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Messages - starspirit

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271
To clarify, are you suggesting to have a twice-a-day auction, where the settlement price is determined by an automatic feed?

272
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: Paid Workers Proposal for Review
« on: May 11, 2015, 11:51:53 pm »
Suppose stakeholders are simultaneously funding two projects that have a point of irreconcilable conflict in their design (i.e. only one or the other change can exist once made). For example, let's suppose it was two completely different designs for a bitAsset or UIA structure, and the community was divided on which was best. What is the process by which the community would ultimately enforce adoption of one over the other? Is it a case that this could lead to 2 differently coded clients, and how is that resolved by the community/market?

273
General Discussion / Re: What is "profit" of the current model?
« on: May 11, 2015, 11:29:34 pm »
Income is a nebulous concept and everyone has slightly different twists in their views. I think form is more important than label. Here are my justifications.

Burning is not a separate source of income, it is a method of immediately distributing income from fees earned. I explained this in my previous post above.

Though one might theoretically claim transaction fees from BTS transfers as income to non-transacting BTS owners, it has no impact on valuation because it is not from an external source. It is only a transfer of value between owners. This is clear if you consider what happens if the BTS transaction fee were increased 10x. The net impact on BTS owners is that shareholders activity costs are now ludicrously high, offset by the increased benefit of periods of passive ownership. This is unlikely to make owning BTS more attractive for owners in general.

Increases in bitAsset supply, or increases in BTS collateral, are not forms of income, because they come attached with an offsetting obligation. Let me reiterate a case study I've raised previously. Suppose a company earns a fee from facilitating transactions between lenders and borrowers, where the sole purpose of the borrowing is to buy shares in the same company, and all lending/borrowing is collateralised also by the shares. Now while the company can claim fees as income, and growth in this business places a bid on the shares, the company has no claim on the collateralised shares. Those shares still belong to the borrowers and lenders, and there is a hard-coded obligation for their return should the business decline. They could no more claim this as income than companies in general could claim the funds raised via debt as income (or that brokers could claim their client's segregated funds as income). Yet, this product structure is effectively what a bitAsset is.

So taking into account some of the other points raised by others, I would say:

Income (distributed in the form of burns)
All transaction fees, except those charged against BTS exchanges
Any other fees related to UIAs or other businesses that might be established

Expenses (paid for by inflation/dilution)
Delegate pay

I expect there will be strong differences of opinion, but that's at least the way I see it.


274
General Discussion / Re: BitAssets 2.0 (formally 3.0)
« on: May 11, 2015, 04:14:09 am »
This system will sometimes trade below 99% of the peg when there are risk concerns with bitUSD, and will often trade above the peg when there is a lack of collateral supply.
When there are large flows in bitUSD, this will expand spreads, as arbitragers between the internal and external markets are constrained by the liquidity in the internal market.
I believe a tighter peg in both directions can be obtained by using a floating market yield between longs and shorts. Why is yield no longer being considered as a regulating mechanism?
If the external market is offering a high yield, how much will this affect use of a no-yield substitute? What is the thought on combining BTA 2.0 with an interest-bearing at-call deposit market to provide at-call parking of funds for transactional purposes?
How much does it matter if USD-based returns earned in the bond market are affected by the continuous movement of bitUSD from its peg before expiry?
Does introducing a settlement process for longs legally bring bitAssets under derivative regulations?

275
https://youtu.be/DTTx6fAisFk
I'll give my own part of my delegate pay for this month if someone can debunk this (for Americans).

You do have to pay income taxes if the IRS says you have to pay. Whether you think it's legal or not it's really just about avoiding the negative consequences such as guns to your head from swat teams, police brutality, arrest, fines, etc.

Depending on the consequence you can determine your risk. Different people are willing to accept different risks. The IRS isn't the agency to play around with though because they took the mafia down if you don't remember.

It would be great if we didn't have to pay the tax but to be honest the way the world works it's always a situation where we have to pay someone not to bring consequences to us. The only way out paying the strong man who has to be paid is to be the strong man getting paid and even then you probably have a stronger man above you who you're paying.
Unfortunately I agree with you luckybit.
Certain people will always seek to usurp, exercise and enforce any form of power they can, often even when they believe they are acting for a greater good.

276
General Discussion / Re: What is "profit" of the current model?
« on: May 10, 2015, 04:46:32 am »
In the first model, all burned fees were considered as a profit.
In the first dilution model, transaction fees, UIA registration fees, etc. were burned and can be considered as a profit.
But now, I cannot find any profit model for shareholders. Company should earn profits. So what kind of profits is our DAC earning now?

Edit: I found one... burned fees when not-100% delegates generate blocks. But this will disappear when all delegates are 100%.
Burning is not strictly a source of DAC income, it's a source of capital re-distribution. Imagine a company that spends from its capital reserves or from debt raising to buy back and redeem shares - the remaining shares each represent greater ownership in the company, but the net assets of the company have been reduced by the same amount. There is no change to the underlying capital claim of shareholders unless the payment made for the shares is from an external party that is required to burn the shares. That's why I've previously argued that not all burns are equal. See https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,13214.msg173054.html#msg173054

There are only two ways that a company or DAC can earn profit for its owners. First, like a traditional company, it could accumulate net assets on its balance sheet through the provision of external products or services. This is only possible for a DAC if there are capital management and trust mechanisms in place such that owners are comfortable to delegate the management of those accumulated resources. Although I would like to see such protocols built in time, currently we do not have that, which leaves only option 2. This is for customers of the DAC to make payment by buying and burning BTS, instead of directly to the accounts of the DAC.

Note however that such payment must be from an external source to qualify as income. Payments made between BTS holders, such as transaction fees on BTS transfers, are simply internal transfers and not a source of DAC income.

A disclaimer I would add is that these are my current views, that may still evolve over time.

277
Yes. There is no yield harvesting problem, because all shorts pay the same rate in the Currency Creation Market.

I'm not sure I see how that prevents yield harvesting - can you explain?
Sorry for delayed response, have been away. monsterer, my impression is that the yield harvest problem in the existing structure related to being able to self-create a short with 0% interest on the short, while earning a yield on the long, giving risk-free yield. If this is a mis-interpretation let me know. In the system I propose here, there is a single market-determined interest rate that at any time all shorts pay and all longs receive. Holding a simultaneous long and short position results in a neutral yield position - i.e. there is no possible net profit or loss.

278
General Discussion / Re: BitAsset 3.0 Concerns
« on: April 30, 2015, 10:08:02 pm »
I see. Thanks for providing the historical context. 

I think the $0.85 for the bitUSD doesn't concern me in an illiquid market.  I'm not sure you can guarantee anyone $1 because BTS will always fluctuate against USD  To me it's more about perspective.  Is the bitUSD flucutating between $0.85 and $1.10 or is BTS fluctuating against bitUSD?  It's just what people use as a reference point. If a person's viewpoint is from BTS as money, BTS is stable and all assets move against it including bitUSD.  If the person's viewpoint is from USD/bitUSD it's BTS that fluctuates around it.  If Gold or Bitcoin were deemed the only legal tender tomorrow, all other fiat currencies will seem worthless or volatile.   Bitcoin or Gold will seem stable.

Last I checked the price for Bitcoin was:
Local Bitcoins:  $248.6
Coinbase: $236.5
Bitfinex was $235.7   
http://bitcoincharts.com/markets/

From a Bitcoin perspective there are three different prices for one dollar.  The differences are entry/exit costs and counterparty risk.  From the dollar perspective there are three different prices for Bitcoin.

I think ultimately the social consensus that bitUSD pays for things with the same purchasing power as the dollar will be the consensus and that is what perspective the traders will take.  In the real world no one values cash (Federal Reserve Notes/base money) differently from checkbook money, or traveler's checks or credit card money. No one sweats the difference.  (Note: Right now the melt-value of a pre-1982 copper penny is worth 1.9 cents, but people trade it at 1 cent.)

Anyways if you take the perspective that people in the real world will treat bitUSD as a cash dollar in the real world and won't sweat the difference you'll have $1.00 per bitUSD in the real world.  A bitUSD at an exchange would be less valuable because of entry/exit costs & counterparty risk.  Hence you'll have something like $0.95 at CoinBaseBTS and $0.93 at BitFinexBTS.

Some of this reasoning is backwards. USD has a floating value. Checkbook money, travellers checks, credit cards share the same value precisely because they are settled in USD. It's not that USD is magically pegged to those things by some form of consensus.

The more points at which bitUSD is settled in basket of comparable value to a real USD, the tighter it will peg. The less emphasis we place on the feed, the less tightly it will peg. People must decide if they want a pegged currency or not, or just a plaything for people in Bitshares.

[Apologies merivercap, this is me criticising an ideology, nothing to do with you personally]

279
Does this proposal deal with the yield harvesting problem?
Yes. There is no yield harvesting problem, because all shorts pay the same rate in the Currency Creation Market.

280
General Discussion / Re: BitUSD supply
« on: April 30, 2015, 05:54:40 am »
The market cap of BTS is determined by the market's subjective expectations of what future value it can accrue for the benefit of its owners. It has little direct relationship with the value of bitAssets, except that it imposes a limit on how much bitAsset can be produced.

281
Starspirit,
I'm curious to know what level of importance you place on the current external price feed.  How much do you trust it and why?  Currently it seems we are using BTC38, BTER, Yunbi exchanges to extrapolate the external 'real' USD/ BTS market.  I would suggest it is more likely these external price feeds are being manipulated than the internal price feed.  Since there is forced 30-day settlement and a heavier collateral burden for long positions in BTS (short bitUSD), all one has to do is buy internal bitUSD and manipulate the external feed downwards.   I'm not saying that is what is occurring, but  I wouldn't be surprised if were.

Remember BTC38 & BTER are centralized exchanges.  I'd be skeptical about trusting their pricing.  If we had a trusted exchange with high liquidity we can rely more on price feeds.  I'm open to using external price feeds when there are better sources, but right now there aren't any.  Furthermore I think the current internal floating free market mechanism is fine and the social consensus will drive the market towards the perceived value of a dollar.

Like everyone here, I don't trust the external price feed. It just logically follows from my view that an external price feed is critical to peg to external assets, that we need to accept the requirement for a price feed, build the best possible product around it, and manage the feed price mechanism in ways to minimise these bad effects as much as possible. Otherwise we keep trying to prove an ideal that will never be and flounder commercially, in my personal opinion. I'm away for next week and a bit, and I will write more on the issue when I return.

282
General Discussion / Re: Why no one is shorting bitassets?
« on: April 29, 2015, 11:40:31 pm »
Another reason is that normally in finance someone who wants to go short GOLD means they want to profit when GOLD falls versus the USD. But in BitShares shorting the bitGOLD(i.e. GOLD/BTS) and does not give the same kind of exposure. It would be good if there was a way to establish an asset whose "Last Price" was a formula instead of a direct price feed. For example: bitGOLDUSD = GOLD/USD. This is the asset that the wider market really wants. At the moment shorting bitAssets means you increase your long exposure to BTS. So if the market trend for BTS is down nobody wants to short.
Soon you will be able to have BitGOLD backed by BitUSD.

I hope that you don't imply that one could create bitGold by shorting BitUSD but rather trade BitGold vs.BitUSD right?

Means trade bitUSD to bitGold. 

BTS is the collateral for the whole system, you cannot create assets without it.

Why isn't it possible to back a bitAsset like bitGold with bitUSD?

283
Absolutely, that is true, yes. Market making cannot help enforce the peg. It can only add liquidity around the price level where buyers and sellers are willing to meet. The only thing that can help strengthen the peg is convertibility and the ability to arbitrage in free markets around that. And that depends on the price feed. This is why I criticise the view that the pegging problem will be resolved one day once we have enough liquidity in the market. I can expand further if you like.

Doesn't this mean there is little point to having an internal bitAsset market? Couldn't you just replace the whole thing with a system which created and destroyed bitassets directly at the feed price, as long as each side had sufficient collateral?

You got me thinking laterally here. Though I'd like to ask what you specifically mean by an internal bitAsset market?

Let's consider currencies like bitUSD. The bitUSD needs to be an on-chain token to preserve its superior transactional features. And derivative markets of the bitUSD such as bills/bonds, credit markets, options and futures etc, would all be best placed internally to provide the superior exchange features that Bitshares has to offer, as well as to maximise coordination between these markets.

Specifically for the creation and destruction of bitUSD, I believe such exchange should occur at the feed price, and there should be an official window where this occurs (in my white-paper, that is the Currency Creation Market). But if we are willing to consider a more open architecture to the creation of the bitUSD itself, yes I suppose you are right that the official window where bitUSD is exchanged for collateral could be external to the system, such as a UIA, with bitUSD as a UIA token. I expect this adds additional risk however, and may not be an optimal path. My preference is still for this window to be internal.

As we are discussing elsewhere, its also possible that the collateral used is not BTS. It could for example be BTC, currently the most recognised and accepted form of digital collateral. This could be converted to an on-chain collateral token (e.g. a substitute bitBTC) useful for many other bitAssets and applications, but again with extra risk that needs to be minimised.

It's further possible to consider alternatives for the structure of the short side. While it makes sense for short speculators to be on the other side of bill, bond, and derivative markets, where there is greater symmetry between longs and shorts and markets have a floating price, at the official window as I've described it might make more sense for the short side to consist of a pool of investors sharing in the benefits of currency issuance, such as a spread on all window transactions.

From a purely commercial perspective, these are all possibilities that can be considered and the various pros and cons weighed against each-other.

So yes, once we reject the idea of an endogenous price feed, and accept that the price feed is critical to underlie convertibility and valuation throughout the system, then the thinking naturally leads in some of these directions. I think we can consider a product suite better suited to current market demand as a result.

284
not really sure how. monsterer, I thank yourself and joele for the dialogue, but for now I still feel the evidence is lacking for this concept, and so I must continue to reject it.

Ok, lets come at this from another angle. If what you assume is true, and the internal market actions cannot affect the external price, then by associated reasoning, market making on the internal exchange cannot help to strengthen the peg?
Absolutely, that is true, yes. Market making cannot help enforce the peg. It can only add liquidity around the price level where buyers and sellers are willing to meet. The only thing that can help strengthen the peg is convertibility and the ability to arbitrage in free markets around that. And that depends on the price feed. This is why I criticise the view that the pegging problem will be resolved one day once we have enough liquidity in the market. I can expand further if you like.

285
Its not a fairytale. BitShares is capable of it:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,13274.0.html

 :)
bitmarley, looking through your linked thread, such a decentralised market for real BTC:BTS, with enough liquidity, could be used as a substitute source for price feeds for other bitAssets such as bitUSD. All you require for this is one internal asset against one external asset. That would still not prevent manipulation of the feed by large players, but it would reduce reliance on centralised exchanges.

Yeah, but that's less controversial. That's just bitAsset backed by bitUSD backed by BTS. That's a good idea that I've also promoted for some time.
I'm suggesting the possibility of another class altogether: bitUSD backed by bitBTC backed by BTC.
I don't know if it technically can be done, just floating the idea, because I think the more immediate market potential might be far greater.

The difficult part is the bitBTC backed by BTC - that requires trust, unless you believe in the fairytale of atomic cross chain transactions :)
ACCT are just not working with btc the way it is required ..

monsterer, xeroc, are you saying we can't do this yet, or that the ideal way of doing it (ACCT) is not available yet? To get commercial product to market, there are always trade-offs to be made. A company can go broke waiting to achieve the ideal.

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