I think the marketing initiative behind this delegate is good, I think your intentions are pure, and I also think that it is reasonable that you want to spread the risk of registering a paid delegate. However, the bonus is setting a bad precedent. Giving a bonus is essentially equivalent to buying votes, directly with the shareholder subsidies that these purchased votes bring. While this particular bonus (+10%) is not very much, what is stopping others from giving +100% bonus? Or more? The more incentive people have to "invest" into a delegate, the more people will do so, and the more guaranteed votes there will be.
This is a slippery slope that we do not want to ride down.
The risk of creating a delegate is on the shoulder of the creator, however the risk of electing a paid delegate is on the shoulders of 100% of the stakeholders. Offloading the creator's risk onto a small subset of the shareholders while simultaneously offering them a bonus reward for this risk creates an imbalance of incentives, and makes the shares of every shareholder who did not "invest" in a paid delegate who was elected this way redistributed to those who did "invest".
At first glance you might think, "well, if they are not elected, then the invested shares of every delegate investor are then redistributed to the rest of the shareholders!". This is true, however since delegate investors have incentive to vote in these bonus-giving delegates, as well as lobby for their election; they have "guaranteed votes".
Consider this post as an immune system reaction. Set a precedent and remove the bonus.