Yes please 

The price feed would be used for collateral requirements and for working out real time the equivalent  voting weight and possibly in the future, yield, which would be due.   For these things, we just need a price feed that is roughly accurate.  It wouldn't need to be hyper accurate on an intra-day basis because we wouldn't have the request settlement option.

The problem with current system which this system might fix is the *uncertainty* for the short position thus leading to low supply and a high premium for the asset.

Currently, a shorter may get their position closed at any time, and it might not be for a good price.   (This is why I am personally wary of using the current system to short anything.)

In the proposed system, all the shorter needs to worry about is that their collateral doesn't drop below a certain threshold on the average price on the external exchanges.  There margin rule would be very simple and it would not depend on any other players in the internal system.

For example, I want to short some bitBTC and short some bitUSD, so that I can trade these two against each other.   I don't really want to care about the price in BTS.  In the current system there is uncertainty because these short positions can be closed at any time due to unknown variables.  This makes me avoid doing this.  In the alternative system, provided I maintain a fixed and known colleteral level, I am assured that my bitBTC / BitUSD positions won't be closed.   This is the major difference

This, along with possibility that the assets might trade exactly around their price feed over time

I posted a reply earlier today where I said I thought it was absolutely required(!)...but then started wondering a bit!!

Suppose the price feed combined with collateral rules,
(along with the interests of the parties wishing to short and hold bitUSD),  mean that we could in practice still track the real price.

The argument against is that buyers of bitUSD wouldn't do so unless they had a guaranteed way out at around the real price.
But, while they hold bitUSD someone else has to have their BTS tied up as collateral. 
So at any point in time there should always be holders of bitUSD and shorters of bitUSD wishing to exit.
An agreed price would be settled upon.

If the price of BTS goes up, the bitUSD shorter can remove collateral.
If the price of BTS goes down, the bitUSD shorter has to add collateral.
If the shorter's collateral to back the asset falls below e.g. 1.5 x the current value, the system takes ownership of it and a buy order is placed at the price feed.
Could this be enough to mean we track the real price?

I guess we maybe tried something like this with BTS1.0, but the thing I'm wondering is if what was tried was exactly like this - I.e., price feed for collateral, but no other rules?
Also BTS1.0 didn't have a simple way where anyone could just create bitUSD (although this may be a minor thing).

(Another argument is that nuBits still seems to be working...)
I probably wouldn't use nuBits because it's not backed in a trust-less way (so not much better than an exchange).
But this smart-coin would still be collateralized at x times a real-value asset (BTS, where the value comes from voting stake + maybe even at some stage, profit  ). 
With nuBits, all of the asset created is done by the market maker.
In this system it wouldn't be.  But, nevertheless,  shorters might not typically wish to short much below the real price;
buyers might not typically wish to buy much above the real price.
And perhaps we'd see interested parties creating 1% spreads exactly on the real price...

The present system is very cool (and an amazing achievement IMO), but the fact that holders can settle at any time means the shorter must build in a high premium to guard against volatility because they can't exit at any time.  But pricing the required premium is difficult.  How do the market participants figure this out (10%, 20%, 50% above..).  With the system where neither side can automatically exit, the pricing can naturally be simple and the market might conceivably centre on somewhere near the actual price.

But I still find it hard to imagine this would work, and that common-sense dictates the current system is required(!)  But maybe this is wrong for the above reasons, and that the thing that shouldn't possibly work might actually work!
So perhaps it so could be worth trying, with an experimental new alt. asset - e.g 'bitUSD-exp'?

Forced settlement is essential/fundamental to the system, I believe.

But we can tune the way it works to avoid shorters being disadvantaged by short-term price fluctuations:
- Use a (e.g.) 7 day moving average for the settlement price.
- Require the forced settler waits (e.g.) 7 days for settlement.
- Only allow 1/x of total BTS to be settled within a x period of days (not sure if this is already in place with x=30?)

Thoughts?

The system is in place to anchor the price, but it is made inconvenient enough to use no-one can use it to 'game' the system. 

I like this!!  Interested in getting involved in any way.. 

Unconfirmed transaction problem

Hi MetaExchange,
I used your site yesterday to try to convert some BTS to BTC, but the transaction doesn't seem to be confirming (I guess because zero fees?) :-/
https://blockchain.info/tx/1ab5af1d83e686fb7f1604bedc8f69a1907fa97434d8161c9e64ec17872ef4b8

Can you help?
thanks in advance

How about a vote with all the shareholders to approve such a decision.

Does this change BTS/BTSX allocations/distribution?