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Offline sfinder

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Bm 太幼稚了,只考虑系统内部的攻击,没有考虑到竞争对手以及虚拟货币利益既得者为了保持手上的财富不缩水而对bts系统发起攻击。目前的规则下,只要手上有1%筹码的人都可以做空市场玩残系统。


still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.

1. use about 10^7 XTS  or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.

It is just a matter of scale.  Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless.  We can set that value as high as 5% or more.  The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network.  No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset.  You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all. 


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« Last Edit: July 17, 2014, 01:43:18 PM by sfinder »
微博:星在飘我在找|BTS X 受托人delegate ID:baidu
中国教育书店合作将20%收入捐献给贫困山区学生。
Cooperating with China Education Bookstore and will donate 20% of delegate income to the poor students

Offline 常拜不败

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我建议不同的风险池,实盘和杠杆分开


Offline cdryan

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你好鸡冻了。。。

Offline 00091lacer

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所以我建议至少请一名金融顾问。

Offline 天籁

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 We can set that value as high as 5% or more.楼主总是一惊一乍,你没看这一句?
BTS account: disneyland
PLAY account: playone

lzr1900

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你又鸡冻了阿。

Offline gyhy

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我建议先出个简单的,支持网关交易的系统

Offline 常拜不败

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没有人反思BITUSD的混合交易机制吗?居然抵押卖出BTS和实盘卖出BITUSD混合在一起交易,我太失望了

Offline gyhy

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做一个支持网关的系统,我相信要比现在的ripple好很多,因为是基于dpos的


Offline ripplexiaoshan

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确实应该从规则上避免这种攻击,而不能靠道义或者常理。毕竟不能避免有人会发疯。
BTS ID:xiaoshan                   www.btsabc.org

Offline sfinder

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We can set that value as high as 5% or more.楼主总是一惊一乍,你没看这一句?
你不能排除有人(竞争对手)拿10%的筹码来做攻击
微博:星在飘我在找|BTS X 受托人delegate ID:baidu
中国教育书店合作将20%收入捐献给贫困山区学生。
Cooperating with China Education Bookstore and will donate 20% of delegate income to the poor students

Offline sfinder

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BM出方案了。。。。。


still can attack with these rules, if I have about 1% XTS.

1. use about 10^7 XTS  or more, control the price to 500USD/XTS, get about 5*10^9 USD
2. usd about 10^7 XTS or more + maybe 10^5 USD, control the price to 0.0005USD/XTS,get all the backup XTS.

It is just a matter of scale.  Attacking the network in such a manner would destroy the network and make your 1% worthless.  We can set that value as high as 5% or more.  The assumption is anyone with that much steak we not want to harm the network.  No one else would participate in the network and instead could go to a new bit asset.  You and then be trading against yourself and not profit at all. 


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Arrrg.  I'm not a tester, but I don't think I like this reasoning at all. Assuming that no individual person or group would spend money to harm the network is a bad assumption, especially at the early stages when the total NAV is still low.  There could be great incentives to try and destroy the network.  :o  Please tell me I don't know crap and I'm wrong because that's what I want to hear right now.  :-\

+ 1

Lets look at this very closely because it is very easy to confuse yourself when it comes to thinking about markets (happens to me a lot and I have a good grasp on it).   I write this to "think out loud" so I may have something wrong.

Before any trading can occur there must be at least X% (say 1%) of the XTS sitting in unmatched shorts & asks.  Lets also assume that this 1% does not belong to the attacker because the attacker would have no victims if it all belonged to him. 

Primary goal of the attack:
1) Create a large amount of BitUSD with very little XTS backing it which will be unresolvable and break the peg until someone eats the loss.
2) To be successful the attacker must be on both sides of the trade (collecting a large USD balance, and an equal short position).
3) To achieve this the attacker must eliminate all other asks on the book that are not their own.

To execute the attack:
1) You must sell 1 XTS for 10000 USD (a very high ask if it were real USD)
2) This means you must place bids to match every ask at 1, 10, 100, 1000 USD per XTS
3) To places these bids means you must short USD at lower and lower prices
4) As you short USD at lower and lower prices you are creating more and more USD backed by less and less XTS.
5) At the end of the day you have a lot of people who long USD while you are short USD at a very low value.
*** Critical Point:  Does the rest of the market run out of money before you do ********
6) Eventually you run out of money and can no longer fight off the hoards of people selling XTS for USD
7) The value of USD starts rising absent your manipulation until your short position is blown.
8) Those who were buying USD while you were shorting knew at the time of purchase that USD wasn't pegged to the dollar and they bought knowing their max return would be 2x on their XTS.   So these buyers of USD gladly sell their USD at a 2x profit even if it is below the dollar peg.
9) The market will continue to correct until all of the attackers USD has been covered and his collateral lost.
10) The peg is restored and all is well.

Some things to note:
1) During the attack many legitimate shorts will start covering to lock in their profits and thus make it more difficult to maintain the attack
2) During the attack many savvy users will start buying USD at the huge discount.  If BitUSD is currently 10% of real USD then you buy it because you know it has collateral worth 20% of real USD backing it.  Sure you don't get to realize a 10x gain when it returns to market peg, but you still get a free 2x gain on the return to market peg.  For this reason, BitUSD is a solid buy any time it is below parity and profit can be made by selling BitUSD for XTS even below market peg if you bought it at an even lower point.

What this means is that only the attacker's short positions get blown out, and everyone else still profits.   In this case I consider an attacker anyone who shorts BitUSD when BitUSD is already below USD value. 

So the attacker has to clear the order book of all orders but their own, create a large short against their own ASK so they end up being LONG and SHORT a significant amount of USD.       To execute this attack requires:

1) Enough XTS to buy out all existing asks while having enough XTS to keep the market open, so lets call that 2% of XTS
2) The ability to execute your attack faster than the rest of the market participants can enter to take your money.
       - shorts entering to cover at a profit
       - asks entering to buy USD cheap

I think that the 2% attack threshold is only viable if the rest of the network is idle, in practice I suspect that the market depth could be 10% and would grow as the attacker attempted to push down USD. 

Lastly I would like to submit one last fail-safe feature:  Delegates
  To execute any attack requires delegates to include your transactions in the first place and for regular users to propagate your transactions.  For this reason an attacker would have to connect directly to a delegate that will include their transaction because it is unlikely to propagate among regular users.   If there are good delegates then the market can function with little opportunity to attack.
微博:星在飘我在找|BTS X 受托人delegate ID:baidu
中国教育书店合作将20%收入捐献给贫困山区学生。
Cooperating with China Education Bookstore and will donate 20% of delegate income to the poor students

Offline alt

没看懂这个方案怎么有效。

假如当前市场价是1个XTS 换1USD。
我牺牲1%的XTS应该就可以操纵价格到500USD/XTS。
如果我还剩下1%XTS,这些XTS换成美元价格就翻了500倍,这种市场操纵谁敢陪着玩?

 

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