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The feed is irrelevant.
What is relevant is the real price on DEX for which you get BTS for your bitUSD.
You buy more BTS make the price above 0.22 then it's pegged again.
The vote weight from the 1x CR from any BTS backed bitasset should be allocated to the bitasset holder, not the debt holder.
Bad idea....gives shitloads of power to BTS shorters..and it's much easier to drop price than raise it
I'd rather have that voting weight "lost" ....essentially the debtor's incentive is for price to go up, the holder's is for it to go down....one has put up 1x collateral, the other holds an asset worth 1x collateral with opposite incentives.
I'd say consider them as cancelling each other out and not assign that weight at all
The vote weight from the 1x CR from any BTS backed bitasset should be allocated to the bitasset holder, not the debt holder.
Anything greater than the 1x CR should be allocated to the debt holder, but the 1x CR is effectively the property of the bitasset holder since the debtor sold the bitasset (and thusly the underlying BTS) to the now bitasset holder.
Interesting thought experiment, sounds familiar.. 🤔
If the exact peg finally lead BTS to 0, why should we insist on it?
smartcoin peg is one purpose of BTS, not all, or not at the highest priority.
we just found that BTS cannot afford smartcoin exact peg at any conditions, need to adjust the policy.
I propose that a fund is created to take over weakly collateralized margin positions. and whenever this fund's CR tops a given value, let’s say 3, the excess of collateral is used to buy some smart-assets in the market, assets like BitUSD, BitBTC, etc. These new bought assets can then be put in a second fund, whose mission should be to pay for workers, not in BTS as today happens, but directly in stable coins. This last step should alleviate the effect from the other feedback loop: the WFL.
Worker are already paid in bitAssets by shorting BTS on the DEX.
1. Createing bitAssets with a margin position takes some risk
2. You can decrease the reserve pool spending by voting for the refund workers
3. We should introduce a margin call fee (0.1-0.2%) to increase income
4. We should also increase the costs for make/take an order to increase income
A second, harmful, negative-feedback loop on BTS price comes via Bitshares’ workers. Worker is the name given by the community to the projects, financed by the blockchain itself, that contribute to the improvement of the ecosystem. Paradoxically, the more workers are financed, the more BTS is sold, on a daily basis, by those very workers in order to obtain BTC or fiat to pay for their bills. So, the workers’ need to sell big chunks of BTS daily is driving the price down in the immediate term, and this is mostly independent of market conditions. In a bull market this effect is somehow lessened by the stimulus of the people behind the workers to keep some BTS and profit from the rise in price. However that’s not always possible due their own immediate financial obligations. Under bearish conditions, on the other hand, the effect from this constant ‘dump’ of BTS into the market may be dramatic. For the purpose of this writing, I will call this second feedback “Worker Feedback Loop (WFL)”.
