suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY

[zhouxiaobao]

if it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.
[/quote

yes,let's do it.the only one choice.

[matle85]

One positive is nobody voted 'Don't care' so at least we are all engaged   

[matle85]

I'm assuming the vote above is just informative - I guess the Committee have the authority make the decision and if they decide they want to put it to a worker vote on chain they do?

Sure informative, like CNN or fake news.

Rather than admit the sentiment is against this change, those pushing for it will keep trying to spin inputs until they get what they want, damned be the shareholders and contrary opinions.

Well the first vote was No and after it was reset and the new option was set the vote was still No.

Some people I would have expected to be against the change aren't though so Ill spend sometime this weekend doing some background reading to see what I'm missing.

My feeling is that we are still in the midst of a pretty serious stress test for BTS stablecoins as the price of BTS has dropped by 90%. That has meant a lot of us have been hurt pretty badly with our margins (I actually had to largely exit mine on the way down with quite a big loss of my BTS).

We need to take this as an opportunity to fix on something that works - the price will go up again during the next bull run but there will be more hard drops and margin holders exposed. The mechanism we figure out over the coming months should maintain the peg / underlying basis for it being a stablecoin above anything else.

[Thom]

I'm assuming the vote above is just informative - I guess the Committee have the authority make the decision and if they decide they want to put it to a worker vote on chain they do?

Sure informative, like CNN or fake news.

Rather than admit the sentiment is against this change, those pushing for it will keep trying to spin inputs until they get what they want, damned be the shareholders and contrary opinions.

[xeroc]

I'm assuming the vote above is just informative - I guess the Committee have the authority make the decision and if they decide they want to put it to a worker vote on chain they do?

Correct.

[matle85]

I'm assuming the vote above is just informative - I guess the Committee have the authority make the decision and if they decide they want to put it to a worker vote on chain they do?

[Thul3]

Create a worker proposal based poll, not an easily manipulated forum poll - I had to re-cast my vote for some reason and there's a new poll option now.. not ideal. 20% is way too much for force settlement offset

Create over time 20 accounts and you will win any poll

[Digital Lucifer]

tomorrow the poll will be closed, please vote to express your opinion.

Create a worker proposal based poll, not an easily manipulated forum poll - I had to re-cast my vote for some reason and there's a new poll option now.. not ideal. 20% is way too much for force settlement offset 👎

Well, i stated earlier in TG that 15% would be sufficient by my personal opinion, but anyway - quite more happy with 20% change option than any other included in the poll

[R]

tomorrow the poll will be closed, please vote to express your opinion.

Create a worker proposal based poll, not an easily manipulated forum poll - I had to re-cast my vote for some reason and there's a new poll option now.. not ideal. 20% is way too much for force settlement offset 👎

[abit]

Alternatively, we can keep the 5% offset, but ask witnesses to set a % bottom (in comparison to trading price) when feeding BTS/bitCNY price.

Do you mean with a % bottom to aim for a constant but positive premium? Or what is the bottom?

No. It's related to the context.

[sschiessl]

Alternatively, we can keep the 5% offset, but ask witnesses to set a % bottom (in comparison to trading price) when feeding BTS/bitCNY price.

Do you mean with a % bottom to aim for a constant but positive premium? Or what is the bottom?

[bitcrab]

tomorrow the poll will be closed, please vote to express your opinion.

[abit]

I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

Alternatively, we can try to do BSIP42 only when bitAsset is at premium, and let force settlement play its role when bitAsset is at discount. That said, since the two tools are incompatible, we adopt one of them.

To make the best use of force settlement, the offset should be set to near zero rather than 5%. The best time to make the change is when BTS/bitCNY price feed is higher than trading price, but we've missed it (we can still do it on bitUSD). Since now the price feed of BTS/bitCNY is around 4% lower than trading price, if change the offset or the feed in a sudden, there would be unexpected consequences, we need quite some efforts if want to make the change and make it perfect. Alternatively, we can keep the 5% offset, but ask witnesses to set a % bottom (in comparison to trading price) when feeding BTS/bitCNY price.

[bitcrab]

As a committee member I have one more request: When a proposal is created and approved for increasing the settlement offset, please make it execute with at least 5 days notice and ensure everyone trading on bitCNY has had a chance to adept to the upcoming change. Thank you.

sure

[xeroc]

Provided that we need to learn along the way, I think we add another experiment to the game and see if settlements can be dis-incentivized by raising the offset. If that results in a better peg, I am not convinced, but I also don't know.
I feel that the bitCNY:BTS market is the only one that can survive such a (to me rather drastic) step given the liquidity.

As a committee member I have one more request: When a proposal is created and approved for increasing the settlement offset, please make it execute with at least 5 days notice and ensure everyone trading on bitCNY has had a chance to adept to the upcoming change. Thank you.

[matle85]

I'm going to read up more today as I feel like I'm a bit poorly informed / haven't quite got my head around the interaction of the different mechanisms and how these are most fairly adjusted to achieve the best possible stablecoin.

My preference would be for calculating the feed price in a far way that recognises the liquidity and market for bitCNY. We want more bitCNY not less so I agree seeing liquidations on a token which is seeing good use and wider adoption is not desirable. That said it is also important that there remains a clear decentralised basis backing the value of the coin with sufficient BTS.

Let's see if I can get my head around it a bit more today.

We should all bear in mind BTS fell 90% and bitUSD / bitCNY survived, that's a pretty impressive stress test but it does mean a lot of people are hurting a bit / are close to the line now.

Basically the price of BTS needs to go up and all this just goes away...

[bitcrab]

up to now about 2/3 of the voters say no to disable force settlement. I think it's clear that there's no enough support to disable force settlement.

to move things ahead, I'd like to reset the poll with adding one more option -  set force settlement offset for bitCNY to 20%.

in the past 2 days something happened in bitCNY - initially feed price fall to 5% more lower than DEX latest price and triggered a lot of settlement orders, and then some market activity are triggered to resist this - the feed price and latest price are pulled to be more close, and now the feed price is almost exactly 5% below the latest price.

the force settlement limit the DEX price to go up and the feed price to go down, for example, if there is no force settlement, we may have a 1CNY DEX price and a 0.8 feed price, but with force settlement, the market force lead to a 0.89 CNY DEX price and 0.85 feed price.

we need to make it possible for feed price to go far below the market price, in other words, we need to allow market price to go far above feed price.

to replace 5% with 20% is to make it possible for market price to be 20% higher than feed price.

please kindly consider and revote.

[abit]

Thank you @xeroc for the reply. Calling you out because I have very high expectations of you. You're so important.

[yamtt]

I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.

同意支持提高清算补偿

一样的，喂价反馈一样可以反馈到无限低，难道清算补偿也要提高无限高？

the situantion is same.

不会无限提高 只是补偿喂价和现价的差而已

[yamtt]

     虽然BIP42已经可以保证BITCNY的锚定了，但是目前的喂价公式不利于活跃市场，灵敏度太低，反映迟于市场行情。压低喂价和强清都可以抑制抵押，但是强清也不是无风险套利，因为延后24小时执行，这就是市场风险了。用压低喂价的方式不如发起强清利于活跃市场，目前看市场已经很死了，不应该一味的打压市场活跃度了。
       如果想发起强清，那么玩家手里必须备有bitcny,这也是bitcny的需求来源。所以目前保留强清会更合适，没有理由移除强清。况且，强清目前也没有什么坏处，无非就是把高抵押的清算了而已，下调喂价一样会把高抵押的爆仓的。移除强清是保护抵押者的说法不成立。只要市场bitcny需求不足，那么高抵押行为必须抑制。
      强请补偿应该为零，而不是5%，会更有利于活跃内盘的。强清应该是很正常的市场行为，而不是偶尔来一次，习惯了就行了。阶梯式强清补偿可能更合适，可以避免恶意强清。

     总之，BTS系统是做市场的，不是国家机构，不能管的太死，否则会适得其反。
   另外，锚定精确不代表非要1:1才是锚定精确。只要在一定时间段保证汇率稳定，保证汇率可控就是锚定精确了。可以是1:1，也可以是1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03，都表示锚定精确。熊市行情应该是bitcny 适度贬值的锚定，比如1:1.02，这样会更有利于活跃市场。


你这是想完全把bts改成期货交易

Although BIP42 can guarantee the anchoring of BITCNY, the current feeding formula is not conducive to the active market, and the sensitivity is too low to reflect the market price later. Lower feeding prices and strong liquidation can suppress mortgages, but strong liquidation is not risk-free arbitrage, because delayed implementation of 24 hours, which is market risk. It's better to lower the feeding price than to activate the market by launching a strong Qing Dynasty. At present, the market is dead, so we should not blindly suppress the market activity.
If you want to be strong, then players must have bitcny in hand, which is also the source of demand for bitcny. Therefore, it is more appropriate to retain strong clearance at present, and there is no reason to remove Qiang Qing. Moreover, there is no harm in Qiangqing at present, just liquidating the high mortgage, and lowering the feeding price will also explode the high mortgage. It is untenable to remove strong clearing is to protect mortgages. As long as the market bitcny demand is insufficient, the high mortgage behavior must be suppressed.
Strong compensation should be zero instead of 5%, which will be more conducive to active internal market. Qiang Qing should be a normal market behavior, rather than once in a while, get used to it. Step by step compensation is probably more appropriate and can avoid malicious strong.

In a word, the BTS system is a market, not a state institution. It should not be too rigid, otherwise it would be counterproductive.
In addition, anchoring accuracy does not mean that 1:1 is anchoring accuracy. As long as the exchange rate is stable in a certain period of time, it is accurate to ensure that the exchange rate is controllable. It can be 1:1 or 1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03, which means anchoring accuracy. Bear market should be the anchor of bitcny moderate depreciation, such as 1:1.02, which will be more conducive to active market.

You want to completely change bts into futures trading.

[binggo]

I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.

同意支持提高清算补偿

一样的，喂价反馈一样可以反馈到无限低，难道清算补偿也要提高无限高？

the situantion is same.

[gghi]

     虽然BIP42已经可以保证BITCNY的锚定了，但是目前的喂价公式不利于活跃市场，灵敏度太低，反映迟于市场行情。压低喂价和强清都可以抑制抵押，但是强清也不是无风险套利，因为延后24小时执行，这就是市场风险了。用压低喂价的方式不如发起强清利于活跃市场，目前看市场已经很死了，不应该一味的打压市场活跃度了。
       如果想发起强清，那么玩家手里必须备有bitcny,这也是bitcny的需求来源。所以目前保留强清会更合适，没有理由移除强清。况且，强清目前也没有什么坏处，无非就是把高抵押的清算了而已，下调喂价一样会把高抵押的爆仓的。移除强清是保护抵押者的说法不成立。只要市场bitcny需求不足，那么高抵押行为必须抑制。
      强请补偿应该为零，而不是5%，会更有利于活跃内盘的。强清应该是很正常的市场行为，而不是偶尔来一次，习惯了就行了。阶梯式强清补偿可能更合适，可以避免恶意强清。

     总之，BTS系统是做市场的，不是国家机构，不能管的太死，否则会适得其反。
   另外，锚定精确不代表非要1:1才是锚定精确。只要在一定时间段保证汇率稳定，保证汇率可控就是锚定精确了。可以是1:1，也可以是1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03，都表示锚定精确。熊市行情应该是bitcny 适度贬值的锚定，比如1:1.02，这样会更有利于活跃市场。


Although BIP42 can guarantee the anchoring of BITCNY, the current feeding formula is not conducive to the active market, and the sensitivity is too low to reflect the market price later. Lower feeding prices and strong liquidation can suppress mortgages, but strong liquidation is not risk-free arbitrage, because delayed implementation of 24 hours, which is market risk. It's better to lower the feeding price than to activate the market by launching a strong Qing Dynasty. At present, the market is dead, so we should not blindly suppress the market activity.
If you want to be strong, then players must have bitcny in hand, which is also the source of demand for bitcny. Therefore, it is more appropriate to retain strong clearance at present, and there is no reason to remove Qiang Qing. Moreover, there is no harm in Qiangqing at present, just liquidating the high mortgage, and lowering the feeding price will also explode the high mortgage. It is untenable to remove strong clearing is to protect mortgages. As long as the market bitcny demand is insufficient, the high mortgage behavior must be suppressed.
Strong compensation should be zero instead of 5%, which will be more conducive to active internal market. Qiang Qing should be a normal market behavior, rather than once in a while, get used to it. Step by step compensation is probably more appropriate and can avoid malicious strong.

In a word, the BTS system is a market, not a state institution. It should not be too rigid, otherwise it would be counterproductive.
In addition, anchoring accuracy does not mean that 1:1 is anchoring accuracy. As long as the exchange rate is stable in a certain period of time, it is accurate to ensure that the exchange rate is controllable. It can be 1:1 or 1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03, which means anchoring accuracy. Bear market should be the anchor of bitcny moderate depreciation, such as 1:1.02, which will be more conducive to active market.

[xeroc]

I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount
. In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with
BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position
holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish
them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset
dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

In fact, I came to the same conclusion. Sorry it took so long.

I think we all agree that BSIP42 leads to force settlement being **overly**
expensive to shorters. I also believe that "disabling" settlement can only
be a termporary solution until dynamic MCR can be used.
Instead of disabling it, why don't we reduce the percentage of supply that can
be settled per maintenance interval to something small? That would discourage
longs from using settlement but would still keep the option open.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain
again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

Sorry for that, my fault.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards
a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the
ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning
the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All
discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid
argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve?
We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time
to learn a bit more?

I am sorry to appear reluctant and "slow" when it comes to understanding market
dynamics. As you know, I do not have an economics background. Still, being a
proxy it is a requirement to *understand* what I am doing. Given the amount of
time that I have put into understanding and even defending BSIP42 in the community
makes it odd you are calling me out :-/

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the
fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and
push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix.

This is great news, I didn't know that. How can we make sure this
makes it into the next upgrade?

Actually, adjusting MCR is
effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset,
so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going,
however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

... except that adjusting MCR allows to keep the price feed reflect the 'actual
price'.

Update: Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied
is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point
of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can
be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when
a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly
apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a
few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO
not a fair enough rule.

I am still trying to figure out if incentives can be aligned for both sides
(shorts and longs) in bearish **and** bullish markets. IMHO, the ultimate goal
is to have a system where merely personal *opinion* about the market leads to
"taking" a side and not market-internal mechanics.

[ouresw]

Chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborate

Force settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.
But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.

I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?

Since you choose to operate this mortgage, you should bear the corresponding risks. If you don't want to be liquidated, you can choose to actively buy back bitCNY to close the position. The rules are fair, and in the current negative feed price mode, liquidation has the effect of accelerating the balance of supply and demand stability of bitCNY, so it cannot be cancelled. Not to mention the forest model, because the liquidation is to give the liquidator the opportunity to close the position.

[yamtt]

I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.

同意支持提高清算补偿

[ebit]

bitcny has mellowed ,please remove the fence .

[oxarbitrage]

Without having an opinion in regards BSIP42 and related as they are beyond my understanding I really hope that the efforts from @abit are appreciated as i am sure he want the best for Bitshares as a whole. By what i saw in the last time his position and also @bitcrab are target of constant attacks, for the good of all us I hope rational consensus is achieved in this subjects that will allow bitshares to grow in the stable coin aspect, one of the most important pieces of our blockchain.

I believe Bitshares have the technology, experience and everything needed to be number 1 in the stable coin market, for this we should fight together as a community or die trying 

[abit]

I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.

[johnson]

强清导致内盘bts价格下跌，同时导致bitcny 产量减少。当内盘价格远远低于外盘价格，搬砖党开始
充值搬砖。然后拉低内外盘价差。搬砖的充值动作使充值费率上升，充值费率上升使喂价上升。
强清停止。
这就是当前喂价的调节逻辑啊，为啥要去掉强清呢？
强清有问题吗？没问题。
但是问题出在哪？出在调节的链路太长了。喂价应该包含市场成交价的信息，不论是外盘价格还是内盘价格，
喂价算法总要包含一个的。

[yamtt]

There is no need to cancel mandatory liquidation if the mandatory liquidation incentive is changed to 110% to offset the price difference due to negative feedback from the feed price

如果把强制清算奖励改成110% 来抵消喂价负反馈所产生的差价 那么就没必要取消强制清算

[pc]

From all the previous discussion around BSIP-42, my understanding was that this situation indicates an oversupply of bitCNY.

Shorters can now buy bitCNY on the market and reduce their own debt positions, which should reduce supply, drive the market price down and improve their collateral ratio, thereby reducing the likelyhood that they will be settled.

No need to change the rules yet again IMO.

[binggo]

voted, i agree to disable force settlement temporarily to protect the BTS holder

All is temporarily，so

[crazybit]

voted, i agree to disable force settlement temporarily to protect the BTS holder

[bitcrab]

I simply haven't understood yet how the exploitation works.

Just to clarify for me, example from your picture:

Code: [Select]

latest price (LP) = 0.675035
settlement price (SP) = 0.670566
force settlement offset multiplier (FSOM) = 0.95
Now assume I hold 100 bitCNY

• I can sell on free market and get 100 * 1 / LP=148.14 BTS
• I can force settle, now assume it would happen instantly then I get 100 * 1 / SP=149.12*FSOM=141.67 BTS

As the holder of the bitCNY this only gives me profit if LP * FSOM > SP. But, as long as LP > SP, the holder of the margin position would have a loss compared to latest price, i.e. someone could pay to hurt you (unlikely to happen though). This does not take the force settle delay into account.

I think I understand the situation now, and I would agree this should be adressed. But not by disabling force settlement, but by ensuring that LP * FSOM <= SP is maintained.

Just in general: The flag "DISABLE FORCE SETTLING" should be able to do exactly that, maybe a core dev could confirm. Not that I advertise this solution.

you misunderstood the price.

in GUI settlement price = feed price/FSOM

so when you settle with 100 bitCNY, you will get 100/SP = 149.13 BTS

this force the debt position owners to sell the BTS under market price, it's exploitation，right?

each time feed price fall below market price*FSOM, this exploitation may happen,

when I wrote this things are even worse: latest price = 0.69, feed price = 0.643683, settlement price = 0.67587, 2.09% lower than market price.

[sschiessl]

Chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborate

Force settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.
But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.

I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?

I simply haven't understood yet how the exploitation works.

Just to clarify for me, example from your picture:

Code: [Select]

latest price (LP) = 0.675035
settlement price (SP) = 0.670566
force settlement offset multiplier (FSOM) = 0.95
Now assume I hold 100 bitCNY

• I can sell on free market and get 100 * 1 / LP=148.14 BTS
• I can force settle, now assume it would happen instantly then I get 100 * 1 / SP=149.12*FSOM=141.67 BTS

As the holder of the bitCNY this only gives me profit if LP * FSOM > SP. But, as long as LP > SP, the holder of the margin position would have a loss compared to latest price, i.e. someone could pay to hurt you (unlikely to happen though). This does not take the force settle delay into account.

I think I understand the situation now, and I would agree this should be adressed. But not by disabling force settlement, but by ensuring that LP * FSOM <= SP is maintained.

Just in general: The flag "DISABLE FORCE SETTLING" should be able to do exactly that, maybe a core dev could confirm. Not that I advertise this solution.

[johnson]

if it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.

You always know， disable settlement is impossible. No one will support it.
So, the best way is increaseing the feed price, and feed price should higher than market price * 96%.

[johnson]

if it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.

So you are now breaking the peg for bitcny which was so important to you at all cost?

I know this is not a perfect solution to solve the current issue and may break the peg, is there any better way? how about to increase the force settlement offset?

increase the feed price

[bitcrab]

if it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.

So you are now breaking the peg for bitcny which was so important to you at all cost?

I know this is not a perfect solution to solve the current issue and may break the peg, is there any better way? how about to increase the force settlement offset?

[Thul3]

if it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.

So you are now breaking the peg for bitcny which was so important to you at all cost?

[binggo]

We have the choice, If use the highest price as the last feed price, we can keep the forcesettlement and the dynamically feed price.

Couldn't an external actor target this sole 'highest price' to force an inflation of the feed price to attack collateral holders?

the highest price is not the"highest", it come from the no bsip 42  feed price and bsip 42 feed price,  most of the time the feed price will be no the bsip 42 feed price, when the price of bts fall fast  which caused by the margin call, the feed  price may be bsip 42 feed price.

[bitcrab]

if it is impossible to disable force settlement, I think there's only one choice to fix the bug: request that the feed price not lower than market price*96% for CNY, not lower than market price for USD.

[R]

You are turning a free market into a centrally planned economy

what you called free market is a forrest where beasts can kill and eat people.

Then don't wander off into the forest if you're not prepared to face beasts? You could always stick to trading UIA or perhaps experiment with non-external-referenced bitassets if you're wary of the risk associated with shorting bitassets.

We have the choice, If use the highest price as the last feed price, we can keep the forcesettlement and the dynamically feed price.

Couldn't an external actor target this sole 'highest price' to force an inflation of the feed price to attack collateral holders?

[xeroc]

we can't disable force settlement without new code either.
The only short-term solution that I can think of is to get back to non-BSIP42 and tune the short squeeze protection ratio. maybe that helps
mitigate the situation until the MCR fix is implemented.

[binggo]

I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?

Well, that is a consequence of BSIP42 and not of settlements per se.
Multiple solutions to that have been proposed already among which are:
- let the price feed reflect the actual pricing again and do negative feedback through MCR
- introduce a distinct price for settlements (though I believe that would allow exploting BSIP42)

The proposal to remove one of the strongest reasons for bitassets to have a "floor"-price isn't easy for me to understand.

the force settlement is already a problem for long time, that's why the bitCNY offset is set to 5%. BSIP42 just make the problem apparent.

maybe the MCR solution can make things better, but I think it will cost at least several months for it to come, in this period we just let the debt position owner be put into the risk of being exploited?

We have the choice, If use the highest price as the last feed price, we can keep the forcesettlement and the dynamically feed price.

just think about it!

[bitcrab]

I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?

Well, that is a consequence of BSIP42 and not of settlements per se.
Multiple solutions to that have been proposed already among which are:
- let the price feed reflect the actual pricing again and do negative feedback through MCR
- introduce a distinct price for settlements (though I believe that would allow exploting BSIP42)

The proposal to remove one of the strongest reasons for bitassets to have a "floor"-price isn't easy for me to understand.

the force settlement is already a problem for long time, that's why the bitCNY offset is set to 5%. BSIP42 just make the problem apparent.

maybe the MCR solution can make things better, but I think it will cost at least several months for it to come, in this period we just let the debt position owner be put into the risk of being exploited?

[xeroc]

I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?

Well, that is a consequence of BSIP42 and not of settlements per se.
Multiple solutions to that have been proposed already among which are:
- let the price feed reflect the actual pricing again and do negative feedback through MCR
- introduce a distinct price for settlements (though I believe that would allow exploting BSIP42)

The proposal to remove one of the strongest reasons for bitassets to have a "floor"-price isn't easy for me to understand.

[Thul3]

You are turning a free market into a centrally planned economy

what you called free market is a forrest where beasts can kill and eat people.

the real free market is a common infrastructure, it need careful design and will evolve with consensus.

Consensus of what ?The people or the few proxies acting like central banks?
You make no announcements,no clear rules no borders no nothing and we the majority of traders are forced to accept it ?
Also is it just me or is the trading volume on DEX decreasing quickly and pushed down from its trone ?

[binggo]

Chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborate

Force settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.
But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.

I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?

what cause this?

[bitcrab]

Chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborate

Force settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.
But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.

I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?

[bitcrab]

You are turning a free market into a centrally planned economy

what you called free market is a forrest where beasts can kill and eat people.

the real free market is a common infrastructure, it need careful design and will evolve with consensus.

[R]

No way. I'd far rather see a global settlement take place than for force settlement to be disabled. If I'm unable to claim the backing collateral directly, then there might as well be no backing collateral (fiat's worst practice).

I'd far rather see these permissions/flags entirely surrendered preventing any such proposal. Funnily enough though, I'm unable to do so within the UI at this time: https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-ui/issues/2043

[Thul3]

You are turning a free market into a centrally planned economy

[binggo]

I suggest to choose the highest price as the last feed price  from the CEX price and the dynamically feed price.

If use the highest price as the last feed price, we can keep the forcesettlement and the dynamically feed price.

and the market may still be a free market possible.

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27357.0

[sschiessl]

Chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborate

Force settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.
But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.

[bitcrab]

at this moment the settlement price is lower than latest price in bitCNY market. which means the debt positions are in risk to be force sold in a under market price.



it is not acceptable.

bitCNY is in good liquidity, if bitCNY want to convert bitCNY to BTS he can just trade in the market, here the force settlement here is not necessary but sometimes provide chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners.

I suggest to disable force settlement for bitCNY.

kindly let me know your opinion.