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Messages - Troglodactyl

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121
General Discussion / Re: October 2nd Test Network
« on: October 03, 2015, 05:29:35 am »
My observer node seems to be stalled:

Code: [Select]
2278085ms th_a       fork_database.cpp:57          push_block           ] Pushing block to fork database that failed to link: 000042dd3748a501c13dee0a0c98aff2adab3bc6, 17117
2278085ms th_a       fork_database.cpp:58          push_block           ] Head: 17100, 000042cc1ae61f87f5417f66d42218140711fa97
2278086ms th_a       application.cpp:416           handle_block         ] Error when pushing block:
3080000 unlinkable_block_exception: unlinkable block                                                                                                                                                                                                         
block does not link to known chain                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
    {}                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
    th_a  fork_database.cpp:79 _push_block                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

    {"new_block":{"previous":"000042dc84a2770bec7112325bef03929676a466","timestamp":"2015-10-03T04:21:36","witness":"1.6.2","transaction_merkle_root":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","extensions":[],"witness_signature":"1f3a3c7837024faadcac1f00e38147e424cc1b28dba94c9aee5aacffc94196f62056fc51c7ac435762b2eac0a271ab54c350853e1f061e831afc10186c6f25b294","transactions":[]}}                                                                                                                             
    th_a  db_block.cpp:195 _push_block                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
2306158ms th_a       application.cpp:699           get_blockchain_synop ] synopsis: ["000042401b2d832712476acd65d286b9cd63e892","00004287828414dd010154dad121998d27f079d7","000042aa00cd6e6868673ab8b25e53aa6550a28b","000042bcaaf7dd2e4ec006534c6a4ade447d7e9d","000042c5e709fdaf2de9875c073b46586e57774e","000042c92bfcfc5b20e1f8e68ddfe8d79e44adc8","000042cbec1178af47476035878ff4410e59dcc8","000042cc1ae61f87f5417f66d42218140711fa97"]

122
Technical Support / Re: Coinbase killed their referral program
« on: October 03, 2015, 02:19:01 am »
It wasn't producing what they expected. Any concerns here?

No concerns from me.  Their referral program was pretty open to one time user abuse, while ours only pays out if the referral sticks around as a user or upgrades.

123
It's incorrect that the attack has no cost, since the attack is completely traceable and can only be attempted after building sufficient reputation to secure a witness position.

It's mostly incorrect that the attack allows double spending, since that is only effective if the victim takes irreversible action based on an alternate head block.

1. You are talking about a vapourware blockchain
2. The 'cost' you refer to is not relevant since the attacker may only plan one 24h attack and have no plans to collect further witness pay
3. Double spends are very real no matter how much you close your eyes and try to reason about merchant actions

The blockchain currently shows a transaction as confirmed at 1 confirmation; this is obviously insecure. I'm sure it will be corrected for 2.0.

edit: anyway, the point is, Nothing At Stake attacks will always be possible when block production costs nothing.
...and the cost of a Bitcoin 51% attack is irrelevant if there's nothing else you intend to do with all that hash power you've accumulated.

124
You mean as you incorrectly suggested.  It's recommended that exchanges use the delayed node to prevent any risk from this, and the cost to the delegate is sacrificing his position and reputation by creating and distributing signed proof of his attempted fraud.  Attempted fraud with a very low chance of success if the target is using the system correctly.

Point out which bit was incorrect.
It's incorrect that the attack has no cost, since the attack is completely traceable and can only be attempted after building sufficient reputation to secure a witness position.

It's mostly incorrect that the attack allows double spending, since that is only effective if the victim takes irreversible action based on an alternate head block.

125
http://bitfury.com/content/4-white-papers-research/2-proof-of-stake-vs-proof-of-work/pos-vs-pow-1.0.2.pdf

they also have DPOS in there:

Quote
...delegated PoS solves the “nothing at stake” problem and prevents short range attacks on the system.

This is false, as I demonstrated in another thread - a bad block producer can use a race attack to perform a double spend by creating fake blocks at no cost, hence nothing at stake.

The whole paper is a bit tedious in my opinion; it doesn't really explore the key issues between POS and POW - i.e. whether either solve the 'byzantine generals problem', which is what all p2p currencies boil down to.
You mean as you incorrectly suggested.  It's recommended that exchanges use the delayed node to prevent any risk from this, and the cost to the delegate is sacrificing his position and reputation by creating and distributing signed proof of his attempted fraud.  Attempted fraud that will fail if the target is using the system correctly.

126
General Discussion / Re: October 1st Testnet for Advanced Users
« on: October 02, 2015, 12:35:46 pm »
There was a hard fork at block 10,000 from a post-tag commit.  Maybe new witnesses got voted in around 14,000 who hadn't gotten that upgrade yet and dropped us below the required participation level.

127
3 seconds initially, 1 second later on.

If people even want 1 second blocks, really.  It will be voted on, but personally I don't see much benefit of 1 second over 3 second.  Seems like it's just for bragging rights and makes chain bloat.

For real. 10 second blocks seem a bit clunky when trading at times, but 3-5 second blocks are close enough to real time where you start experiencing diminishing returns even for those like myself who are queing up several trades back to back.  Make this parameter a voting parameter and let the masses decide what they want but you can still brag that the capability is there if enough traders want to buy stake and vote 1second block times into office.

It's definitely going to be subject to vote.  That's already decided, but it's still worth debating the costs and benefits here in order to educate the voters.  There's definitely a point of diminishing returns. 

1 second blocks just have very low tolerance for network slowdowns and increase the overhead costs in terms of both bandwidth and storage space.

Quote
With Delegated Proof of Stake, the BitShares network can confirm transactions in an average of just 1 second, limited only by the speed of light.
https://bitshares.org/technology/industrial-performance-and-scalability/


...Which implies a block time of 2 seconds.

128
General Discussion / Re: Reputation, voting weight, and referral program.
« on: October 01, 2015, 04:27:50 am »
I think the argument behind vesting the upgrade referral income was that if it's instant someone will undercut the other referrers by giving the new users refunds.  I don't think that's a good argument, but I think that's what the argument was.

129
Technical Support / Re: Please help
« on: October 01, 2015, 03:00:07 am »
Thanks for your response Troglodactyl,

If I am not able to remember my password is there a way to get it back with just the Json backup?

Without the password you can't get into the wallet.  If you can't remember the password, the only other option would be using a dictionary or brute force strategy to try to guess the password if it isn't too long and complex.

130
Technical Support / Re: Please help
« on: October 01, 2015, 02:30:38 am »
There is no limit to the number of login attempts allowed.

The backup from 0.9.1 should be fine on 0.9.3c.  Just be careful and make sure you keep your backups safe while figuring things out.

Update us if you run into any more specific issues, and I hope it works out.

131
General Discussion / Re: Bitcoin 100x less secure than commonly believed
« on: October 01, 2015, 02:16:09 am »
Conclusion:  The Bitcoin network is only as secure as the profit margins on mining, not the cost of mining.   The lower the profit margins fall the cheaper it becomes to perform the negative mining attack.
Does "negative mining" ever become a profitable attack, in and of itself? I thought I recalled seeing a paper on that in the past months, describing how a pool could increase income by this method, allocating a portion of its hashing against an enemy pool.

Suppose mining profit margin is 5%
Suppose you have a mining pool with 20% of the hash power, you would normally produce 70 blocks per day and if you charge a 1.5% fee your pool profit would be 26.5 BTC per day and your pools revenue would be 1750 BTC
Suppose you direct 25% of your hash power (5%) of the total at all competing pools, you will now produce 52 blocks per day directly, and 17.1 blocks per day indirectly (from other pools) and your pools revenue would be 1727.5 a reduction in revenue of  22.5 BTC
Quote
a reduction in revenue of  22.5 BTC

What about a way to directly increase revenue by sharing in the target pool's revenues, while contributing nothing to the other miners in the enemy pool? That's what I thought I remembered, but it only works if the target is a huge pool. Anyone?

I guess I don't know exactly how rewards for not finding a block work. Why couldn't you negative mine against all pools, simultaneously, reusing the same hashpower? Just submit the same work to all the pools.

If negative mining is a losing proposition outside of explicit blockchain takeovers, or advertising your not-attacked-but-fee-charging pool, I can see why it hasn't caught on very much yet.

I think you're thinking of selfish mining, which is just delaying the release of a mined block to get a head start on the next one.

132
3 seconds initially, 1 second later on.

If people even want 1 second blocks, really.  It will be voted on, but personally I don't see much benefit of 1 second over 3 second.  Seems like it's just for bragging rights and makes chain bloat.

133
You could have a multisig group verify the blocks and issue new coins accordingly.  Obviously wouldn't appeal to anyone who wants to keep mining for security purposes, but for those who believe mining imbues the coin with value it could work.

134
General Discussion / Re: Bitshares price discussion
« on: September 30, 2015, 01:50:26 pm »
Blazin8888 = Cagara? :-P

135
General Discussion / Re: Test Net for Advanced Users
« on: September 30, 2015, 12:42:38 pm »
Here's how my observer node ended:

Code: [Select]
1179254ms th_a       application.cpp:388           handle_block         ] Got block #314806 with time 2015-09-30T08:19:39 from network with latency of 255 ms from delegate-dev3.btsnow
1179486ms th_a       application.cpp:518           get_item             ] Serving up block #314806
1182227ms th_a       application.cpp:388           handle_block         ] Got block #314807 with time 2015-09-30T08:19:42 from network with latency of 227 ms from init6
1182462ms th_a       application.cpp:518           get_item             ] Serving up block #314807
1185107ms th_a       application.cpp:388           handle_block         ] Got block #314808 with time 2015-09-30T08:19:45 from network with latency of 108 ms from init11
1185338ms th_a       application.cpp:518           get_item             ] Serving up block #314808
1188176ms th_a       application.cpp:388           handle_block         ] Got block #314809 with time 2015-09-30T08:19:48 from network with latency of 177 ms from init1
1188411ms th_a       application.cpp:518           get_item             ] Serving up block #314809
1191249ms th_a       application.cpp:388           handle_block         ] Got block #314810 with time 2015-09-30T08:19:51 from network with latency of 250 ms from init2
1194378ms th_a       application.cpp:388           handle_block         ] Got block #314811 with time 2015-09-30T08:19:54 from network with latency of 379 ms from delegate-clayop
1197207ms th_a       application.cpp:388           handle_block         ] Got block #314812 with time 2015-09-30T08:19:57 from network with latency of 207 ms from wackou
1200221ms th_a       application.cpp:388           handle_block         ] Got block #314813 with time 2015-09-30T08:20:00 from network with latency of 222 ms from init4
1200461ms th_a       application.cpp:518           get_item             ] Serving up block #314813
1203250ms th_a       application.cpp:388           handle_block         ] Got block #314814 with time 2015-09-30T08:20:03 from network with latency of 251 ms from init3
1207182ms th_a       application.cpp:388           handle_block         ] Got block #314814 with time 2015-09-30T08:20:06 from network with latency of 1182 ms from mr.agsexplorer
2209930ms th_a       application.cpp:699           get_blockchain_synop ] synopsis: ["0004cdb3d2d7eb80189f83633c4cb9edfa428ca8","0004cdb90bdf86f48dd2d6695fe8f5edb3322e67","0004cdbcecb0901e9e26dabd0c5610f648a14108","0004cdbe86f24753a0133e23c6e26ebd3c05bf9e"]
...
Code: [Select]
890491ms th_a       application.cpp:518           get_item             ] Serving up block #314811
890491ms th_a       application.cpp:518           get_item             ] Serving up block #314812
890491ms th_a       application.cpp:518           get_item             ] Serving up block #314813
890491ms th_a       application.cpp:518           get_item             ] Serving up block #314814
898941ms th_a       application.cpp:699           get_blockchain_synop ] synopsis: ["0004cdb4a094bb65e4ddf13138fca35a9c5b4141","0004cdbab1c582f8ccc1e6396f0d62cb9c047323","0004cdbde932bd1fbe5e160b4dd22b1a9b1f8135","0004cdbe86f24753a0133e23c6e26ebd3c05bf9e"]
witness_node: /home/daniel/Crypto/graphene/libraries/chain/db_market.cpp:290: bool graphene::chain::database::fill_order(const graphene::chain::call_order_object&, const graphene::chain::asset&, const graphene::chain::asset&): Assertion `order.get_collateral() >= pays' failed.
./run_node: line 1:  1063 Aborted                 (core dumped)

EDIT: The synopsis is just the last 4 blocks, right?

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