有了最高法就已经可以很大程度上解决掉一些问题。

问题是反馈因子是从何而来，什么来决定的？是否使喂价偏离了真实的法币价格？我不是很赞成加反馈因子的做法，缺乏支撑。

既然喂价=最高价+反馈因子来促使BITCNY1：1锚定， 那么抵押的基础定价是否应该采用实时内盘价格或者最高价？

导致动不动10%以上的溢价的原因已经很清楚了，并不是供应量的问题，而是MSSR与市场情绪的问题，MSSR当初的设定并不是为了惩罚抵押，而是为了保证一个合理的市场覆盖率，现在看来这个覆盖率是有问题的，并不是一个合理的参数。10%的爆仓价并不是爆仓单被吃的主要动力，任何人都必须认清这个事实，爆仓单被吃的原因是市场是往复的，下跌过程中必然伴随着反弹，再者黑天鹅的触发是由问题的，并不是MSSR的问题。

不修正MSSR，到时候照样被爆到10%，而没有人来吃大量悬挂的爆仓单，内盘价格与喂价相差越大，反馈因子越大，爆仓单该爆不爆，溢出抵押越多，不一样是定时炸弹吗？！

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费率是随着市场情绪波动的, 内盘价格跟外盘的价格差是MSSR与市场情绪决定, 非喂价决定.

讨论的偏到太平洋了, 锚定的基础都偏掉了.

相对真实反应法币价格的喂价是实现锚定共识的基础。

加入反馈因子的喂价很容易会破坏这个共识，锚定的基础到底是反应真实法币价格的喂价还是内盘价格？


现在喂价托不住, 是外盘没有资金托盘, 内盘托盘的资金量又太小, 托不住内盘价格，即使托住也会被爆仓单砸没。

假如采用喂价最高价"比较法" 之后，如果内盘有大资金量, 是完全可以托住内盘价格跟喂价，完全不惧外盘砸喂价，而加入反馈因子，变相提高喂价，没有大资金来做支撑，也是白搭。

几千万的资金是完全托不住内盘价格的，只会稍微延缓下降时间而已。

而想要改动MSSR，就必须加入以下两条或者其中一条
1. 收取爆仓者爆仓单的交易手续费，最少收取5%或更高，可以设置为一个可调参数K；
2. 抵押率分开: 分为基础抵押率（比如180%）与爆仓抵押率（比如175%）;(预防价格有点波动就爆的问题，我这里针对的就是贴线抵押。）

并实现：强清补偿按照抵押率进行补偿问题(强清可以更大发挥其作用,更有效的调节抵押杠杆);



另外建议增加系统锁仓池分红功能：一个月，三个月，六个月，一年。

锁仓池的bts享受锚定资产区交易手续费分红，增加大户的长期持仓动力，锁仓池不进行抵押等有风险操作。

论 "人为操纵汇率的合理性"

喂价还是喂价，一半的见证人还是izai采用老式喂价。

涨的时候不见喂价涨，跌的时候倒是很赶趟。

MSSR has one specific purpose: to incentivize shorters to avoid being margin called (or rather to punish them if they are). Margin calls are bad for the health of our smartcoins and should be avoided. Shorters are expected to actively manage their positions so they are *not* margin called.

It is clear, IMO, that bitCNY shorters are doing a very bad job here. As can be seen here (https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/asset/CNY ), most shorters make use of the recently introduced target_collateral_ratio to keep their collateral at the bare minimum. Obviously, they *prefer* being margin called. At the same time, they are *rewarded* from the settlement offset of 5% everytime someone settles a long position!

The logical conclusion is that the MSSR must be increased so its original purpose is fulfilled.


*Once again*, while BTS is in a downtrend, certain people come up with creative ideas to protect their own interests. So tired of this.

very simple to solve the problem of keeping their collateral at the bare minimum.

1. Charge the mortgagor Margin Called（mandatory liquidation）deal  fees, charge 5% or higher

4. Change the collateral ratio to two parts: Margin Call ratio（175%）and Maintenance collateral ratio(185%or180%).

i don't want to explain why.

But Increased the MSSR is the worst idea, can't take any advantage to the bitasset.

110% MSSR was harming the system, i don't want to explain this too.

WHY?! WHY?! WHY?! EVERYONE WANT "BALANCE“， WHO GOT IT？

1. Charge the mortgagor Margin Called（mandatory liquidation）deal  fees, charge 5% or higher
2. Change the MSSR to 105%
4. Change the collateral ratio to two parts: Margin Call ratio（175%）and Maintenance collateral ratio(185%or180%).

IF want to change the MSSR to 105%, must have 1 or 4, can't separate!!!

And the time is not the good chance to change the MSSR, must wait the market turnning to good!!!

witness.yao
delegate.freedom
magicwallet.witness

Please change back to 110%, must wait the market turnning to good!!!

If the market weight of BITUSD is large, the BITUSD MSSR must be changed too.
 

而且现在币种与BTC的价格挂钩,很多都在利用BTC的托价,一旦BTC价格血崩, 被BTC托价的币种也会血崩, 所以强烈建议降低甚至取消掉BTC为主的喂价模式.