suggestion for an offical market value management infrastructure

[R]

The short term and quickest solution is already presented here, since it requires no blockchain update (change fees, collected fees used to create bitassets).

I would also agree to incentivize the creation of BitAssets, but I think in long-term it should be mostly user driven. Thus I could think of an additional feature when creating a margin position that allows dividends of some sort.

When the user creates a margin position, he can choose his collateral ratio. If the ratio is above some ratio, lets call it incentivize collateral ratio ICR, then additional features becomes visible:
User can lock his position for timespan X, where locking means:

• the position can not be closed
• the positions borrowed amount of bitAssets amount can not be reduced, only increased
• the positions collateral can not be reduced below ICR, only increased
• position becomes unlocked if ratio is less then the unlock incentivize collateral ratio UICR (set by commitee)

If position becomes locked, then the positions collateral in BTS receives Y% from the reserve pool (or some commitee account, eventually filled by fees?) every month the position is locked, where the Y% is only with reference to amount of BTS necessary to achieve ICR. Value Y% depends on the choice X of the user.

For example: ICR is 3.

• User opens position to create 1000 bitUSD backed by 50000 BTS (assume 10 BTS/bitUSD price).
  The collateral ratio of this position is then 5, which is higher than ICR, and user chooses to lock for one month.
• Bitshares says now he will get 0.1% paid every month for all BTS required to achieve ICR.
  To achieve ICR, he would need only 30000 BTS, so the incentive is 30000 * 0.1% = 30.
• The positions collateral will be increased by 30 BTS taken from reserve pool every month. After the two months,
  the position unlocks itself automatically (but is  not closed) and the user has now 50060 BTS as collateral.

This approach would certainly need development on back- and frontend, but could be very interesting for hodlers.

BSIP 19 (https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0019.md) is highly related, however I disagree with only rewarding shorters - both shorters and asset holders aught to have a portion of market fees redistributed to them.

How would the reward be balanced between the shorter and holder though?

Holders aught to benefit from the 'coinage' of their held MPA, whilst the shorter aught to benefit from a higher collateral ratio.

Eligibility for fee redistribution should only trigger once the borrowed asset has been included in a fill order (perhaps only the backing asset to keep it simple?) so that we have cryptographic proof that it is publicly liquid instead of simply borrowed and transferred to a secondary account owned by the shorter. It would still be possible for someone to put up a huge sell/buy wall and sell/buy to themselves but by doing so they offer the public (bots included) the opportunity to eat into that public market liquidity, it could also boost the trading volume considerably.

I want to see the BTSX marketing of "x% on anything" come back - it was one of the major selling points for me that the broken FIAT banking sector offer 1% but I could get 5%+ on the blockchain - very powerful!

[Emma Lee]

the fee rate should be low enough to keep the user experience as almost same as before, and also should be high enough to provide enough fund for  market value management, considering all this, 0.05% should be a good level.

[Ashaman]

I don't know how I feel about the committee playing central banker like this. IMO change this radical should be introduced via a hardfork that would add something like a a central banking committee, separate from existing infrastructure.

On the other hand, the added liquidity from market making like this might really be key...

[abit]

hello, please help, if i want to buy bitCNY throug alipay, is it possible?

or any other ways ?

Try MagicWallet: https://www.magicw.net/

[blaze]

hello, please help, if i want to buy bitCNY throug alipay, is it possible?

or any other ways ?

[abit]

The comittee is in control of roughly 3.6 million BTS which are being held in either comittee-trade or committee-account.
https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/account/committee-account
https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/account/committee-trade

Questions:

• Is the current balance simply stacking up of transaction fees, or how did this accumulate?
  

The BTS in committee-trade: originally were fees accumulated in some bitAssets, mainly bitUSD, mostly accumulated in BTS 0.9 due to the "you get what you ask for" mechanism. We got them out and sold them for BTS in 2016 to bring more liquidity to the market. The BTS are being used to fund fee pools of assets controlled by committee-account, then accumulate fees again, thus circulating.

The BTS in committee-account: after BSIP18, the account started to hold short positions. The biggest position was SILVER which had about 2M BTS of collateral, at a time, SILVER got globally settled again (black swan), so the overcollateralized BTS was returned to committee-account.

[lovegan007]

理事会不是还有没解的十亿BTS么，动用它啊，抵押10亿BTS，抵押出5亿BITCNY来拉盘，5亿BITCNY可以拉到5块了，到5块了又可以从10亿BTS和买进来的那几亿BTS 一起提高抵押，可以一共抵押出25亿以上的BITCNY来托盘拉盘，这个时候谁还能砸得动？

[pc]

The committee-account is holding short positions. Why?

These are from bitAssets being auto-revived after a black swan. See BSIP-18.

Where can I see the accumulation of incoming market fees?

Market fees are not listed separately. The asset object holds them in "accumulated_fees", together with the tx fees that were paid in the asset in exchange for funds from the fee pool.
You can look at the trade volume of that asset, and calculate the resulting fees.

[sschiessl]

The comittee is in control of roughly 3.6 million BTS which are being held in either comittee-trade or committee-account.
https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/account/committee-account
https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/account/committee-trade

Questions:

• Is the current balance simply stacking up of transaction fees, or how did this accumulate?
  
• The committee-account is holding short positions. Why?
  
• Where can I see the accumulation of incoming market fees?
  
• How and when will you move forward with bitAsset creation? Backed by worker proposal?
  

[bench]

The fees shouldn't be used to artificially increase the price of bts, I agree here. What happens to the fees now?

The fees should directly be used to provide liquidity to the exchanges. A lot of companies adopted the BTS network, because there were no fees in trading to bitAssets. I didn't hear any numbers on the duration of the new market fee.

[Crypto Kong]

I am against this proposal, you want to increase fees in order to artificially pump the price of BTS. This is a terrible idea. You will deter people from making the markets by increasing fees and no doubt will get margin called keeping the price of BTS low. BAD BAD IDEA.

If this does go ahead, then I suggest keeping the call price at extreme lows to reduce the risk by as much as possible. By that I mean for bitUSD, a call price of $0.01 maximum.

[JohnR]

While I'm glad that this was able to be approved so quickly I think it would be wise to establish some metrics for how successful this fee implementation will be.  How can we assess whether this fee change helps or hurts the bitassets markets?  As it appears to me having a fee to sell bitUSD/CNY seems like a pure windfall to those incumbents who have built up a large short position.

[bench]

I like the idea to reward the BTS holder directly with new BTS paid by trading fees. There is no middle man and anybody has the freedom to do with his BTS, what you wanna do.
This is the staking for BTS, a function much needed to convince people, holding BTS.


我喜欢这个想法，直接用BTS交换费用支付BTS持有人。 没有中间人，任何人都有自由处理他的BTS，你想做什么。
这是BTS的角色，这是一个非常需要说服人们持有BTS的功能。

短期和最快的解决方案已经在这里提出，因为它不需要区块链更新（更改费用，用于创建比特资源的收取费用）。

我也同意激励创建BitAssets，但我认为从长远来看，它应该主要由用户驱动。因此，我可以在创建允许某种类型的股息的保证金头寸时考虑附加功能。

当用户创建保证金头寸时，他可以选择他的保证金比率。如果该比率高于某个比率，我们称之为激励抵押比率ICR，则可以看到其他功能：
用户可以锁定其时间范围X的位置，其中锁定意味着：

    该位置不能关闭
    bitAssets的借入量不能减少，只能增加
    职位抵押额不能减少到ICR以下，只能增加
    如果比率小于解锁激励抵押比率UICR（由委托人设置）

如果头寸锁定，那么BTS的抵押品收到储备池（或某个委托人账户，最终由费用填充）的Y％，该位置每月锁定，其中X％仅参照必要的BTS数量实现ICR。值Y取决于用户的选择X.

例如：ICR是3。

    用户打开位置以创建由50000 BTS支持的1000 bitUSD（假设10 BTS / bitUSD价格）。
    此位置的抵押比率为5，高于ICR，并且用户选择锁定一个月。
    Bitshares表示，现在他将获得每月支付0.1％的所有BTS以实现ICR。
    为了实现ICR，他只需要30000 BTS，所以激励是30000 * 0.1％= 30。
    每月从储备池中抽取30个BTS增加抵押品的头寸。两个月后，
    该位置自动解锁（但未关闭），用户现在有50060 BTS作为抵押品。


这种方法肯定需要在后台和前端进行开发，但对于hodlers来说可能非常有趣。

[sschiessl]

The short term and quickest solution is already presented here, since it requires no blockchain update (change fees, collected fees used to create bitassets).

I would also agree to incentivize the creation of BitAssets, but I think in long-term it should be mostly user driven. Thus I could think of an additional feature when creating a margin position that allows dividends of some sort.

When the user creates a margin position, he can choose his collateral ratio. If the ratio is above some ratio, lets call it incentivize collateral ratio ICR, then additional features becomes visible:
User can lock his position for timespan X, where locking means:

• the position can not be closed
• the positions borrowed amount of bitAssets amount can not be reduced, only increased
• the positions collateral can not be reduced below ICR, only increased
• position becomes unlocked if ratio is less then the unlock incentivize collateral ratio UICR (set by commitee)

If position becomes locked, then the positions collateral in BTS receives Y% from the reserve pool (or some commitee account, eventually filled by fees?) every month the position is locked, where the Y% is only with reference to amount of BTS necessary to achieve ICR. Value Y% depends on the choice X of the user.

For example: ICR is 3.

• User opens position to create 1000 bitUSD backed by 50000 BTS (assume 10 BTS/bitUSD price).
  The collateral ratio of this position is then 5, which is higher than ICR, and user chooses to lock for one month.
• Bitshares says now he will get 0.1% paid every month for all BTS required to achieve ICR.
  To achieve ICR, he would need only 30000 BTS, so the incentive is 30000 * 0.1% = 30.
• The positions collateral will be increased by 30 BTS taken from reserve pool every month. After the two months,
  the position unlocks itself automatically (but is  not closed) and the user has now 50060 BTS as collateral.

This approach would certainly need development on back- and frontend, but could be very interesting for hodlers.

[JohnR]

I agree that smartcoins are the lifeblood of bitshares.  Distributing the decision-making for the total supply of smartcoins to the market is interesting.  It's clear that we all want more smartcoins in circulation and the way to do that is by rewarding debtors/stakeholders.  My question is whether there is a way to accomplish this without instituting a tax on trade of smartcoins?

- What about lowering the margin requirement?  This would decrease the cost of creating smartcoins.
- What about a dividend from the treasury or from protocol fees?  For new people it is very startling/confusing to see they are in essence paying two fees to trade in UIAs like Open.BTC.  I think we want less fees not more.