Empirical, I think if you looked at my post history you would see I've been a big proponent of letting shareholders direct equity for a long time; I'm well aware of the merits. My problem is that tying this function to being a delegate is a very inefficient way for shareholders to have their will done. If shareholders want to fund a core dev, let them simply make a decision about that. Don't make them try to find which delegates are currently giving some percentage of funds to core development along with deciding if these delegates have reliable network statistics and are trusted community members, and now maybe they need to somehow set alerts to find out if any of their delegates has changed their priorities/fund allocation. The shareholders might think we should be aggressively reinvesting in development above all else but that doesn't mean they want to let a developer control over 50% of delegates. The two things are separate.
You have now turned what should be a simple process into an excruciatingly complex process by mixing 2 naturally separate roles and combining them. I now must analyze the spending habits of tons of delegates and combine that info with my various levels of trust and faith in their abilities to perform a simple task of running delegates to write blocks. It will cause voters (shareholders) to disengage, tune out, and only approve a couple delegates at a time, and ultimately lose faith in the institution.
I think it engages shareholders MUCH more.
As long as the system drip feeds the equity, the risk is low.
DAC's are businesses selling products & services, so they will need centralised advertising campaigns etc. imo. So I can see DAC's having a marketing delegate which may even end up being a full service agency that gets their budget released via the blockchain and if the shareholders don't like the job they're doing, they will be fired. I can see them having a Charity delegate. A couple of Developers as delegates Etc. (Though most of the delegates elected will probably be the ones giving the equity back to shareholders most of the time.)
I think it's potentially great, like personally I think airdropping equity is generally a bad idea, if I'm right and that when you have a competitive product/service the money is better spent on traditional advertising to let customers know about it and make it accessible and convenient for them, then that should quickly be realised by self interested shareholders & they should move towards voting to direct equity in the best interest of the company when one or another approach is shown not to work. (For example if I saw oh wow airdropping to Y did generate a lot of free advertising, new support & the share price wasn't effected then I would even change my mind and vote for airdropping more of the equity.)
So basically whatever is the best model, this kind of approach gives the DAC the best opportunity to find it imo.
The optimal system for security may be to have 101 unique delegates all around the world but the optimal investment decision could involve directing a lot of this new equity they receive to development. Thereby in your opinion resulting in potentially security compromising clusters, like in the extreme - A developer controlling over 50% of the delegates.
But if we decided on 101 unique delegates all around the world, but now needed 5 delegates worth of equity to be released to Toast for .p2p development. Would we,
A) Fire 5 delegates originally based in Guatamala, The North Pole, Mt. Everest, The Amazon Jungle & The Sahara Desert. Instead giving Toast control of five delegates?
Or would we
B) Vote for those 5 delegates that could still be based in Guatamala, The North Pole, Mt. Everest, The Amazon Jungle & The Sahara Desert who send all of the equity they are released to the Toast development fund, with Toast simply confirming on a regular basis that he's received it?
Maintaining high security is in the best interests of the company so shareholders will choose options that maximise the best investment decisions with minimal compromise to security imo.
You agree with shareholders directing equity. But how would you do it? I think we'd have to find a decentralised trusted group of people to administer it according to our wishes. But that's pretty much what the 101 delegates system is. So I think introducing any secondary system to do the exact job the delegates can do is sub-optimal. Tweaking the delegate system and maybe putting in some tracking controls, automations and limits etc. will be best.
I'm not saying I agree 10/10/80 will be optimal, I'm still processing my own thoughts on it. But in general the concept is quite brilliant and inspired in my opinion. (Like for example in the first year we obviously trust the developers who released the product so I think we should direct a portion to them in the allocation model for maintenance & development without the need to go through/complicate the delegate system at the start.)