There have been many discussions over the past 6 months about having paid workers separate from Delegates as well as changing the maximum income per worker without increasing the dilution limit. I would like to explore how this might look and see what ideas you all can come up with.
Step 1: Assume there are at most 432,000 BTS per day available to be paid to workers. (50 BTS every 10 seconds)
Step 2: Assume there is a list of projects that specify how much they need paid each day.
Step 3: Pay out projects in order of total approval once per day until all 432,000 BTS has been consumed.
Step 4: Have several projects that payout to no one (burning) and thus prevent dilution.
Next define each project in terms of the following parameters:
1) Start Date
2) Fundings to Receive Per Day
3) End Date for Funding
4) Vesting Period for Funds Received
Next give each account the ability to vote *FOR* or *AGAINST* each funding proposal.
Sort all projects by NET votes including the burn projects.
Each projects funding would flow to an account with multi-sig authority (for serious projects that demand accountability).
Under this model I would propose the following project:
We have 7 core developers that need at least $25,000 per month (combined) just to pay for Food, Shelter, and Clothing and earning 1/4 what they could make on the free market. These 7 core developers form a company that produces a wallet and profits from referral income. This company would have a funded project with a roadmap for BTS and would receive 250,000 BTS per day that their project is in the top list of projects for 4 years. The funds would not vest for 5 years which means the core company would not sell their 250,000 BTS/day for 5 years. 5 years is long enough that the project is either a success and the dilution is insignificant or a complete failure and the shares are worthless anyway. Either way existing BTS holders benefit from work today that is ultimately paid for in 5 years. Each year the devs can re-negotiate their project funding and shareholders can vote in new terms as the vote down the old terms.
At any time this developer company could be fired by giving more votes to a burn proposal or an alternative set of developers. When they are fired they stop receiving new income but must still wait for 5 years before they can touch any of the BTS they have already earned.
This would have the core devs consuming about half of the available dilution (3% per year) and allowing the community room to fund other projects with the remaining half of the funds.
Currently the Core DEVs have about 15 paid delegate slots and their pay vests immediately. Under this new approach their combined pay would be 3x higher but it wouldn't vest for 5 years. Perhaps most importantly, this would still keep the number of block producers decentralized and keep the sell pressure caused by dilution at bay. Additionally it makes it easier for shareholders to vote for one "company" than for individual developers which may come and go without accountability.
By having VOTES AGAINST a project it becomes easier for stakeholders to vote down projects they explicitly don't want funded in the event of a change in circumstances.