Author Topic: Proxy: xeroc  (Read 27365 times)

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Offline pc

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #120 on: September 18, 2018, 12:05:25 pm »
What was your voting for BSIP42 ?

He's currently voting FOR the proposal. http://cryptofresh.com/ballots
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Offline Thul3

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #121 on: September 18, 2018, 12:44:24 pm »
Is it true that you were weeks before informed about the plan to remove global settlement and didn't talked about it to the community ?
That you guys are deciding it in a small circle ?

Offline xeroc

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #122 on: September 18, 2018, 03:12:10 pm »
Is it true that you were weeks before informed about the plan to remove global settlement and didn't talked about it to the community ?
That you guys are deciding it in a small circle ?
I told you (in a PM) the same story I tell everyone: if they want my vote they need to ask in public. I dont do backdoor deals and you very well know that, unless you forgot.

Furthermore, please show me where i made a comment about removal of global settlement other than in this post. The topic was raised to me 4 days ago and I have not taken any time to even built an opinion about it as i am on vacation and do not read up on everyones opinion.

My opinion about Bsip42 has been expressed here in the forums. You can find it in my posting history. If you dont know how, please ask the community, they'll gladly point it out to you.

In the meantime, i am back to vacation.
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Offline Thul3

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #123 on: September 18, 2018, 03:35:49 pm »
I'm asking cause another comitee member claimed something diffrent on telegram

Offline JohnR

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #124 on: September 24, 2018, 11:09:18 pm »
Xeroc, I hope you enjoy your vacation.

Thul3, in a DM to me as well you quoted an anonymous 'witness'.  For the benefit of everyone in the community I suggest you be more specific with your assertions.  Most on the committee are hard working people who want the best for BTS.  I give everyone the benefit of the doubt, and it's hard to get far without knowing more details.

Offline edward freeman

Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #125 on: September 26, 2018, 08:17:43 am »
Have a great vacation XEROC!

Offline xeroc

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #126 on: September 26, 2018, 11:28:22 am »
I have just voted for @roelandp's worker for sponsorship of steemfest3. This far, I am not sure I can make it there, but from previous experience, I am convinced steemfest3 will be a wonderful event.
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Offline Thul3

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #127 on: September 27, 2018, 07:04:04 pm »

Offline xeroc

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #128 on: October 01, 2018, 07:22:32 am »
At this point, I decided to withdraw my support from witnesses to that feed BSIP42 to bitUSD. This will happen later this week so there is sufficient time for witnesses to
evaluate their individual situation.

(https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27203.msg322845#msg322845)

My thinking is quite easy, I (as a proxy) gave an approval to BSIP42 in the premise that it would be limited to bitCNY for now (in fact I wanted it to named explicitly in the BSIP - which unfortunately didn't happen).
The reason is that I can only acknowledge the fact that the Chinese community apparently wants to experiment with bitCNY which is "their native token" - they know their own markets much better than I do
and I have mostly seen support for BSIP42 from the chinese community so far.

bitUSD is a different beast though. There are many opponents (me included) about running BSIP42 on bitUSD. Not only because there is no real on-off-ramp for bitUSD into fiat USD but also because
it is a less liquid market. I am not convinced it would work well there.

Also, BSIP42, to me is a short term "patch" at best. It forces a price onto the markets instead of providing incentives to the market. Knowing how nuBits failed with such an approach
I would argue that we should do better.

That said, i still support the BSIP42 worker because it want the Chinese community to continue their experiment on bitCNY and chose to instead withdraw my vote
from witnesses that push BSIP42 onto bitUSD.

How to go forward (IMHO):
While BSIP42 is a rather harsh approach that seems to work well (for bitCNY), I would try another experiment and allow witnesses to leverage the "maintainance
collateral ratio" (MCR). In my (and other people's) mind, when there is a premium, we see too little supply and reducing the MCR would allow
"cheaper" creation of bitUSD. While if there is a negative premium, there is oversupply and the MCR could be raised to reduce the supply (potentially through
margin calls).
The only drawbacks I currently see are:
- shorters need to watch their collateral more actively because their position could be called even if the price is not moving
- there is a backend issue that currently prevents this approaach from being effective/fair

The fact that MCR cannot be lower than 100.1% is _NOT_ a drawback because bitassets are supposed to always be backed
by at least 100% reserves. Removing settlement would not make sense here. Removing black swan/global settlement would
not be required (make sense) either.

To further improve bitassets, I would recommend to lose then limits of the "short protection ratio" in case a call position goes
below a collateral ratio of .. say 130% to force the margin call to buy into the entire market not just up to 10%. This would be an
additional penalty to those that don't even bother keeping their collateral ratio sane.
« Last Edit: October 02, 2018, 08:46:15 am by xeroc »
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Offline binggo

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #129 on: October 01, 2018, 08:12:35 am »
How to go forward (IMHO):
While BSIP42 is a rather harsh approach that seems to work well (for bitCNY), I would try another experiment and allow witnesses to leverage the "maintainance
collateral ratio" (MCR). In my (and other people's) mind, when there is a premium, we see too little supply and reducing the MCR would allow
"cheaper" creation of bitUSD. While if there is a negative premium, there is oversupply and the MCR could be raised to reduce the supply (potentially through
margin calls).
The only drawbacks I currently see are:
- shorters need to watch their collateral more actively because their position could be called even if the price is not moving
- there is a backend issue that currently prevents this approaach from being effective/fair

I don't think this is a good idea to allow witnesses to leverage the "maintainance collateral ratio" (MCR), it can't help the bitassets to grow and the wintnesses didn't have the ability to guess the market any time,no one can.

Leveraging the MCR is very dangerous like the feed BSIP42.

We have the force settlement, why not to use it flexible?

The 110% MSSR is the main problem for the bitassets, not the MCR.

The feed BSIP42 is adjustting the MSSR dynamically indeed, not the MCR like said.

If we didn't have a new method to solve and prevent the black swan, some changes is very dangerous and  immature.

If we didn't have a new method to make sure feed price reaction the real market price or Fair Price, some changes is very dangerous and  immature too.
« Last Edit: October 01, 2018, 08:37:03 am by binggo »

Offline sahkan

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #130 on: October 01, 2018, 08:32:12 am »
I will be short:

I started to feed BSIP42 on BitUSD mostly because majority of witnesses started to do the same. Few hours ago in the witness chat Bitcrab told everyone that they will start removing votes for witnesses that do not support BSIP42 starting with spring-team, but in reality their votes do not match the BSIP42 BitUSD witnesses.

My personal stand: I am AGAINST BSIP42 on BitUSD clearly puts BitUSD holders at an disadvantage and effectively wipes out their ability to convert their BitUSD to BTS and a true face value. BitUSD creators have their call price always ABOVE the current market price (black swan if they don't sell?)

My stand as a witness: On Friday I will go with whatever the community decides. But for now since spring-team already removed a vote from my witness, I will remove BSIP42 from BitUSD and support xeroc's stand.
« Last Edit: October 01, 2018, 05:23:39 pm by sahkan »

Offline xeroc

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #131 on: October 01, 2018, 09:04:00 am »
I don't think this is a good idea to allow witnesses to leverage the "maintainance collateral ratio" (MCR), it can't help the bitassets to grow and the wintnesses didn't have the ability to guess the market any time,no one can.
I disagree, or at least, I cannot agree. No one ever tried experimenting with the MCR, so we simply do not know
if it will work or not. I believe it is worth a try and can help reduce the premium.

Leveraging the MCR is very dangerous like the feed BSIP42.
It is only dangerous to those that are short and do not monitor their position, as it should be.

We have the force settlement, why not to use it flexible?
Not sure what you mean with "flexible". If you are proposing to add another "price" just for settlement, then
I believe you haven't thought through the consequences with respect to arbitrage that could exploit two
different price feeds. If you mean something else, please elaborate.

The 110% MSSR is the main problem for the bitassets, not the MCR.
I respectfully disagree. The MSSR is meant to protect shorts from paying to much in the
case they get margin called. This limit is supposed to be effective in illiquid markets.
bitCNY:BTS is far from illiquit and MSSR should IMHO not be the major problem. Those
not maintaining their collateral are the problem and they risk paying a premium.
In crypto, paying a premium of 10% pay not be "sufficient" incentive to maintain the ratio
hence why I propose to remove the MSSR entirely for positions that literally *fail* to
maintain the ratio @ less than 150% (or so).

The feed BSIP42 is adjustting the MSSR dynamically indeed, not the MCR like said.
I don't see how changing MSSR affects anything ..

If we didn't have a new method to solve and prevent the black swan, some changes is very dangerous and  immature.
We do have BSIP18 - preventing black swan is not an option unless you accept running fractional reserver, which i do not.

If we didn't have a new method to make sure feed price reaction the real market price or Fair Price, some changes is very dangerous and  immature too.
Yes, I want the price feed to be "closer" to the fair price and I want the traded price to be closer to the real price too (low premiums) and ideally, all of that with
a small spread.

Ultimately, there are two goals bitassets tried to achieve and have promised in the last years:
1) settlement at a fair price ("fair" as in 5% 'fee' but at least a transparent price)
2) full collateralization (as in >100% - maybe even signifiantly more than >100)

I do see a need to reduce the costs for generating supply so that shorters can sell into the market and reduce the premium - hence reduced MCR. *OF COURSE*, the MCR shouldn't be lowered too much.


All I am saying is that I want another experiment ..
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Offline binggo

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #132 on: October 01, 2018, 09:28:40 am »
Quote
I disagree, or at least, I cannot agree. No one ever tried experimenting with the MCR, so we simply do not know
if it will work or not. I believe it is worth a try and can help reduce the premium.

The MSSR lead the premium,not the MCR,if you change MSSR to 105% or 103%, you will find a different premium.

Quote
It is only dangerous to those that are short and do not monitor their position, as it should be.
It is dangerous to the whole bitasset, not only the short, it's not a experiment.

Quote
Not sure what you mean with "flexible". If you are proposing to add another "price" just for settlement, then
I believe you haven't thought through the consequences with respect to arbitrage that could exploit two
different price feeds. If you mean something else, please elaborate.
no, the feed price didn't change , just reaction the fair price. we can design a quick force settlement fuction to instead of the margin call for to the shorter which below 175%, and make a dynamically force settlement offset(like min -2%) to the shorter which below 175%.

Quote
I respectfully disagree. The MSSR is meant to protect shorts from paying to much in the
case they get margin called. This limit is supposed to be effective in illiquid markets.
bitCNY:BTS is far from illiquit and MSSR should IMHO not be the major problem. Those
not maintaining their collateral are the problem and they risk paying a premium.
In crypto, paying a premium of 10% pay not be "sufficient" incentive to maintain the ratio
hence why I propose to remove the MSSR entirely for positions that literally *fail* to
maintain the ratio @ less than 150% (or so).

The 110% MSSR is destroy the depth of the market, and Serious squeeze the market,make the premium up to 15%.

i don't want to argue about it,  as it happened again and again in the market.


Quote
I don't see how changing MSSR affects anything ..
you can find the relation of the price of BITNCY/bts and the bitcny feed price/MSSR, and something will clearly.

Quote
We do have BSIP18 - preventing black swan is not an option unless you accept running fractional reserver, which i do not.
BSIP18 is not a good method, you can check the BITMEX Perpetual Contracts.
 https://www.bitmex.com/app/perpetualContractsGuide

If we didn't have a new method to change MSSR, the DEX price can't be as a feed price, beacause the dex price always been squeezed by the MSSR.

and the The feed BSIP42 has some effect,but it adjust dynamically too high.
« Last Edit: October 01, 2018, 10:08:57 am by binggo »

Offline xeroc

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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #133 on: October 01, 2018, 10:08:23 am »
Provided that the UI team is looking for help with UX/UI and they now have a leason, I am in support for the Rossul worker: 1.14.124 https://www.bitshares.foundation/workers/2018-09-rossul-ui
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Re: Proxy: xeroc
« Reply #134 on: October 01, 2018, 10:09:20 am »
At this point, I decided to withdraw my support from witnesses to that feed BSIP42 to bitUSD. This will happen later this week so there is sufficient time for witnesses to
evaluate their individual situation.


My thinking is quite easy, I (as a proxy) gave an approval to BSIP42 in the premise that it would be limited to bitCNY for now (in fact I wanted it to named explicitly in the BSIP - which unfortunately didn't happen).
The reason is that I can only acknowledge the fact that the Chinese community apparently wants to experiment with bitCNY which is "their native token" - they know their own markets much better than I do
and I have mostly seen support for BSIP42 from the chinese community so far.

bitUSD is a different beast though. There are many opponents (me included) about running BSIP42 on bitUSD. Not only because there is no real on-off-ramp for bitUSD into fiat USD but also because
it is a less liquid market. I am not convinced it would work well there.

Also, BSIP42, to me is a short term "patch" at best. It forces a price onto the markets instead of providing incentives to the market. Knowing how nuBits failed with such an approach
I would argue that we should do better.

NuBits has failed due to its pure botting framework which highly exposes to risks when trend changes. We're far different.

BSIP42 DOES provide incentives to the market. When bitUSD is at premium, settlement price is adjusted to higher (note: all price in my comment is X bitUSD per BTS) than trading price, borrowers are encouraged to borrow more bitUSD and sell into existence thus helps the peg, because it's less likely to be margin called. It's not setting trading price, instead, trading is free.


Quote
That said, i still support the BSIP42 worker because it want the Chinese community to continue their experiment on bitCNY and chose to instead withdraw my vote
from witnesses that push BSIP42 onto bitUSD.

How to go forward (IMHO):
While BSIP42 is a rather harsh approach that seems to work well (for bitCNY), I would try another experiment and allow witnesses to leverage the "maintainance
collateral ratio" (MCR). In my (and other people's) mind, when there is a premium, we see too little supply and reducing the MCR would allow
"cheaper" creation of bitUSD. While if there is a negative premium, there is oversupply and the MCR could be raised to reduce the supply (potentially through
margin calls).
The only drawbacks I currently see are:
- shorters need to watch their collateral more actively because their position could be called even if the price is not moving
- there is a backend issue that currently prevents this approaach from being effective/fair

The fact that MCR cannot be lower than 100.1% is _NOT_ a drawback because bitassets are supposed to always be backed
by at least 100% reserves. Removing settlement would not make sense here. Removing black swan/global settlement would
not be required (make sense) either.

When talking about "make sense" you only provided conclusions but no valid argument in regards to why it makes sense or not.

Quote

To further improve bitassets, I would recommend to lose then limits of the "short protection ratio" in case a call position goes
below a collateral ratio of .. say 130% to force the margin call to buy into the entire market not just up to 10%. This would be an
additional penalty to those that don't even bother keeping their collateral ratio sane.

As mentioned in BSIP42, applying a modifier to settlement price is effectively same as applying a modifier to MCR, MSSR and force_settlement_offset at same time.

When the modifier is greater than 10%, MSSR is effectively adjusted to less than 100% thus margin calls is avoided at all, thus reduced sell pressure (of collateral), thus reduced bitUSD premium, because selling BTS is buying bitUSD which pushes up the premium. Your proposal about increasing MSSR will lead to more consumption to market depth thus IMHO doesn't help the peg.

On the other hand, reducing MCR does effectively increase of possibility of black swan, it's no difference than increasing settlement price.

The only difference I can see is adjusting MCR and etc provides more transparency than adjusting settlement price, while effectively it's the same. The cons are also obvious: they can not be adjusted to less than 100% when needed as (IMHO) proven on bitCNY.

Quote
The MSSR is meant to protect shorts from paying to much in the
case they get margin called. This limit is supposed to be effective in illiquid markets.
bitCNY:BTS is far from illiquit and MSSR should IMHO not be the major problem.

Margin calls not protected by MSSR DID greatly suppress liquidity. Increasing MSSR in a downtrend DOES harm the peg. It IS one of the major problems.
« Last Edit: October 01, 2018, 10:27:55 am by abit »
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