I don't think anyone is ignoring his *valid* points. I have yet to see acknowledgement of the counter arguments to his proposal which are ALSO based on game theory.
All your counter arguments are from the POV of the well behaved witness, not from the perspective of the adversary - this even extends to your argument that securing the DPOS blockchain costs X times less than in POW therefore it is X times more efficient, when the actuality is that just costs X times less to attack it.
POS, for all its flaws, has a maximal game theoretical disadvantage to an adversary being the best block producer - they have the most to lose and yet can attack the most easily. In DPOS, such an attack can cost 0, in the case where a block producer has social engineered their way into power.
I have made arguments for why there would be no incentive for well behaved witness. Providing incentive for good behavior is at least as important as providing distinctive for bad behavior. Let remove all of the smoke and mirrors and simply assume the following:
1. To be a witness you must pay $300 per month
2. If you misbehave then you must pay $100,000
How many witnesses would sign up? How secure would the network be? This is what has been proposed to be more secure. Sure the $300 you must pay are in OPPORTUNITY COST but opportunity cost cannot be ignored.
The cost to attack POW is not the cost they advertize ($414K per day for BTC). The cost to attack any system is to attack at its weakest link, not its strongest. For $18,000 per day in transaction fees you could completely cripple the bitcoin network until all of the wallets out there raised fees. Then once they raise fees you pull off your attack until the wallet providers lower fees... then attack again. For $18,000 per day you could easily make competing mining pools unprofitable.
So the argument that it costs X times less to attack it is wrong on its face. What does it cost to "attack" a swiss bank and get them to change their policy to censor/limit transfers?
You must compare COST to ATTACK vs VALUE of DAMAGE. VALUE of DAMAGE is measured by how long the attack can be sustained and how costly it is to recover.
The COST to ATTACK BTC may be $18,000 per day, but the attack can continue indefinitely. As the attack progresses the value of BTC will fall which will make the attack cheaper to maintain.
In DPOS the COST of a DIRECT attack is much higher $1.5M dollars for BitShares 0.9 to gain control of all delegates via "frontal attack" compared with going after 51% of BTC.
In DPOS2 the COST of a DIRECT attack is even higher due to proxy voting and collateral voting raising the barrier
The cost to attack BTS2 is the cost of getting a TRUSTED community member to TURN on the community. While some men/women are easily bought, other men/women have integrity that cannot be bought.
The cost to attack BTC is the cost of getting a TRUSTED mining pool operator to TURN.
If we assume that the cost of getting a mining pool to turn is similar to getting a witness to turn, then the fact that we have more witnesses means it costs more to get 50%
We know that many mining pools charge 0% while others charge 1%. At 1% with 20% of BTC the mining pool has INCOME of $50K per month, but also has expenses.
What we can conclude from this is that if witnesses had a combined income equal to that of the mining pools, then the cost to corrupt them would be the same.
If we keep witness pay at 50,000 BTS per month (as proposed) and had 17 witnesses (as proposed) and BTS grew to be the size of BTC then they would each earn over $70K per month with far lower expenses.
From this I can conclude that the security of DPOS is greater while the cost is LESS which makes if much more efficient.
Topic: Best Selling Option (Read 24845 times)
