Are you getting to "pay to win" by assuming people only vote/approve themselves as delegates?

Not everyone needs to be a delegate, but anyone can be elected as a delegate if they can convince other stakeholders to approve them.  It should be more about reputation than money.

Maximum number of delegates per person I don't think can be limited without forcing everyone to prove their identity and taking DNA samples or something, and without that, random selection of registered delegates becomes "spam to win".

Quote from: Troglodactyl on June 25, 2014, 04:21:38 am

Agent86, can you explain how you think dilution is so powerful and "right"?  It still just seems like a clever way of altering the deal to redistribute shares.  If the investors accurately price future dilution into the value assessment on which they base their investment, then dilution is equivalent to reserving shares to fund development from the beginning.  The only way dilution results in increased funding for development compared to reserved shares is if the dilution is more extreme than investors anticipate, meaning that the investors are effectively tricked into investing more than they would if they had realistic expectations.

Trog... have you been involved with other crypto communities before?  Do you need me to link for you a bunch of ridiculous threads begging for charity donations from community members to pay for things like attend conferences or pay a developer etc?  Do you realize how ridiculous it is that Charlie Lee who founded Litecoin (worth 300million) can't work full time on litecoin because no one will pay him to work full time on it?  Do you understand the correlation between what I am talking about and the phenomenon of highly valued cryptos with no money to do anything?

Edit:
Ok in more direct answer to your question.  Reserving some huge portion of stake up front for a developer is not at all equivalent or as powerful and useful as giving the shareholders the right to decide what investments make sense over time.  Doing it up front means you are putting all your eggs in one basket and trusting one developer to always take care of you forever.  If he dumps the shares and quits or gets run over by a bus your f*cked.

It's certainly regrettable when good projects are hindered by lack of resources, and I recognize that having an unlimited fountain of money for investment in the system would be terribly convenient, but that's kind of beside the point.

It's a messy issue.  If the rate of dilution is pre scheduled and advertised, people should price it in, and I can see how it could solve the centralized trust issue you mention.  If it's not pre scheduled, ideally people should price in that uncertainty, but it centralizes power to a rather extreme degree, and I think there's a lot of opportunity for fraud.

Dilution allows boomerang shares that can be sold, effectively reclaimed, and sold again repeatedly.  If the customer knows that's what he's buying that's fine, but it's much easier to sell if he doesn't.

I agree with the premise that voting is bad governance (I have long been on the record about that).   And there would certainly be a lot of waist.

 

The issue I have with dilution is that what makes voting reasonable for picking delegates in the first place is that they can do virtually no harm anyway.  Dilution effectively gives the delegates (with 50%+ support) basically total power to do whatever they want in the DAC through redistribution.

...

hah. guess i'm a liberal according the smallest political quiz.

hmm... i guess with extreme conservatism the corporations would eat the government (like we see in the US). the opposite, extreme liberalism, would see the government eating the corporations (china anybody?)

in a more conservative government the focus would be on rights, but in a more liberal government the focus would be on liberties. but with both of the extreme ends, we see a degradation of liberties in favor of rights. (correct me if I'm wrong about china, but they don't seem to have more liberties than we do). so maybe both sides do have more in common, and the difference is just who our masters ultimately are.

there has to be some way we can prevent both extremes from happening.

I think in either extreme it's not so much an issue of one side eating the other as the two hierarchies merging.  Hierarchical power structures don't share power well with other hierarchical power structures, they integrate and determine a single pecking order within the integrated hierarchical power structure.  That's why many of us here are so attached to decentralized systems with low barriers to entry.  Mesh structures are more flat, so no one entity has strongly established asymmetrical power over those "below" it as in hierarchies.

The original purpose of the inactivity fee as I see it was to prevent blockchain bloat and allow us to keep only one year's records.  This is advantageous both to cut storage and overhead requirements and to make the real "total supply" numbers more transparent by filtering out any holdings belonging to lost or destroyed wallets after a year.

The moral justification for doing this I think would depend on a squatter's rights based foundation of the right to property, and the idea that claiming ownership of property requires providing some way for interested parties to determine that the property in question is actively owned.  Any wallet software should automatically prevent the "inactivity fee" from coming into action as long as the wallet is brought online from time to time. 

Here is a proposal that sounds right to me:

1 Give all of the initial delegates the names they want
2 Assign the total trust to ALL initial delegates to no more than 0.01% of all shares
3 Assign ONE special untrusted-delegate with 99.99% of the votes and never enable it. (throw its private key into the deepest river you can find)
4 Let the people rule

Is there something wrong with the above ?

PS: I know how hard it is to organize everything. You are doing great job. Keep going.

PPS: If point 3 is difficult due to the max 2% per delegate you can use 50 special untrusted-delegates and destroy all their keys.

This sounds like a good idea. I'd modify it in that after shares start paying inactivity fees they should no longer vote, which means we need a no-vote state anyway, instead of generating fake delegates to sink votes.

Oh....well what do you think about sitting down and explaining this in a  mumble session at some point?

I can do that.  Please also ask any questions here though, especially if my OP is unclear or confusing.

There are a number of mesh network projects out there, and I think one of the biggest things holding them back is lack of incentive for participation.

Because of this, I'm developing a plan for trustless, dustless, session based payments for bandwidth between two nodes.

The idea is that when two nodes initially connect, they share the prices (denominated in bitUSD or any other bit asset) at which each is willing to provide bandwidth.  They also establish a joint multisig wallet, requiring that both nodes sign any spending transactions.  Each node contributes a deposit to the escrow account to establish commitment, and both nodes begin tracking bandwidth usage over their link.  By multiplying each node's bandwidth usage by the opposing node's advertised bandwidth price, they can establish the running balance due to each node from the escrow account to settle up and close their session.  The indebted node is required to use this running balance to create and privately share with the creditor node a signed settling transaction, which is discarded and replaced periodically (before its referenced block becomes too old) until the end of the session.  At any time, the creditor node may end the session by taking this transaction, adding its signature, and sending it to the delegates for inclusion in the blockchain.

This replaces the need for microtransactions and blockchain bloat, while allowing the participants to withdraw and cash out at any time.