I still think it's a mistake to give asset transaction fees as interest instead of allocating them through the delegates. The sooner we have solid rules that are obviously sustainable, the sooner people will be comfortable building business on the network. It's possible that BTSX transactions will have high enough volume to compensate for asset transactions, but if the goal is Visa level volumes in bitUSD, and shorts only pay one time BTSX fees to create bitUSD, it's plausible that relatively stable asset markets with high transaction volume could become millstones around the delegate's necks, and that creates uncertainty and deters serious commitment. This also runs the risk of inflating BTSX fees to the point where only high volume transactions are cost effective, stratifying a class system for investors. Even if these concerns are unrealized, subsidizing asset holders from BTSX holders adds unnecessary economic complication and uncertainty, and hard codes a marketing agenda that I think would be better left at the fluid discretion of delegates and investors.
Conceptually, I think the ideal is that transaction fees should pay for the real costs of transactions, and shorts should pay longs a variable amount depending on the current demand to short. Is there any disagreement on this?
I'm trying to figure out ways to implement these concepts more cleanly, but wanted to see how much consensus there is that they should be pursued.