Steem dollar is more liquid than BitUSD. We should copy it's key feature.

[Geneko]

go ahead, get a quotation, hire a dev and setup a worker proposal. less talk more action

I agree. Maybe @Chris4210 and bitshares-munich can help with this. They already have experienced team and knowledge dealing with work proposals.

[fav]

In my last post I highlighted some of the tremendous benefits of paying workers/witnesses in the bitAsset currency of their choice.  So what are the downsides?  I can't really think of any.  It doesn't create inflation.  Worst case scenario, all bitAssets are force settled by workers/witnesses and all of the associated collateral simply goes right back into the reserve pool.

What about the cost to implement it?  I have no idea what the cost would be.  But I can't imagine it would be prohibitive, especially relative to the benefits derived.  Maybe someone could give us a ballpark estimate of the development cost, just so we have a rough idea.  Below is a list to help jump start a determination of specifically what items need to be coded. 


We would need to create/modify parameters for committee to specify:
     o level of witness pay in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS
     o % of witness/worker pay that should be made using bitAssets
     o which bitAssets are eligible to be chosen by witnesses/workers for their pay
     o collateral level to be used when automatically creating bitAssets used for payments

It will also be necessary to enable:
     o witnessses to specify which eligible bitAsset currency they would like to be paid in
     o workers to specify worker proposal price in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS

go ahead, get a quotation, hire a dev and setup a worker proposal. less talk more action

[tbone]

In my last post I highlighted some of the tremendous benefits of paying workers/witnesses in the bitAsset currency of their choice.  So what are the downsides?  I can't really think of any.  It doesn't create inflation.  Worst case scenario, all bitAssets are force settled by workers/witnesses and all of the associated collateral simply goes right back into the reserve pool.

What about the cost to implement it?  I have no idea what the cost would be.  But I can't imagine it would be prohibitive, especially relative to the benefits derived.  Maybe someone could give us a ballpark estimate of the development cost, just so we have a rough idea.  Below is a list to help jump start a determination of specifically what items need to be coded. 


We would need to create/modify parameters for committee to specify:
     o level of witness pay in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS
     o % of witness/worker pay that should be made using bitAssets
     o which bitAssets are eligible to be chosen by witnesses/workers for their pay
     o collateral level to be used when automatically creating bitAssets used for payments

It will also be necessary to enable:
     o witnessses to specify which eligible bitAsset currency they would like to be paid in
     o workers to specify worker proposal price in terms of bitUSD (or bitCNY?) instead of BTS

[tbone]

This idea should be seriously considered and I urge everyone to read this thread from the start, it only takes a short amount of time to review.  But anyway, here are my thoughts on the matter:

If we want people to take bitAssets seriously and to use them, then we should set the example.  That means paying workers and witnesses in the bitAsset currency of their choice.   Additionally, by paying in bitUSD, bitCNY, etc. it would make the income earned by witnesses and workers far more predictable.  It also means individual worker proposals would be much easier for voters to evaluate. 

Another huge benefit is that this would create a base supply of bitAssets, stimulate bitAsset market activity, and give greater encouragement and confidence for people to borrow/short even more bitAssets into existence, thus perpetuating a virtuous cycle.

[JonnyB]

Bump.
This idea is worth revisiting for 2 reasons.

1.) Because of the recent BTS price rise the committee will need to adjust the fees down again. With this idea they would never need to adjust them again.

2.) There is not enough BitUSD to meet demand at feed price. (when BTS price spiked but you couldn't sell it for BitUSD because of huge spread)

[Chris4210]

there is a problem: does the market has bitUSD demand?

I have expected that the bitUSD liquidity would rise obviously after the parameter change, but seems I was wrong.

now it is safe enough to generate bitUSD by shorting, but seems few people like to use this leverage tool, weird.

Hopefully, BlockPay will change this situation. @Chris4210

Yes, this is an important issue that I will focus on now. We need to consider any kind of liq program that could work for us.

The challenge here is really that even when we have 16 mio BTS right now, we only can create around 40k USD in total. So we need to think about additional ways how to create more liquidity and learn from the BitCNY approach.

[ripplexiaoshan]

there is a problem: does the market has bitUSD demand?

I have expected that the bitUSD liquidity would rise obviously after the parameter change, but seems I was wrong.

now it is safe enough to generate bitUSD by shorting, but seems few people like to use this leverage tool, weird.

Hopefully, BlockPay will change this situation. @Chris4210

[abit]

there is a problem: does the market has bitUSD demand?

I have expected that the bitUSD liquidity would rise obviously after the parameter change, but seems I was wrong.

now it is safe enough to generate bitUSD by shorting, but seems few people like to use this leverage tool, weird.

Perhaps due to lack of gateway/utility and/or legal/tax related concerns.

[yvv]

there is a problem: does the market has bitUSD demand?

I have expected that the bitUSD liquidity would rise obviously after the parameter change, but seems I was wrong.

now it is safe enough to generate bitUSD by shorting, but seems few people like to use this leverage tool, weird.

If there was excess of demand for bitUSD, it would be overpriced, like bitGold or bitSilver. At the moment, bitUSD is traded below the feed price, which means that supply exceeds the demand.

[Chronos]

BitUSD and BitCNY serve a similar purpose for those using them as a hedge. Maybe traders are favoring the more liquid option, which is perhaps why BitUSD is currently underutilized.

[bitcrab]

there is a problem: does the market has bitUSD demand?

I have expected that the bitUSD liquidity would rise obviously after the parameter change, but seems I was wrong.

now it is safe enough to generate bitUSD by shorting, but seems few people like to use this leverage tool, weird.

[Chronos]

But both of them are not even close (it seems like they are not even trying) to see the real problems they are creating with the steam design.
It is such a money grab right now....enormous money grab...NuBits scam seems like a child play...

Let's be honest... what major altcoin is not a money grab?  Most were premined, and yes, that includes both NuBits and Steem.

Anyway, as you might have guessed, I would probably be opposed to tapping into the "reserve pool" at a rate faster than the limit that's already hard-coded. It's fundamentally dangerous to do so.

[tonyk]

@no one in particular....

bitUSD has much MUCH better design than S(b)D Steem (Steam?) Backed Dollar.

Unfortunately dan/bytemaster...dan/dantheman/reverseflash learned little to nothing from bitshares to put into steem


@ ben / 'I am a dev'  / therotical (ly) is genius mathematician - he can literally put any concept you can image in working math terms. I do marvel how he solves it for X....every and each time....

But both of them are not even close (it seems like they are not even trying) to see the real problems they are creating with the steam design.
It is such a money grab right now....enormous money grab...NuBits scam seems like a child play...

[Chuckone]

Personally I would prefer to incentivize shorting rather than using the reserve pool to short bitUSD. The only reason is that it will reduce BTS in circulation and help to increase market cap. A higher market cap gives the opportunity to fund more worker projects with less dilution. All in all it's a win win situation.

How to incentivise shorting bitUSD? I believe the whole discussion should evolve around that question. It can be done by changing the rules (which would require a hard fork, which is inconvenient, but feasable), or by changing the parameters, as it was done with bitCNY, all thanks to bitcrab.

Thoughts?


Envoyé de mon iPhone en utilisant Tapatalk

[KenMonkey]

I think you misunderstand. You say "the problem of witnesses and workers selling their BitUSD for BTS"
This is actually the benefit.
Witnesses and workers would most likely sell their BitUSD to others, this means there would be a bigger supply of BitUSD for others to buy.

Hokay. Let's Econ 101 this shit. When USD is collateralized 3x that value in BTS is now illiquid. If the market wants to hold X amount of USD then, in the long run, they will. If a bunch of bitUSD is being created (from the reserve pool) that pushes the price of bitUSD down (from 1.10 to maybe 1.02) giving less incentive for people to "short" the USD. Then the supply of liquid BTS is higher.  Maybe the demand is also lower, if people are buying BTS in order to short the USD. BTS price falls.

“All my economists say, ‘on the one hand...on the other'” "Give me a ONE-HANDED economist!"
-Harry Truman

So, on the other hand. Maybe the demand to short USD vs BTS is relatively constant and those people are going to do it regardless. So, with a bunch of bitUSD being created, pushes the bitUSD price down to 1.02 and then more people buy it? hmm. Increases bitUSD marketcap... hmm.

I like you saying that when someone settles the bitUSD the collateral goes back to the reserve pool, I hadn't thought of that.