Agent86, can you explain how you think dilution is so powerful and "right"?  It still just seems like a clever way of altering the deal to redistribute shares.  If the investors accurately price future dilution into the value assessment on which they base their investment, then dilution is equivalent to reserving shares to fund development from the beginning.  The only way dilution results in increased funding for development compared to reserved shares is if the dilution is more extreme than investors anticipate, meaning that the investors are effectively tricked into investing more than they would if they had realistic expectations.

Trog... have you been involved with other crypto communities before?  Do you need me to link for you a bunch of ridiculous threads begging for charity donations from community members to pay for things like attend conferences or pay a developer etc?  Do you realize how ridiculous it is that Charlie Lee who founded Litecoin (worth 300million) can't work full time on litecoin because no one will pay him to work full time on it?  Do you understand the correlation between what I am talking about and the phenomenon of highly valued cryptos with no money to do anything?

Edit:
Ok in more direct answer to your question.  Reserving some huge portion of stake up front for a developer is not at all equivalent or as powerful and useful as giving the shareholders the right to decide what investments make sense over time.  Doing it up front means you are putting all your eggs in one basket and trusting one developer to always take care of you forever.  If he dumps the shares and quits or gets run over by a bus you're f*cked.

My preference is that BTS X be released without any default dilution in place but some promise to never dilute IS NOT RESPONSIBLE.  Business and competitive needs could make it a virtual necessity and the lack of this power could be more than a missed opportunity, it could easily be a death sentence.  Don't do the wrong thing just because some people have a hard time understanding the right thing.

Quote

The majority that votes for delegate A is a different majority than the one that votes for delegate B.  The majority shareholders that trust delegate C are again a totally separate subset of shareholder stake than those voting for delegates A & B.

Unless the majority that votes for A votes for A0->A101 in which case the minority is unrepresented.
Now the majority that votes for A can only vote for A0-A33... a different majority would have to vote for B34->B66 and yet a 3rd majority would have to vote for C66 to C100.

Someone with 33% of the shares is guaranteed 33% of the delegates under this approach.   Under the full slate approach having 33% may not be enough to get 33% of the delegates... but then again having 49% may not be enough to get even a single delegate. 

Perhaps it doesn't matter in the end.

As a shareholder I would never vote for A0-A33. You'd probably need a good reason why people should vote for more than one delegate you control.  I don't think there are big colluding majorities; it's too hard to coordinate getting 50% + of the stake together to collude without the rest of the shareholders finding out.  It wouldn't achieve anything anyway.  I expect most people will support a broad mix of delegates who they think have shown commitment to the community and seem like they are not part of same entity/cooperating.

If a shareholder is in the unlikely position of not  trusting or liking any chosen delegates (they don't feel represented) this shareholder is probably one that will sell to someone who likes what he sees.   And that's best for everyone.

What's worse anyway: someone with 33% without representation or having active delegates that 66% oppose?  I prefer the former (there's likely a good reason why 66% oppose and I don't have a problem with majority rule)

I had never considered the random voting for privacy.  As a user/shareholder I'm not sure I'd bother with it much if it were an option.  I would want the big majority of my stake as a shareholder to vote for exactly who I want.  I might have a small "checking account" that handles most of the commerce type transactions and doesn't represent a big stake anyway so I don't bother with voting.  It would then be hard to tie those transactions to anything else.

The reason is so minorities can still get some representation.   Unbounded is not an option.  Setting the limit at 101 means there can only be a single majority.  By placing a limit to 33 each individual only gets a say in 1/3 of the delegates. 

This hybrid approach should have benefits of both ideas. 

I don't think the "proportional representation issue" was ever a real problem that needed solving... just people not thinking it through.   So if it were up to me, I wouldn't do anything for that reason.

Overall, I think approval voting is a huge step in the right direction.

Emski, some comments where we may have disagreed:

Quote from: Agent86 on June 21, 2014, 10:35:47 pm

*Autovoting algorithms that can be gamed

Autovoting algorithm exploitation depends on the predictability of the voting algorithm not on the voting system. One can still exploit it even in approval voting.

Approval voting (AV) is a different animal.  You don't need a computer algo to help you vote, just select some delegates you like and trust or seem to be doing good things for the community.  You can adjust it if others come along you like better or if someone you voted for can't get their act together.  Network statistics will be readily available and will inform your decision but we shouldn't encourage autovote algorithms imo.  I'm not voting for any delegate just because of network stats; I need to know what forum member or who is claiming to run the delegate.  Otherwise no dice for "mystery delegates" sockpuppets? with favorable network stats.  I'm sure we'll find plenty of good candidates so we don't have to get desperate.

Edit: if there is no autovoting for, but only automatically removing support for someone you've voted for that does something wrong, I think this should be fine.

Quote from: Agent86 on June 21, 2014, 10:35:47 pm

*Large shareholders profit from voting themselves to be delegate or negotiating kickbacks.

The idea in DPOS is - shareholders elect delegates. If there is a large shareholder he will elect his own delegate(s).
As the votes are public negotiating will be always possible. Imagine the deal: You vote for me, I vote for you, none of us vote for anyone else.

Assuming approval voting is in use, If I see someone negotiating a deal on the forums saying "you vote for me, I vote for you, we don't vote for others."  There is no way I'm voting for this person, not to mention blasting them so no one else does.  They are not going to get elected using only the votes of themselves and some friends they've made deals with.  To be competitive in AV you need LOTS of support, maybe upwards of 50% of stake voting for you, not some stupid backdoor deal you negotiated.

Quote from: Agent86 on June 21, 2014, 10:35:47 pm

*Small shareholders most likely don't get these benefits or can't negotiate kickbacks

This is correct in both systems. Negotiating efforts should produce value - you dont negotiate for 10 units but you will do it for 10 mil.

In "AV" there is no need for these negotiations and if they are discovered you have probably just blown your chance to ever be a delegate.  You need BROAD support to win, if you try to negotiate "you scratch my back I scratch yours" with individuals, the broad community whose back you are not scratching will reject your candidacy.  Delegates must act in the best interests of the DAC to appeal to the most people rather than just trying to appeal to those who voted for them.  The small guy will benefit just as much because delegates are looking out for the whole DAC and also courting small voters.

Quote from: Agent86 on June 21, 2014, 10:35:47 pm

*No incentive for delegates to reinvest profits to help the DAC

Votes are always incentive. Most people will elect delegate that helps the system. These just for profit might not stay unless backed by large shareholders.

This is based on my contention that selfish voting would predominate (self voting, kickbacks etc.)  It's hard to convince someone to vote for you because of all you do for the community when they get a direct kickback elsewhere.

Quote from: Agent86 on June 21, 2014, 10:35:47 pm

*Attacking entity can buy 50+ delegate positions through kickbacks

Where is that explained?

Basically, if you can encourage support with kickbacks people will look for delegates that offer the best kickbacks… take it from there, it's a slippery slope.

I agree the existing algo is probably sufficient if we don't dilute to pay delegates.  I also know a lot of things I listed are different ways of looking at the same issue.  I'm not trying to be difficult, I just believe approval voting is a real improvement and feel a certain obligation to advocate for it.

I just want us to hold ourselves to a higher standard.  I'm anxious for us to be able to leverage the power of reinvestment through dilution.  I think this is a big opportunity and the quicker we get there the better.  I don't want us to spend a ton of energy tweaking something to make it sufficient if there is a better option.  If there's something more future proof and better than sufficient that's what I want!

Am I the only one to think that thesis is utterly nonsensical?

no

Quote from: Agent86 on June 20, 2014, 04:49:31 pm

"-Is it as easy to vote out bad delegates?"
Yes. In fact it's much easier to vote out bad delegates than in the current system and much less likely that bad delegates get voted in in the first place.  In the current system if someone has enough stake to vote themselves in as a delegate (less than 1% required) it will be next to impossible to get rid of them as a delegate if they want to vote for themselves.

I have not gone into the details of your voting system (yet) but it is guest like the regular ‘majoritarian voting system’ – over 50% of votes you are in, less you are out.
In that system voting out somebody is not direct. It is more voting somebody else in, which is my main concern i.e I kind of like ‘direct firing’ of bad actors/delegates.

It will take a lot of broad trust to get in in the first place, you have to convince a lot of people that you are a trustworthy, capable member of the community to make the grade.  If you betray that trust, I believe your reversal of support will be swift and vigorous.