Even if there was a promise of no inflation, it would be irrelevant because the authority in a DAC lies with the delegates, and nowhere else. If elected delegates decide to hard fork to inflate, and no majority or significant minority of stakeholders oppose them, then it will happen regardless of any promises made earlier. The purpose of a DAC is to grow in network and in value, and as it is fast becoming apparent that no inflation without a huge bootstrapped network is not competitive, then I don't think it will be difficult to gain a majority for inflation any longer.
I would say the authority of the DAC actually lies with the shareholders not the delegates, since the shareholders can always fork it and change delegates if the delegates decide to take over the DAC and refuse to follow the wishes of the shareholders.
Also, you said "and no majority or significant minority of stakeholders oppose them." That is the problem. I think there is a majority of BTSX holders who oppose dilution, or maybe it's just a significant minority now because all of this discussion initiated by bytemaster has scared BTSX holders straight
. Then again, I and no one else really knows that. This is why we need a quantifiable mechanism of determining the consensus of the shareholders. That's my cue to plug my proposals
here,
here,
here, and
here.
P.S. I like your merger and acquisition discussion
here. I have a similar discussion but regarding a DAC
splitting into two instead of two DACs merging together. For either process, delegate proposals with shareholder ratification would seriously help with the process and would allow a consensus of the shareholders to be determined to know if they actually approved of such significant actions.