I just had a subsequent idea that levers off your principle of a floating R, but better satisfies my concerns that R always acts to sustain rather than distort the peg. What if you had a simpler set of rules, that if BitUSD is below the peg price, R could be steadily increased once every hour say, and if above, R could be steadily reduced every hour. The rate of increase or reduction at the end of each hour could further depend on how far the price is from the peg price, the further it is requiring more aggressive change. The increments would step down again as the gap tightened.

It should also not be required to have any limits on R, as if they are hit, it will only mean the peg will break again. We should be prepared for R to get very high if that is what is required to balance the supply and demand, given the view is that the peg is more important.

This would still require price feed.

The question whether R limits should be lifted is open to discussion. They are there for preventing short-term market manipulation.

I think that a proxy for interest rate is collateral requirement.  The more collateral required the less BitUSD can be created.

Both collateral and interest rate are cost of the shorts. But they are slightly different.

Collateral represents opportunity cost. If there is no BTSX bank that pays interest for BTSX deposit, there is not much opportunity cost here.

Interest rate represents real cost, because the shorts will lose real BTSX everyday.

As a BitUSD holder, such as a market maker, he will be much more comfortable holding an interest-carrying BitUSD. In a market of variable interest rate, it's much easier for a market maker to honor 1:1 peg, or something close, because now he does not have to go against the entire market force to peg BitUSD. The interest rate acts as a counter-balancing force against the initial market move and therefore helps the market maker.

投给了alt和麦克猫，真的很难选，每个人都是社区的元老

BitUSD needs interest, based on an interest rate that is determined by the supply and demand of BitUSD. This is the solution to the long term market peg without delegates' price feed.

Also, this short term solution would potentially print more BTSX, if the price of BTSX does increase as the shorts wishes.

Current problem:
BitUSD is undervalued compared to USD outside (~20% at the time of writing). Potential reason:
1) Not enough incentive to hold BitUSD. No interested received.
2) Not much demand for BitUSD for commercial usage, especially when little merchants accept BitUSD for payment.

Result to achieve:
1) BitUSD receives interest to add incentive for holding it.
2) The added incentive evens out the imbalanced force from one side of the market, which pushes the peg towards 1:1.

Goal/requirement:
1) Interest rate, R, needs to be market-driven.
2) BitUSDs are fungible, meaning they enjoy the same R. The previous proposal of BitUSDx (R = x%) would generate many kinds of BitUSDs, and inherently they are non-fungible, as they enjoy different interest rates. Here, the interest that BitUSD receives comes from the BTSX collateral, which is the loss of the BitUSD shorter.

Design principle:
More short of BitUSD pushes up R; more long of BitUSD drives down R.
(BitUSD priced in BTSX)

Range of R:
Rmin < R < Rmax, while Rmin can be negative if necessary.

Specific rules:
1) Orders can be sorted into three categories: sitting orders, driving orders, and neutral orders. When a buy order and a sell/short order are matched, usually they were initially placed in the different blocks. The one placed in the earlier block becomes the sitting order, and the other is the driving one. Sometimes, two matching orders are included in the same block, which makes both neutral.
2) Presumption: driving orders represent market direction/intention.
3) Only driving orders move R.
4) A long driving order drives R down; a short driving order pushes R up.
5) R moves 0.1% for every $x million BitUSDs in the driving order, proportionally. For instance, x can be 1, 10, or 100.

Expected end results:
1) R reaches equilibrium. This is the market-driven interest rate, which represents the wills of both sides of the market. If one side disagrees, it would move R by buying or selling BitUSDs to the direction that it prefers.

This proposal provides a general idea of how to set up a market-driven interest rate. Measures against various attacks are very likely to be in need. 

Bytemaster,

Can we hold on for 8 hours. It's 2:20 am in China. Give us some sleep.

And I oppose against slated voting. Too centralized. Likely do more damage than good. But multi-voting is good.