Dry Run 10: Viva la Vida Delegada

[spartako]

Thanks spartako! Just registered as a delegate.

Please wallet_approve_delegate bitsapphire true so we can do some testing on our server this round.

BTW, has anybody built a tool for delegate server monitoring yet? Email notifications or anything?

It seems the voting doesn't work in this run, there are only init delegates in the first 101.
I don't know any tool for monitoring delegate, but there is the rpc interface and in theory anyone can write his own tool.

[itnom]

Sent

Code: [Select]

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2014-07-17T13:53:18 5200      spartako-w          itnom               100.00000 XTS           0.10000 XTS    63bd94d


Thanks spartako! Just registered as a delegate.

Please wallet_approve_delegate bitsapphire true so we can do some testing on our server this round.

BTW, has anybody built a tool for delegate server monitoring yet? Email notifications or anything?

[spartako]

There is the CNY/XTS market blocked for:

Code: [Select]

Bid Depth: 253,164.55696 XTS     Ask Depth: 252,091.65001 XTS
Last Error:  insufficient collateral (37004)


Details:
37004 insufficient_collateral: insufficient collateral

I think the problem it is this order:

Code: [Select]

bid_order   0.00000 XTS         100. CNY / XTS   0.0009 CNY    0.0000 CNY         N/A       XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv

But I'm unable to remove it:

Code: [Select]

default (unlocked) >>> wallet_market_cancel_order XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv
31005 insufficient_funds: insufficient funds

    {"amount":-4349999,"current_bid->balance":9}
    th_a  market_operations.cpp:35 evaluate

    {"*this":{"amount":-4349999,"bid_index":{"order_price":{"ratio":"10.","quote_asset_id":14,"base_asset_id":0},"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}}}
    th_a  market_operations.cpp:60 evaluate

    {"op":{"type":"bid_op_type","data":{"amount":-4349999,"bid_index":{"order_price":{"ratio":"10.","quote_asset_id":14,"base_asset_id":0},"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}}}}
    th_a  operation_factory.hpp:52 evaluate

    {"trx":{"expiration":"20140717T155945","delegate_slate_id":null,"operations":[{"type":"bid_op_type","data":{"amount":-4349999,"bid_index":{"order_price":{"ratio":"10.","quote_asset_id":14,"base_asset_id":0},"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}}},{"type":"deposit_op_type","data":{"amount":4349999,"condition":{"asset_id":14,"delegate_slate_id":0,"type":"withdraw_signature_type","data":{"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv","memo":null}}}},{"type":"withdraw_op_type","data":{"balance_id":"XTSDtmByRShgZqeHZpCcpdvyuC7CR9Wiic1C","amount":10000,"claim_input_data":""}}],"signatures":["207361eb388718318ac6241a923cf7c2f7e82b8ef5035ab7cce8f314bc45e04abb5a316fe0f0e0d03b499070e72d9dcc1e8b48b7f767473d5599f7ddb446f59d00","1fb073d5ef0290b7688477910f1ca4511d21b26f8207a58deb6feb0d3ad56466e599bb6eaebde9823e3de92f21b285c23189856208b68bb8ba9f36d6ff73c1f81f"]}}
    th_a  transaction_evaluation_state.cpp:218 evaluate

    {"trx":{"expiration":"20140717T155945","delegate_slate_id":null,"operations":[{"type":"bid_op_type","data":{"amount":-4349999,"bid_index":{"order_price":{"ratio":"10.","quote_asset_id":14,"base_asset_id":0},"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}}},{"type":"deposit_op_type","data":{"amount":4349999,"condition":{"asset_id":14,"delegate_slate_id":0,"type":"withdraw_signature_type","data":{"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv","memo":null}}}},{"type":"withdraw_op_type","data":{"balance_id":"XTSDtmByRShgZqeHZpCcpdvyuC7CR9Wiic1C","amount":10000,"claim_input_data":""}}],"signatures":["207361eb388718318ac6241a923cf7c2f7e82b8ef5035ab7cce8f314bc45e04abb5a316fe0f0e0d03b499070e72d9dcc1e8b48b7f767473d5599f7ddb446f59d00","1fb073d5ef0290b7688477910f1ca4511d21b26f8207a58deb6feb0d3ad56466e599bb6eaebde9823e3de92f21b285c23189856208b68bb8ba9f36d6ff73c1f81f"]}}
    th_a  chain_database.cpp:1562 evaluate_transaction

    {"trx":{"expiration":"20140717T155945","delegate_slate_id":null,"operations":[{"type":"bid_op_type","data":{"amount":-4349999,"bid_index":{"order_price":{"ratio":"10.","quote_asset_id":14,"base_asset_id":0},"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}}},{"type":"deposit_op_type","data":{"amount":4349999,"condition":{"asset_id":14,"delegate_slate_id":0,"type":"withdraw_signature_type","data":{"owner":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv","memo":null}}}},{"type":"withdraw_op_type","data":{"balance_id":"XTSDtmByRShgZqeHZpCcpdvyuC7CR9Wiic1C","amount":10000,"claim_input_data":""}}],"signatures":["207361eb388718318ac6241a923cf7c2f7e82b8ef5035ab7cce8f314bc45e04abb5a316fe0f0e0d03b499070e72d9dcc1e8b48b7f767473d5599f7ddb446f59d00","1fb073d5ef0290b7688477910f1ca4511d21b26f8207a58deb6feb0d3ad56466e599bb6eaebde9823e3de92f21b285c23189856208b68bb8ba9f36d6ff73c1f81f"]}}
    th_a  chain_database.cpp:1953 store_pending_transaction

    {}
    th_a  wallet.cpp:1540 sign_and_cache_transaction

    {"owner_address":"XTSPGVcDPth86ckk2RpT9ufDKpfghZPobUgv"}
    th_a  wallet.cpp:2852 cancel_market_order

    {}
    th_a  common_api_client.cpp:1331 wallet_market_cancel_order

    {"command":"wallet_market_cancel_order"}
    th_a  cli.cpp:538 execute_command


[spartako]

Would appreciate some funds for delegate registration.

XTS64BxdfP2svYcvHdeJK6dpeisMqsEKmfJct9cYaFAPtxyUtjXEe

Sent

Code: [Select]

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-07-17T13:53:18 5200      spartako-w          itnom               100.00000 XTS           0.10000 XTS    63bd94d


[biophil]

still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.

1. use about 10^7 XTS  or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.

It is just a matter of scale.  Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless.  We can set that value as high as 5% or more.  The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network.  No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset.  You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all. 


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Arrrg.  I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low.  There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network.    Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. 

You are wrong. The point is that even at the current market cap which is approximately 20-30 mil you would have to spend 200k or 300k on acquiring shares before you could attack the network (in the future it will be much more expensive). And if you had that many shares, it would be WAY more profitable to INCREASE the value of the network than to destroy it by having some kind of attack on it.


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So you're saying we should bet the house on the premise that "a rational person probably wouldn't want to do that?" Never mind that if they did, or they weren't rational, or you misunderstood what it means for them to be rational, they would ruin everything. Our discussion about this needs to be more risk-averse. When design decisions are being dominated by people saying "We're pretty sure that shouldn't happen," my confidence gets a little shaky.

[itnom]

As far as I know this dry run is already dead. Last I checked no transactions were going through. Unless anyone else knows anything different?

Well, that was fast. Europe just wakes up and things already restart

[bdnoble]

Would appreciate some funds for delegate registration.

XTS64BxdfP2svYcvHdeJK6dpeisMqsEKmfJct9cYaFAPtxyUtjXEe

As far as I know this dry run is already dead. Last I checked no transactions were going through. Unless anyone else knows anything different?


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[bdnoble]

still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.

1. use about 10^7 XTS  or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.

It is just a matter of scale.  Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless.  We can set that value as high as 5% or more.  The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network.  No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset.  You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Arrrg.  I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low.  There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network.    Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. 

You are wrong. The point is that even at the current market cap which is approximately 20-30 mil you would have to spend 200k or 300k on acquiring shares before you could attack the network (in the future it will be much more expensive). And if you had that many shares, it would be WAY more profitable to INCREASE the value of the network than to destroy it by having some kind of attack on it.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[itnom]

Would appreciate some funds for delegate registration.

XTS64BxdfP2svYcvHdeJK6dpeisMqsEKmfJct9cYaFAPtxyUtjXEe

[biophil]

still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.

1. use about 10^7 XTS  or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.

It is just a matter of scale.  Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless.  We can set that value as high as 5% or more.  The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network.  No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset.  You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Arrrg.  I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low.  There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network.    Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. 

Totally agree, and I'm not going to hedge with "I'm not a tester." You can't build a system and say "oh that fatal fault should never happen." If the design allows it to happen, you're crazy to call that a good design. Alt just explained very clearly how a 1% attack could destroy everything you've worked for, BM says "Oh, I don't think someone would do that." Very reassuring.

[liondani]

still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.

1. use about 10^7 XTS  or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.

It is just a matter of scale.  Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless.  We can set that value as high as 5% or more.  The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network.  No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset.  You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Arrrg.  I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low.  There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network.    Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. 

+ 1

[JakeThePanda]

still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.

1. use about 10^7 XTS  or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.

It is just a matter of scale.  Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless.  We can set that value as high as 5% or more.  The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network.  No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset.  You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all. 


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Arrrg.  I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low.  There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network.    Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now. 

[Fox]

I don't believe delegate voting is functioning properly.  The initial delegates are the only delegates producing blocks and the individual registered delegates are not replacing them, as their approval remains 0.0%.

Code: [Select]

blockchain_list_delegates 1 200
ID    NAME (* next in line)           APPROVAL       PRODUCED MISSED   RELIABILITY   PAY RATE PAY BALANCE         LAST BLOCK
============================================================================================================================
31    init30                          0.0000000001 % 49       0        100.00 %      100 %    0.00274 XTS         4127
83    init82                          0.0000000001 % 48       0        100.00 %      100 %    0.00269 XTS         4063
...
68    init67                          0.0000000001 % 42       0        100.00 %      100 %    0.00227 XTS         3955
22    init21 *                        0.0000000001 % 41       0        100.00 %      100 %    0.00225 XTS         4012
1     init0                           0.0000000000 % 0        42       0.00 %        100 %    0.00000 XTS         NONE
4     init3                           0.0000000000 % 0        44       0.00 %        100 %    0.00000 XTS         NONE
5     init4                           0.0000000000 % 0        44       0.00 %        100 %    0.00000 XTS         NONE
6     init5                           0.0000000000 % 0        46       0.00 %        100 %    0.00000 XTS         NONE
7     init6                           0.0000000000 % 0        44       0.00 %        100 %    0.00000 XTS         NONE
104   alexxy                          0.0000000000 % 0        0        N/A           100 %    0.00000 XTS         NONE
169   fox                             0.0000000000 % 0        0        N/A           100 %    0.00000 XTS         NONE
298   hackfisher-test                 0.0000000000 % 0        0        N/A           50 %     0.00000 XTS         NONE
299   bitcoiners                      0.0000000000 % 0        0        N/A           1 %      0.00000 XTS         NONE
300   bits                            0.0000000000 % 0        0        N/A           1 %      0.00000 XTS         NONE
...   

Five of the initial delegates have failed to produce a single block, which matched well with the network block production stat:

Code: [Select]

get_info
{
  "blockchain_head_block_num": 4295,
  "blockchain_head_block_age": "2 seconds old",
  "blockchain_head_block_timestamp": "20140717T111410",
  "blockchain_average_delegate_participation": 96.19047619047619,
...
}

Is this by design for Dry Run 10?

[alexxy]

when compiling new binaries i get this error when trying to update submodules

Code: [Select]

git submodule update

Code: [Select]

xxx:bitshares_toolkit x$ git submodule update
fatal: reference is not a tree: d539f9d42d6283c1739bf2bfbdd3b367263372f8
Unable to checkout 'd539f9d42d6283c1739bf2bfbdd3b367263372f8' in submodule path 'programs/web_wallet'
Any ideas?

Do

Code: [Select]

cd programs/web_wallet
git reset --hard origin/master
git checkout master
cd ../../


[cass]

when compiling new binaries i get this error when trying to update submodules

Code: [Select]

git submodule update

Code: [Select]

xxx:bitshares_toolkit x$ git submodule update
fatal: reference is not a tree: d539f9d42d6283c1739bf2bfbdd3b367263372f8
Unable to checkout 'd539f9d42d6283c1739bf2bfbdd3b367263372f8' in submodule path 'programs/web_wallet'
Any ideas?