suggestion for an offical market value management infrastructure

[R]

The short term and quickest solution is already presented here, since it requires no blockchain update (change fees, collected fees used to create bitassets).

I would also agree to incentivize the creation of BitAssets, but I think in long-term it should be mostly user driven. Thus I could think of an additional feature when creating a margin position that allows dividends of some sort.

When the user creates a margin position, he can choose his collateral ratio. If the ratio is above some ratio, lets call it incentivize collateral ratio ICR, then additional features becomes visible:
User can lock his position for timespan X, where locking means:

• the position can not be closed
• the positions borrowed amount of bitAssets amount can not be reduced, only increased
• the positions collateral can not be reduced below ICR, only increased
• position becomes unlocked if ratio is less then the unlock incentivize collateral ratio UICR (set by commitee)

If position becomes locked, then the positions collateral in BTS receives Y% from the reserve pool (or some commitee account, eventually filled by fees?) every month the position is locked, where the Y% is only with reference to amount of BTS necessary to achieve ICR. Value Y% depends on the choice X of the user.

For example: ICR is 3.

• User opens position to create 1000 bitUSD backed by 50000 BTS (assume 10 BTS/bitUSD price).
  The collateral ratio of this position is then 5, which is higher than ICR, and user chooses to lock for one month.
• Bitshares says now he will get 0.1% paid every month for all BTS required to achieve ICR.
  To achieve ICR, he would need only 30000 BTS, so the incentive is 30000 * 0.1% = 30.
• The positions collateral will be increased by 30 BTS taken from reserve pool every month. After the two months,
  the position unlocks itself automatically (but is  not closed) and the user has now 50060 BTS as collateral.

This approach would certainly need development on back- and frontend, but could be very interesting for hodlers.

BSIP 19 (https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0019.md) is highly related, however I disagree with only rewarding shorters - both shorters and asset holders aught to have a portion of market fees redistributed to them.

How would the reward be balanced between the shorter and holder though?

Holders aught to benefit from the 'coinage' of their held MPA, whilst the shorter aught to benefit from a higher collateral ratio.

Eligibility for fee redistribution should only trigger once the borrowed asset has been included in a fill order (perhaps only the backing asset to keep it simple?) so that we have cryptographic proof that it is publicly liquid instead of simply borrowed and transferred to a secondary account owned by the shorter. It would still be possible for someone to put up a huge sell/buy wall and sell/buy to themselves but by doing so they offer the public (bots included) the opportunity to eat into that public market liquidity, it could also boost the trading volume considerably.

I want to see the BTSX marketing of "x% on anything" come back - it was one of the major selling points for me that the broken FIAT banking sector offer 1% but I could get 5%+ on the blockchain - very powerful!

[Emma Lee]

the fee rate should be low enough to keep the user experience as almost same as before, and also should be high enough to provide enough fund for  market value management, considering all this, 0.05% should be a good level.

[Ashaman]

I don't know how I feel about the committee playing central banker like this. IMO change this radical should be introduced via a hardfork that would add something like a a central banking committee, separate from existing infrastructure.

On the other hand, the added liquidity from market making like this might really be key...

[abit]

hello, please help, if i want to buy bitCNY throug alipay, is it possible?

or any other ways ?

Try MagicWallet: https://www.magicw.net/

[blaze]

hello, please help, if i want to buy bitCNY throug alipay, is it possible?

or any other ways ?

[abit]

The comittee is in control of roughly 3.6 million BTS which are being held in either comittee-trade or committee-account.
https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/account/committee-account
https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/account/committee-trade

Questions:

• Is the current balance simply stacking up of transaction fees, or how did this accumulate?
  

The BTS in committee-trade: originally were fees accumulated in some bitAssets, mainly bitUSD, mostly accumulated in BTS 0.9 due to the "you get what you ask for" mechanism. We got them out and sold them for BTS in 2016 to bring more liquidity to the market. The BTS are being used to fund fee pools of assets controlled by committee-account, then accumulate fees again, thus circulating.

The BTS in committee-account: after BSIP18, the account started to hold short positions. The biggest position was SILVER which had about 2M BTS of collateral, at a time, SILVER got globally settled again (black swan), so the overcollateralized BTS was returned to committee-account.

[lovegan007]

理事会不是还有没解的十亿BTS么，动用它啊，抵押10亿BTS，抵押出5亿BITCNY来拉盘，5亿BITCNY可以拉到5块了，到5块了又可以从10亿BTS和买进来的那几亿BTS 一起提高抵押，可以一共抵押出25亿以上的BITCNY来托盘拉盘，这个时候谁还能砸得动？

[pc]

The committee-account is holding short positions. Why?

These are from bitAssets being auto-revived after a black swan. See BSIP-18.

Where can I see the accumulation of incoming market fees?

Market fees are not listed separately. The asset object holds them in "accumulated_fees", together with the tx fees that were paid in the asset in exchange for funds from the fee pool.
You can look at the trade volume of that asset, and calculate the resulting fees.

[sschiessl]

The comittee is in control of roughly 3.6 million BTS which are being held in either comittee-trade or committee-account.
https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/account/committee-account
https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/account/committee-trade

Questions:

• Is the current balance simply stacking up of transaction fees, or how did this accumulate?
  
• The committee-account is holding short positions. Why?
  
• Where can I see the accumulation of incoming market fees?
  
• How and when will you move forward with bitAsset creation? Backed by worker proposal?
  

[bench]

The fees shouldn't be used to artificially increase the price of bts, I agree here. What happens to the fees now?

The fees should directly be used to provide liquidity to the exchanges. A lot of companies adopted the BTS network, because there were no fees in trading to bitAssets. I didn't hear any numbers on the duration of the new market fee.

[Crypto Kong]

I am against this proposal, you want to increase fees in order to artificially pump the price of BTS. This is a terrible idea. You will deter people from making the markets by increasing fees and no doubt will get margin called keeping the price of BTS low. BAD BAD IDEA.

If this does go ahead, then I suggest keeping the call price at extreme lows to reduce the risk by as much as possible. By that I mean for bitUSD, a call price of $0.01 maximum.

[JohnR]

While I'm glad that this was able to be approved so quickly I think it would be wise to establish some metrics for how successful this fee implementation will be.  How can we assess whether this fee change helps or hurts the bitassets markets?  As it appears to me having a fee to sell bitUSD/CNY seems like a pure windfall to those incumbents who have built up a large short position.

[bench]

I like the idea to reward the BTS holder directly with new BTS paid by trading fees. There is no middle man and anybody has the freedom to do with his BTS, what you wanna do.
This is the staking for BTS, a function much needed to convince people, holding BTS.


我喜欢这个想法，直接用BTS交换费用支付BTS持有人。 没有中间人，任何人都有自由处理他的BTS，你想做什么。
这是BTS的角色，这是一个非常需要说服人们持有BTS的功能。

短期和最快的解决方案已经在这里提出，因为它不需要区块链更新（更改费用，用于创建比特资源的收取费用）。

我也同意激励创建BitAssets，但我认为从长远来看，它应该主要由用户驱动。因此，我可以在创建允许某种类型的股息的保证金头寸时考虑附加功能。

当用户创建保证金头寸时，他可以选择他的保证金比率。如果该比率高于某个比率，我们称之为激励抵押比率ICR，则可以看到其他功能：
用户可以锁定其时间范围X的位置，其中锁定意味着：

    该位置不能关闭
    bitAssets的借入量不能减少，只能增加
    职位抵押额不能减少到ICR以下，只能增加
    如果比率小于解锁激励抵押比率UICR（由委托人设置）

如果头寸锁定，那么BTS的抵押品收到储备池（或某个委托人账户，最终由费用填充）的Y％，该位置每月锁定，其中X％仅参照必要的BTS数量实现ICR。值Y取决于用户的选择X.

例如：ICR是3。

    用户打开位置以创建由50000 BTS支持的1000 bitUSD（假设10 BTS / bitUSD价格）。
    此位置的抵押比率为5，高于ICR，并且用户选择锁定一个月。
    Bitshares表示，现在他将获得每月支付0.1％的所有BTS以实现ICR。
    为了实现ICR，他只需要30000 BTS，所以激励是30000 * 0.1％= 30。
    每月从储备池中抽取30个BTS增加抵押品的头寸。两个月后，
    该位置自动解锁（但未关闭），用户现在有50060 BTS作为抵押品。


这种方法肯定需要在后台和前端进行开发，但对于hodlers来说可能非常有趣。

[sschiessl]

The short term and quickest solution is already presented here, since it requires no blockchain update (change fees, collected fees used to create bitassets).

I would also agree to incentivize the creation of BitAssets, but I think in long-term it should be mostly user driven. Thus I could think of an additional feature when creating a margin position that allows dividends of some sort.

When the user creates a margin position, he can choose his collateral ratio. If the ratio is above some ratio, lets call it incentivize collateral ratio ICR, then additional features becomes visible:
User can lock his position for timespan X, where locking means:

• the position can not be closed
• the positions borrowed amount of bitAssets amount can not be reduced, only increased
• the positions collateral can not be reduced below ICR, only increased
• position becomes unlocked if ratio is less then the unlock incentivize collateral ratio UICR (set by commitee)

If position becomes locked, then the positions collateral in BTS receives Y% from the reserve pool (or some commitee account, eventually filled by fees?) every month the position is locked, where the Y% is only with reference to amount of BTS necessary to achieve ICR. Value Y% depends on the choice X of the user.

For example: ICR is 3.

• User opens position to create 1000 bitUSD backed by 50000 BTS (assume 10 BTS/bitUSD price).
  The collateral ratio of this position is then 5, which is higher than ICR, and user chooses to lock for one month.
• Bitshares says now he will get 0.1% paid every month for all BTS required to achieve ICR.
  To achieve ICR, he would need only 30000 BTS, so the incentive is 30000 * 0.1% = 30.
• The positions collateral will be increased by 30 BTS taken from reserve pool every month. After the two months,
  the position unlocks itself automatically (but is  not closed) and the user has now 50060 BTS as collateral.

This approach would certainly need development on back- and frontend, but could be very interesting for hodlers.

[JohnR]

I agree that smartcoins are the lifeblood of bitshares.  Distributing the decision-making for the total supply of smartcoins to the market is interesting.  It's clear that we all want more smartcoins in circulation and the way to do that is by rewarding debtors/stakeholders.  My question is whether there is a way to accomplish this without instituting a tax on trade of smartcoins?

- What about lowering the margin requirement?  This would decrease the cost of creating smartcoins.
- What about a dividend from the treasury or from protocol fees?  For new people it is very startling/confusing to see they are in essence paying two fees to trade in UIAs like Open.BTC.  I think we want less fees not more.

[白衣]

提高手续费、买入bts、抵押、锁定等等，依旧是治标不治本。任何面向现有用户、降低用户体验、提高用户交易成本的方案，也许会有一定的可行性和效果，但都不会是最优方案，说不定下次又得想个方案，如何解决因交易成本升高导致用户减少和交易不活跃的问题。
为什么不面向草根百姓，面向不懂区块链、不懂编程、不懂去中心化、不懂比特币和比特股有何差别的人群去探求解决的途径呢？
巨蟹的鼓鼓钱包面世推广，是 Bitshares一个了不起的里程碑。如果做个类比，内盘相当于天弘基金管理有限公司，鼓鼓钱包相当于支付宝。但是很遗憾，一直没见到鼓鼓钱包推出类似余额宝的产品。
余额宝给的7日年化收益率最高不过7%左右，但产品推出后平均每天有超过30万新用户开通余额宝。很简单，草根屌丝的想法很简单，简单、轻松、快捷、门槛低，灵活进出，保本，赚点钱，如果赚到的比贷款利息还高，我就贷款搞它。
马云的余额宝每天比银行活期高14到18倍的收益，根据人类贪婪的本性和资本的本质，在安全性有一定可靠的情况下。傻子都会选谁………..
鼓鼓钱包难道真的无暇、无能、无意开发这样的产品吗？
如果鼓鼓钱包倒腾出一个安全稳定、每日返利、年化收益率12%左右的做市基金或者套利基金的“余额宝”，我都怀疑鼓鼓钱包能不能装下那么多大妈大爷的钱………………那时候，再考虑市值管理？

[bench]

English please

The proposal that has already been adopted is to buy the BTS with a recycling fee and then buy it in the mortgage. The time to buy first, who is this? How much is the mortgage rate performed? What should I do if the funds after the mortgage collapse? This follow-up has a series of questions.
I come to a suggestion to collect the daily fee, buy the BTS through a random block, and (PS: why it is a random block to prevent someone from maliciously targeting the wool) to destroy it immediately!
Reasons: First of all, the current transaction fees generated by the internal disk transaction cannot form a large pool of funds within a short period of time to buy the BTS, and it needs long-term accumulation. However, once a large pool of funds is formed in the later period, the use of this fund will form the focus. Pile of troublesome things. The use of the destruction mechanism has long formed a deflationary trend in disguise, and the logic is simple. The effect is obvious. The community can take a lot of time to study how to expand the market and do technological research and development. It does not need to spend too much effort on this kind of thing. on.
Just to explore, to initiate, we can explore other deflation channels?

请使用谷歌翻译等翻译工具提供您的文本的英文版本。
谢谢！
Please use a translation tool like Google translate to provide an English copy of your text.
Thanks!

Maybe an onboard translator would be a nice thing.

[sschiessl]

English please

[binggo]

如果被人盯住故意做空咋办，方案是不是应该考虑周全点？
另外你们一直在喊着smart coin不足，然后一直在想办法解决smart coin紧缩的问题。这些完全是本末倒置，治标不治本，BTS没有实际价值都是扯淡。
我们要做得无非两点：
1. 让别人更加倾向长期拿着BTS（长期持有smart coin才能稳定抵押；这是交易所活跃的基础）。
2. 让更多人进入BTS交易所（其实我看到大家都很努力整一堆交易对，类似鼓鼓钱包的生态建立，但是没有良好的基础环境都是扯淡。BTS有了良好的良性循环，bts持有人作为旁观者岂有不入局？岂能不越来越了解bts？岂能不为bts宣传一下？而不是给人感觉比中心化交易所风险还大的东西。）

分析：
bts内盘 == 各大交易所（应该自带盈利功能，虽然效率低了点但是安全点，本身就不输中心化平台）
bts == 各大交易所的平台币（怎么市值管理平台币？各大中心化交易所不是已经有好榜样了么）
smartcoin == 出入金资金，以及高风险爱好者偶尔玩玩的抵押。
总之一句话：我们需要更多钱，但是钱应该自产！别人中心化交易所能这么赚钱，我们bts交易所却这么穷为啥？（你手续费那么低，让利给机器人？ 你会员那么便宜，丢掉一个赢利点。你上币不收别人年费或x费的，又浪费盈利点）。感觉就是这也让利，那也让利，自己穷成狗，还要支付见证人费用，还要给社区开开工资等各种日常费用。如今还想做市值管理？如果上帝操控bts，也许可以。

I agree with the BTS market mangement.

But I don't agree with below point of view:
-------
3. Borrow bitCNY/bitUSD by putting the bought BTS into collateral with high collateral ratio and continue to buy in BTS.
-------
I think some of bitCNY/bitUSD should be the fee when use them to Buy other coins but these BTS should not be COLLATERAL to borrow bitCNY/bitUSD.
Then there will be no risk for this account pool.
These BTS bought by fees should be locked for long time or forever, or use this as bonus for some development projects and projects like billionare project etc.

我主要想表达的是bitCNY/bitUSD可以作为交易费用，但是费用池中买回BTS不应该继续作为抵押。使得这个费用池出现任何风险都是不应该的。
而买回的BTS可以作为长期锁仓，或做长远项目费用拨备或支持类似billionare计划。

I don't agree with you.
with enough higher collateral ratio(at least 3) the bought BTS can be put into collateral for borrowing bitCNY/bitUSD. the worst result is that the debt position is margin called and these BTS is selled out in a lower price, no further risks.
just locking BTS there is a waste of resource, with collateral it can add more power to the ecosystem.

我也觉得再次抵押不妥，今年多少次短期腰斩行情了，要不是不知道，强烈建议回收销毁机制，还是需要马克思的供给和需求关系来解决，市场的货越少，货越值钱就是这个理。

抵押再买入bts也无不妥，但是这个系统的抵押倍数必须在5左右，而不能在3.
销毁一部分也可以，但是本身bts的手续费就有销毁提案，变相的锁仓并不能促进bts的价格上涨，该跌的时候还是会跌，实际应用的推广才是bts价格能够上涨的持续动力。
BTS保证合适的流通性也是系统的需要，也是价值的体现。东西并不是越少就越值钱，人们认可它的价值才是最重要的。

[时光旅行机]

如果被人盯住故意做空咋办，方案是不是应该考虑周全点？
另外你们一直在喊着smart coin不足，然后一直在想办法解决smart coin紧缩的问题。这些完全是本末倒置，治标不治本，BTS没有实际价值都是扯淡。
我们要做得无非两点：
1. 让别人更加倾向长期拿着BTS（长期持有smart coin才能稳定抵押；这是交易所活跃的基础）。
2. 让更多人进入BTS交易所（其实我看到大家都很努力整一堆交易对，类似鼓鼓钱包的生态建立，但是没有良好的基础环境都是扯淡。BTS有了良好的良性循环，bts持有人作为旁观者岂有不入局？岂能不越来越了解bts？岂能不为bts宣传一下？而不是给人感觉比中心化交易所风险还大的东西。）

分析：
bts内盘 == 各大交易所（应该自带盈利功能，虽然效率低了点但是安全点，本身就不输中心化平台）
bts == 各大交易所的平台币（怎么市值管理平台币？各大中心化交易所不是已经有好榜样了么）
smartcoin == 出入金资金，以及高风险爱好者偶尔玩玩的抵押。
总之一句话：我们需要更多钱，但是钱应该自产！别人中心化交易所能这么赚钱，我们bts交易所却这么穷为啥？（你手续费那么低，让利给机器人？ 你会员那么便宜，丢掉一个赢利点。你上币不收别人年费或x费的，又浪费盈利点）。感觉就是这也让利，那也让利，自己穷成狗，还要支付见证人费用，还要给社区开开工资等各种日常费用。如今还想做市值管理？如果上帝操控bts，也许可以。

I agree with the BTS market mangement.

But I don't agree with below point of view:
-------
3. Borrow bitCNY/bitUSD by putting the bought BTS into collateral with high collateral ratio and continue to buy in BTS.
-------
I think some of bitCNY/bitUSD should be the fee when use them to Buy other coins but these BTS should not be COLLATERAL to borrow bitCNY/bitUSD.
Then there will be no risk for this account pool.
These BTS bought by fees should be locked for long time or forever, or use this as bonus for some development projects and projects like billionare project etc.

我主要想表达的是bitCNY/bitUSD可以作为交易费用，但是费用池中买回BTS不应该继续作为抵押。使得这个费用池出现任何风险都是不应该的。
而买回的BTS可以作为长期锁仓，或做长远项目费用拨备或支持类似billionare计划。

I don't agree with you.
with enough higher collateral ratio(at least 3) the bought BTS can be put into collateral for borrowing bitCNY/bitUSD. the worst result is that the debt position is margin called and these BTS is selled out in a lower price, no further risks.
just locking BTS there is a waste of resource, with collateral it can add more power to the ecosystem.

我也觉得再次抵押不妥，今年多少次短期腰斩行情了，要不是不知道，强烈建议回收销毁机制，还是需要马克思的供给和需求关系来解决，市场的货越少，货越值钱就是这个理。

[时光旅行机]

目前已经通过的提案是用回收手续费买入BTS，在抵押然后买入。首先买入的时机，这个是谁来定？抵押倍率执行多少？抵押后资金爆仓该怎么办？这后续有一系列的问题。
  我来个建议，每日回收手续费，通过随机块买入BTS，（PS：为什么是随机块，防止有人恶意定点撸羊毛）即刻销毁！
  原因：首先目前内盘交易产生的手续费在买入BTS短时间内形成不了大的资金池，需要长期积累，但是后期一旦形成大资金池，那这笔资金的使用，会形成焦点，肯定一大堆的麻烦事。使用销毁机制，长期形成变相的通缩趋势，而且逻辑简单，效果立显，社区大可拿出大把的时间研究怎么来扩大市场，做做技术研发，不必要把过多精力花在这种事情上。
   仅探讨，抛砖引玉，大家可以探讨下其他的通缩渠道？

[bench]

Adding extra fees (0,05%) for bitshares to offer a better longterm value and having more liquidity could be a good thing, but I don't think we gonna solve the problem with this. No fees for assets are a huge plus for now.

You can get bitFIAT only when buying BTS and sell BTS again, this is a huge gap for the system. We need more decentralized fiat gateways. Like Bisq integration. https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=23800.msg316383#msg316383

Who creates the bitFIAT when there is more demand?

[oldman]

I would support and vote for bitcrab's proposal and would further suggest using reserve funds to create enough of an initial trading stake for the management efforts to have a worthwhile impact. Moving 100M BTS from the reserve fund to a committee CNY trading account would have no noticeable impact on the Bitshares community but would allow bitcrab to begin manually managing immediately.

[Achilles]

Do what exchanger should do rather than watching smartcoin! smartcoin only give an opportunity to cash in/out.  Regards bts as bnb or ht... (Binance can run without usd and cny? why bts not? bnb can to the moon, why bts not?)

[Achilles]

如果被人盯住故意做空咋办，方案是不是应该考虑周全点？
另外你们一直在喊着smart coin不足，然后一直在想办法解决smart coin紧缩的问题。这些完全是本末倒置，治标不治本，BTS没有实际价值都是扯淡。
我们要做得无非两点：
1. 让别人更加倾向长期拿着BTS（长期持有smart coin才能稳定抵押；这是交易所活跃的基础）。
2. 让更多人进入BTS交易所（其实我看到大家都很努力整一堆交易对，类似鼓鼓钱包的生态建立，但是没有良好的基础环境都是扯淡。BTS有了良好的良性循环，bts持有人作为旁观者岂有不入局？岂能不越来越了解bts？岂能不为bts宣传一下？而不是给人感觉比中心化交易所风险还大的东西。）

分析：
bts内盘 == 各大交易所（应该自带盈利功能，虽然效率低了点但是安全点，本身就不输中心化平台）
bts == 各大交易所的平台币（怎么市值管理平台币？各大中心化交易所不是已经有好榜样了么）
smartcoin == 出入金资金，以及高风险爱好者偶尔玩玩的抵押。
总之一句话：我们需要更多钱，但是钱应该自产！别人中心化交易所能这么赚钱，我们bts交易所却这么穷为啥？（你手续费那么低，让利给机器人？ 你会员那么便宜，丢掉一个赢利点。你上币不收别人年费或x费的，又浪费盈利点）。感觉就是这也让利，那也让利，自己穷成狗，还要支付见证人费用，还要给社区开开工资等各种日常费用。如今还想做市值管理？如果上帝操控bts，也许可以。

I agree with the BTS market mangement.

But I don't agree with below point of view:
-------
3. Borrow bitCNY/bitUSD by putting the bought BTS into collateral with high collateral ratio and continue to buy in BTS.
-------
I think some of bitCNY/bitUSD should be the fee when use them to Buy other coins but these BTS should not be COLLATERAL to borrow bitCNY/bitUSD.
Then there will be no risk for this account pool.
These BTS bought by fees should be locked for long time or forever, or use this as bonus for some development projects and projects like billionare project etc.

我主要想表达的是bitCNY/bitUSD可以作为交易费用，但是费用池中买回BTS不应该继续作为抵押。使得这个费用池出现任何风险都是不应该的。
而买回的BTS可以作为长期锁仓，或做长远项目费用拨备或支持类似billionare计划。

I don't agree with you.
with enough higher collateral ratio(at least 3) the bought BTS can be put into collateral for borrowing bitCNY/bitUSD. the worst result is that the debt position is margin called and these BTS is selled out in a lower price, no further risks.
just locking BTS there is a waste of resource, with collateral it can add more power to the ecosystem.

[binggo]

网上看到的，这里转载一下：
抵押爆仓怎么办，谁救？
 
手续费买来的BTS是要抵押的，只要抵押都有爆仓危险，如果连理事会的抵押都爆仓了，这个资金量(比如2-3亿的bts)，我相信没人能救了吧。那时候发生的时候，我估计也是时候来次黑天鹅。

所以方案绝对是个定时炸弹，双刃剑，用的好大家都获利，用的不好，那BTS以后都别玩了，起不来了。

所以，看得出来稳定抵押的关键性，这个抵押率巨蟹定不小于3倍。如果小于3，收来的Bitcny用来还款，如果大于3，收来的Bitcny继续买BTS。这样，基本能抵抗一定的风险。

但是这种抗性不应急，因为对于过山车行情，暴跌往往发生在几夜间，如果没有资金存量的话，那暴跌期间是无法保证3倍抵押率的，因为几天收上来的Bitcny也就几百万，塞牙缝都不够。具体的买进卖出策略都是系统执行，不知道有没有资金池收集到一定程度后再抵押部分的策略，我没看到巨蟹有具体说道，但我强烈建议有。

我强烈建议在中文区也开一个讨论帖子进行讨论，难道国内的BTS持有人就准备忽略掉了....

抵押倍数以3为界限是不安全的，过山车行情只会导致系统的抵押也会爆仓，而且理事会的多签账户，不能保证这些多签人都能够及时反馈，谁没有个头疼脑热，身体不适？！突然停电，电脑死机，飞来横祸？！

不应该光收BITCNY及bitusd的手续费来进行市值管理，而应当是整个系统的BTS手续费来加入市值管理，因为到时候造福的是整个BTS社区，而不是单一的某个智能资产。而且在BITCNY及BTIUSD收取过高的手续费可能会伤害做市机器人的流动性。


系统的抵押也需要释放到市场中来促进bts的流通量，建议将系统的抵押在没有爆仓单的时候可以排位到强清第一位来释放抵押。因为变相的锁仓并不会抬高bts价格，该跌的时候还是会跌。

有进有出才能保证整个系统的抵押不会出现死局。

另一个方面，必须减少累积高杠杆抵押，注意累积二字，防止倒金字塔抵押结构形成，不强求完全消除，毕竟市场有人有做高杠杆需求，但是必须减少，让抵押结构呈正金字塔结构才行，让更多的BIT智能资产参与到实际流通中，而不是累积到自身的高杠杆中。

建议建立 爆仓池实行强平（有爆仓单时，强清也直接从这个池子里走，价格实行强平价格），在抵押倍数没有到一定程度的情况下，不去直接冲击市场深度。

我们实在不想在系统中形成这样一个超级无敌的定时炸弹，蟹老板的定时炸弹到现在还没有解除掉。

I agree with the offical market value management, but we must notice some problems:

1."how to manage the whole operation procedure?

create a trading account for each smartcoin, for example create committee.cnymaker for bitCNY operation,  the account will be owned by committee-account and the active key will be set as say 3/5 multisig, normally the accounts in the multisig structure are from committee members."

people is not safe and stabel. we can't make sure (3/5 multisig) committee members timely reflected.

2."the collateral ratio should be set as no less than 3" ,

must set as no less than 5.

3."Charge market fee for smarcoins like bitCNY and bitUSD."

Charge market fee must from all the bts system, not only bitcny and bitusd, the offical market value management is not only benefit the bitasset, it benefits all the bts system.

4. we must pay attention to the accrued highly leverage, must reduce the the accrued highly leverage.

[clockwork]

supported at a fee of 0.1% and using committee-trade for execution

I prefer use 2  accounts to handle bitCNY and bitUSD trade separately, team members that handle the bitCNY trade need to be close to CNY market

fair enough, no problem as long as multisig owners are agreed

[bitcrab]

supported at a fee of 0.1% and using committee-trade for execution

I prefer use 2  accounts to handle bitCNY and bitUSD trade separately, team members that handle the bitCNY trade need to be close to CNY market

[abit]

In conclusion, we need more money.

[bighotstar]

网上看到的，这里转载一下：
抵押爆仓怎么办，谁救？
 
手续费买来的BTS是要抵押的，只要抵押都有爆仓危险，如果连理事会的抵押都爆仓了，这个资金量(比如2-3亿的bts)，我相信没人能救了吧。那时候发生的时候，我估计也是时候来次黑天鹅。

所以方案绝对是个定时炸弹，双刃剑，用的好大家都获利，用的不好，那BTS以后都别玩了，起不来了。

所以，看得出来稳定抵押的关键性，这个抵押率巨蟹定不小于3倍。如果小于3，收来的Bitcny用来还款，如果大于3，收来的Bitcny继续买BTS。这样，基本能抵抗一定的风险。

但是这种抗性不应急，因为对于过山车行情，暴跌往往发生在几夜间，如果没有资金存量的话，那暴跌期间是无法保证3倍抵押率的，因为几天收上来的Bitcny也就几百万，塞牙缝都不够。具体的买进卖出策略都是系统执行，不知道有没有资金池收集到一定程度后再抵押部分的策略，我没看到巨蟹有具体说道，但我强烈建议有。

[vegolino]

I had simple plan when I started margin trading, in case of margin call I could always sell some of my other crypto and buy bitUSD and repay the debt.
What I didn't realise that when it came to it that nobody wanted to sell their bitUSD in the BTS falling market.

Well it is clear enough to me that at present smart-coins are not working as intended  due to low liquidity as nobody wishes to create/sell  new ones in falling market.
I don't know if bitcrab proposal will fix it but it won't cause any harm so we should try it unless someone else comes with better proposal.
Thanks to bitcrab for putting proposal and starting convo as it was needed.

Kind Regards
aloha

[Victor118]

 
Basically the problem is that the supply of smart assets does not depend on the demand, it depends on the borrowers.
Borrowers want to make profit, they are not interested in the total demand of smart assets, moreover to my knowledge there is no chart of the evolution of the demand for bitCNY for example?

The proposal is interesting, I support it.
But I wonder if it's enough.
At present, only DEX users create bitCny or BitUSD, besides the more these assets will be used outside the DEX, the more it will be necessary to create, asking DEX users to cover this demand is not realistic
I think an exchange like AEX should also offer the possibility to its users to short bitCNY.
I don't know if it's possible, but imagine a user-friendly widget for an exchange or any other loan service that would like to use Bitshares.
Obviously the possibility of putting Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies as collateral would greatly assist in the massive adoption of Bitshares decentralized loan mechanism
In conclusion, we need more borrowers, I think we have to get them outside the DEX.
DEX users can cover internal demand but not demand from anywhere in the world.

[Bangzi]

如何看待巨蟹提议官方进行比特股市值管理？
https://www.bitask.org/question/2016

[szs484]

我曾经建议提供阶梯抵押的功能
现在我仍然坚持这个提议
可作为控制风险的措施之一
而且我这个提议是完全市场化的
也交给用户自己选择的风险管控
功能详细介绍,见此贴:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=25557.0;topicseen.

[clockwork]

supported at a fee of 0.1% and using committee-trade for execution

[bitcrab]

I agree with the BTS market mangement.

But I don't agree with below point of view:
-------
3. Borrow bitCNY/bitUSD by putting the bought BTS into collateral with high collateral ratio and continue to buy in BTS.
-------
I think some of bitCNY/bitUSD should be the fee when use them to Buy other coins but these BTS should not be COLLATERAL to borrow bitCNY/bitUSD.
Then there will be no risk for this account pool.
These BTS bought by fees should be locked for long time or forever, or use this as bonus for some development projects and projects like billionare project etc.

我主要想表达的是bitCNY/bitUSD可以作为交易费用，但是费用池中买回BTS不应该继续作为抵押。使得这个费用池出现任何风险都是不应该的。
而买回的BTS可以作为长期锁仓，或做长远项目费用拨备或支持类似billionare计划。

I don't agree with you.
with enough higher collateral ratio(at least 3) the bought BTS can be put into collateral for borrowing bitCNY/bitUSD. the worst result is that the debt position is margin called and these BTS is selled out in a lower price, no further risks.
just locking BTS there is a waste of resource, with collateral it can add more power to the ecosystem.

[zhaomu]

Totally agree and support this idea. It it time to make a change and make bitshares great again. Wish this proposal can be approved and implemented ASAP.

[spiritabsolute]

I agree. Obviously the current system does not work.

[Brekyrself]

This proposal would cover all current BitAssets or just CNY & USD?

apply to CNY and USD at first, do not want to cover other smartcoins currently as they have very low trading volumes.

Would it not make sense to cover all markets to bootstrap liquidity?

[biotwang]

I agree with the BTS market mangement.

But I don't agree with below point of view:
-------
3. Borrow bitCNY/bitUSD by putting the bought BTS into collateral with high collateral ratio and continue to buy in BTS.
-------
I think some of bitCNY/bitUSD should be the fee when use them to Buy other coins but these BTS should not be COLLATERAL to borrow bitCNY/bitUSD.
Then there will be no risk for this account pool.
These BTS bought by fees should be locked for long time or forever, or use this as bonus for some development projects and projects like billionare project etc.

我主要想表达的是bitCNY/bitUSD可以作为交易费用，但是费用池中买回BTS不应该继续作为抵押。使得这个费用池出现任何风险都是不应该的。
而买回的BTS可以作为长期锁仓，或做长远项目费用拨备或支持类似billionare计划。

[bitcrab]

This proposal would cover all current BitAssets or just CNY & USD?

apply to CNY and USD at first, do not want to cover other smartcoins currently as they have very low trading volumes.

[Brekyrself]

This proposal would cover all current BitAssets or just CNY & USD?

[bitcrab]

Generally speaking, charging fees on bitCNY and etc is doable.

However, I don't think those fees would be enough to do effective "market value management".

Say, on average 10M CNY volume a day, and a fee rate at 0.05%, means 5K CNY of income per day. In order to have a working "market value management", I guess we need billions of CNY.

Another possible con:
* charging fees introduces friction, thus may reduce activity, thus may harm reputation of BitShares and price of BTS token.

By the way, why not increase basic network fees? The fees were reduced when BTS is 6CNY each, now BTS is around 1CNY each.

0.05% is really low, if most members from the community agree, I have no problem to set the fee rate to 0.1%.

we need billions of bitCNY supply, but I don't think we need so much just for market value management, after the operation begin, it will not only create purchasing power for BTS, but also change the expectation of traders, leverage effect here, I believe even 10k bitCNY/day will make sense.

I think we can do this first, if necessary, we can also modify the fee schedule later, or even seek more ways to optimize the liquidity.

I don't think such a fee rate friction will reduce the trading activity greatly, central exchanges like poloniex, Bitfinex have higher fee rate but still have big trading volume.

[bitcrab]

Broadly speaking, I support the concept of a Committee controlled market bot. Owner set to Committee is required. I have some reservations about Active set to M/N accounts.

Consider the following implementation concepts (for each SmartCoin):
1. committee.smartcoin: Owner, Active set to Committee
2. Each Committee member runs (to-be developed) code locally that:
3. --Calculates which Committee Member is the 'Market Maker Proposer' (highest votes, next highest if Proposal delay exceeds threshold below)
4. --Observes SmarCoin market:
5. ----Market Maker Proposer (MMP) evaluates SmartCoin market conditions for Triggers (OP examples):
6. ----MMP broadcasts Proposed Transaction containing market actions based on Triggers
7. ----Observes Proposed Transactions:
8. ------Evaluates Triggers
9. --------If TRUE: Signs Proposed Transaction
10. The automated decentralized bot should execute the intended market actions using a dynamic set of Committee authorities.
 
The above rough concept is similar to a Block Producer (Witness) providing Price Feed data by observing and having authority to sign their findings. However, the decentralized bot above requires observations from multiple sources to form the authority to perform the market actions.

interesting concept, however, I believe it will cost some time for development and test before getting reliable bot, we cannot wait while seeing the BTS price go down, we can start from manual operation and migrate to bot while it is available.

actually there is already a committee controlled account committee-trade which has a 3/4 multisig active key, this account do a lot trading in the past and works well.

if we need some enhanced setting for security, I think one choice is to block the committee-cnymaker account when too much(>10M?) BTS accumulate in it by setting both owner key and active key to null-account. and then create a new account to trade continully.

[sgsbtstwo]

agree  with  abit.

the  bitcny tx  fee  is too  small  to  make difference.

it  is  helpful but  not enough.

maybe we can add  btc or eth as  collateral
to generate stable coin.

[Victor118]

Very important topic! (Sorry for my english)
Authorizing the use of BTC as collateral could increase potential shorters, some exchanges like Aex could be interested in this feature and offer it to their users !?

[Bangzi]

1. I would like to suggest the market fee for bitCNY/bitUSD is 0.1%. This rate is reasonable and some exchanges even charge 0.2%. Traders will not care the fee is 0.05% or 0.1%.

2. Part of the market fee generated can used to reward traders who borrow BitCNY/bitUSD with BTS. The purpose of this is to incentive them to buy more BTS, borrow more BitCNY/BitUSD and then share market fee from BitCNY/bitUSD. A good example is BridgeCoin, one of the gateway for Bitshares allow its investors to stake BCO and share profit generated. Another example is STEEM, STEEM holders can delegate their STEEM Power to upvote bot and share profits.

[pc]

Interesting proposal. Thanks @bitcrab .

Might make sense to code such a mechanism into the blockchain. The committee are unpaid, Running such infrastructure could easily cost more than what we'd earn in fees.

[paliboy]

In general I support this proposal. However, I agree with abit that it probably create some friction and won't have a big impact. On the other hand, it could buy us time in hard times.

[abit]

Generally speaking, charging fees on bitCNY and etc is doable.

However, I don't think those fees would be enough to do effective "market value management".

Say, on average 10M CNY volume a day, and a fee rate at 0.05%, means 5K CNY of income per day. In order to have a working "market value management", I guess we need billions of CNY.

Another possible con:
* charging fees introduces friction, thus may reduce activity, thus may harm reputation of BitShares and price of BTS token.

By the way, why not increase basic network fees? The fees were reduced when BTS is 6CNY each, now BTS is around 1CNY each.

[ripplexiaoshan]

It's definitely doable. Using fees to buy back BTS is a positive feedback,which will increase the price of BTS.

[lovegan007]

好好好，管它是什么，只要能涨，什么样的都行。

[Fox]

Broadly speaking, I support the concept of a Committee controlled market bot. Owner set to Committee is required. I have some reservations about Active set to M/N accounts.

Consider the following implementation concepts (for each SmartCoin):
1. committee.smartcoin: Owner, Active set to Committee
2. Each Committee member runs (to-be developed) code locally that:
3. --Calculates which Committee Member is the 'Market Maker Proposer' (highest votes, next highest if Proposal delay exceeds threshold below)
4. --Observes SmarCoin market:
5. ----Market Maker Proposer (MMP) evaluates SmartCoin market conditions for Triggers (OP examples):
6. ----MMP broadcasts Proposed Transaction containing market actions based on Triggers
7. ----Observes Proposed Transactions:
8. ------Evaluates Triggers
9. --------If TRUE: Signs Proposed Transaction
10. The automated decentralized bot should execute the intended market actions using a dynamic set of Committee authorities.
 
The above rough concept is similar to a Block Producer (Witness) providing Price Feed data by observing and having authority to sign their findings. However, the decentralized bot above requires observations from multiple sources to form the authority to perform the market actions.

[Achilles]

Nice.
the basic value of shares is bonus. so why bitshares have no bonus for those who BTS Longer? Encourage people to buy bts and save bts rather than borrow too much smart coin and wait margin calling.

[ebit]

support ,we need new idea.The infrastructure can be used to collect eos btc too.

[bitcrab]

Frankly speaking, Bitshares ecosystem, especially smart coin ecosystem is facing bottleneck, recently the whole cryptocurrencies is in bear market, BTS price also wander in low level, consequently, margin calling happen frequently and smartcoins like bitCNY is in big shortage. When I wrote this, in magicwallet  traders need to pay 1.12 fiat CNY to buy 1 bitCNY. AEX, the first central exchange that open bitCNY market, now issue CNC, a token similar to USDT, and adopt it as base currency because now they are not confident that bitCNY can work well and fulfill the exchange demand，if we cannot find solution to overcome these hurdles, “make Bitshares great again” will be hollow words.

The current margin call rule has some flaws, which give BTS shorters big chance to make benefit and bring BTS longer big risk, hopefully the flaws will be solved by a planned hardfork with “sell only required collateral while margin call” feature in 1-2 months, however, even the hard fork happen without delay, it still do not solve all the problems,  Bitshares need some infrastructure to do BTS market value management, to bring the ecosystem to a more stable an active level.

I now propose to do “official market value management” to add power to Bitshares, below is the planned steps:

1. Charge market fee for smarcoins like bitCNY and bitUSD.

2.Use the collected fee to buy BTS. 

3. Borrow bitCNY/bitUSD by putting the bought BTS into collateral with high collateral ratio and continue to buy in BTS.

With this procedure, more and more BTS will be locked as collateral and more and more smartcoins will be supplied, all this will create incentive and also the expectation for BTS price to go up, consequently this will speed up the grow up of the smart coin ecosystem and then the whole Bitshares ecosystem.

what a market fee for smartcoins is appropriate?  

the fee rate should be low enough to keep the user experience as almost same as before, and also should be high enough to provide enough fund for  market value management, considering all this, 0.05% should be a good level.

how to manage the whole operation procedure?

create a trading account for each smartcoin, for example create committee.cnymaker for bitCNY operation,  the account will be owned by committee-account and the active key will be set as say 3/5 multisig, normally the accounts in the multisig structure are from committee members.

operation will follow some predefined rules, taking bitCNY as example:

Rules for placing/canceling orders to buy BTS:

1. while bitCNY is priced lower than 1 fiat CNY in market, then stop placing new buy orders.
2. while bitCNY is priced higher than 1 fiat CNY in market, place order to buy BTS, with the price at least 1% lower than the top buy order in market.
3. if any exist buy order A is with a price more than 10% lower than the top buy order, cancel order A.

Rules for borrowing bitCNY:

While borrowing bitCNY, the collateral ratio should be set as no less than 3, while the collateral go down to less than 3, stop buying BTS and use the collected bitCNY to reduce debt until the collateral is higher than 3.

Now more decentralized exchange appear in the market, CYBEX，a decentralized exchange forked from BTS with adding many ICO friendly features, is planning to get big share in the market, Bitfinex also plan to develop EOSfinex on the coming EOS platform, if Bitshares cannot make big advance by making good use of its specific advantages, no one can guarantee a good future. I hope everyone can carefully check the proposal and suggest constructively, I hope we have chance to make such a change happen and make bitshares great again.