Author Topic: New BSIP:GS protection via core code  (Read 2444 times)

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Online sschiessl

Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #30 on: July 19, 2019, 03:59:23 pm »
Followed abit's style and added a 6th option to https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179#issuecomment-513269772

Offline abit

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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #31 on: July 19, 2019, 05:08:51 pm »
I'm for the 4th option now:
* allow undercollateralization
* no globally settlement
* has individual settlement, the system take over the undercollateralized debt positions (which would form a pool)
* when undercollateralization happens and someone tries to settle, fill the settlement request with the positions with lowest CR (can be the pool) first, so first settler will get less

so the pool as a debt position may have CR<1, when some tries to settle, how can the pool fulfill the request with CR<1? or the pool can only fulfill the request with CR>1?
The pool pays less BTS per bitUSD.

so when someone tries to settle,
the pool has a settle price of 0.05USD,
the margin call order price is 0.04USD,
the normal force settlement price is 0.043USD

which will fill the settle request? the pool?
Compare CR of the pool and the call order, whose CR is lower gets settled.

If CR of the order or pool > 1 / (1+force_settle_offset), fill settle order at normal force settlement price,
if CR of the order or pool < 1 / (1+force_settle_offset), fill settle order at CR.

so in my above example, obviously the pool has lower CR and will be settled with price 0.05USD.

maybe at the time the feed price is 0.042(not exact), but when user settle, they have to settle the pool with price 0.05, not the margin call order with price 0.04?

you tell the people the price is 0.042, but you only allow them to settle at 0.5...confusion...
feed_price = 0.04
settlement_price = 0.05

两个数,没毛病。

现在UI也是两个数:
feed_price = 0.3
settlement_price = 0.303

如果你硬是要因为 settlement_price = 0.05 而显示 feed_price = 0.05 才让人更困惑,明明外盘成交价在0.04
« Last Edit: July 19, 2019, 05:12:10 pm by abit »
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Offline bitcrab

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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #32 on: July 19, 2019, 05:23:48 pm »
Quote from: bitcrab

so in my above example, obviously the pool has lower CR and will be settled with price 0.05USD.

maybe at the time the feed price is 0.042(not exact), but when user settle, they have to settle the pool with price 0.05, not the margin call order with price 0.04?

you tell the people the price is 0.042, but you only allow them to settle at 0.5...confusion...
feed_price = 0.04
settlement_price = 0.05

两个数,没毛病。

现在UI也是两个数:
feed_price = 0.3
settlement_price = 0.303

如果你硬是要因为 settlement_price = 0.05 而显示 feed_price = 0.05 才让人更困惑,明明外盘成交价在0.04

0.303=0.3*1.01, easy to understand the relation of these 2 figures.

0.05 and 0.04 is an example, even higher gap is possible, maybe the settlement price is 0.08 and feed price is 0.04, because the settle price of the pool may be much higher than market price.

when force settlement price does not refer the feed price, what sense does the feed price make? although it is the market price?

难道不是喂价格A, 然后爆仓价是A/MSSR, 清算价是A*(1+force settlement offset),保持这样一种关系才是正常的吗?

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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #33 on: July 19, 2019, 06:36:49 pm »
The market will run as your thought? en,that's very interesting.

How about we just increase MSSR to to least 5%? Margin calls will be bought before GS happens. If you continue to 100% protect the debt holders GS events will happen all the time.

If you settle the under collateralized positions to smart coin owners that's just stealing from them and goes against DEX rules.

GS happens because of 1 thing:
1. debt positions don't adjust debt

To correct that DEX should:
1. Margin call their position with enough incentive for the position to be liquidated (MSSR), the margin call should be such that debt holder would want to adjust their debt or close it.

Shifting risk to the DEX, smart coin holders or anyone else is just not a good business practice.

But you are most likely a debt holder so you probably want others to pay for the risk you took and lost. When BTS goes up I don't see any debt holders creating GS funds, they just want to use other people's money to cover their risk. And that's the gist of it. The sad part is that by seeing only your way, you fail to notice that BTS continues to slide because of people's mistrust and bad practices.

I've been thinking about this a lot lately, and am writing a paper which I'll potentially submit to the Decentralized 2019 conference on the topic.

Choosing MCR and MSSR is a surprisingly complex issue. Like abit said, 10% MSSR didn't protect BitUSD from GS last December. Maybe this was because MSSR penalties are paid out of collateral, which means that there's less margin before a GS. Or maybe the GS happened because MSSR was too low, so there wasn't enough demand for margin calls. Or, maybe this was just because the BTS market was so bad that BitUSD was going to global settle no matter what.

I'm generally in favor of MSSR, and one of the things this paper is going to say is that 0% MSSR may be one of the worst options of all. However, I think one of the bigger issues is that there really isn't a good incentive for individual traders to protect against a GS event. Because of this, I'm loosely in favor of any proposal that gets rid of GS. I totally agree with bitcrab that GS is like suicide. However, I've yet to see a replacement that I really like. It'll be one of the major focuses of my research project.
Support our research efforts to improve BitAsset price-pegging! Vote for worker 1.14.204 "201907-uccs-research-project."

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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #34 on: July 19, 2019, 11:59:56 pm »
I've been thinking about this a lot lately, and am writing a paper which I'll potentially submit to the Decentralized 2019 conference on the topic.

Choosing MCR and MSSR is a surprisingly complex issue. Like abit said, 10% MSSR didn't protect BitUSD from GS last December. Maybe this was because MSSR penalties are paid out of collateral, which means that there's less margin before a GS. Or maybe the GS happened because MSSR was too low, so there wasn't enough demand for margin calls. Or, maybe this was just because the BTS market was so bad that BitUSD was going to global settle no matter what.

I'm generally in favor of MSSR, and one of the things this paper is going to say is that 0% MSSR may be one of the worst options of all. However, I think one of the bigger issues is that there really isn't a good incentive for individual traders to protect against a GS event. Because of this, I'm loosely in favor of any proposal that gets rid of GS. I totally agree with bitcrab that GS is like suicide. However, I've yet to see a replacement that I really like. It'll be one of the major focuses of my research project.

yes, when the market is bad enough, bad debt will happen no matter either the MSSR is 1.01 or 1.5.

I tried to change MSSR of bitUSD from 1.02 to 1.01 at this time, because I feel now either 1.01 or 1.02 does not change the market status, however 1.01 will lead to a better pegging than 1.02.
« Last Edit: July 20, 2019, 12:01:55 am by bitcrab »

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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #35 on: July 20, 2019, 04:30:35 am »
Quote from: bitcrab

so in my above example, obviously the pool has lower CR and will be settled with price 0.05USD.

maybe at the time the feed price is 0.042(not exact), but when user settle, they have to settle the pool with price 0.05, not the margin call order with price 0.04?

you tell the people the price is 0.042, but you only allow them to settle at 0.5...confusion...
feed_price = 0.04
settlement_price = 0.05

两个数,没毛病。

现在UI也是两个数:
feed_price = 0.3
settlement_price = 0.303

如果你硬是要因为 settlement_price = 0.05 而显示 feed_price = 0.05 才让人更困惑,明明外盘成交价在0.04

0.303=0.3*1.01, easy to understand the relation of these 2 figures.

0.05 and 0.04 is an example, even higher gap is possible, maybe the settlement price is 0.08 and feed price is 0.04, because the settle price of the pool may be much higher than market price.

when force settlement price does not refer the feed price, what sense does the feed price make? although it is the market price?

难道不是喂价格A, 然后爆仓价是A/MSSR, 清算价是A*(1+force settlement offset),保持这样一种关系才是正常的吗?
The purpose of implementing GS protection into core is, no matter witnesses feed what price, force settlements and margin calls will execute at the protected price. So it's clearer for traders to know what's the feed price (produced by witnesses) and what's the settlement price (decided by the blockchain). Actually it's a UI issue, so we don't need to argue here. UI can even should a third price: what will be the settlement price and margin call price if GS protection is disabled.

On the other hand, if GS protection is implemented into core, witnesses will no longer need to and should not publish adjusted price feeds which was criticized as price manipulation.

IMHO, whether the blockchain should take over the bad debt is the main thing to debate.
« Last Edit: July 20, 2019, 04:32:19 am by abit »
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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #36 on: July 20, 2019, 12:37:26 pm »

Choosing MCR and MSSR is a surprisingly complex issue. Like abit said, 10% MSSR didn't protect BitUSD from GS last December.
   
The MSSR did not work because BSIP 42 introduced price manipulation and the MSSR was offset by fake price feeds.

I will give everyone another option to think about on the GS issue:
When collateral reaches 1:1 simply force settle that debt based on percentages. If there are 1000 smart coins issued, 10 is being force settled; each holder would see 1% of their smart coin force settled by the blockchain. This avoids GS alltogether and good debt stays in the system.

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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #37 on: July 20, 2019, 01:42:07 pm »

Choosing MCR and MSSR is a surprisingly complex issue. Like abit said, 10% MSSR didn't protect BitUSD from GS last December.
   
The MSSR did not work because BSIP 42 introduced price manipulation and the MSSR was offset by fake price feeds.
I understand you. It's easier to blame others than to find the real reason or solution.

bitSILVER, bitGOLD and bitBTC always had 10% MSSR and never applied BSIP42 but GSed long ago. This fact doesn't support the assumption that a higher MSSR will prevent undercollateralization from happening.

Actually the assets got into undercollateralized situation simply due to
1. lack of incentives for borrowers to keep shorting (lack of desire to put more collateral, because putting more collateral would mean the potential to lose more in a downtrend, thus they chose to "stop loss"), and
2. lack of incentives for debt asset holders to settle when CR is low (because settling when price is dropping simply means loss, we assume most of debt asset holders tend to hold stabler assets, although some of them may don't know about GS or don't care, anyway finally they chose to take no action before GS).

If we can find a proper way to incentivize the involved parties, we'll solve the problem.

Higher MSSR is not an incentive for borrowers who decided to stop loss (aka so-called "bad borrowers" although I don't like to label people), although it may be an incentive for borrowers who have enough funds to add collateral.

GS is actually an incentive for borrowers who decided to stop loss, but not an incentive for borrowers who have enough funds to add collateral.

Quote
I will give everyone another option to think about on the GS issue:
When collateral reaches 1:1 simply force settle that debt based on percentages. If there are 1000 smart coins issued, 10 is being force settled; each holder would see 1% of their smart coin force settled by the blockchain. This avoids GS alltogether and good debt stays in the system.
This is also an option if our only goal is to avoid undercollateralization (btw technically 1% is not guaranteed that all undercollateralized positions will be settled, also technically we can increase the percentage when it's the case).

IMHO this option does more harm than good, because we have other goals which IMHO are more important, one of them is to give debt asset holders as much freedom as possible to decide by themselves, because we assume they're risk haters. On the other hand, debt position holders are risk lovers, so it's fine to have more aggressive rules on them, e.g. margin calls and force settlements. Please see discussions in https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179.

Also it would be a crisis for businesses built on top of BitAssets because they have no easy way to convert the collateral back to BitAsset when collateral price bounced back up. Imagine that if someone deposit bitUSD to an exchange but later can only withdraw some BTS and some BitUSD. In short, don't remove coins from users' balance, otherwise users will leave.

Alternatively, perhaps we should give asset holders an option on whether *automatically* settle a part of their holdings when feed price is closed to GS price, which may slightly improve the situation, but is not that hard.
« Last Edit: July 20, 2019, 01:45:06 pm by abit »
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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #38 on: July 21, 2019, 01:42:52 am »
I understand you. It's easier to blame others than to find the real reason or solution.
I'm not sure if you do, at least on this issue. I was just stating a fact.

bitSILVER, bitGOLD and bitBTC always had 10% MSSR and never applied BSIP42 but GSed long ago. This fact doesn't support the assumption that a higher MSSR will prevent undercollateralization from happening.
It takes more than MSSR. At least a combo of MSSR and MCR. But The weaker the bitAsset the higher they need to be; as en example bitCNY can have lower settings and still function properly. If you don't have liquid market on butAssets GS will happen no matter the MSSR and MCR if the right conditions are met.

If we can find a proper way to incentivize the involved parties, we'll solve the problem.
No matter the incentive, there will be always someone (maybe someone that no longer pays attention to his debt) that will let it ride. If we don't come up with a way to automatically close the debt the GS will always be there.
Quote
I will give everyone another option to think about on the GS issue:
When collateral reaches 1:1 simply force settle that debt based on percentages. If there are 1000 smart coins issued, 10 is being force settled; each holder would see 1% of their smart coin force settled by the blockchain. This avoids GS alltogether and good debt stays in the system.
This is also an option if our only goal is to avoid undercollateralization (btw technically 1% is not guaranteed that all undercollateralized positions will be settled, also technically we can increase the percentage when it's the case).

IMHO this option does more harm than good, because we have other goals which IMHO are more important, one of them is to give debt asset holders as much freedom as possible to decide by themselves, because we assume they're risk haters. On the other hand, debt position holders are risk lovers, so it's fine to have more aggressive rules on them, e.g. margin calls and force settlements. Please see discussions in https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179.

Also it would be a crisis for businesses built on top of BitAssets because they have no easy way to convert the collateral back to BitAsset when collateral price bounced back up. Imagine that if someone deposit bitUSD to an exchange but later can only withdraw some BTS and some BitUSD. In short, don't remove coins from users' balance, otherwise users will leave.

Alternatively, perhaps we should give asset holders an option on whether *automatically* settle a part of their holdings when feed price is closed to GS price, which may slightly improve the situation, but is not that hard.

bitAsset is not a currency or not even a coin, it's a contract between 2 parties that agree that particular asset will have a value equivalent to that asset in real life and will be backed by BTS. If anyone (exchanges) are running their business on that asset they should be able to adjust their holding (and users) to bitAsset+BTS. They already do it for some forks, air drops etc. This would not be any different and would always avoid GS. And I think that's the goal to have liquid market where the bitAsset is equal to it's RL counterpart ie: 1 bitUSD = 1 USD
Auto settling bad debt on a bit asset holder would be somewhat like force settlement on the debt holder. A risk on both sides.


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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #39 on: July 21, 2019, 07:05:08 am »
The purpose of implementing GS protection into core is, no matter witnesses feed what price, force settlements and margin calls will execute at the protected price. So it's clearer for traders to know what's the feed price (produced by witnesses) and what's the settlement price (decided by the blockchain). Actually it's a UI issue, so we don't need to argue here. UI can even should a third price: what will be the settlement price and margin call price if GS protection is disabled.

On the other hand, if GS protection is implemented into core, witnesses will no longer need to and should not publish adjusted price feeds which was criticized as price manipulation.

IMHO, whether the blockchain should take over the bad debt is the main thing to debate.

yes, in my view one principle should always be followed either bad debt appears or not:

borrowing, margin call, force settlement should always refer to the same price.

so it seems necessary to introduce one new parameter which is called settlement price as margin trading reference to replace feed price.

settlement price = max(feed price, GS Protection Price)

feed price should always be the real time market price.

borrowing, margin call, force settlement will always refer to settlement price, CR is calculated based on settlement price, margin call order price = settlement price/MSSR, force settlement price = settlement price*(1+force settlement offset)

normally, settlement price = feed price.

while bad debt appear, settlement price will be GS Protection Price, in financial sense it means, the system recognize and accept the fact that the smartcoin is in devaluation.

however, margin call order filling, debt position adjustment, force settlement can all reduce GS Protection Price and lessen the devaluation, until finally bad debt disappear.

and GS will be disabled for ever.

and I feel a new name is needed to replace "GS protection", maybe "active devaluation of smartcoin".

blockchain taking over bad debt have no essential help, as it can do nothing but wait for the BTS price to go up.

updated BSIP: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179
« Last Edit: July 21, 2019, 02:21:51 pm by bitcrab »

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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #40 on: July 21, 2019, 07:09:43 pm »
blockchain taking over bad debt have no essential help, as it can do nothing but wait for the BTS price to go up.
So just talk about this.

Assuming we never GS.

If the blockchain takes over bad debt positions,
1. debt position holders (borrowers) will have a bit more pressure to keep their CR a bit higher, otherwise they'll always lose the whole collateral when devaluation occurs;
2. if we fund the pool somehow, E.G. putting a part of market fee into the pool, CR of the pool can be higher than the other debt positions, so "wait for price to go up" is not the only way

If blockchain don't take over bad debt positions,
1. the bad debt positions can lose their collateral if someone buy into margin calls or force-settle, but if nobody buys into margin calls nor force-settle, they will keep the collateral;
2. the borrowers have the option to increase CR of their positions (although perhaps they won't do)

Think about how game theory works.

By the way, just saying, there are a lot of voices from the community which want to "punish the bad borrowers", one way to punish is taking over the debt positions when some conditions are met.
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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #41 on: July 21, 2019, 08:12:57 pm »
bitSILVER, bitGOLD and bitBTC always had 10% MSSR and never applied BSIP42 but GSed long ago. This fact doesn't support the assumption that a higher MSSR will prevent undercollateralization from happening.
It takes more than MSSR. At least a combo of MSSR and MCR. But The weaker the bitAsset the higher they need to be; as en example bitCNY can have lower settings and still function properly. If you don't have liquid market on butAssets GS will happen no matter the MSSR and MCR if the right conditions are met.
You got the point: liquidity.

You think why bitCNY got better liquidity?

How to attract people to provide liquidity?
The answer:
1. find more people
2. give people what they want.

Who are them?
The borrowers (bitAsset creators) and the holders. Need a balance between the 2 parties.

What's the most important thing do they want?
Actually this is a hard question.
In Economics and project management practices, there are terms "effective demand" and "ineffective demand". People may keep saying they want something, but actually they want something else which they didn't say but is more important. One solution is to list all the demands/requirements, and sort them by priority, see discussions in https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179.


Quote

If we can find a proper way to incentivize the involved parties, we'll solve the problem.
No matter the incentive, there will be always someone (maybe someone that no longer pays attention to his debt) that will let it ride. If we don't come up with a way to automatically close the debt the GS will always be there.
Actually, "someone that no longer pays attention to his debt" will be margin called or force-settled if there are other people willing to and have the funds and desire to provide liquidity. Theoretically there are ways to avoid undercollateralization/devaluation, E.G. have a strong fund to keep BTS price stable (some people may say it's price manipulation, but if it works and benefits, who cares what it is).

Quote
Quote
I will give everyone another option to think about on the GS issue:
When collateral reaches 1:1 simply force settle that debt based on percentages. If there are 1000 smart coins issued, 10 is being force settled; each holder would see 1% of their smart coin force settled by the blockchain. This avoids GS alltogether and good debt stays in the system.
This is also an option if our only goal is to avoid undercollateralization (btw technically 1% is not guaranteed that all undercollateralized positions will be settled, also technically we can increase the percentage when it's the case).

IMHO this option does more harm than good, because we have other goals which IMHO are more important, one of them is to give debt asset holders as much freedom as possible to decide by themselves, because we assume they're risk haters. On the other hand, debt position holders are risk lovers, so it's fine to have more aggressive rules on them, e.g. margin calls and force settlements. Please see discussions in https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179.

Also it would be a crisis for businesses built on top of BitAssets because they have no easy way to convert the collateral back to BitAsset when collateral price bounced back up. Imagine that if someone deposit bitUSD to an exchange but later can only withdraw some BTS and some BitUSD. In short, don't remove coins from users' balance, otherwise users will leave.

Alternatively, perhaps we should give asset holders an option on whether *automatically* settle a part of their holdings when feed price is closed to GS price, which may slightly improve the situation, but is not that hard.

bitAsset is not a currency or not even a coin, it's a contract between 2 parties that agree that particular asset will have a value equivalent to that asset in real life and will be backed by BTS. If anyone (exchanges) are running their business on that asset they should be able to adjust their holding (and users) to bitAsset+BTS. They already do it for some forks, air drops etc. This would not be any different and would always avoid GS. And I think that's the goal to have liquid market where the bitAsset is equal to it's RL counterpart ie: 1 bitUSD = 1 USD
Auto settling bad debt on a bit asset holder would be somewhat like force settlement on the debt holder. A risk on both sides.
You think the most important thing is to avoid undercollateralization/devaluation, which is even more important than the freedom of asset holders.

I have to disagree with this. I think freedom is more important.

People hold 1 bitUSD, it will always be 1 bitUSD. Nobody will forcefully get some bitUSD from them although give back some BTS to them. This is the freedom.
As a result, the 1 bitUSD they hold can devalue under certain circumstances.
Actually, currently GS is working in this way. GS protection is in this way too.
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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #42 on: July 21, 2019, 08:43:05 pm »
Agree on that "manipulation" part from Abit.

And lets clear it up once and for all.

We have "bad debt" situation. In real life, if i wanna lend someone cash he needs to provide security (car, house, depends on the cash). If he fails to return the debt per agreement, he loses his security and debt is "cleared".

Why it's such a problem here to recreate same event ?

Simplified definition by me:
MANIPULATION would be something done for personal/selfish/unfair interests of individual or certain group, while here it would be MANAGEMENT for the safety of entire population.

You can all google up both terms for better and more refined definition, but facts are facts.

Lets do simple test:

- Block producers are being manipulated in order to keep their job ->> Block producers are being managed in order to keep their job.
- CNY market is manipulated by Chinese. ->> CNY market is managed by Chinese.
- Price feeds are manipulated by BTS Holders through block producers. ->> Price feeds are managed through block producers by BTS Holders.

Back to point from Abit:

IF IT DOES THE JOB AND SAVE THE DAY WHO THE F**K CARES WHAT TERM YOU WILL USE AS EXCUSE FOR THIS OR ANYTHING ELSE ?

This is not science anymore, it's turning into bullshit and endless drama.

Bad debts are the problem, core needs mechanics to deal with them more efficiently.

Remove the bad debts and we will get liquidity back to bitUSD as well.

End of discussion from my perspective.

Chee®s
« Last Edit: July 21, 2019, 08:45:25 pm by Digital Lucifer »
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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #43 on: July 22, 2019, 07:47:33 am »
blockchain taking over bad debt have no essential help, as it can do nothing but wait for the BTS price to go up.
So just talk about this.

Assuming we never GS.

If the blockchain takes over bad debt positions,
1. debt position holders (borrowers) will have a bit more pressure to keep their CR a bit higher, otherwise they'll always lose the whole collateral when devaluation occurs;
2. if we fund the pool somehow, E.G. putting a part of market fee into the pool, CR of the pool can be higher than the other debt positions, so "wait for price to go up" is not the only way

If blockchain don't take over bad debt positions,
1. the bad debt positions can lose their collateral if someone buy into margin calls or force-settle, but if nobody buys into margin calls nor force-settle, they will keep the collateral;
2. the borrowers have the option to increase CR of their positions (although perhaps they won't do)

Think about how game theory works.

By the way, just saying, there are a lot of voices from the community which want to "punish the bad borrowers", one way to punish is taking over the debt positions when some conditions are met.

in most of the cases, whether the bad debt position owner want to handle bad debt depend on whether they are able to, not whether they will, in extreme bear market, almost everyone are in serious shortage of fund, how can you demand them to handle each bad debt?

I don't think the "punish the bad borrower" way will work, it can only lead to less borrowing. and, should borrower be responsible for going down of BTS price?

there also have been a lot of voices from the community for higher MSSR, but now, don't you agree that MSSR should be low enough?

whether the bad debt position are kept by borrower or system is not a problem, market fee can be used to fund the pool, it can also be used to force settle the bad debt positions.

there's one important reason why I prefer the "active smartcoin devaluation" way, it minimize the impact to the market, as we have seen in several days ago, bad debt appeared in USD market but the GS protection worked, the common users were even not aware that the bad debt had appeared, if bad debt lead to debt position taking over, possibly it will have much bigger market impact.

we have seen many facts that the risk itself is not serious, however the way to handle the risk lead to much bigger risk, 10% MSSR is one example, GS is another example, we need to try to avoid this in bad debt handling.

« Last Edit: July 23, 2019, 06:23:06 am by bitcrab »

Offline bitcrab

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Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« Reply #44 on: July 30, 2019, 06:49:52 am »
the draft BSIP is updated. https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179

please comment if you have any further thoughts.

if no big update is needed, I hope the BSIP can be soon finished and put on poll voting.

« Last Edit: July 30, 2019, 07:08:39 am by bitcrab »