After almost 2 months of Graphene we have had a more stable network with higher participation than we ever had under BTS 0.x. 

Any witnesses having any problems with your nodes?   It seems like things just run smoothly!

I want a BitShares product that has a smooth and functional exchange interface, that will attract traders, that has an API which merchants can plug into, with a fully functional referral system that we can use to market the hell out of it.

It's close. Are we there yet?

I am going to moderate / delete all off-topic replies.  Leaving this one as a warning.

I am looking for a list of laws that have the following characteristics:

1. Completely Unjust  (Victimless Crimes)
2. Probability of Getting Caught Violating the law is Low
3. Cost of getting caught is high
4. The penalty for getting caught is mostly financial
5. Have public sympathy for the individual prosecuted

It isn't faulty.   Imagine trading OPEN.BTC vs TRADE.BTC who should get the fees when those two assets trade?

Quote from: Thom on December 02, 2015, 05:44:09 am

There are others who lost big time however, to the tune of $50K.

I have missed that. Who was that? I3?

Yes.  We lent him the capital for the gold inventory.  Then he ran.  I would very much support a community led campaign to track him down and pressure him into refunding the money.   I will offer a bounty of 50% to anyone who can track it down, the other 50% will be put toward improving BTS.

Quote from: bytemaster on December 01, 2015, 08:07:38 pm

Quote from: tonyk on December 01, 2015, 08:03:05 pm

Quote from: bytemaster on December 01, 2015, 07:58:13 pm

An option with a 10 year expiration is close enough to infinite. The further in the future you go the smaller the difference in price.

So do your estimation based upon the curve generated by 3 month, 6 month, and 12 month expirations.

Do you have any idea how much an option with 3 y expiration and the volatility of BTS will cost?

I bet it will be hitting 1usd per 1usd if not more.

I actually think that the option is not infinite in term because the option doesn't have a fixed price.  So I think that is the wrong algorithm to use.

When I go short, I am pricing the cost of finding someone else to take over my short position in the future relative to the BitUSD holder wishing to exercise.

With liquidity and no fixed price, the premium can be much lower.

1 bitCNY - is 1) 'smart instrument' and 2)the right to sell this instrument for a price of 1 CNY at any point in the future.

So this is definitely some instrument[we are not concerned with exactly here]  plus  a put option with strike of 1 CNY [ aka giving you the right to sell said instrument for 1 CNY = straight definition of an option]...except it has no expiration date.

When you are buying the bitCNY you are paying one CNY for the underlying contract (or smart instrument) and anything above 1 CNY is the premium for the put option.



And yes any option definitely has a price (theoretical value) at any point in time.

I think the place you went wrong is saying you have the right to sell said instrument for 1 CNY... which is no true,  you have the right to sell it for 1 CNY worth of BTS. 

So the person selling the BitCNY into circulation simply has a callable (on-demand) loan.  You borrow money that is callable on demand (24 hour notice)... considering the loan is interest-free itself we can consider the premium on BitCNY to be  PRICE_OF_OPTION - PREPAID_INTEREST where PREPAID_INTEREST is a variable that represents the value gained by the short and is proportional to the expected change in price of the collateral.   

There are a lot of variables in play, but I do not think it is fair to say the premium is just the cost of the option.  It factors in the cost of capital for collateral required to stay in the top 98% where you do not have to provide the option.

In other words the bottom 2% of least-collateralized shorts must assume the cost of the option.  The other 98% don't have to provide the option.  So the premium is pro-rated between these two costs.

I encourage someone else to come up with an alternative price feed script so we can get some diversity. 

Shorts can pick their place in line for settlement.  Think of it this way, if you fall in the bottom 2% of shorters by collateral you have been given notice of potential margin call.  This is like any other market where they give you 24 hours to add collateral.  If someone is short and doesn't want to meet the new higher collateral limits then they can either cover on their own terms or add collateral.

By giving 24 hours shorts have an opportunity to cover prior to any price manipulation. 

If there is a 10% premium on BitUSD relative to the feed, then the attacker would have to increase reported price feed (value of BTS) by 10% just to get the force-settlement price to equal the previously fair value for BitUSD.  They would have to push beyond 10% before the short starts taking a loss relative to a voluntary cover.     All savvy market participants would be aware of a large force-settle order and would therefore reset the manipulator making it much harder to manipulate the price.  In effect, price manipulation represents "free money" to those who know it is going on.

Look at it another way, someone enters a large force-settlement order it becomes an opportunity for the shorter to do reverse manipulation. It is a tug of war where both sides (short and long) have equal opportunity to manipulate the market in their favor.  They go to battle and the result is just the fair market price at that point in time.  It is not a guaranteed win for the potential manipulator.