Author Topic: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY  (Read 2005 times)

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Offline yamtt

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #30 on: November 08, 2018, 01:35:33 am »
I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.

同意支持提高清算补偿

Offline ouresw

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #31 on: November 08, 2018, 04:34:18 am »
Chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborate

Force settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.
But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.

I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?

Since you choose to operate this mortgage, you should bear the corresponding risks. If you don't want to be liquidated, you can choose to actively buy back bitCNY to close the position. The rules are fair, and in the current negative feed price mode, liquidation has the effect of accelerating the balance of supply and demand stability of bitCNY, so it cannot be cancelled. Not to mention the forest model, because the liquidation is to give the liquidator the opportunity to close the position.
« Last Edit: November 08, 2018, 04:50:46 am by ouresw »

Offline xeroc

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #32 on: November 08, 2018, 09:08:33 am »
I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount
. In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with
BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position
holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish
them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset
dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.
In fact, I came to the same conclusion. Sorry it took so long.

I think we all agree that BSIP42 leads to force settlement being **overly**
expensive to shorters. I also believe that "disabling" settlement can only
be a termporary solution until dynamic MCR can be used.
Instead of disabling it, why don't we reduce the percentage of supply that can
be settled per maintenance interval to something small? That would discourage
longs from using settlement but would still keep the option open.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain
again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.
Sorry for that, my fault.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards
a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the
ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning
the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All
discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid
argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve?
We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time
to learn a bit more?
I am sorry to appear reluctant and "slow" when it comes to understanding market
dynamics. As you know, I do not have an economics background. Still, being a
proxy it is a requirement to *understand* what I am doing. Given the amount of
time that I have put into understanding and even defending BSIP42 in the community
makes it odd you are calling me out :-/

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the
fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and
push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix.
This is great news, I didn't know that. How can we make sure this
makes it into the next upgrade?

Actually, adjusting MCR is
effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset,
so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going,
however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.
... except that adjusting MCR allows to keep the price feed reflect the 'actual
price'.

Update: Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied
is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point
of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can
be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when
a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly
apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a
few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO
not a fair enough rule.
I am still trying to figure out if incentives can be aligned for both sides
(shorts and longs) in bearish **and** bullish markets. IMHO, the ultimate goal
is to have a system where merely personal *opinion* about the market leads to
"taking" a side and not market-internal mechanics.
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Offline gghi

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #33 on: November 08, 2018, 11:49:14 am »
     虽然BIP42已经可以保证BITCNY的锚定了,但是目前的喂价公式不利于活跃市场,灵敏度太低,反映迟于市场行情。压低喂价和强清都可以抑制抵押,但是强清也不是无风险套利,因为延后24小时执行,这就是市场风险了。用压低喂价的方式不如发起强清利于活跃市场,目前看市场已经很死了,不应该一味的打压市场活跃度了。
       如果想发起强清,那么玩家手里必须备有bitcny,这也是bitcny的需求来源。所以目前保留强清会更合适,没有理由移除强清。况且,强清目前也没有什么坏处,无非就是把高抵押的清算了而已,下调喂价一样会把高抵押的爆仓的。移除强清是保护抵押者的说法不成立。只要市场bitcny需求不足,那么高抵押行为必须抑制。
      强请补偿应该为零,而不是5%,会更有利于活跃内盘的。强清应该是很正常的市场行为,而不是偶尔来一次,习惯了就行了。阶梯式强清补偿可能更合适,可以避免恶意强清。

     总之,BTS系统是做市场的,不是国家机构,不能管的太死,否则会适得其反。
   另外,锚定精确不代表非要1:1才是锚定精确。只要在一定时间段保证汇率稳定,保证汇率可控就是锚定精确了。可以是1:1,也可以是1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03,都表示锚定精确。熊市行情应该是bitcny 适度贬值的锚定,比如1:1.02,这样会更有利于活跃市场。


Although BIP42 can guarantee the anchoring of BITCNY, the current feeding formula is not conducive to the active market, and the sensitivity is too low to reflect the market price later. Lower feeding prices and strong liquidation can suppress mortgages, but strong liquidation is not risk-free arbitrage, because delayed implementation of 24 hours, which is market risk. It's better to lower the feeding price than to activate the market by launching a strong Qing Dynasty. At present, the market is dead, so we should not blindly suppress the market activity.
If you want to be strong, then players must have bitcny in hand, which is also the source of demand for bitcny. Therefore, it is more appropriate to retain strong clearance at present, and there is no reason to remove Qiang Qing. Moreover, there is no harm in Qiangqing at present, just liquidating the high mortgage, and lowering the feeding price will also explode the high mortgage. It is untenable to remove strong clearing is to protect mortgages. As long as the market bitcny demand is insufficient, the high mortgage behavior must be suppressed.
Strong compensation should be zero instead of 5%, which will be more conducive to active internal market. Qiang Qing should be a normal market behavior, rather than once in a while, get used to it. Step by step compensation is probably more appropriate and can avoid malicious strong.

In a word, the BTS system is a market, not a state institution. It should not be too rigid, otherwise it would be counterproductive.
In addition, anchoring accuracy does not mean that 1:1 is anchoring accuracy. As long as the exchange rate is stable in a certain period of time, it is accurate to ensure that the exchange rate is controllable. It can be 1:1 or 1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03, which means anchoring accuracy. Bear market should be the anchor of bitcny moderate depreciation, such as 1:1.02, which will be more conducive to active market.

Offline binggo

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #34 on: November 08, 2018, 12:18:41 pm »
I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.

同意支持提高清算补偿

一样的,喂价反馈一样可以反馈到无限低,难道清算补偿也要提高无限高?

the situantion is same.

Offline yamtt

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #35 on: November 08, 2018, 03:07:49 pm »
     虽然BIP42已经可以保证BITCNY的锚定了,但是目前的喂价公式不利于活跃市场,灵敏度太低,反映迟于市场行情。压低喂价和强清都可以抑制抵押,但是强清也不是无风险套利,因为延后24小时执行,这就是市场风险了。用压低喂价的方式不如发起强清利于活跃市场,目前看市场已经很死了,不应该一味的打压市场活跃度了。
       如果想发起强清,那么玩家手里必须备有bitcny,这也是bitcny的需求来源。所以目前保留强清会更合适,没有理由移除强清。况且,强清目前也没有什么坏处,无非就是把高抵押的清算了而已,下调喂价一样会把高抵押的爆仓的。移除强清是保护抵押者的说法不成立。只要市场bitcny需求不足,那么高抵押行为必须抑制。
      强请补偿应该为零,而不是5%,会更有利于活跃内盘的。强清应该是很正常的市场行为,而不是偶尔来一次,习惯了就行了。阶梯式强清补偿可能更合适,可以避免恶意强清。

     总之,BTS系统是做市场的,不是国家机构,不能管的太死,否则会适得其反。
   另外,锚定精确不代表非要1:1才是锚定精确。只要在一定时间段保证汇率稳定,保证汇率可控就是锚定精确了。可以是1:1,也可以是1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03,都表示锚定精确。熊市行情应该是bitcny 适度贬值的锚定,比如1:1.02,这样会更有利于活跃市场。


你这是想完全把bts改成期货交易

Although BIP42 can guarantee the anchoring of BITCNY, the current feeding formula is not conducive to the active market, and the sensitivity is too low to reflect the market price later. Lower feeding prices and strong liquidation can suppress mortgages, but strong liquidation is not risk-free arbitrage, because delayed implementation of 24 hours, which is market risk. It's better to lower the feeding price than to activate the market by launching a strong Qing Dynasty. At present, the market is dead, so we should not blindly suppress the market activity.
If you want to be strong, then players must have bitcny in hand, which is also the source of demand for bitcny. Therefore, it is more appropriate to retain strong clearance at present, and there is no reason to remove Qiang Qing. Moreover, there is no harm in Qiangqing at present, just liquidating the high mortgage, and lowering the feeding price will also explode the high mortgage. It is untenable to remove strong clearing is to protect mortgages. As long as the market bitcny demand is insufficient, the high mortgage behavior must be suppressed.
Strong compensation should be zero instead of 5%, which will be more conducive to active internal market. Qiang Qing should be a normal market behavior, rather than once in a while, get used to it. Step by step compensation is probably more appropriate and can avoid malicious strong.

In a word, the BTS system is a market, not a state institution. It should not be too rigid, otherwise it would be counterproductive.
In addition, anchoring accuracy does not mean that 1:1 is anchoring accuracy. As long as the exchange rate is stable in a certain period of time, it is accurate to ensure that the exchange rate is controllable. It can be 1:1 or 1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03, which means anchoring accuracy. Bear market should be the anchor of bitcny moderate depreciation, such as 1:1.02, which will be more conducive to active market.

You want to completely change bts into futures trading.


Offline yamtt

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #36 on: November 08, 2018, 03:13:04 pm »
I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.

同意支持提高清算补偿

一样的,喂价反馈一样可以反馈到无限低,难道清算补偿也要提高无限高?

the situantion is same.

不会无限提高 只是补偿喂价和现价的差而已

Offline abit

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #37 on: November 08, 2018, 10:32:07 pm »
Thank you @xeroc for the reply. Calling you out because I have very high expectations of you. You're so important.
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Offline bitcrab

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #38 on: November 09, 2018, 05:51:47 am »


up to now about 2/3 of the voters say no to disable force settlement. I think it's clear that there's no enough support to disable force settlement.

to move things ahead, I'd like to reset the poll with adding one more option -  set force settlement offset for bitCNY to 20%.

in the past 2 days something happened in bitCNY - initially feed price fall to 5% more lower than DEX latest price and triggered a lot of settlement orders, and then some market activity are triggered to resist this - the feed price and latest price are pulled to be more close, and now the feed price is almost exactly 5% below the latest price.

the force settlement limit the DEX price to go up and the feed price to go down, for example, if there is no force settlement, we may have a 1CNY DEX price and a 0.8 feed price, but with force settlement, the market force lead to a 0.89 CNY DEX price and 0.85 feed price.

we need to make it possible for feed price to go far below the market price, in other words, we need to allow market price to go far above feed price.

to replace 5% with 20% is to make it possible for market price to be 20% higher than feed price.

please kindly consider and revote.
« Last Edit: November 09, 2018, 05:56:08 am by bitcrab »

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #39 on: November 09, 2018, 06:55:13 am »
I'm going to read up more today as I feel like I'm a bit poorly informed / haven't quite got my head around the interaction of the different mechanisms and how these are most fairly adjusted to achieve the best possible stablecoin.

My preference would be for calculating the feed price in a far way that recognises the liquidity and market for bitCNY. We want more bitCNY not less so I agree seeing liquidations on a token which is seeing good use and wider adoption is not desirable. That said it is also important that there remains a clear decentralised basis backing the value of the coin with sufficient BTS.

Let's see if I can get my head around it a bit more today.

We should all bear in mind BTS fell 90% and bitUSD / bitCNY survived, that's a pretty impressive stress test but it does mean a lot of people are hurting a bit / are close to the line now.

Basically the price of BTS needs to go up and all this just goes away... ;)
« Last Edit: November 09, 2018, 07:14:22 am by matle85 »

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #40 on: November 09, 2018, 07:16:15 am »
Provided that we need to learn along the way, I think we add another experiment to the game and see if settlements can be dis-incentivized by raising the offset. If that results in a better peg, I am not convinced, but I also don't know.
I feel that the bitCNY:BTS market is the only one that can survive such a (to me rather drastic) step given the liquidity.

As a committee member I have one more request: When a proposal is created and approved for increasing the settlement offset, please make it execute with at least 5 days notice and ensure everyone trading on bitCNY has had a chance to adept to the upcoming change. Thank you.
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Offline bitcrab

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #41 on: November 09, 2018, 08:47:51 am »
As a committee member I have one more request: When a proposal is created and approved for increasing the settlement offset, please make it execute with at least 5 days notice and ensure everyone trading on bitCNY has had a chance to adept to the upcoming change. Thank you.

sure

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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #42 on: November 11, 2018, 01:30:32 am »
I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

Alternatively, we can try to do BSIP42 only when bitAsset is at premium, and let force settlement play its role when bitAsset is at discount. That said, since the two tools are incompatible, we adopt one of them.

To make the best use of force settlement, the offset should be set to near zero rather than 5%. The best time to make the change is when BTS/bitCNY price feed is higher than trading price, but we've missed it (we can still do it on bitUSD). Since now the price feed of BTS/bitCNY is around 4% lower than trading price, if change the offset or the feed in a sudden, there would be unexpected consequences, we need quite some efforts if want to make the change and make it perfect. Alternatively, we can keep the 5% offset, but ask witnesses to set a % bottom (in comparison to trading price) when feeding BTS/bitCNY price.
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Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #43 on: November 12, 2018, 02:32:31 pm »
tomorrow the poll will be closed, please vote to express your opinion.

Offline sschiessl

Re: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY
« Reply #44 on: November 12, 2018, 08:08:48 pm »
Alternatively, we can keep the 5% offset, but ask witnesses to set a % bottom (in comparison to trading price) when feeding BTS/bitCNY price.
Do you mean with a % bottom to aim for a constant but positive premium? Or what is the bottom?