Author Topic: Paper about Economics of Blockchain  (Read 2041 times)

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Offline xeroc

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Offline Samupaha

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Here is two more:

Blockchains and the Boundaries of Self-Organized Economies: Predictions for the Future of Banking

Abstract:     
This chapter uses economic theory to explore the implications of the blockchain technology on the future of banking. We apply an economic analysis of blockchains based on both new institutional economics and public choice economics. Our main focus is on the economics of why banks exist as organizations (rather than a world in which all financial transactions occurring in markets), and how banks are then impacted by technological change that affects transaction costs. Our core argument is that blockchains are more than just a new technology to be applied by banks, but rather compete with banks as organizations, enabling banking transactions to shift out of centralized hierarchical organizations and back into decentralized markets. Blockchains are a new institutional technology — because of how they affect transaction costs in financial markets — that will fundamentally re-order the governance of the production of banking services. We then explore this implication through broader political economy lens in which banking moves out of organizations and deeper into markets. We examine this as a form of institutional economic evolution in which the boundary of catallaxy — i.e., a self-organized economy — is enlarged, at the margin of the banking sector. Such institutional competition enables evolutionary discovery in the institutions of banking.

Cryptosecession and the limits of taxation: Towards a theory of non-territorial internal exit

Abstract:
This paper presents a model of partial internal exit that captures the competitive dynamic between incumbent and potential governments in a non-territorial political system. This model particularly applies to the case of ‘cryptosecession’ that appears the most likely avenue for non-territorial decentralisation to ever eventuate. It demonstrates how fiscal exploitation is reduced and eventually eliminated as the capability of citizens to move to non-territorial jurisdictions increases. When interpreted as a model of cryptosecession, it shows how the balance of citizen opacity and government legibility determines the balance of fiscal exploitation versus equivalence.

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Offline Samupaha

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Really interesting stuff!

Economics of Blockchain

Sinclair Davidson
RMIT University - School of Economics, Finance and Marketing

Primavera De Filippi
Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas

Jason Potts
RMIT University

March 8, 2016

Abstract:     
Claims blockchain is more than just ICT innovation, but facilitates new types of economic organization and governance. Suggests two approaches to economics of blockchain: innovation-centred and governance-centred. Argues that the governance approach — based in new institutional economics and public choice economics — is most promising, because it models blockchain as a new technology for creating spontaneous organizations, i.e. new types of economies. Illustrates this with a case study of the Ethereum-based infrastructure protocol and platform Backfeed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23