitAssets into existence, thus perpetuating a virtuous cycle.

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