Steem dollar is more liquid than BitUSD. We should copy it's key feature.

[unicow]

When bitcoin will down?
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[JonnyB]

Was there a BSIP submitted for this proposal on github?

a) worker requests payment with bitUSD (keeping it simple is good)
b) reserve fund of BTS is used in entirety as collateral to create amount of bitUSD necessary for payouts (no fixed ratio)
c) fees set in bitUSD to pay off debt, also payable in BTS rate determined through price feed conversion that add to reserve fund collateral (no market use necessary)

if forced settling occurs for any reason, you still have BTS so nothing changes, keep borrowing to create only what's necessary

done

Hey this makes a lot of sense to me, others will argue with you.

Tricky bit would implementing it technically and getting it voted for.

[moinyoin]

Was there a BSIP submitted for this proposal on github?

a) worker requests payment with bitUSD (keeping it simple is good)
b) reserve fund of BTS is used in entirety as collateral to create amount of bitUSD necessary for payouts (no fixed ratio)
c) fees set in bitUSD to pay off debt, also payable in BTS rate determined through price feed conversion that add to reserve fund collateral (no market use necessary)

if forced settling occurs for any reason, you still have BTS so nothing changes, keep borrowing to create only what's necessary

done

[mranderson]

The more volume of anything on the DEX can only help in the long run.   Paying interest to large stake holders does work, look at what it did for Dash and their masternodes.  Keeping 75% of total supply bonded in a voluntary transparent way offers much needed comfort/trust and it really does buffer the huge sell pressure the centralized exchanges (all incentive for DEX to fail) can inflict on a newly budding BTS market bull run.

Increasing our total supply in bitUSD makes sense because it is the most well known fiat across the globe, which for 99% of the world that thinks about value with those terms we should exploit it.  We all know fiat's days are numbered, but what other platform could serve a better bridge for the masses.  I would be happy to collateralize all my BTS and increase MM in all top markets if I knew I would get a little interest on the effort and would think would even feel better about selling other crypto when I normally wouldn't.

Another option is going after other well known fiats that are not often paired with BTC like GBP.  Although with Tether starting to unravel, having bitUSD there with a big exit sign (Large liquidity) ready seems the more prudent thing at this time.

All in all the witnesses stand to benefit the most from the increase in BTS value.  So it seems logical that Witnesses could show their strong belief and support in BitShares by storing  bit***  in their account.  We as voters could start to look at things like that and adjust our votes accordingly.   The higher the BTS held on the DEX in collateral BitUSD (or whatever) means the weaker competing centralized exchange capital power has manipulating BTS.  We just need to breakthrough the liquidity threshold in several markets before the slow trickle of new users becomes a massive flood into the DEX.  The banking pressure/friction being applied to central exchanges right now is making it the perfect opportunity to work together to use one of BitShares unique features to solve a massive problem for the traders who have no interest in going back into fiat (although they really can on the DEX as well).

[logart]

taking out the leverage talk out of this thread....

What you guys think of, my idea to increase liquidity to all bit-assets. With the hard fork Original Poster was suggesting but instead of only favoring the Bitusd asset, it would favor all Bit-assets.

[yvv]

There are no inherent obstacles in bts which prevent to offer 100-300x leverage. Markets are just too shallow for this at the moment.
 

To do that though, wouldn't the committee need to drop the MCR and sqpr well below 1? That greatly​ increases the risk to the bitasset holder. It basically puts the bitasset holder in the position of the broker.

MCR=1 gives you infinite leverage. You deposit 1 USD, short it for 1 USD worth of BTS (let's ignore fees, slippage etc), borrow 1 bitUSD, short it for 1 USD worth of BTS, borrow another bitUSD, short it ... and so on infinite number of times. We don't want this to happen, that's why we have MCR > 1. But, with MCR=1.75 a safe collateral ratio is somewhere around 2x, and you don't have a leverage anymore at this CR (for 1 USD invested your can short 1 bitUSD maximum). If BTS price moves up, you still make more profit if you short bitUSD, than if you just buy and keep BTS, but this profit does not outwheight the risk you take at short position. If we want to attract shorters, we need to offer at least same leverage as poloniex offers (they require 1.4x collateral to open position (2.5x leverage) and allow it to go down all the way to 1.2x).

[lil_jay890]

If any DEV seeing this, please we need this feature, If we want mass adoption in our DEX we need to have enough liquidity for all stable fiat assets, we will never see mass adoption if we rely only on users to create BITusd or BitCNY .

In fact, I'm proposing that the BTS blockchain automatically creates and pays an equal or fixed amount of value diversified in all Bit-assets. Not just in BitUSD. That way there will be liquidity distributed among all the Bit-assets too, we want liquidity in BitGold, BitSilver, BitEUR, BitUSD, bitCNY, Bitbtc. Witnesses and workers should like the idea too because they are incentivized in diversified assets and they know that diversification is the best and recommended way to store the value of money. And if in the future the more bit-assets are added to DEX like BitCHF or BitMXN,  etc the more diversification they will get

Bitshares is really appealing for traders but traders search two main things when choosing a broker liquidity and leverage. Leverage is also important for traders in Forex because Forex currencies only move less than a cent sometimes so there's logically the need of leverage to make a profit. 100-500X leverage is needed in forex. 3-10X is only needed in cryptos because they are far more volatile.

While I agree that in order to attract traders, you need to offer leverage, I don't believe this should be offered "on chain".

In the current forex market, it's the brokers that are offering the traders leverage.  Leverage is actually a tool that they exploit to make money since they know 90% of traders who use high leverage end up blowing up their accounts. The brokers  that allow 100x leverage don't pass the clients orders to the actual market, they take the opposite side of the trade and pocket any spreads or commissions as well as all the clients cash when they blow up from over leveraging.  It's a business plan that has worked for decades.

Bitshares is not designed to act as a broker and offer leverage. Not only are the mechanics to process the leveraged trade not present, but the risk management protocol would also need to be developed. All brokers have the possibility of blowing up in extreme market conditions, and I don't believe bts should be taking those risks. Bitshares needs to continue to act as an exchange like the nasdaq, and hopefully start making money off of fees.  Let third parties come in and offer leverage off chain.

Check out bitAssets dude, they do offer you leverage right "on chain", with no broker. Yes, short position with 1.75 collateral gives you 1.33x leverage, do your math. This 1.33x can be easily increased to at least what poloniex offers by bringing MCR down to 1.4.

Sorry dude.  I was addressing the post that mentioned 100-300 times leverage and that bts is not designed to offer that. And it shouldn't be adapted to try to compete with those brokers.

You are right though, bts does offer limited leverage

There are no inherent obstacles in bts which prevent to offer 100-300x leverage. Markets are just too shallow for this at the moment.
 

To do that though, wouldn't the committee need to drop the MCR and sqpr well below 1? That greatly​ increases the risk to the bitasset holder. It basically puts the bitasset holder in the position of the broker.

[yvv]

If any DEV seeing this, please we need this feature, If we want mass adoption in our DEX we need to have enough liquidity for all stable fiat assets, we will never see mass adoption if we rely only on users to create BITusd or BitCNY .

In fact, I'm proposing that the BTS blockchain automatically creates and pays an equal or fixed amount of value diversified in all Bit-assets. Not just in BitUSD. That way there will be liquidity distributed among all the Bit-assets too, we want liquidity in BitGold, BitSilver, BitEUR, BitUSD, bitCNY, Bitbtc. Witnesses and workers should like the idea too because they are incentivized in diversified assets and they know that diversification is the best and recommended way to store the value of money. And if in the future the more bit-assets are added to DEX like BitCHF or BitMXN,  etc the more diversification they will get

Bitshares is really appealing for traders but traders search two main things when choosing a broker liquidity and leverage. Leverage is also important for traders in Forex because Forex currencies only move less than a cent sometimes so there's logically the need of leverage to make a profit. 100-500X leverage is needed in forex. 3-10X is only needed in cryptos because they are far more volatile.

While I agree that in order to attract traders, you need to offer leverage, I don't believe this should be offered "on chain".

In the current forex market, it's the brokers that are offering the traders leverage.  Leverage is actually a tool that they exploit to make money since they know 90% of traders who use high leverage end up blowing up their accounts. The brokers  that allow 100x leverage don't pass the clients orders to the actual market, they take the opposite side of the trade and pocket any spreads or commissions as well as all the clients cash when they blow up from over leveraging.  It's a business plan that has worked for decades.

Bitshares is not designed to act as a broker and offer leverage. Not only are the mechanics to process the leveraged trade not present, but the risk management protocol would also need to be developed. All brokers have the possibility of blowing up in extreme market conditions, and I don't believe bts should be taking those risks. Bitshares needs to continue to act as an exchange like the nasdaq, and hopefully start making money off of fees.  Let third parties come in and offer leverage off chain.

Check out bitAssets dude, they do offer you leverage right "on chain", with no broker. Yes, short position with 1.75 collateral gives you 1.33x leverage, do your math. This 1.33x can be easily increased to at least what poloniex offers by bringing MCR down to 1.4.

Sorry dude.  I was addressing the post that mentioned 100-300 times leverage and that bts is not designed to offer that. And it shouldn't be adapted to try to compete with those brokers.

You are right though, bts does offer limited leverage

There are no inherent obstacles in bts which prevent to offer 100-300x leverage. Markets are just too shallow for this at the moment.
 

[lil_jay890]

If any DEV seeing this, please we need this feature, If we want mass adoption in our DEX we need to have enough liquidity for all stable fiat assets, we will never see mass adoption if we rely only on users to create BITusd or BitCNY .

In fact, I'm proposing that the BTS blockchain automatically creates and pays an equal or fixed amount of value diversified in all Bit-assets. Not just in BitUSD. That way there will be liquidity distributed among all the Bit-assets too, we want liquidity in BitGold, BitSilver, BitEUR, BitUSD, bitCNY, Bitbtc. Witnesses and workers should like the idea too because they are incentivized in diversified assets and they know that diversification is the best and recommended way to store the value of money. And if in the future the more bit-assets are added to DEX like BitCHF or BitMXN,  etc the more diversification they will get

Bitshares is really appealing for traders but traders search two main things when choosing a broker liquidity and leverage. Leverage is also important for traders in Forex because Forex currencies only move less than a cent sometimes so there's logically the need of leverage to make a profit. 100-500X leverage is needed in forex. 3-10X is only needed in cryptos because they are far more volatile.

While I agree that in order to attract traders, you need to offer leverage, I don't believe this should be offered "on chain".

In the current forex market, it's the brokers that are offering the traders leverage.  Leverage is actually a tool that they exploit to make money since they know 90% of traders who use high leverage end up blowing up their accounts. The brokers  that allow 100x leverage don't pass the clients orders to the actual market, they take the opposite side of the trade and pocket any spreads or commissions as well as all the clients cash when they blow up from over leveraging.  It's a business plan that has worked for decades.

Bitshares is not designed to act as a broker and offer leverage. Not only are the mechanics to process the leveraged trade not present, but the risk management protocol would also need to be developed. All brokers have the possibility of blowing up in extreme market conditions, and I don't believe bts should be taking those risks. Bitshares needs to continue to act as an exchange like the nasdaq, and hopefully start making money off of fees.  Let third parties come in and offer leverage off chain.

Check out bitAssets dude, they do offer you leverage right "on chain", with no broker. Yes, short position with 1.75 collateral gives you 1.33x leverage, do your math. This 1.33x can be easily increased to at least what poloniex offers by bringing MCR down to 1.4.

Sorry dude.  I was addressing the post that mentioned 100-300 times leverage and that bts is not designed to offer that. And it shouldn't be adapted to try to compete with those brokers.

You are right though, bts does offer limited leverage

[paliboy]

Check out bitAssets dude, they do offer you leverage right "on chain", with no broker. Yes, short position with 1.75 collateral gives you 1.33x leverage, do your math. This 1.33x can be easily increased to at least what poloniex offers by bringing MCR down to 1.4.

What about this:

• make the platform profitable - introduce competitive fees to bitasset markets and change network/LTM fee split ratio
• decrease MCR as much as possible (in small steps)
• use reserve pool as an insurance for bankrupt accounts

[yvv]

If any DEV seeing this, please we need this feature, If we want mass adoption in our DEX we need to have enough liquidity for all stable fiat assets, we will never see mass adoption if we rely only on users to create BITusd or BitCNY .

In fact, I'm proposing that the BTS blockchain automatically creates and pays an equal or fixed amount of value diversified in all Bit-assets. Not just in BitUSD. That way there will be liquidity distributed among all the Bit-assets too, we want liquidity in BitGold, BitSilver, BitEUR, BitUSD, bitCNY, Bitbtc. Witnesses and workers should like the idea too because they are incentivized in diversified assets and they know that diversification is the best and recommended way to store the value of money. And if in the future the more bit-assets are added to DEX like BitCHF or BitMXN,  etc the more diversification they will get

Bitshares is really appealing for traders but traders search two main things when choosing a broker liquidity and leverage. Leverage is also important for traders in Forex because Forex currencies only move less than a cent sometimes so there's logically the need of leverage to make a profit. 100-500X leverage is needed in forex. 3-10X is only needed in cryptos because they are far more volatile.

While I agree that in order to attract traders, you need to offer leverage, I don't believe this should be offered "on chain".

In the current forex market, it's the brokers that are offering the traders leverage.  Leverage is actually a tool that they exploit to make money since they know 90% of traders who use high leverage end up blowing up their accounts. The brokers  that allow 100x leverage don't pass the clients orders to the actual market, they take the opposite side of the trade and pocket any spreads or commissions as well as all the clients cash when they blow up from over leveraging.  It's a business plan that has worked for decades.

Bitshares is not designed to act as a broker and offer leverage. Not only are the mechanics to process the leveraged trade not present, but the risk management protocol would also need to be developed. All brokers have the possibility of blowing up in extreme market conditions, and I don't believe bts should be taking those risks. Bitshares needs to continue to act as an exchange like the nasdaq, and hopefully start making money off of fees.  Let third parties come in and offer leverage off chain.

Check out bitAssets dude, they do offer you leverage right "on chain", with no broker. Yes, short position with 1.75 collateral gives you 1.33x leverage, do your math. This 1.33x can be easily increased to at least what poloniex offers by bringing MCR down to 1.4.

[lil_jay890]

If any DEV seeing this, please we need this feature, If we want mass adoption in our DEX we need to have enough liquidity for all stable fiat assets, we will never see mass adoption if we rely only on users to create BITusd or BitCNY .

In fact, I'm proposing that the BTS blockchain automatically creates and pays an equal or fixed amount of value diversified in all Bit-assets. Not just in BitUSD. That way there will be liquidity distributed among all the Bit-assets too, we want liquidity in BitGold, BitSilver, BitEUR, BitUSD, bitCNY, Bitbtc. Witnesses and workers should like the idea too because they are incentivized in diversified assets and they know that diversification is the best and recommended way to store the value of money. And if in the future the more bit-assets are added to DEX like BitCHF or BitMXN,  etc the more diversification they will get

Bitshares is really appealing for traders but traders search two main things when choosing a broker liquidity and leverage. Leverage is also important for traders in Forex because Forex currencies only move less than a cent sometimes so there's logically the need of leverage to make a profit. 100-500X leverage is needed in forex. 3-10X is only needed in cryptos because they are far more volatile.

While I agree that in order to attract traders, you need to offer leverage, I don't believe this should be offered "on chain".

In the current forex market, it's the brokers that are offering the traders leverage.  Leverage is actually a tool that they exploit to make money since they know 90% of traders who use high leverage end up blowing up their accounts. The brokers  that allow 100x leverage don't pass the clients orders to the actual market, they take the opposite side of the trade and pocket any spreads or commissions as well as all the clients cash when they blow up from over leveraging.  It's a business plan that has worked for decades.

Bitshares is not designed to act as a broker and offer leverage. Not only are the mechanics to process the leveraged trade not present, but the risk management protocol would also need to be developed. All brokers have the possibility of blowing up in extreme market conditions, and I don't believe bts should be taking those risks. Bitshares needs to continue to act as an exchange like the nasdaq, and hopefully start making money off of fees.  Let third parties come in and offer leverage off chain.

[xeroc]

In fact, I'm proposing that the BTS blockchain automatically creates and pays an equal or fixed amount of value diversified in all Bit-assets. Not just in BitUSD.

Read up on yield harvesting.

I simply borrow 1M BitUSD to myself, earn interest but don't provide any liquidity to the markets. No problems solved, but non-traders make a profit.
You cannot increase liquidity but paying people to borrow bitUSD and let them sit in their accounts.

[logart]

If any DEV seeing this, please we need this feature, If we want mass adoption in our DEX we need to have enough liquidity for all stable fiat assets, we will never see mass adoption if we rely only on users to create BITusd or BitCNY .

In fact, I'm proposing that the BTS blockchain automatically creates and pays an equal or fixed amount of value diversified in all Bit-assets. Not just in BitUSD. That way there will be liquidity distributed among all the Bit-assets too, we want liquidity in BitGold, BitSilver, BitEUR, BitUSD, bitCNY, Bitbtc. Witnesses and workers should like the idea too because they are incentivized in diversified assets and they know that diversification is the best and recommended way to store the value of money. And if in the future the more bit-assets are added to DEX like BitCHF or BitMXN,  etc the more diversification they will get

Bitshares is really appealing for traders but traders search two main things when choosing a broker liquidity and leverage. Leverage is also important for traders in Forex because Forex currencies only move less than a cent sometimes so there's logically the need of leverage to make a profit. 100-500X leverage is needed in forex. 3-10X is only needed in cryptos because they are far more volatile.

[llildur]

Hi i just find this https://www.alt-m.org/2017/04/06/dollar-denominated-cryptocurrencies-flops-tethered-success/    someone in bitbay claims find a new method to make the pegged automatic but don't give any details about it.

[tbone]

No offense, but what you're describing doesn't just sound complicated, but actually is unnecessarily complicated. 

I couldn't be offended even if you said it is stupid. It is your observation and I respect that.

And it also doesn't achieve the goal of having witness payouts get automatically and seamlessly converted from BTS to bitUSD before disbursing to witnesses.

When you have a pool that self maintains preset balance it is ease to set up automatic payments from it. The main problem is how to "converted from BTS to bitUSD seamlessly" taking in consideration market forces.

It's not a problem to take market forces into consideration.  That's what the feed price is for.  It gives you the conversion rate at any given time. 

I really doubt there is any reason why conversion of BTS to bitUSD prior to paying witnesses/workers can't be automated.  But I hope @xeroc and @kenCode will chime in to help corroborate the overall feasibility of what we're talking about trying to accomplish here.

[Geneko]

No offense, but what you're describing doesn't just sound complicated, but actually is unnecessarily complicated. 

I couldn't be offended even if you said it is stupid. It is your observation and I respect that.

And it also doesn't achieve the goal of having witness payouts get automatically and seamlessly converted from BTS to bitUSD before disbursing to witnesses.

When you have a pool that self maintains preset balance it is ease to set up automatic payments from it. The main problem is how to "converted from BTS to bitUSD seamlessly" taking in consideration market forces.

[tbone]

I thought about this many times. Let me share this recent one.

Block rewards and workers are payed from reserve fund. Obvious solution would be that reserve fund gets ability to pay in MPA assets.
I am not familiar how hard proposed change would be, but for the purpose of this brainstorm lets pretend it is feasible.

It is already discussed many time so I wont repeat, but reserve fund should not be maintainer of collateral positions because it is not able to cope with market forces. But it could borrow MPAs from shareholders and traders which can. It could borrow on market established interest rate (like 5% meme) let the market decide, up to some figure, for instance two year worth of expenses(adjustable by comity).
Interests would be payed from reserve fund in BTS at feed price on hourly bases like vesting balances. The long position could be settled at any time from the reserve fund in BTS at current feed price. Everyone who want to settle MPAs could get current feed price worth of BTS from reserve fund, within 24 hour to prior notice as already defined (settle option). These acquired MPAs could burn the dept, so dept account could also have negative balance. The fact that this market opportunity has limited supply should provide additional incentive for borrowers. The liquidity would be increased slowly at a peace of about 2000 bitUSD/day.

Two years worth of expenses in bitUSD, at current price, is about 1.32 mil. It is impossible to make any predictions, but such a change could easily double the BTS price in short time.  There is inbuilt fluctuating factor in every price, including witness pay and workers price. With bitUSD price denomination for witness and workers pay, I am confident it could at least cancel additional interest expenses.
Also improve liquidity, get market adjust BTS supply, get more incentive for witness and workers, provide more transparent pricing and steady stream of fresh MPAs liquidity.

My feeling is this idea isn't simple enough to understand. A more simple and elegant implementation would be preferred.

I know it sounds little complicated but for the sake of an argument let me support it with example, how it would look like in UI, I suppose everyone is familiar with it.

Like we have "borrow" button, we could also have "lend" button. When it is pressed, new window pop up with option to fill amount and interest rate.
It could be the same as borrow option, a slider and manual fill , with same mechanics and comments like "you don't have sufficient funds", etc..
Block chain will fill order, the one with lowest interest rate (upper interest rate limit set buy commity), until upper fund limit is reached (also set by commity). After upper fund limit is reached, blockchain will fill lowest interest rate orders and borrow back upper ones.   

So for example, lets assume, upper interest rate limit is set to 20% and upper fund limit is set to 1mil bitUSD.
If I want to lend 100 bitUSD with interest rate of 5%, my order would be filled, if upper fund limit isn't reached.
After upper fund limit is reached, if there's any 40 bitUSD offered with 4.8% interest rate and my long has highest interest rate, my long would be borrowed back to me for 40 bitUSD in bitUSD, and 60 bitUSD maintained.
All the time my long position exists I would be payed bitUSD interest, from reserve fund denominated in BTS(at feed price) which will show in vesting balances. At any time I could decide to lower my interest rate, and if I decide to exit my long (partially or fully), I would be payed bitUSD worth of BTS at feed price.

Edit:
The critical part not mentioned could be as follows. When order is filled you are practically "locked" until someones outbids you or you decide to settle long position. Possible margin call would automatically trigger long settle option.

No offense, but what you're describing doesn't just sound complicated, but actually is unnecessarily complicated.  And it also doesn't achieve the goal of having witness payouts get automatically and seamlessly converted from BTS to bitUSD before disbursing to witnesses.

[Geneko]

I thought about this many times. Let me share this recent one.

Block rewards and workers are payed from reserve fund. Obvious solution would be that reserve fund gets ability to pay in MPA assets.
I am not familiar how hard proposed change would be, but for the purpose of this brainstorm lets pretend it is feasible.

It is already discussed many time so I wont repeat, but reserve fund should not be maintainer of collateral positions because it is not able to cope with market forces. But it could borrow MPAs from shareholders and traders which can. It could borrow on market established interest rate (like 5% meme) let the market decide, up to some figure, for instance two year worth of expenses(adjustable by comity).
Interests would be payed from reserve fund in BTS at feed price on hourly bases like vesting balances. The long position could be settled at any time from the reserve fund in BTS at current feed price. Everyone who want to settle MPAs could get current feed price worth of BTS from reserve fund, within 24 hour to prior notice as already defined (settle option). These acquired MPAs could burn the dept, so dept account could also have negative balance. The fact that this market opportunity has limited supply should provide additional incentive for borrowers. The liquidity would be increased slowly at a peace of about 2000 bitUSD/day.

Two years worth of expenses in bitUSD, at current price, is about 1.32 mil. It is impossible to make any predictions, but such a change could easily double the BTS price in short time.  There is inbuilt fluctuating factor in every price, including witness pay and workers price. With bitUSD price denomination for witness and workers pay, I am confident it could at least cancel additional interest expenses.
Also improve liquidity, get market adjust BTS supply, get more incentive for witness and workers, provide more transparent pricing and steady stream of fresh MPAs liquidity.

My feeling is this idea isn't simple enough to understand. A more simple and elegant implementation would be preferred.

I know it sounds little complicated but for the sake of an argument let me support it with example, how it would look like in UI, I suppose everyone is familiar with it.

Like we have "borrow" button, we could also have "lend" button. When it is pressed, new window pop up with option to fill amount and interest rate.
It could be the same as borrow option, a slider and manual fill , with same mechanics and comments like "you don't have sufficient funds", etc..
Block chain will fill order, the one with lowest interest rate (upper interest rate limit set buy commity), until upper fund limit is reached (also set by commity). After upper fund limit is reached, blockchain will fill lowest interest rate orders and borrow back upper ones.   

So for example, lets assume, upper interest rate limit is set to 20% and upper fund limit is set to 1mil bitUSD.
If I want to lend 100 bitUSD with interest rate of 5%, my order would be filled, if upper fund limit isn't reached.
After upper fund limit is reached, if there's any 40 bitUSD offered with 4.8% interest rate and my long has highest interest rate, my long would be borrowed back to me for 40 bitUSD in bitUSD, and 60 bitUSD maintained.
All the time my long position exists I would be payed bitUSD interest, from reserve fund denominated in BTS(at feed price) which will show in vesting balances. At any time I could decide to lower my interest rate, and if I decide to exit my long (partially or fully), I would be payed bitUSD worth of BTS at feed price.

Edit:
The critical part not mentioned could be as follows. When order is filled you are practically "locked" until someones outbids you or you decide to settle long position. Possible margin call would automatically trigger long settle option.

[Thom]

Good thoughts @tbone concerning the failsafe aspects.

Until we get a quality coder experienced with graphene to look at the code to assess how difficult implementing this will be the best we can do is brainstorm the possibilities and think through the impacts. tbone has pointed out the benefits, which is why I would like to see this taken to the next level, which in my mind is the code evaluation. That is also necessary to write a good proposal.

If no such devs are interested the idea stops (for now at least) at the concept phase.

I see a significant dis-incentive for a dev to put in the work required to create a proposal for this, b/c the scope of the work impacts both backend and UI, which will probably require at least 2 people to assess the changes. Doubt anyone believes this will be easy or fast to implement. It would be great if a dev was interested / curious / motivated enough in the idea to begin the assessment. We'll just have to see if anyone steps up to the plate I guess.

I dunno, maybe I'm wrong, but after the code is assessed then a proposal must be created which requires time for planning, cost estimation etc. After all that's done the shareholders could decide the cost is too high to implement or there just might not be enough interest in the idea. It would be up to people like tbone to campaign support for the proposal so it would pass, and perhaps even raise funds by other means to reduce the impact on shareholders and make it more attractive for them to pass.

One thing you might consider doing @JonnyBitcoin or @tbone is to begin writing the proposal in terms of describing it in as much detail as you can, explain the rational for it and in general just commit as much about the idea to paper as you can. The OP is pretty clear, and others have expressed some good ideas here which could be included. After someone looks at the code & UI they can flush out technical considerations and perhaps work with you to describe the time it would take to implement and create some type of roadmap for how it would be done. Here is a link to the github repo for BSIPs (BitShares Improvement Proposals) you can use as a template or to get an idea of how you could begin.

[tbone]

I agree with @JonnyBitcoin.  This should be as simple as possible.  Some things are complicated and that is just unavoidable.  But in this case, why introduce unnecessary complication by inserting a middleman that needs to be paid interest, etc etc?  Why can't the reserve pool just short bitUSD with pre-set levels of collateral?  In that scenario, just as in yours, long positions can be settled out of the reserve pool at the feed price. 

As far as coping with market forces, remember, we're not talking about having the reserve pool short as much bitUSD as demand calls for.  So, we won't have to worry about carefully regulating the supply of bitUSD (as steem must do with SBD) depending on total current circulation, current market conditions, etc.  We're talking about shorting only a limited amount of bitUSD, just enough to pay witnesses and workers.  The idea here is just to create a base supply of bitUSD that will help stimulate activity in bitUSD markets and boost confidence in individual participants to also short bitUSD into existence.

This is a strategic initiative.  It can start with bitUSD and later (or even immediately) expand to bitCNY and ultimately other bitAssets for which we want to produce a base supply to help spin up active markets in those bitAssets.  When liquidity in one bitAsset is sufficient, we can move on to the next and continue doing that as long as there is a bitAsset market that we want to jumpstart.

If we want to improve liquidity much sooner than later (and turn the screws on the coming competition), we should take @JonnyBitcoin's proposal very seriously and consider taking action ASAP.

[JonnyB]

I thought about this many times. Let me share this recent one.

Block rewards and workers are payed from reserve fund. Obvious solution would be that reserve fund gets ability to pay in MPA assets.
I am not familiar how hard proposed change would be, but for the purpose of this brainstorm lets pretend it is feasible.

It is already discussed many time so I wont repeat, but reserve fund should not be maintainer of collateral positions because it is not able to cope with market forces. But it could borrow MPAs from shareholders and traders which can. It could borrow on market established interest rate (like 5% meme) let the market decide, up to some figure, for instance two year worth of expenses(adjustable by comity).
Interests would be payed from reserve fund in BTS at feed price on hourly bases like vesting balances. The long position could be settled at any time from the reserve fund in BTS at current feed price. Everyone who want to settle MPAs could get current feed price worth of BTS from reserve fund, within 24 hour to prior notice as already defined (settle option). These acquired MPAs could burn the dept, so dept account could also have negative balance. The fact that this market opportunity has limited supply should provide additional incentive for borrowers. The liquidity would be increased slowly at a peace of about 2000 bitUSD/day.

Two years worth of expenses in bitUSD, at current price, is about 1.32 mil. It is impossible to make any predictions, but such a change could easily double the BTS price in short time.  There is inbuilt fluctuating factor in every price, including witness pay and workers price. With bitUSD price denomination for witness and workers pay, I am confident it could at least cancel additional interest expenses.
Also improve liquidity, get market adjust BTS supply, get more incentive for witness and workers, provide more transparent pricing and steady stream of fresh MPAs liquidity.

My feeling is this idea isn't simple enough to understand. A more simple and elegant implementation would be preferred.

[Geneko]

I thought about this many times. Let me share this recent one.

Block rewards and workers are payed from reserve fund. Obvious solution would be that reserve fund gets ability to pay in MPA assets.
I am not familiar how hard proposed change would be, but for the purpose of this brainstorm lets pretend it is feasible.

It is already discussed many time so I wont repeat, but reserve fund should not be maintainer of collateral positions because it is not able to cope with market forces. But it could borrow MPAs from shareholders and traders which can. It could borrow on market established interest rate (like 5% meme) let the market decide, up to some figure, for instance two year worth of expenses(adjustable by comity).
Interests would be payed from reserve fund in BTS at feed price on hourly bases like vesting balances. The long position could be settled at any time from the reserve fund in BTS at current feed price. Everyone who want to settle MPAs could get current feed price worth of BTS from reserve fund, within 24 hour to prior notice as already defined (settle option). These acquired MPAs could burn the dept, so dept account could also have negative balance. The fact that this market opportunity has limited supply should provide additional incentive for borrowers. The liquidity would be increased slowly at a peace of about 2000 bitUSD/day.

Two years worth of expenses in bitUSD, at current price, is about 1.32 mil. It is impossible to make any predictions, but such a change could easily double the BTS price in short time.  There is inbuilt fluctuating factor in every price, including witness pay and workers price. With bitUSD price denomination for witness and workers pay, I am confident it could at least cancel additional interest expenses.
Also improve liquidity, get market adjust BTS supply, get more incentive for witness and workers, provide more transparent pricing and steady stream of fresh MPAs liquidity.   

[Thom]

* The entity/business could run with the BTS or simply not burn it

If there's any type of trusted group/foundation/company involved then this idea is no good.
It would be a step backwards to involve any third party.

Currently the blockchain currently pays the witnesses and workers in BTS, the idea is that the blockchain pay them in BitUSD instead.

 

[tbone]

@Thom: you make some good points regarding payment intervals, tracking of who produced how many blocks, etc. Such details would have to be worked out, but I doubt those things present a major technical challenge.

As for having a fallback, I agree.  My suggestion was to make the % of pay in bitAssets a parameter that the committee can set anywhere from 0-100, so they can turn it all the way on, all the way off, or anything in between.

Regardless of what % is paid in bitAssets vs. BTS, I think it makes sense for witness pay to be specified in terms of bitUSD for the reasons cited by OP and others (i.e. greater simplicity, predictability, ease of evaluation, etc.).  And I think workers should have to submit their proposals with the cost denominated in bitUSD for the same reasons.

I agree, it would be great to get input from @xeroc and @kenCode regarding the cost and ease of implementing OPs idea.


@iHashFury:  Who said witnesses are dumping BTS to cover costs?   That's not even relevant to this proposal.  The question is, what will they do with bitUSD if they get paid in that bitAsset.  Will they horde the bitUSD, or will they be more likely to exchange them for BTS?  I suspect much more the latter than the former...which is what this proposal expects and wants to happen.

[logart]

Fork it.

[JonnyB]

* The entity/business could run with the BTS or simply not burn it

If there's any type of trusted group/foundation/company involved then this idea is no good.
It would be a step backwards to involve any third party.

Currently the blockchain currently pays the witnesses and workers in BTS, the idea is that the blockchain pay them in BitUSD instead.



 

[xeroc]

Another issue is how to deal with the accruing / accumulating nature of  worker / witness payments.

I mean witness pay is paid in BTS per block. I don't see how you could pay witnesses incrementally without increasing the interval of payouts. Payments With 21 witnesses, 3 second block times and price per BTS at $0.005 that comes out to roughly $20USD per day or ~4k BTS. Each witness account would have to be tracked as to how many blocks it generated during the payment period, be it daily / weekly / monthly.

I like the idea in general, but believe the devil is in the details of implementation. Should conversions of BTS be done per witness per pay period or should a witness pay pool of BitUSD be created for all witness daily / weekly / monthly and from that pool each witness' pay is calculated based on the blocks they produced?

It might also be prudent to build in a fallback strategy to revert to payouts in BTS to cover situations where the BTS price drops very low and remain there which might drain the reserve pool into oblivion. That may be such a rare situation it isn't worth coding to cover, but frankly this is an idea we may not be able to anticipate all of the ramifications of.

As @tbone pointed out, changes will be required in a number of different areas of the UI as well as the backend. So this may not be a quick or cheap proposal to implement.

The reserve pool is large enough now however that I believe it's a good time to give something like this a try. Let's get more discussion on the finer points of this with an eye towards implementation issues. In particular I'd like to hear from @kenCode, @xeroc or others who are familiar with the C++ codebase.

No offense intended, but @fav's comment to basically just have one person go off and just "do it" (i.e. create a proposal) for such a change is not very realistic. This will take more than one mind working together to accomplish to make sure we cover all bases.

Let me show you yet another way of dealing with this:

Basically each witness has a signing key and corresponds to a
regular account which in turn has an active an owner key.
The active key is required to obtain the payment.

Now, how about this setup:

0. I want to become a witness
1. A business/entity/foundation/whatever sets up a regular account for me
2. I provide them with a pubkey for signing (i control the private key)
3. The business registeres the witness with that key
4. I start producing blocks for an account that I do not control
5. I request payment with the business/foundation/entity
6. They obtain the BTS from the vesting balance, buy USD/GOLD whatnot and burn the rest (minus a fee)

This would "work", although it comes with a few drawbacks:

* No such business exists yet
* The business may have control over multiple witnesses and can change keys any time
* It may be difficult for people to identify who 'actually' runs the witness
* Figuring out how many blocks have been missed would need to happen offchain
* The entity/business could run with the BTS or simply not burn it

It comes with a couple advantages too:

* We can do this today
* The witness can actually get paid in any currency
* Any kind of contract can be made beween company and witness
* company can perform the backup functionality (at a fee) and switch
  over to other witnesses if you miss your blocks

Ideally, such a company would only control maybe 3-5 witnesses but it
could be ofc possible to have many of those businesses to co-exist.

Throughts?

[iHashFury]

Paying witnesses in a bitASSET of their choice seams like a waste of time to me (never mind the code bloat).
All witnesses can pay themselves in whatever bitASSET they want by using their pay BTS as collateral.

I'd be very surprised if witness are dumping their BTS pay to cover costs.
Please take the time to learn how to use the tools we have now to maximise potential.

[Thom]

Another issue is how to deal with the accruing / accumulating nature of  worker / witness payments.

I mean witness pay is paid in BTS per block. I don't see how you could pay witnesses incrementally without increasing the interval of payouts. Payments With 21 witnesses, 3 second block times and price per BTS at $0.005 that comes out to roughly $20USD per day or ~4k BTS. Each witness account would have to be tracked as to how many blocks it generated during the payment period, be it daily / weekly / monthly.

I like the idea in general, but believe the devil is in the details of implementation. Should conversions of BTS be done per witness per pay period or should a witness pay pool of BitUSD be created for all witness daily / weekly / monthly and from that pool each witness' pay is calculated based on the blocks they produced?

It might also be prudent to build in a fallback strategy to revert to payouts in BTS to cover situations where the BTS price drops very low and remain there which might drain the reserve pool into oblivion. That may be such a rare situation it isn't worth coding to cover, but frankly this is an idea we may not be able to anticipate all of the ramifications of.

As @tbone pointed out, changes will be required in a number of different areas of the UI as well as the backend. So this may not be a quick or cheap proposal to implement.

The reserve pool is large enough now however that I believe it's a good time to give something like this a try. Let's get more discussion on the finer points of this with an eye towards implementation issues. In particular I'd like to hear from @kenCode, @xeroc or others who are familiar with the C++ codebase.

No offense intended, but @fav's comment to basically just have one person go off and just "do it" (i.e. create a proposal) for such a change is not very realistic. This will take more than one mind working together to accomplish to make sure we cover all bases.

In my last post I highlighted some of the tremendous benefits of paying workers/witnesses in the bitAsset currency of their choice.  So what are the downsides?  I can't really think of any.  It doesn't create inflation.  Worst case scenario, all bitAssets are force settled by workers/witnesses and all of the associated collateral simply goes right back into the reserve pool.

What about the cost to implement it?  I have no idea what the cost would be.  But I can't imagine it would be prohibitive, especially relative to the benefits derived.  Maybe someone could give us a ballpark estimate of the development cost, just so we have a rough idea.  Below is a list to help jump start a determination of specifically what items need to be coded. 


We would need to create/modify parameters for committee to specify:
     o level of witness pay in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS
     o % of witness/worker pay that should be made using bitAssets
     o which bitAssets are eligible to be chosen by witnesses/workers for their pay
     o collateral level to be used when automatically creating bitAssets used for payments

It will also be necessary to enable:
     o witnessses to specify which eligible bitAsset currency they would like to be paid in
     o workers to specify worker proposal price in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS

[Geneko]

go ahead, get a quotation, hire a dev and setup a worker proposal. less talk more action

I agree. Maybe @Chris4210 and bitshares-munich can help with this. They already have experienced team and knowledge dealing with work proposals.

[fav]

In my last post I highlighted some of the tremendous benefits of paying workers/witnesses in the bitAsset currency of their choice.  So what are the downsides?  I can't really think of any.  It doesn't create inflation.  Worst case scenario, all bitAssets are force settled by workers/witnesses and all of the associated collateral simply goes right back into the reserve pool.

What about the cost to implement it?  I have no idea what the cost would be.  But I can't imagine it would be prohibitive, especially relative to the benefits derived.  Maybe someone could give us a ballpark estimate of the development cost, just so we have a rough idea.  Below is a list to help jump start a determination of specifically what items need to be coded. 


We would need to create/modify parameters for committee to specify:
     o level of witness pay in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS
     o % of witness/worker pay that should be made using bitAssets
     o which bitAssets are eligible to be chosen by witnesses/workers for their pay
     o collateral level to be used when automatically creating bitAssets used for payments

It will also be necessary to enable:
     o witnessses to specify which eligible bitAsset currency they would like to be paid in
     o workers to specify worker proposal price in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS

go ahead, get a quotation, hire a dev and setup a worker proposal. less talk more action

[tbone]

In my last post I highlighted some of the tremendous benefits of paying workers/witnesses in the bitAsset currency of their choice.  So what are the downsides?  I can't really think of any.  It doesn't create inflation.  Worst case scenario, all bitAssets are force settled by workers/witnesses and all of the associated collateral simply goes right back into the reserve pool.

What about the cost to implement it?  I have no idea what the cost would be.  But I can't imagine it would be prohibitive, especially relative to the benefits derived.  Maybe someone could give us a ballpark estimate of the development cost, just so we have a rough idea.  Below is a list to help jump start a determination of specifically what items need to be coded. 


We would need to create/modify parameters for committee to specify:
     o level of witness pay in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS
     o % of witness/worker pay that should be made using bitAssets
     o which bitAssets are eligible to be chosen by witnesses/workers for their pay
     o collateral level to be used when automatically creating bitAssets used for payments

It will also be necessary to enable:
     o witnessses to specify which eligible bitAsset currency they would like to be paid in
     o workers to specify worker proposal price in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS

[tbone]

This idea should be seriously considered and I urge everyone to read this thread from the start, it only takes a short amount of time to review.  But anyway, here are my thoughts on the matter:

If we want people to take bitAssets seriously and to use them, then we should set the example.  That means paying workers and witnesses in the bitAsset currency of their choice.   Additionally, by paying in bitUSD, bitCNY, etc. it would make the income earned by witnesses and workers far more predictable.  It also means individual worker proposals would be much easier for voters to evaluate. 

Another huge benefit is that this would create a base supply of bitAssets, stimulate bitAsset market activity, and give greater encouragement and confidence for people to borrow/short even more bitAssets into existence, thus perpetuating a virtuous cycle.

[JonnyB]

Bump.
This idea is worth revisiting for 2 reasons.

1.) Because of the recent BTS price rise the committee will need to adjust the fees down again. With this idea they would never need to adjust them again.

2.) There is not enough BitUSD to meet demand at feed price. (when BTS price spiked but you couldn't sell it for BitUSD because of huge spread)

[Chris4210]

there is a problem: does the market has bitUSD demand?

I have expected that the bitUSD liquidity would rise obviously after the parameter change, but seems I was wrong.

now it is safe enough to generate bitUSD by shorting, but seems few people like to use this leverage tool, weird.

Hopefully, BlockPay will change this situation. @Chris4210

Yes, this is an important issue that I will focus on now. We need to consider any kind of liq program that could work for us.

The challenge here is really that even when we have 16 mio BTS right now, we only can create around 40k USD in total. So we need to think about additional ways how to create more liquidity and learn from the BitCNY approach.

[ripplexiaoshan]

there is a problem: does the market has bitUSD demand?

I have expected that the bitUSD liquidity would rise obviously after the parameter change, but seems I was wrong.

now it is safe enough to generate bitUSD by shorting, but seems few people like to use this leverage tool, weird.

Hopefully, BlockPay will change this situation. @Chris4210

[abit]

there is a problem: does the market has bitUSD demand?

I have expected that the bitUSD liquidity would rise obviously after the parameter change, but seems I was wrong.

now it is safe enough to generate bitUSD by shorting, but seems few people like to use this leverage tool, weird.

Perhaps due to lack of gateway/utility and/or legal/tax related concerns.

[yvv]

there is a problem: does the market has bitUSD demand?

I have expected that the bitUSD liquidity would rise obviously after the parameter change, but seems I was wrong.

now it is safe enough to generate bitUSD by shorting, but seems few people like to use this leverage tool, weird.

If there was excess of demand for bitUSD, it would be overpriced, like bitGold or bitSilver. At the moment, bitUSD is traded below the feed price, which means that supply exceeds the demand.

[Chronos]

BitUSD and BitCNY serve a similar purpose for those using them as a hedge. Maybe traders are favoring the more liquid option, which is perhaps why BitUSD is currently underutilized.

[bitcrab]

there is a problem: does the market has bitUSD demand?

I have expected that the bitUSD liquidity would rise obviously after the parameter change, but seems I was wrong.

now it is safe enough to generate bitUSD by shorting, but seems few people like to use this leverage tool, weird.

[Chronos]

But both of them are not even close (it seems like they are not even trying) to see the real problems they are creating with the steam design.
It is such a money grab right now....enormous money grab...NuBits scam seems like a child play...

Let's be honest... what major altcoin is not a money grab?  Most were premined, and yes, that includes both NuBits and Steem.

Anyway, as you might have guessed, I would probably be opposed to tapping into the "reserve pool" at a rate faster than the limit that's already hard-coded. It's fundamentally dangerous to do so.

[tonyk]

@no one in particular....

bitUSD has much MUCH better design than S(b)D Steem (Steam?) Backed Dollar.

Unfortunately dan/bytemaster...dan/dantheman/reverseflash learned little to nothing from bitshares to put into steem


@ ben / 'I am a dev'  / therotical (ly) is genius mathematician - he can literally put any concept you can image in working math terms. I do marvel how he solves it for X....every and each time....

But both of them are not even close (it seems like they are not even trying) to see the real problems they are creating with the steam design.
It is such a money grab right now....enormous money grab...NuBits scam seems like a child play...

[Chuckone]

Personally I would prefer to incentivize shorting rather than using the reserve pool to short bitUSD. The only reason is that it will reduce BTS in circulation and help to increase market cap. A higher market cap gives the opportunity to fund more worker projects with less dilution. All in all it's a win win situation.

How to incentivise shorting bitUSD? I believe the whole discussion should evolve around that question. It can be done by changing the rules (which would require a hard fork, which is inconvenient, but feasable), or by changing the parameters, as it was done with bitCNY, all thanks to bitcrab.

Thoughts?


Envoyé de mon iPhone en utilisant Tapatalk

[KenMonkey]

I think you misunderstand. You say "the problem of witnesses and workers selling their BitUSD for BTS"
This is actually the benefit.
Witnesses and workers would most likely sell their BitUSD to others, this means there would be a bigger supply of BitUSD for others to buy.

Hokay. Let's Econ 101 this shit. When USD is collateralized 3x that value in BTS is now illiquid. If the market wants to hold X amount of USD then, in the long run, they will. If a bunch of bitUSD is being created (from the reserve pool) that pushes the price of bitUSD down (from 1.10 to maybe 1.02) giving less incentive for people to "short" the USD. Then the supply of liquid BTS is higher.  Maybe the demand is also lower, if people are buying BTS in order to short the USD. BTS price falls.

“All my economists say, ‘on the one hand...on the other'” "Give me a ONE-HANDED economist!"
-Harry Truman

So, on the other hand. Maybe the demand to short USD vs BTS is relatively constant and those people are going to do it regardless. So, with a bunch of bitUSD being created, pushes the bitUSD price down to 1.02 and then more people buy it? hmm. Increases bitUSD marketcap... hmm.

I like you saying that when someone settles the bitUSD the collateral goes back to the reserve pool, I hadn't thought of that.

[iHashFury]

If you would like to see and trade more MPA's (smartcoins) try using https://altcap.io as a wallet!

[JonnyB]

How also making bitusd a core trading pair in gui also. With enough liquidity people would rather against bitusd than other coins.

Sent from my SM-N920T using Tapatalk

In the light wallet it is.
In the web GUI (openledger) it is not. 
I think Ronny from OL should focus on just bitusd and open.btc for now
theres alot of similar assets which all have almost zero volume OPEN.USD, OPEN.USDT, OPEN.SBD and OPEN.EURT

[JonnyB]

Perhaps have worker proposals contracts "we'll pay you 50USD in value each day" but make the 'value' in BTS.

Did you mean "but make the payment in BTS"? I was thinking about something like that... it doesn't solve problem with low liquidity of BitUSD but IMHO is closer to how people think when making a worker proposal.

Exactly, it wouldn't help with liquidity. If workers get paid 50 BitUSD per day it's easy enough to turn that in to $50 worth of BTS.

[JonnyB]

The kosher way to do this would be through a smart contract, like steem did. But, this would require some efforts from devs, and for this reason is unlikely to happen soon.

Yes the steem way makes sense. Hopefully this code could be lifted straight from Steem as they both use graphene.

[abit]

Just a note, NBT had much more liquidity than BitUSD..

[Pheonike]

How also making bitusd a core trading pair in gui also. With enough liquidity people would rather against bitusd than other coins.

Sent from my SM-N920T using Tapatalk

[paliboy]

Perhaps have worker proposals contracts "we'll pay you 50USD in value each day" but make the 'value' in BTS.

Did you mean "but make the payment in BTS"? I was thinking about something like that... it doesn't solve problem with low liquidity of BitUSD but IMHO is closer to how people think when making a worker proposal.

[bitcrab]

the idea of paying bitUSD to worker is interesting and make sense.

but it will bring some challenge, the committee will need to borrow bitUSD, and sell BTS periodically  with high enough price to cover the debt position.

let's first do some calculation.

currently the reserve balance is 1,029,940,606 BTS, if we put half of these balance to collateral with a low enough price say 0.0018USD/BTS as"my margin call price", we can get 463473 bitUSD.

suppose we set budget at 80USD/hour, then these bitUSD can offer at least 241 days.

to make this happen, we need:
1.developers provide the necessary change, maybe a hard fork is needed?
2.committee draft a plan to borrow bitUSD and sell BTS periodically, committee will play the role a little like FED.

surely the precondition is that the community reach a consensus on doing this.

Absolutely we need consensus, but I don't think people will support accessing the reserve pool at a rate higher than the current max spending budget of:
14,675 BTS per hour.  (see here http://cryptofresh.com/reserve)
Like you say this max 14675 bts hour is equivalent to $80 per hour at todays prices.

How we make this max worker budget function as bitUSD instead of BTS is tricky.
 I can't see how it would work with the decentralised voting system if the committee is paying the workers.

if committee can sell BTS in good price, then actually the cost from reserve pool will be lowered, and I think shareholders would like to see this.
this is not difficult, as committee has a long time to wait for the selling orders to be fulfilled.
the key point is how this can get enough support from shareholders and committee members, and how to manage the process.

[yvv]

The kosher way to do this would be through a smart contract, like steem did. But, this would require some efforts from devs, and for this reason is unlikely to happen soon.

[JonnyB]

the idea of paying bitUSD to worker is interesting and make sense.

but it will bring some challenge, the committee will need to borrow bitUSD, and sell BTS periodically  with high enough price to cover the debt position.

let's first do some calculation.

currently the reserve balance is 1,029,940,606 BTS, if we put half of these balance to collateral with a low enough price say 0.0018USD/BTS as"my margin call price", we can get 463473 bitUSD.

suppose we set budget at 80USD/hour, then these bitUSD can offer at least 241 days.

to make this happen, we need:
1.developers provide the necessary change, maybe a hard fork is needed?
2.committee draft a plan to borrow bitUSD and sell BTS periodically, committee will play the role a little like FED.

surely the precondition is that the community reach a consensus on doing this.

Absolutely we need consensus, but I don't think people will support accessing the reserve pool at a rate higher than the current max spending budget of:
14,675 BTS per hour.  (see here http://cryptofresh.com/reserve)
Like you say this max 14675 bts hour is equivalent to $80 per hour at todays prices.

How we make this max worker budget function as bitUSD instead of BTS is tricky.
 I can't see how it would work with the decentralised voting system if the committee is paying the workers.

[bitcrab]

the idea of paying bitUSD to worker is interesting and make sense.

but it will bring some challenge, the committee will need to borrow bitUSD, and sell BTS periodically  with high enough price to cover the debt position.

let's first do some calculation.

currently the reserve balance is 1,029,940,606 BTS, if we put half of these balance to collateral with a low enough price say 0.0018USD/BTS as"my margin call price", we can get 463473 bitUSD.

suppose we set budget at 80USD/hour, then these bitUSD can offer at least 241 days.

to make this happen, we need:
1.developers provide the necessary change, maybe a hard fork is needed?
2.committee draft a plan to borrow bitUSD and sell BTS periodically, committee will play the role a little like FED.

surely the precondition is that the community reach a consensus on doing this.

[mike623317]

Great idea jonny  . Be interested to hear from Stan or any of the devs on this idea for feedback.

So what would be the steps to make this happen and the cost?

[yvv]

Workers actually have a good incentive to choose to be paid in bitAssets, because they are often traded above the feed price. In this case a worker will get more USD for 1 bitUSD than he would get if he would be paid in BTS. If bitUSD falls below the feed, he can always force settle at feed price.

[fav]

make it happen

[valtr]

As far as I can see this wont relieve selling pressure on BTS and it would increase the inflation.
     1.1. To create 1 bitUSD it takes 3x BTS, which means we'll be putting 3x BTS into the total supply.
     1.2. If workers want to sell their earnings, they will. If the demand for bitUSD is X then it will stay the same. Workers can and should trade their payments in BTS for bitUSD as they get it, now that would relieve selling pressure, increase liquidity and ensure the workers' compensation is fixed.

If the blockchain collateralized bitUSD into existence then where is the collateral? To me it seems the blockchain voting and payment can only pay in the core token. 

Would it really encourage traders to trust the system more if liquidity was provided by automated process rather than real activity? I suppose it might actually... but to an already complicated (but amazing) platform to add further complexity and a complex hard-fork seems like a bad idea.

What we could really do is fix the damn blockchain explorer showing ZERO volume for the bitUSD:BTS pair. That's an easy fix to generate more volume! Let's use the thousands of dollars already there! As traders start using bitshares to store value safely or to short the USD we wont have to worry about problems like this.

There is a reserve pool of "unavailable" BTS see here: http://cryptofresh.com/reserve
Currently just over a billion BTS
This fund is used to pay workers at a max rate of 14,677 BTS per hour but a lesser rate is usually elected.

Instead of paying a max rate of 14677 BTS per hour I am suggesting the max rate per hour is the equivalent value but in BitUSD.

If the backing collateral was from the reserve pool it wouldn't have a net inflationary value outcome because they could only force settle for 1:1 value.
The 3:1 dilution which you mention would not be expanding the supply of BTS because the collateral would be returned to the reserve pool in the event of a force settle.

I am afraid that it does not solve the problem of selling bitUSD by workers. Workers and witness sell to get fiat. Maybe part would be sold directly on bitUSD/USD market instead in bitUSD-BTS-USD order.  It would be better for BTS, but the only solution I see is bitUSD commonly used for trade see BitShares Munich project.

I think you misunderstand. You say "the problem of witnesses and workers selling their BitUSD for BTS"
This is actually the benefit.
Witnesses and workers would most likely sell their BitUSD to others, this means there would be a bigger supply of BitUSD for others to buy.

I see, there will be other source of bitUSD for sale than the one from shorting. The offer of bitUSD will rise.

[noisy]

I totally agree with @JonnyBitcoin

I even posted similar idea here:

When you will ask Americans which currency is the most stable for them, they will answer - USD
When you will ask Chinese which currency is the most stable for them, they will answer - CNY

This is obvious, right?

So why we are selling and buying things here with BTS? This thread is of course related to @tonyk 's thread: bitSHARES - As True Shares and Not a Currency!

When I came to bitshares, I was convinced, that bitshares has great value for companies, because there is no risk at all, when you use it as derivative asset. This is great explained here:

https://youtu.be/pbX4nt2UKP4?t=6m55s

So... the question is, why we pay witnesses with BTS? We should ask each of them which bitAsset they prefer and give them...

[yvv]

This makes sense and looks like a very simple scheme to implement. If it is implemented through a worker, no change in protocol is required. Workers can be paid in bitAssets or in BTS at same time, whatever they choose. BitAssets will be created using worker budget of 14K BTS per hour, and if they fall below the feed price, they'll get settled through forced settlements at feed price. Not much efforts are required to keep this scheme going.

Cashing out of bitAsset for fiat by workers is not going to increase BTS inflation. This will increase bitAsset supply.

[JonnyB]

Well, we cannot ignore that Steem took the intertubes in a viral way, which Bitshares failed (so far) to do - therefore, one would expect more SBD liquidity just from that alone.

What you propose here may also have merit, I confess the numbers and implications befuddle me .. it would make more sense to pay workers with smartcoins, but are there hidden implications, that's my concern.

Another key part of the reason is that the documentation about shorting and creating bitAssets is frankly very confusing .. I played around with it a couple of times, and always got margin called.. in my sleep.. because there's no stop-loss ..

I agree the whole shorting bitassets into existence is very confusing.
People get confused between forced settlements and margin calls.
I also think some people don't realise that they do no have a short position until they sell the bitassets that they create.
The inability of shorters to close their positions near settlement price is a big problem that is not widely understood.
I may make a video explaining the basics of how bitassets are created and then destroyed when a collateral position is closed.

[JonnyB]

As far as I can see this wont relieve selling pressure on BTS and it would increase the inflation.
     1.1. To create 1 bitUSD it takes 3x BTS, which means we'll be putting 3x BTS into the total supply.
     1.2. If workers want to sell their earnings, they will. If the demand for bitUSD is X then it will stay the same. Workers can and should trade their payments in BTS for bitUSD as they get it, now that would relieve selling pressure, increase liquidity and ensure the workers' compensation is fixed.

If the blockchain collateralized bitUSD into existence then where is the collateral? To me it seems the blockchain voting and payment can only pay in the core token. 

Would it really encourage traders to trust the system more if liquidity was provided by automated process rather than real activity? I suppose it might actually... but to an already complicated (but amazing) platform to add further complexity and a complex hard-fork seems like a bad idea.

What we could really do is fix the damn blockchain explorer showing ZERO volume for the bitUSD:BTS pair. That's an easy fix to generate more volume! Let's use the thousands of dollars already there! As traders start using bitshares to store value safely or to short the USD we wont have to worry about problems like this.

There is a reserve pool of "unavailable" BTS see here: http://cryptofresh.com/reserve
Currently just over a billion BTS
This fund is used to pay workers at a max rate of 14,677 BTS per hour but a lesser rate is usually elected.

Instead of paying a max rate of 14677 BTS per hour I am suggesting the max rate per hour is the equivalent value but in BitUSD.

If the backing collateral was from the reserve pool it wouldn't have a net inflationary value outcome because they could only force settle for 1:1 value.
The 3:1 dilution which you mention would not be expanding the supply of BTS because the collateral would be returned to the reserve pool in the event of a force settle.

I am afraid that it does not solve the problem of selling bitUSD by workers. Workers and witness sell to get fiat. Maybe part would be sold directly on bitUSD/USD market instead in bitUSD-BTS-USD order.  It would be better for BTS, but the only solution I see is bitUSD commonly used for trade see BitShares Munich project.

I think you misunderstand. You say "the problem of witnesses and workers selling their BitUSD for BTS"
This is actually the benefit.
Witnesses and workers would most likely sell their BitUSD to others, this means there would be a bigger supply of BitUSD for others to buy.

[karnal]

Well, we cannot ignore that Steem took the intertubes in a viral way, which Bitshares failed (so far) to do - therefore, one would expect more SBD liquidity just from that alone.

What you propose here may also have merit, I confess the numbers and implications befuddle me .. it would make more sense to pay workers with smartcoins, but are there hidden implications, that's my concern.

Another key part of the reason is that the documentation about shorting and creating bitAssets is frankly very confusing .. I played around with it a couple of times, and always got margin called.. in my sleep.. because there's no stop-loss ..

[valtr]

As far as I can see this wont relieve selling pressure on BTS and it would increase the inflation.
     1.1. To create 1 bitUSD it takes 3x BTS, which means we'll be putting 3x BTS into the total supply.
     1.2. If workers want to sell their earnings, they will. If the demand for bitUSD is X then it will stay the same. Workers can and should trade their payments in BTS for bitUSD as they get it, now that would relieve selling pressure, increase liquidity and ensure the workers' compensation is fixed.

If the blockchain collateralized bitUSD into existence then where is the collateral? To me it seems the blockchain voting and payment can only pay in the core token. 

Would it really encourage traders to trust the system more if liquidity was provided by automated process rather than real activity? I suppose it might actually... but to an already complicated (but amazing) platform to add further complexity and a complex hard-fork seems like a bad idea.

What we could really do is fix the damn blockchain explorer showing ZERO volume for the bitUSD:BTS pair. That's an easy fix to generate more volume! Let's use the thousands of dollars already there! As traders start using bitshares to store value safely or to short the USD we wont have to worry about problems like this.

There is a reserve pool of "unavailable" BTS see here: http://cryptofresh.com/reserve
Currently just over a billion BTS
This fund is used to pay workers at a max rate of 14,677 BTS per hour but a lesser rate is usually elected.

Instead of paying a max rate of 14677 BTS per hour I am suggesting the max rate per hour is the equivalent value but in BitUSD.

If the backing collateral was from the reserve pool it wouldn't have a net inflationary value outcome because they could only force settle for 1:1 value.
The 3:1 dilution which you mention would not be expanding the supply of BTS because the collateral would be returned to the reserve pool in the event of a force settle.

I am afraid that it does not solve the problem of selling bitUSD by workers. Workers and witness sell to get fiat. Maybe part would be sold directly on bitUSD/USD market instead in bitUSD-BTS-USD order.  It would be better for BTS, but the only solution I see is bitUSD commonly used for trade see BitShares Munich project.

[JonnyB]

As far as I can see this wont relieve selling pressure on BTS and it would increase the inflation.
     1.1. To create 1 bitUSD it takes 3x BTS, which means we'll be putting 3x BTS into the total supply.
     1.2. If workers want to sell their earnings, they will. If the demand for bitUSD is X then it will stay the same. Workers can and should trade their payments in BTS for bitUSD as they get it, now that would relieve selling pressure, increase liquidity and ensure the workers' compensation is fixed.

If the blockchain collateralized bitUSD into existence then where is the collateral? To me it seems the blockchain voting and payment can only pay in the core token. 

Would it really encourage traders to trust the system more if liquidity was provided by automated process rather than real activity? I suppose it might actually... but to an already complicated (but amazing) platform to add further complexity and a complex hard-fork seems like a bad idea.

What we could really do is fix the damn blockchain explorer showing ZERO volume for the bitUSD:BTS pair. That's an easy fix to generate more volume! Let's use the thousands of dollars already there! As traders start using bitshares to store value safely or to short the USD we wont have to worry about problems like this.

There is a reserve pool of "unavailable" BTS see here: http://cryptofresh.com/reserve
Currently just over a billion BTS
This fund is used to pay workers at a max rate of 14,677 BTS per hour but a lesser rate is usually elected.

Instead of paying a max rate of 14677 BTS per hour I am suggesting the max rate per hour is the equivalent value but in BitUSD.

If the backing collateral was from the reserve pool it wouldn't have a net inflationary value outcome because they could only force settle for 1:1 value.
The 3:1 dilution which you mention would not be expanding the supply of BTS because the collateral would be returned to the reserve pool in the event of a force settle.

[KenMonkey]

Perhaps have worker proposals contracts "we'll pay you 50USD in value each day" but make the 'value' in BTS. 

[KenMonkey]

As far as I can see this wont relieve selling pressure on BTS and it would increase the inflation.
     1.1. To create 1 bitUSD it takes 3x BTS, which means we'll be putting 3x BTS into the total supply.
     1.2. If workers want to sell their earnings, they will. If the demand for bitUSD is X then it will stay the same. Workers can and should trade their payments in BTS for bitUSD as they get it, now that would relieve selling pressure, increase liquidity and ensure the workers' compensation is fixed.

If the blockchain collateralized bitUSD into existence then where is the collateral? To me it seems the blockchain voting and payment can only pay in the core token. 

Would it really encourage traders to trust the system more if liquidity was provided by automated process rather than real activity? I suppose it might actually... but to an already complicated (but amazing) platform to add further complexity and a complex hard-fork seems like a bad idea.

What we could really do is fix the damn blockchain explorer showing ZERO volume for the bitUSD:BTS pair. That's an easy fix to generate more volume! Let's use the thousands of dollars already there! As traders start using bitshares to store value safely or to short the USD we wont have to worry about problems like this.

[JonnyB]

BitUSD   0.8 BTC buy wall / 1.3 BTC sell wall


Steem Backed dollar 50 BTC buy wall / 30BTC sell wall


There are a lot more Steem dollars around than BitUSD and they are much more liquid.

The key reason is because the Steem blockchain creates the Steem dollars autonomously and distributes them.

The Bitshares blockchain only creates and distributes BTS but relies on traders to create the BitUSD.

If the Bitshares blockchain paid our witnesses and workers in BitUSD instead of BTS it would have the following effects.

- Reduce selling pressure on BTS
- Create a large supply of BitUSD
- Create liquidity and confidence for traders to short even more BitUSD in to existence.
- Easier to understand how much worker proposals are being paid /asking for
- Workers would know how many dollars they were getting paid each month.
- We wouldn't be increasing the current inflation rate of BTS from what it is now

This proposal was the result of a long discussion here: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,22935.0.html
Ultimately this would need a hard fork, money for development and shareholder consensus.

Please keep on topic and concise with any replies.