Well if you have 51% you will obviously get all the delegate seats unless there is a limit on the amount of delegates you can vote for.
I personally think the limit as a very good idea.
If you have one entity that has 51%, you have bigger problems and you must trust this entity to use the system anyway. Limiting the votes doesn't change this at all. 51% could control the network no matter what, and ignore votes cast for any other delegates, this is the nature of POS the same way that 51% of hashing power controls bitcoin (if one entity controls 51% of the hash power you must trust that entity to use the system).
Getting rid of the limit is a good idea and makes it harder for bad actors with less than 51% to get their unpopular delegates elected. If a bad actor gets 51% stake the network must be forked to remove them regardless.
The fork can happen at any time when there is disagreement regardless of the % of any party (5% can fork ignoring the rest and you cant do anything about this).
Even if those 51% decide to fork and separate it is their choice. However an entity (may be a group) controlling 51% shouldn't be given total control over the network.
In the previous scenario when the stakeholders' vote was limited to max 33 delegates an entity with 51% will not be able to get all the delegate seats. Guaranteed representation at 33% wasn't a bad idea either.
That's why I think limiting the amount of delegates you can vote for was a good idea and pyre approval voting is not (although pyre approval voting is better than the previous system). EDIT: This is my opinion feel free to disagree and share your thoughts.
PS: Each sequential state is better , isn't this cool ?
By limiting the number of delegates you can vote for to 33 you can be guaranteed a delegate seat with 17% of the shares. You simply give 50.0001% of you shares to 66 delegates. Everyone else combined would be unable to muster enough votes to kick you out. So the lower limit actually makes it vulnerable to a much lower threshold.
So if you allow 101 votes, someone with 51% can own it all. If you only allow 33 votes, then someone with 51% can still own over 51% of the delegates which is the same as owning it all. But now they can be assured a spot with just 17% of the shares because you are always subject to the 51% attack in what ever group you happen to be in. So if you allow everyone 33 votes then 51% of 33 is enough to control all 33 delegates in that group and no one else will have enough stake to elect another group of 33 with more than 49% approval.
Assume 67% of the people agree 100% on 67% of the delegates. The other 33% are up for grabs and can be taken by who ever has 17% of the shares.
I think I understood your concerns and why you don't want the limit in that form.
I agree it might give 17% shareholder too much delegates. And changing the limit just changes these 17% (51 delegates limit would give someone with 25% stake control over 50 delegates)
What about decreasing the vote weight of people who have already elected delegates by 1% per delegate?
This should prevent groups with 51% to elect all the delegates.
Consider these elections:
1 Order delegates by pure Approval Voting
2 Pick the highest voted delegate and mark it as elected.
3 Multiply the vote weight of everyone who voted for the delegate from 2. by (NUMBER_OF_DELEGATES-1)/NUMBER_OF_DELEGATES (should be around -1%)
4 If not all delegates are elected continue from 1 (accounting for 3)
This should prevent anyone from taking up all delegate seats.
Any thoughts?