Now i must question the Market making contest：

1. Did the MM have checked the trade volume for so long time？or considered it as a measure of the "liquidity"?

2. Did the MM have checked the growth rate of new effective users for so long time？or considered it as a measure of the "result"？

3. Did the MM have a BSIP for the community to vote？or the fund can be used easily by Committee without the vote of the community？

In a way, the MM became a joke slowly, only have expenditure，nothing gained.

锁的窗口期时间太长了，这么长的窗口期什么动作也没有，使这个窗口期失去了意义。

不能这样管杀不管埋。

这么长的锁定时间窗口：

第一：没有解决喂价问题；

现在这个喂价改工会难道感觉很满意？放眼合约市场，有哪个为了防打针做到这个程度的？实力不行就要认清现实。

靠折价来耍赖还账（甚至于不还账）到最后只会留下一群癞子在这个市场，不会再有新资金进入。

难道还准备用这种赖账的方法来收筹码？似乎这样也挺不错。

第二：没有解决强清问题；

一帮人搞计划经济上瘾了是吧？足额抵押与市场共识都锚不住你，靠一个强清把抵押者都清死就能锚了（似乎都清干净就真的感觉好多了）？稍微正常一点的金融市场都不会这么二。

锚定资产进行存款可以获息的操作不应该难搞吧？爆仓的想要不爆仓付一些利息借一些款来变相提高抵押也应该可以的吧？

第三：没有风险处理机制。

吃不掉债仓一个是体量问题，一个是没有风险处理机制的问题，难道就一个只能吃债仓的方法才能消除爆仓单？付点利息借一些抵押物来难道不行？

I doubt it would have changed something.

Increasing the offset to 5% would only move the buy orders and sell orders at a higher price.

Debt holders who get force settled mostly instantly adds buy orders near price they receive for forcesettle.

Instead an offset of 5% it should be offset 0% and a "penalty" fee for network of 3% which would create a gap between buy and sell orders which would hopefully reduce force settlements.

This is the risk to maintain DEX price = feed price*（1+offset or “penalty" fee）in the market.

Maintain price Risk = {1/MCR - 1/(MCR+MCR*offset)}/ (1/MCR)

let's make it simple: Maintain price Risk= offset or “penalty" fee.

also you can check the FOREX.

If you still didn't understand it, sorry about that.

May be most of you not clear about the trade logic and the market, have lost the spirit of free market, just want a dead and fixed exchang rate market.


---------------------

Besides:

The window time of lock feed price is too long，BTS community still didn‘t find out the solution，that make BTS became a joke in DEFI, BSIP76 beame meaninglessness.

CLOSED. 

SUPPORTERS, please remove your vote from me, thanks.

Let's check：

https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/260
----------------------

Force settlement order price = settlement price*(1+FSO)/(1-FSFR)

smartcoin quantity： X

the buyer：X*(1-FSFR)/[settlement price*(1+FSO)]

the settled debt position owner：X/[settlement price*(1+FSO)]

settlement price：1.0
DEX price：1.025
offset：2%
fee：1%

so，everyone can calculate these very easy and got the result，

so，who can tell me， how to restrain the settlement like now，or just want to charge the fees？！

and if：
offset=0
fee=3%
so the Force settlement order price=1.03093，en very interesting.

a basic trade logic of settlement.

---------------------------
强清订单价格=喂价*（1+强清补偿）/（1-费率）
强清金额为：X 数量的bitcny
强清者获得的bts数量为 ：X*(1-费率）/ 喂价*（1+强清补偿），付出X
被强清者付出的bts数量为：X / 喂价*(1+强清补偿）, 获得X

喂价：1.0
内盘价格：1.025
强清补偿：2%
强清价格：1.02

现在的强清逻辑的话可以直接清了。

改后的强清逻辑：
假如手续费为：1%，
那么强清的价格为：1.0303
这样的话内盘价格到1.035就可以了/

这样看着似乎不错了，但是这个价格空间，你们还是会被清的活来死去。

而且如果我预估没有错的话，到时候可能强清补偿会为1%，手续费1%[哈哈][哈哈][哈哈][哈哈][哈哈][坏笑][坏笑][坏笑][坏笑][憧憬][憧憬][憧憬][憧憬] 嗯，似乎什么地方不对[笑cry][笑cry]

假如补偿为零，手续费为3%的话，嗯，似乎就更有趣了。

也许，你们就是为了想要收费而已...

666

用稳定币拿利息的当然想要稳定的利息。DAI的利息由MKR持有人投票，每星期变来变去，看到都心烦，反而NEXO固定8%的年利息让人放心很多。

BitCNY真要搞可以考虑发行UIA的债卷，利息从交易费里出。这样可以吸收多余的BitCNY，也让BitCNY多个去处。

这个我们不需要稳定的利息，利息本来就是为了调节流动性用的。

而且似乎也不需要发什么债券，直接从市场交易手续费跟爆仓流动罚金里出就行了，每日的派息与规模考量设计好就行。

Quote from: binggo on February 29, 2020, 09:18:26 pm

Everyone should clear:  force settlement = Exchange Rate Manipulation.

Everyone should clear:  fake price feeds = Exchange Rate Manipulation.

I know that.

A higher MSSR is

BAIP2 is

BSIP76 is

We open a window for so long time hope to fix the the defects of mechanism in the open window time, did we finish something? now all you know BSIP 76 and BAIP2 is Exchange Rate Manipulation, but many of you didn't have any adverse options to force settlement, and think it's very right for such long time, that make me very confused.

We lost the spirit of the free market in the beginning, and never found we have lost it for so long time until now.