Competiting at 1-1 on negative fees?

[Empirical1.2]

I am trying to formulate the content of my

"A case for Demurrage bitUSD" thread.

It has some common elements (as well as some differences) from what you are thinking about in this OP, so I for one do not find it 'dumb' on the opposite I have extended much further some of the ideas expressed here.

 

  thanks, cool 

[tonyk]

I am trying to formulate the content of my

"A case for Demurrage bitUSD" thread.

It has some common elements (as well as some differences) from what you are thinking about in this OP, so I for one do not find it 'dumb' on the opposite I have extended much further some of the ideas expressed here.

 

[Empirical1.2]

This might be dumb but would immediately payable bonuses/negative fees incentivise more trading than just offering to buy above the peg?

Idea

Participants can only buy BitUSD at exactly 1-1

Participants can only sell/short BitUSD at exactly 1-1.

No forced settlement (Or much lower like 0.95)

Participants compete on the negative fee they are willing to offer the other side & the order book is ranked accordingly.

Example

I want to buy BitUSD but there are no sellers at 1-1
There is already $1000 of BitUSD buy orders with zero bonus at 1-1
I offer to buy $100 of BitUSD with a 1% bonus.
My order goes to the top of the order book and would be filled first.
Whoever sold/Shorted BitUSD to me would receive a 1% immediate bonus/negative fee.

Subsidising liquidity

If BitShares wants to subsidize liquidity they can add to the existing bonuses/negative fees offered by market participants.

Example

BTS could offer 0.3% a day on $33 000 worth of BitUSD, ($100 daily cost) This would mean if you sold or shorted USD at 1-1 you would receive the bonus offered by the BitUSD buyer and an additional 0.3%.