I have been working through the delegate pay model that I recomend for future DACs including VOTE, MUSIC, DNS, etc.
It works off of the principle that shareholders have a right to dilute to raise capital and that the ability to dilute to raise capital ultimately maximizes shareholder value by allowing rapid growth through many rounds of funding.
1) 100% of all fees are burned.
2) Delegates can set any fee per block they like measured in XTS (BTSX, VOTES, etc)
3) The cost to register a delegate with a "high fee" is equal to 100x the fee-per-block they want to get paid.
With this system a delegate must produce at least 100 blocks to break even. It also naturally limit potential abuses because the cost of registering a HIGH PAY delegate will be VERY HIGH while the probability of getting elected will be very low. The person registering the HIGH PAY delegate will also lose out on the ability of using their own shares to vote for themselves.
For starters no one would be able to register a delegate that would pay 2 billion BTSX per block because the cost would be 200 billion BTSX (which don't exist). This puts a limit to what one could attempt to register to be 20 million BTSX per block... assuming they owned all 2billion BTSX... if we assume the largest stakeholder owns 10% of BTSX and the use 100% of their stake to register a high paying delegate then the maximum pay per block would be 2 million and they would have no stake left to vote for themselves.
Assume someone used 1% of the BTSX to register their delegate at a pay rate of 200K BTSX per block it would take them over 28 hours to break even during which the rest of the shareholders could coordinate their votes to get them ousted if they didn't consent.
With this setup the DACs can fund development in a decentralized manner for their entire lifetime.
One thing I would like to mention is that there is a "HARD" limit on the share supply based upon limits of 64 bit numbers and the precision.