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61
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Last post by Thom on October 11, 2018, 03:41:56 pm »
Just to be totally clear, do I understand correctly that you evaluate risk of undercollateralization as very low?
I do believe undercollatarlization must be avoided at all costs!
But I also realize that
a) black swan isn't as bad as world armageddon, but in fact can be recovered through BSIP18 and
b) the risk of *OVER-ALL* undercollateralization is much smaller than the risk of an individual position going below 100% collateral.

Point b) is very crucial to understand and while I do not believe we should bail out individual short positions with too little collateral (but instead would rather penalize
them), I do see a fine line between risking the entire asset through global settlement just because of a single position being undercollateralized and temporarily tune
price feeds to potentially "hide" a few undercollateralized positions (that will have a margin call that can be filled!).

Again, to me, this is a short-term solution and I would prefer any undercollateralization to be *obvisous* and *transparent*, but we first need to fix the backend to provide us
with the necessary means to get there. In the mean time, plenty of discussion is being done to figure out the "how"

So glad to see you make these points clear Fabian. I see collateralization is a crucial, bedrock principle that must be maintained. Lets not allow BitShares to become like Bitcoin, with its whitepaper principles ignored and the platform no longer useful for why it was created.

I'm not saying the platform shouldn't evolve, ofc it should nothing is ever perfect. I'm just saying its evolution should take place according to sound economic and individual freedom promoting principles (Austrian, not Keynesian, individuals not collectives) and not forget the lessons learned over the centuries and in particular the last 100 or so years of just how counter to individual freedom and prosperity centralized planning is.
62
一段时间来的喂价实在看不懂啊,前面外盘价格基本稳定,喂价一直在降低,直至到昨天喂价低于内外盘市场价,今天市场价大幅降低,喂价反而仅仅小幅降低,就像市场没有暴跌一样。

现在的喂价属于阴跌姿势~~外盘暴跌,喂价中跌。 外盘暴涨,喂价中涨。外盘横盘,喂价就阴跌。
昨前天喂价低于外盘市场价可能是因为bitcny充值手续费率为0或为负...然后充值手续费这个目前来说太好操作了,鼓鼓承兑商充值手续费最低的几个,总共bitcny就几万,十几万。
然后AEX bitcny:cnc交易 机器人一直0.997。0.998的刷单。负反馈就会认为bitcny<1人民币。就直接降喂价。 最终阴跌到低于外盘市场价。

63
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [Worker Proposal] BitShares.org - ID: 1.14.126
« Last post by Digital Lucifer on October 11, 2018, 02:22:17 pm »
Why pay for SSL certs when you can get them for free using certbot?

I'm not sure of the neccessity of the newsletter, email nor professional inquiry panel, these feel like centralizing BTS around this website.

1) Paid SSL at inbound price of 10ish Dollar per certificate for a year with signature of the domain on it is not same security as free ssl certbot.

2) Newsletter is common in any normal business in the world. Its being used for signups and monthly notifications to its clients/partners.

Everything but "centralizing" is included in this worker.

Many thanks for your opinion and support. 
64
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [Worker Proposal] BitShares.org - ID: 1.14.126
« Last post by Customminer on October 11, 2018, 02:12:01 pm »
Why pay for SSL certs when you can get them for free using certbot?

I'm not sure of the neccessity of the newsletter, email nor professional inquiry panel, these feel like centralizing BTS around this website.
65
General Discussion / Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Last post by abit on October 11, 2018, 01:37:53 pm »
bitUSD/CNY face chronic shortages partially because it is expensive to hold the .75 x of surplus collateral.  Widgets that are expensive get supplied in lower quantity.

I have brought the idea in another branch, but would like to raise it one more time in this discussion. Although I'm not fond of the way BSIP42 was pushed, I agree that smart coins shall be enhanced to foster mass adoption. IMO there should be more incentive for people to borrow an MPA.
How about adding one more incentive to those who takes the risk? MPA generally is a good service/product, it has big demand. And therefore it can generate revenue stream (e.g. market fees). IMO it would be nice if those who take the risk and support (borrow) MPA shall have a cut from the revenue. To avoid passive yield harvesting, the borrower shall release borrowed MPA to the open market:
1. An MPA owner specifies market fee portion he would like to share with borrowers.
2. A user borrows the MPA providing the collateral.
3. To receive the cut of the MPA market fees, the user has to place market sell order on MPA:Collateral asset (e.g. bitUSD:BTS) market.
4. As the MPA is being bought and sold by other users, market fee goes to the MPA's owner vesting balance, particular part of it (as specified in 1st step) is proportionally sharedropped to all borrowers who has executed step 3.

This proposal sounds interesting, but actually hard to implement to avoid being gamed.
* Liquidity in the DEX is not only MPA:collateral asset market but all markets, e.g. bitUSD:OPEN.BTC need liquidity as well, and perhaps need more liquidity than bitUSD:BTS;
* people who borrowed MPA and sold to others already provided liquidity, they have nothing more to sell, how can they place another order in the market?
* people who borrowed MPA and sold to their sock puppets would earn the cut from the revenue (yield harvesting)
* Orders placed far away from current trading price are useless. With bots it's easy to maintain an order in the market (and perhaps harvest the yield).

The most significant incentive for borrowers to borrow (and perhaps buy the collateral asset again) is there is something (e.g. the collateral asset) to buy and the price will raise after he bought and he can profit by selling the bought asset later, but this is unable to be guaranteed nor incentivized. The risk is he can get margin called if price of the collateral asset drops.
66
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Last post by yury on October 11, 2018, 01:19:34 pm »
Just to be totally clear, do I understand correctly that you evaluate risk of undercollateralization as very low?
I do believe undercollatarlization must be avoided at all costs!
But I also realize that
a) black swan isn't as bad as world armageddon, but in fact can be recovered through BSIP18 and
b) the risk of *OVER-ALL* undercollateralization is much smaller than the risk of an individual position going below 100% collateral.

Point b) is very crucial to understand and while I do not believe we should bail out individual short positions with too little collateral (but instead would rather penalize
them), I do see a fine line between risking the entire asset through global settlement just because of a single position being undercollateralized and temporarily tune
price feeds to potentially "hide" a few undercollateralized positions (that will have a margin call that can be filled!).

Again, to me, this is a short-term solution and I would prefer any undercollateralization to be *obvisous* and *transparent*, but we first need to fix the backend to provide us
with the necessary means to get there. In the mean time, plenty of discussion is being done to figure out the "how"

I've got your point, thanks a lot!
67
一段时间来的喂价实在看不懂啊,前面外盘价格基本稳定,喂价一直在降低,直至到昨天喂价低于内外盘市场价,今天市场价大幅降低,喂价反而仅仅小幅降低,就像市场没有暴跌一样。


题外话:这种喂价变化,还不如在MCR不能调整的现阶段,将喂价在外盘价基础上直接加10%更好,这样至少喂价变化规律是确定的。
68
General Discussion / Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Last post by pc on October 11, 2018, 12:28:04 pm »
3. To receive the cut of the MPA market fees, the user has to place market sell order on MPA:Collateral asset (e.g. bitUSD:BTS) market.

There are several problems here.

First, this does not prevent yield harvesting. A shorter can sell the asset to himself (i. e. to his sock puppet account) through the market, thus avoiding all risk associated with being either long or short.

Second, this is unfair on users who not only trade in the asset but who also want to use it as a fiat replacement. If they short without selling, or (presumably) buy the asset without repaying their debt, they are punished by being excluded from the market fee share.
69
大跌行情,外盘领跌,外盘价低于内盘价。

因为bitUSD溢价基本是靠比较内外盘价格来计算,所以这种情况下,算法认为bitUSD有折价,开始向下调喂价。

于是,要么引起不断爆仓,要么内盘把价格砸下去让算法觉得bitUSD有溢价,保持喂价。

不是说不能接受爆仓或者内盘价格下跌,但问题是,这种情况下通过简单比较内外盘价格来判断溢价是有问题的。

需要发展更好的算法来判断溢价/折价。
70
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Last post by xeroc on October 11, 2018, 09:59:53 am »
Just to be totally clear, do I understand correctly that you evaluate risk of undercollateralization as very low?
I do believe undercollatarlization must be avoided at all costs!
But I also realize that
a) black swan isn't as bad as world armageddon, but in fact can be recovered through BSIP18 and
b) the risk of *OVER-ALL* undercollateralization is much smaller than the risk of an individual position going below 100% collateral.

Point b) is very crucial to understand and while I do not believe we should bail out individual short positions with too little collateral (but instead would rather penalize
them), I do see a fine line between risking the entire asset through global settlement just because of a single position being undercollateralized and temporarily tune
price feeds to potentially "hide" a few undercollateralized positions (that will have a margin call that can be filled!).

Again, to me, this is a short-term solution and I would prefer any undercollateralization to be *obvisous* and *transparent*, but we first need to fix the backend to provide us
with the necessary means to get there. In the mean time, plenty of discussion is being done to figure out the "how"
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