Author Topic: 关于喂价人与见证人分离、竞争上岗的提议  (Read 27868 times)

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Offline binggo

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我建议工会对BSIP 83提前做风险预案吧!

Why are you guys so afraid of Bsip-83?

It is quite clear to me that, at least considering the current form of the bsip, the Chinese community doesn't support it.
It is equally clear that the Bsip-83 worker-poll has no chance to obtain the necessary votes since, I think, it is literally impossible to push a proposal if all of the following proxies/accounts vote against it: cn-vote, baozi, nevermore1, bitcrab, abit.

According to bts.ai, that list counts a total of ~600M, or ~22.26 of total stake.
Considering that according to cryptofresh.com the total active voting stake is ~46%, the above list alone basically counts as 50% of all active voting stake.

With the above data, there is no chance a bsip could pass if all those accounts are against it... so why don't you just let the authors of bsip-83 get their poll?
Once it is rejected, they will have to reconsider their position and re-evaluate the bsip with community input and discussions.

I'm not afraid of Bsip-83, just make a risk plan as a precaution, when it had a BSIP number and approved by somebody, i think we should do something first.

Offline Bhuz

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我建议工会对BSIP 83提前做风险预案吧!

Why are you guys so afraid of Bsip-83?

It is quite clear to me that, at least considering the current form of the bsip, the Chinese community doesn't support it.
It is equally clear that the Bsip-83 worker-poll has no chance to obtain the necessary votes since, I think, it is literally impossible to push a proposal if all of the following proxies/accounts vote against it: cn-vote, baozi, nevermore1, bitcrab, abit.

According to bts.ai, that list counts a total of ~600M, or ~22.26 of total stake.
Considering that according to cryptofresh.com the total active voting stake is ~46%, the above list alone basically counts as 50% of all active voting stake.

With the above data, there is no chance a bsip could pass if all those accounts are against it... so why don't you just let the authors of bsip-83 get their poll?
Once it is rejected, they will have to reconsider their position and re-evaluate the bsip with community input and discussions.

Offline binggo

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BSIP83修改稿中又提出了一个新想法,但是这个想法跟之前没有太大的新意,依然属于新瓶装旧酒。
里面对所有bts持有者空投这个代币根本就是一个坑。
也没有阐明一些需要详细明确定义的东西。


嗯,但是假设如果只给BTS抵押者空投的话会是什么效果?
假设一下分析一下利弊:

利:
1.锚定资产规则投票不会再受其它空持bts大户影响,比如beos.
2.cn-vote可能是最大的抵押方(存疑)?需要重新争取这个代币的代理权。猴子跟资金盘会有大量票。
3.这种代币是否有代理功能?需要研究一下BSIP85;
    待补充

弊:
1.可能会失去对申领资金池资金的法理性; 当然还是要BSIP投票;
2.core团队可能以智能资产不在平台管理职责内,在规划中没有或者拒绝开发智能资产的一些功能, 并且可能会要求智能资产的开发费用自付;
3.双代币赋能肯定会分散资金;
4.bts核心代币会少一个赋能,这个赋能就是其它人想与抵押者投票权竞争就需要买入bts;
5.可能会出现失衡的投票权重;
6.会对cn-vote的积分造成什么影响?
7.抵押者可能某个时间会面临额外出血购买这个代币来增加权重的情况, 及外部交易所分流权重的情况, 也就是利益纠缠.
    待补充

BSIP83有几点不能动或者必须明确的就是:
1.理事会必须拥有智能资产的所有权及全部管理权;
2.智能资产管理者只具有智能资产的代理管理权,此代理管理权必须是理事会授权。
3.智能管理者人选需要理事会投票过筛?或者必须是理事会成员才有竞选智能资产管理者的权利?
4.智能资产功能必须属于平台的开发功能之内,也必须具有申领资金池资金的权利。
   待补充

我建议工会对BSIP 83提前做风险预案吧!

Offline zhouxiaobao

喂证分离这个事情,做了好像也没太多好处,风险倒是很大。喂价人由理事会确定,这个太危险了。喂价人要是作恶成本实在太小。越简单的系统越安全。现在的问题并不是由谁来喂价的问题,而是如何喂价的问题。如果非要说谁喂价更适合,我反而认为见证人喂价可能是最适合的了,没有利益激励,谁会认真喂价呢?见证人至少还有不少工资,之后喂价人就算有工资,也不会超过见证人吧?

总之,此事太重大,要慎重,况且也不是那么急迫。如果没想好怎么做,还不如不做。

Offline binggo

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现在理事会就已经执行喂价人和见证人分离了么?竟然不要bisp投票的么?有必要这么快么?具体的方案通过没有?这个喂价又不是小孩过家家,改不好就是要命的事。我不知道有什么好处值得这么冒险?以后理事会就有权利确定喂价和喂价人了?如何监管?喂价人作恶怎么办?有的提案要投票,这么重要的提案又不要投票,我们小散表示真的搞不懂。一直在懵逼状态。这么改到底什么目的?

必须要有明确的方案,充分研究有无漏洞,再投票通过,才能执行。这样谁报名就给谁喂价权利, 开玩笑吧?

没有这么快,先慢慢把有意向的喂价人凑齐了再说,以免到时候火急火燎的凑不齐喂价人就有点尴尬了。
喂价肯定是按现有的BSIP来。
« Last Edit: October 18, 2019, 03:15:34 pm by binggo »

Offline zhouxiaobao

现在理事会就已经执行喂价人和见证人分离了么?竟然不要bisp投票的么?有必要这么快么?具体的方案通过没有?这个喂价又不是小孩过家家,改不好就是要命的事。我不知道有什么好处值得这么冒险?以后理事会就有权利确定喂价和喂价人了?如何监管?喂价人作恶怎么办?有的提案要投票,这么重要的提案又不要投票,我们小散表示真的搞不懂。一直在懵逼状态。这么改到底什么目的?

必须要有明确的方案,充分研究有无漏洞,再投票通过,才能执行。这样谁报名就给谁喂价权利, 开玩笑吧?

Offline abit

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理事会和“智能货币委员会”也是有分开的必要的。

分开可能有那么点好处。不过,反正现在都是(瞎)投票上去的,分不分我感觉没什么区别。
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Offline bitcrab

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理事会和“智能货币委员会”也是有分开的必要的。
Email:bitcrab@qq.com

Offline binggo

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不要浪费时间在BSIP83了,都没有理事会,见证人,大代理人支持和大力推动的。

我感觉喂证分离出来就差不多了,剩下的内容意义几无。

这只不过是风险预案,以防风向突变。
« Last Edit: October 17, 2019, 08:16:26 am by binggo »

Offline Bangzi

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不要浪费时间在BSIP83了,都没有理事会,见证人,大代理人支持和大力推动的。
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Offline binggo

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BSIP83修改稿中又提出了一个新想法,但是这个想法跟之前没有太大的新意,依然属于新瓶装旧酒。
里面对所有bts持有者空投这个代币根本就是一个坑。
也没有阐明一些需要详细明确定义的东西。


嗯,但是假设如果只给BTS抵押者空投的话会是什么效果?
假设一下分析一下利弊:

利:
1.锚定资产规则投票不会再受其它空持bts大户影响,比如beos.
2.cn-vote可能是最大的抵押方(存疑)?需要重新争取这个代币的代理权。猴子跟资金盘会有大量票。
3.这种代币是否有代理功能?需要研究一下BSIP85;
    待补充

弊:
1.可能会失去对申领资金池资金的法理性; 当然还是要BSIP投票;
2.core团队可能以智能资产不在平台管理职责内,在规划中没有或者拒绝开发智能资产的一些功能, 并且可能会要求智能资产的开发费用自付;
3.双代币赋能肯定会分散资金;
4.bts核心代币会少一个赋能,这个赋能就是其它人想与抵押者投票权竞争就需要买入bts;
5.可能会出现失衡的投票权重;
6.会对cn-vote的积分造成什么影响?
7.抵押者可能某个时间会面临额外出血购买这个代币来增加权重的情况, 及外部交易所分流权重的情况, 也就是利益纠缠.
    待补充

BSIP83有几点不能动或者必须明确的就是:
1.理事会必须拥有智能资产的所有权及全部管理权;
2.智能资产管理者只具有智能资产的代理管理权,此代理管理权必须是理事会授权。
3.智能管理者人选需要理事会投票过筛?或者必须是理事会成员才有竞选智能资产管理者的权利?
4.智能资产功能必须属于平台的开发功能之内,也必须具有申领资金池资金的权利。
   待补充
« Last Edit: October 17, 2019, 08:38:29 am by binggo »

Offline Bangzi

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本论坛目前不能注册新账号,如果您有兴趣成为预言家/喂价提供者可以去中文论坛注册:
https://dpos.club/t/topic/104
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Offline abit

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USD CNY 喂价与见证人分离的理事会提案已经发了。

大家加紧确定谁来喂价。

有兴趣喂价的报名。第一个月没有工资。

现在在名单里的,麻烦也留个话,说明愿不愿意继续按现有 BSIP76 共识喂价。
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Offline binggo

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我想bsip83不要老是当抵押者是狍子,抵押者本身已经够狍子的了,改来改去的本质上有些东西根本没有变化,抵押者又不是猴子,朝三暮四,暮三朝四的分不清楚。

Offline Bhuz

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I will try to step in and share my opinion about the decouple proposal.

Apologies if some of my replies will be slightly off-topic or inconsistent with the OP intention (or his statements), but it is difficult for me to follow the discussion here due to the automatic translation accuracy (not good at all).

Being a member of the committee, I think it is important that you know what is my general view about the proposal to separate the price feeding operation from the block production operation.
My opinion will be reflected in the event that the committee is asked to express itself by voting for applying the changes inside such a proposal. It is therefore important that you are aware as well so to be able to cast your vote accordingly.

I am totally in favor of the separation of price feeding from block production.
In the event that the committee members are asked to cast a vote to support or reject such separation, I will vote to support it.


I think it is important to acknowledge that recent (and eventually future) events about unvoting witnesses to change the bitassets fed price put some danger (as security, safety, and stability) to the whole platform. The willingness of the community and it's stakeholders to express their own opinion and change some rules about a key component as the price feeding is understandable, but we must ensure that this is possible without jeopardizing the security of the entire blockchain.

I also think that bigger changes would probably be needed to best address some other problems that currently affect our bitassets. Some of those changes are included in the BSIP83 draft. At the same time, I understand the reluctance to support such a big proposal that would need a good amount of work, code and time by the core-team.
I, therefore agree on trying to implement these changes with the tools we have available now, without adding new code.

In my opinion, the committee should change major bitassets flag so to not be automatically fed by witnesses anymore, but instead to be fed by a selected list of "feeders".
For start, such feeders list should actually be the currently active witnesses.
This, in my opinion, makes sense because currently active witnesses are already feeding the price for bitassets, are already following the community will, have already implemented some important BSIPs and have already the infrastructure (node) and code (script) needed for such operations. Selecting the currently active witnesses as the initial feeders list would allow us to make the transition as smooth as possible, with the lowest possible risk of price feeding inconveniences and failures.

After the switch is made, the committee would be able to modify the feeders list to remove those witnesses that are not interested in price feeding (or are not considered worthy and fit for the role), and at the same time add those community members who are instead interested to fill and apply for the price feeding role. The committee can look for community feedback and recommendation about how exactly apply these modifications.

About other inputs from the OP:
- I am not sure we really need a bailment from feeders
- We instead can have a no-pay-period during which feeders are checked to ensure their setup is in line with what is required. If not, they will be voted out from the feeders list and will get no pay for their first period. This could also help reduce committee fund management
- We can use worker-poll to determine the initial feeders reward. Suggestion for values in these worker-polls can be made by the committee, considering the costs that the feeders will have to bear.

I hope everything I wrote above is clear enough to not create misunderstandings due to translation errors.