Also just thinking out loud.......the interesting thing I liked about the protocol described in the paper was that since the voting boards are adhoc and changing randomly only a few stakeholders need to contribute at any time. The existing voting requires all stakeholders to be interested all the time in order to deliver voting that produces the best results. This is unrealistic as all stake holders can't always pay attention to who are the best delegates. But instead if I can commit to occasionally sharing the effort along with others who have a significant BTS stake to vote, then analysis behind voting will be much higher quality. In this way good delegates/projects/expenses should quickly be funded. And bad ones should always be quickly rejected.
For example, you need to get your bunker mining delegates voted up. But probably a lot of stake holders are out of reach or don't have time to prioritize to analyzing your offer and voting for your delegates even though its in their best interest. With the randomized boards described in the paper a group of stake holders could could have a random group of 10 or so (it says board sizes are customized) to control their votes. So these 10 board members who temporarily represent a large block of BTS stake holders and have immediate authority for a large voting block.
So as a delegate you can now directly communicate with a small group of decision makers to present your offer for faster access to funds. You wouldn't need to spend so much effort to "get the word out". The stake holders benefit too because good opportunities are not missed due to the analysis work load of voting.