Author Topic: BitShares Development Fund using Adhoc Random Boards  (Read 463 times)

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Offline bitmarley

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BitShares Development Fund using Adhoc Random Boards
« on: July 18, 2015, 01:39:25 pm »
I read the paper posted at
https://www.reddit.com/r/BitShares/comments/3dhxda/self_managing_using_adhoc_random_boards_as_a/

There was a section therein which described crowd funders maintaining control of funds using a protocol of randomized juries. This sounds excellent especially since control is weighted by Stake. I'd be willing to contribute to such a fund for BitShares development if it existed. Basically it sounds like funders could maintain control over expenses through a system of rolling randomized juries that act as a temporary board for authorizing fund transactions. The end of the paper mentions an idea to extend bitcoin multi-signature accounts to be controlled by rolling juries/boards. Will someone do this with bitcoin and beat us to the punch? Is there anyone else that thinks BitShares could benefit by implementing such a protocol?


Offline BunkerChainLabs-DataSecurityNode

Re: BitShares Development Fund using Adhoc Random Boards
« Reply #1 on: July 18, 2015, 02:38:13 pm »
I read the paper posted at
https://www.reddit.com/r/BitShares/comments/3dhxda/self_managing_using_adhoc_random_boards_as_a/

There was a section therein which described crowd funders maintaining control of funds using a protocol of randomized juries. This sounds excellent especially since control is weighted by Stake. I'd be willing to contribute to such a fund for BitShares development if it existed. Basically it sounds like funders could maintain control over expenses through a system of rolling randomized juries that act as a temporary board for authorizing fund transactions. The end of the paper mentions an idea to extend bitcoin multi-signature accounts to be controlled by rolling juries/boards. Will someone do this with bitcoin and beat us to the punch? Is there anyone else that thinks BitShares could benefit by implementing such a protocol?

We are more likely to have the technology in time.. but the term 'beat us' is relative to whom ever might choose to make sure an offering on 2.0. It is going to be a 3rd party offering using the 2.0 platform for this. So if we really want to see something like this come to life, best to start assembling the team and putting plans together that incorporates BitShares.

Just thinking out loud.. it might even call for a separate chain if we want to not make them randomized but voted in members.. another 101 so to speak of 'witnesses' that would act as a board.

Or save the trouble of going through all that, and perhaps work with already trusted witnesses in bitshares... create a worker proposal that would make witnesses part of this board directive for funds... maybe more likely delegates on second thought.  Anyways.. there are options.. but the bottom line is getting a team together to plan and execute.
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Offline bitmarley

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Re: BitShares Development Fund using Adhoc Random Boards
« Reply #2 on: July 18, 2015, 03:59:25 pm »
Also just thinking out loud.......the interesting thing I liked about the protocol described in the paper was that since the voting boards are adhoc and changing randomly only a few stakeholders need to contribute at any time. The existing voting requires all stakeholders to be interested all the time in order to deliver voting that produces the best results. This is unrealistic as all stake holders can't always pay attention to who are the best delegates. But instead if I can commit to occasionally sharing the effort along with others who have a significant BTS stake to vote, then analysis behind voting will be much higher quality. In this way good delegates/projects/expenses should quickly be funded. And bad ones should always be quickly rejected.

For example, you need to get your bunker mining delegates voted up. But probably a lot of stake holders are out of reach or don't have time to prioritize to analyzing your offer and voting for your delegates even though its in their best interest. With the randomized boards described in the paper a group of stake holders could could have a random group of 10 or so (it says board sizes are customized) to control their votes. So these 10 board members who temporarily represent a large block of BTS stake holders and have immediate authority for a large voting block.

So as a delegate you can now directly communicate with a small group of decision makers to present your offer for faster access to funds. You wouldn't need to spend so much effort to "get the word out". The stake holders benefit too because good opportunities are not missed due to the analysis work load of voting.