Author Topic: [Committee] Fee schedule overhaul  (Read 121 times)

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Offline abit

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[Committee] Fee schedule overhaul
« on: February 19, 2020, 04:16:21 pm »
IMHO, an important direction for the BitShares chain in year 2020 is to try to gain more income, while trying to make use of existing features and keep a reasonable size of user base.

There are two things to do in parallel.
1. the committee adjusts the fee schedule,
2. the core developer team develops tools that can be used by the committee to fine tune the fee schedule.

This thread is mainly for the committee part.

Recently a big part of volume in the DEX comes from the trading activities in the BTS/CNY market related to force settlements. Regardless of whether the activities are abnormal, IMHO the chain should earn from the activities.

There are two committee proposals currently in voting:
* 1.10.57202 - to increase the force-settlement fee from 2.4 BTS to 1000 BTS (400x)
* 1.10.57236 - to increase the force-settlement fee from 2.4 BTS to 9.6 BTS (4x), and increase the call update fee from 0.048 BTS to 0.48 BTS (10x) and adjust the collateral bid fee from 0.048 BTS to 0.48 BTS to be consistent with the call update fee.

This is the first step towards a fee schedule overhaul.

Please discuss and vote.

I'm currently voting for the second proposal since I think it's effective but not too aggressive.
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Offline Bhuz

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Re: [Committee] Fee schedule overhaul
« Reply #1 on: February 19, 2020, 04:38:04 pm »
Since I think a fee schedule overhaul, among other things, is badly needed, I am willing to give a chance and try out proposal 1.10.57236 that I just approved.

Offline litepresence

Re: [Committee] Fee schedule overhaul
« Reply #2 on: February 19, 2020, 05:42:57 pm »
Code: [Select]
* 1.10.57202 - to increase the force-settlement fee from 2.4 BTS to 1000 BTS (400x)
* 1.10.57236 - to increase the force-settlement fee from 2.4 BTS to 9.6 BTS (4x)

This is a logical fallacy called "false dilemma".

"Either we 4X or we make it stupid large 400X", therefore 4X must be reasonable!

The proposition seems silly, just on that front.

Wouldn't you think after 6 years we'd have reached a point where fees were somewhat near appropriate and we should be moving them if anything up or down maybe 10%, rather changing the rules of the game entirely by radically altering them 400% or 40,000%?

Secondly... any flat rate tax on trading activity invariably leads to "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer"

If market activity is to be taxed it should be taxed relative to its value.

In the real world when you buy a cheap hammer, the tax is 5% of its value; variable rate - not flat.  If you buy an expensive hydraulic jack hammer the tax is still 5% of its value.   A $10 hammer might have a $0.50 tax... whereas a $2000 jackhammer might have $100 tax.

If you applied the same $100 flat tax to $10 hammers as you do to jackhammers... nobody would buy hammers.   What you essentially do is price the product out of the market; choosing winners and losers in the economy.  It becomes a state command economy rather than a market economy.

Likewise, the same will occur in margin markets; you create a huge flat tax on margin lending the result will be only whales will take margin loans and only entrenched high volume MPA's will ever be loaned into existence.   Flat taxes are effectively regulatory capture abetting incumbent markets and wealthy traders.

Flat taxes on the blockchain should be reserved to prevent blockchain clutter of dust transactions, to reserve asset names and account names, to discourage the sending of bulk scam proposals, etc.    They should not be used to discourage legitimate market activity of smaller borrowers.

It is my suggestion that if you wish to raise revenue from defaulted loans, the rate should be percent based and effect all equally relative to their respective investment... just as market trading fees do.    Then, when massive loans default... surely the chain will profit without adversely discouraging other market activity along the way.

Likewise... if it can be accomplished that each individual UIA and MPA on the chain can have a percent based market fee.  Why can we not raise revenue for the chain itself by applying percent based market fees which benefit the public coffers on all market matched limit orders?

In short:

Flat fees, on a per item basis, should only be implemented to prevent blockchain clutter.
Variable rate fees, relative to transaction value, should be the taxation method of choice to raise revenue.
« Last Edit: February 19, 2020, 10:32:05 pm by litepresence »

Offline abit

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Re: [Committee] Fee schedule overhaul
« Reply #3 on: February 19, 2020, 06:55:53 pm »
Code: [Select]
* 1.10.57202 - to increase the force-settlement fee from 2.4 BTS to 1000 BTS (400x)
* 1.10.57236 - to increase the force-settlement fee from 2.4 BTS to 9.6 BTS (4x)

This is a logical fallacy called "false dilemma".

"Either we 4X or we make it stupid large 400X", therefore 4X must be reasonable!

The proposition seems silly, just on that front.

Wouldn't you think after 6 years we'd have reached a point where fees were somewhat near appropriate and we should be moving them if anything up or down maybe 10%, rather changing the rules of the game entirely by radically altering them 400% or 40,000%?
Unfortunately after 6 years the fees are still far from appropriate. The chain is always being operated at a loss. See discussions happened 2 years ago: https://github.com/bitshares/committee-tools/pull/1 . Few changes were done after that discussion.

Quote

Secondly... any flat rate tax on trading activity invariably leads to "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer"

If market activity is to be taxed it should be taxed relative to its value.

...
Flat fees are just what we have right now. Market fee % doesn't apply to margin calls nor force settlements so far. The are BSIPs about charging percentage fees:
* BSIP74 Margin Call Fee Ratio https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0074.md
* Force settlement fee ratio https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/260
* market fee for BTS https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/262
* BSIP86 Share market fees to the network https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0086.md
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Offline bench

Re: [Committee] Fee schedule overhaul
« Reply #4 on: February 19, 2020, 07:51:26 pm »
I think 1.10.57236 is fine, is the fee nominated in USD or bitUSD ?
Be part of the change and vote for the bitshares-vision proxy!

Offline abit

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Re: [Committee] Fee schedule overhaul
« Reply #5 on: February 19, 2020, 08:14:24 pm »
I think 1.10.57236 is fine, is the fee nominated in USD or bitUSD ?
Actually IMHO the fee nomination is another topic to discuss in the overhaul. I didn't see the positive effects it supposed to bring to us. So in OP I only mentioned BTS but not USD nor bitUSD.
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Online binggo

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Re: [Committee] Fee schedule overhaul
« Reply #6 on: February 19, 2020, 11:32:36 pm »
I think 1.10.57236 is more better, it is more flat, we can try it, maybe we will lower the force-settlement fee in the further if we get more feedbacks from Prediction Market Assets.

Prediction Market Assets is a something like Contract Market, it should need an applicable fee and threshold.
« Last Edit: Today at 12:00:05 am by binggo »