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Messages - biophil

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31
Thanks for your reply, BTSMoon. Let me offer a few answers to your concerns.

I appreciate your effort to conduct BitAsset PhD Research project but I disagree Bitshares need to funds the PhD student at the University of Colorado for 2 years.

Why I Disagree this worker proposal:
1. Cryptocurrency world change by day, not by year. What work today, may not working after 1 year.

I agree; to combat this, you need generalizable solutions. The project's goal is to create a framework which allows us to study BitAsset design comprehensively so that we can have plans in place to deal with changing market conditions. I'm curious -- what do you recommend instead of making contingency plans?

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2. This worker proposal measured by time rather than work which mean just need to wait time pass to get $$$.

First, as the proposal mentions, the money doesn't come to me; it comes to my University. The University of Colorado has many safeguards in place to prevent me from running away with the money. That is, it's literally not possible for me to just wait till the worker expires and then disappear with the money.

Second, I technically could take the money and then leave it in an account and not spend it. But that would be a stupid thing for me to do, because this is all happening in public: I'm not anonymous (as a professor, I'm quite the opposite), and I have my entire future career to spoil if I mis-spend this money. If I take your money and then don't produce anything meaningful, that would make it extremely difficult for me to ever do it again.

I can't do good research unless I can find good funding sources; if I waste a source's money, that will severely hurt my ability to convince other funding sources to fund more good research.

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3. Workers proposal for such long period may voted out half way due to high competition. In that case, what happen to this worker proposal? Most likely is "We can't continue because no more $$$" and Bitshares get nothing at the end.

The work is measured in time, but the worker provides the money all at the beginning. At current market prices, the $160,000 budget could be released in as little as 2 months; the project will continue for 2 years after this with no further funding. I know this is unusual for a worker proposal, but it's not possible to attach the PhD student to the project unless I have the ability to make a long-term funding commitment to him.

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4. Your BTS accounts biophil and browns never create any BitAsset, not even buying and selling BitAsset. Basically you are good in talking but not in action and only know BitAsset others people words. I don't foresee you can help us to solve problem. What I foresee is just academic talk.

Let me ease your mind: I have been active on the BitShares blockchain(s) literally since day 1. Consider these points:
  • biophil is account number 1361; this means I founded it on the BitShares X chain (prior to the launch of the current BitShares chain), before abit (12376), baozi (2204), fav (21106), cass (5178), etc.
  • "biophil" is not my main account. Take a look at account zebulon: http://cryptofresh.com/u/zebulon. To prove that I control zebulon, this morning I added biophil as one of the active permissions. Zebulon is a lifetime member account; I upgraded to a lifetime membership in block 8886: https://bitshares-explorer.io/#/blocks/8886, this is less than 8 hours after BitShares 2.0 main chain launched.
  • If you're worried that I have no experience with the BitAsset mechanisms, feel free to explore zebulon's history to see that I've been quite active in the markets.
  • It's true that professors have a reputation for being good at talk and not at action, but I'm good at both; my activity on Steem gives some recent blockchain-focused examples: I created the STEEM sub-token POCKET (https://steemit.com/pocket/@biophil/pocket-announcement) as well as a simple AI-based curation bot the "gentlebot" (https://steemit.com/introduceyourself/@gentlebot/hello-steemit-i-m-the-gentlebot).
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5. Bitshares lack of budget 8).

Think of this in amortized terms: $160,000 over two years is $6666 per month, less than half the daily worker budget at today's prices. Essentially, the proposal is asking for less than a 60th of the BitShares budget to support a full-time student and 2 months per year of my time to study low-volatility assets exclusively.

32
General Discussion / Re: Developing a bitAsset research program
« on: June 21, 2019, 07:29:14 pm »
The worker proposal to fund this project is now on-chain!

Worker Announcement and discussion: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28542
Proposal: https://www.bitshares.foundation/workers/2019-07-uccs-research-project

33
Greetings community! Two months ago, I (Dr. Philip N. Brown, Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs) made the announcement here that I was embarking on a unique research project to study bitAssets. You can read my original introduction post and its discussion here: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28340.0

Today, I give you a worker proposal to raise funds for the project and ensure its success; many thanks to @xeroc and the BitShares Blockchain Foundation for their invaluable assistance in putting forward this proposal. You can find the complete proposal below and at https://www.bitshares.foundation/workers/2019-07-uccs-research-project; but here is the TL;DR version:

  • This worker fully funds a PhD student at the University of Colorado for 2 years; under my supervision, this student will study the fundamental design tradeoffs surrounding price-stabilized crypto-tokens with a particular focus on bitAssets in BitShares.
  • The student and I will present reports and recommendations to the BitShares community as well as author publications which we will submit to high-profile academic conferences and journals for peer-review.
    • Whenever we give a talk for this project at a conference, we'll acknowledge the BitShares Blockchain as the research's funding source.
    • Whenever we publish a paper resulting from the funds in this worker, we'll include the text "This work was supported by BitShares worker proposal 1.14.204."
  • The BitShares Blockchain Foundation will act as escrow, and the University of Colorado will be the custodian of the funds for the duration of the project (read: I can't just cut and run with the cash).

Please pepper me with your questions, and I will make myself available to chat via Skype (philskypetalk) or any other chat service if that would be helpful. I'll also update this post with something like a FAQ as I start to see which questions are the most frequent. What follows is the complete proposal as published at https://www.bitshares.foundation/workers/2019-07-uccs-research-project:

Name/bfid: 201907-uccs-research-project
Category: Research
Team: Dr. Philip N. Brown, Assistant Professor of Computer Science
Total: $160,000
Duration: 4 months
Worker ID: 1.14.204
Discussions: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28340.0
Accounting & Reporting: https://workers.bitshares.foundation/201907-uccs-research-project

University Research Project for BitAssets
This worker proposal, if approved and funded, will support a gift to the University of Colorado Colorado Springs (UCCS) to fund a 2-year bitasset-specific research project by a PhD student under the direction of Dr. Philip Brown. Please scroll down for more details.

Yearly Budget
By far the most critical budget items are the stipend and tuition payments for the PhD student, who will be committing the bulk of the time to the project. In addition to the student’s budget items, the project’s impact is significantly enhanced by including some time for Dr. Brown, to ensure that he can adequately direct the research. Time for faculty can be included as salary in the summer months or as a “course buy-out” during the academic year which reduces his teaching load to allow more time for research. The following budget includes a summer month as well as a teaching reduction. Finally, an annual $10,000 travel budget is included; both Dr. Brown and the PhD student will travel to universities, conferences, and workshops to promote the work, disseminate research findings and develop future collaborative relationships with other researchers. UCCS applies indirect costs of 10% to each budget line item below to cover facilities maintenance, support staff salaries and related grant management expenses; each of the following budget items includes these 10% indirect costs.

A sample annual budget is as follows:
  • PhD Student annual stipend: $26,736
  • PhD student annual tuition (6 credits per semester): $10,211.11
  • Dr. Brown month of summer salary: $14,354.44
  • Dr. Brown 1-course teaching load reduction: $12,919.00
  • Travel budget: $11,111.11
  • Total annual budget: $75,331.66
If the project is funded at higher levels, the additional money will be used to extend the student’s funding for up to a third year. It is important to stress that this is likely to significantly increase the ultimate impact of the project, as the productivity of PhD students tends to increase over time.

Accountability and Transparency
Once the funds from this worker proposal are disbursed to UCCS, the University of Colorado will be the custodian of the funds as required for all funded university research projects. Dr. Brown will have signature authority over the funds, but all expenditures will be vetted through the usual accounting procedures of the University of Colorado, providing a strong layer of protection against embezzlement and other malfeasance by Dr. Brown.

Budget Restrictions
Worker funds are released relatively slowly, so an extremely aggressive timeline may not be possible. However, the PhD student cannot be attached to the project unless a minimum of two years’ funding is allocated to him up front.

To reduce costs, this worker proposal may pay out BTS to the BBF (the escrow) directly to reduce trading fees and spreads that would otherwise increase total costs to cover the commitment. Payments to the University of Colorado will remain transparent to the Community and the voters.

Executive summary
Dr. Philip Brown wrote an executive summary that contains the full details of the PhD student to work on.

Read full executive summary: http://cs.uccs.edu/~pbrown2/files/BTS_executive_summary.pdf

Key Research Thrusts:
  • Recommend concrete improvements to the BitShares MPA system.
  • Develop a “science of collateralized tokens,” investigating the key design tradeoffs in the space.
  • Can the balance between short-term and long-term stability be tuned?
  • Is there a fundamental tradeoff in collateralized tokens between manipulability and short-term stability?
  • How can we assess risk in collateralized token systems, taking into account the incentives seen by all parties?

Additional project activities:
  • Travel to universities and academic/blockchain conferences to present our research.
  • Participation and outreach in blockchain community events in the greater Colorado Springs area.
  • Sharing ongoing research findings with the BitShares Core Team and contributing insights to relevant design discussions.

Principal Investigator Bio
Dr. Philip N. Brown, an Assistant Professor at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs, will direct the research project. Dr. Brown brings uniquely multidisciplinary expertise to the project, as his research combines concepts from automation and controls, game theory and incentive design, and integrated engineered and engineered systems. Dr. Brown has been a BitShares community member since early 2014, and participated in bitsharestalk.org discussions (under the pseudonym “biophil”) regarding the design of the first BitAsset pegging mechanisms. Since then, he has launched an interdisciplinary research program in the department of Computer Science at the University of Colorado: http://cs.uccs.edu/~pbrown2/.

Summary
The proposed research gift funds an exciting and ambitious undertaking to result in both technical results relevant to the functioning of the BitShares Blockchain as well as basic science which will advance knowledge and lead to visibility and lasting impact in the broader academic community.

It is our hope that in its success, this project will accomplish the following three unique things:
  • Bring new tools and theory to bear on the practical challenges faced by the BitShares Blockchain,
  • Spread awareness of the BitShares ecosystem to a previously unreached audience, and
  • Showcase the BitShares community’s ability and commitment to fund higher learning projects which confer benefits beyond the insular setting of the BitShares Blockchain itself.

34
General Discussion / Re: Developing a bitAsset research program
« on: June 03, 2019, 09:01:09 pm »

In auction theory there is a bizarre fact called the "revenue equivalence theorem," which basically says that every possible auction mechanism earns the same revenue on average unless it's a deliberately stupid mechanism (such as awarding the object completely at random). The reason this is true is that if you have an auction that normally earns X revenue, and then you change some particulars of your auction mechanism to try to get more revenue out of it, the bidders will adjust their bids accordingly and once they equilibrate you'll still only get X revenue.


Do you think the revenue equivalence theorem applies between Dutch and double continuous auctions (where both buyers and sellers post bids to exchange)?

Do you have any thoughts on Gnosis' new market structure?

Thanks for your interest. BTS can benefit a lot from formal research and peer-review.

I'm almost positive that a typical Dutch auction fits the revenue equivalence model (which means that Dutch earns the same average revenue as, say, an Ebay auction), but the result might not carry over to a two-sided market, since the classical revenue equivalence result holds for a single seller and many buyers. I'd have to do more reading.

I haven't read about Gnosis's market in a long time, but I recall when they first proposed it, the idea was essentially to run a low-speed Dutch auction for low-liquidity tokens, is that right? It seemed like a reasonable idea at the time -- but I may look further into it. Also I bet the implementation has changed a fair amount since the initial proposals.

While I can't comment on Gnosis in particular, Dutch auctions are generally considered to be pretty smart auctions because the bidding strategies are easy to understand. One of the main takeaways of the revenue equivalence theorem is that "simple auctions are best": because your revenue doesn't depend on your mechanism, you might as well make the mechanism as user-friendly as possible. Hence the popularity of English and Dutch auctions.

35
General Discussion / Re: Developing a bitAsset research program
« on: May 28, 2019, 08:02:24 pm »
Support. Maybe you can propose a whole new BitAsset system rather than solving current BitAsset problems.

That would be a very good outcome from this project. However, I have a feeling that the challenges faced by BitAsset systems aren't really implementation issues.

In auction theory there is a bizarre fact called the "revenue equivalence theorem," which basically says that every possible auction mechanism earns the same revenue on average unless it's a deliberately stupid mechanism (such as awarding the object completely at random). The reason this is true is that if you have an auction that normally earns X revenue, and then you change some particulars of your auction mechanism to try to get more revenue out of it, the bidders will adjust their bids accordingly and once they equilibrate you'll still only get X revenue.

The analogy to BitAssets only goes so far, but my point is that very likely, decentralized mechanisms for price-stable assets all inherit the same set of challenges, and we won't be able to move forward well until we have a better understanding of those challenges. That's the deeper goal of the project.

36
General Discussion / Re: Developing a bitAsset research program
« on: May 06, 2019, 08:55:43 pm »
This sounds very interesting. You'll get my support. Looking forward to more outcome from your research. Do you have a schedule about the research, e.g. at what time you will publish what?

Thanks for your support! I have no formal proposed schedule yet, but here are some preliminary thoughts:

When the project launches, I expect to dedicate 1-2 months of my own time right at the beginning to refine the research questions and bring the student up to speed. In this time, I'd like to write two preliminary papers myself and submit them for publishing within the first 5 months of the project. These papers would serve to clarify some of the core problems and begin disseminating preliminary solutions among the community. Different parts of the academic publishing world run at different timescales, so the time between submitting a paper (to a conference) and its publication/presentation can be anywhere from 3 months (in the highly-competitive world of systems security) to 9 months (in the mature field of feedback control theory), and any time you submit a paper you run the risk that is is rejected for various reasons.

Because of these long timelines, I envision a two-track approach where we informally release information within the BitShares community far in advance of its publication in a formal academic venue. Then, as results are workshopped in the Bitshares community, we'll simultaneously prepare them formally to publish.

Welcome Philip, expect that your research will bring suggestive ideas to BTS.
I just wrote down some of my thoughts on smartcoin evolution, maybe you are also interested in the topics https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28367.0

Thanks very much; I'll give it a good read. And this summer I'll also set up some one-on-one discussions with core community members to start gathering input on various problems.

37
General Discussion / Re: Developing a bitAsset research program
« on: May 01, 2019, 03:22:30 am »
There's also the idea of using multiple assets as backing collateral for a single MPA: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/100

That might be more directly in the project's scope if it could plausibly introduce some stability benefits. I'll have to chew on it.

38
General Discussion / Re: Developing a bitAsset research program
« on: April 30, 2019, 03:41:44 pm »
Thanks for the warm welcome back.

To answer a few questions:

The only thing that concerns me is it seems that you don't have a clear economy-related background, so possibly an average Joe (who don't understand computer science nor game theory nor economy) won't believe you nor your research results.

Messaging to average Joes is one of my favorite things to do -- check out my "Game Theory of Steem" series I published on Steemit a couple years back. As to my background, I actually do have training in economic thinking -- more than most computer science/engineering people, and one of my key research areas is developing algorithmic incentive mechanisms to influence human behavior. The topic of MPA/bitassets is fundamentally interdisciplinary, so anyone working on it needs access to a range of background material, and this is something I bring. In addition, the PhD student who will likely be working on the project is a software engineer with trading experience, so he brings some good relevant diversity as well.

When talking about economy, bitAsset is impacted by the impossible trinity theory. More discussions are linked below:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27203.msg322852#msg322852
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=11946.0
Looking forward to your inputs about this.

Yes, I'm aware of the impossible trinity and I'm looking forward to formalizing that kind of concept for bitassets in particular. More about my thoughts on this in the future.

Good to see you are preparing to do deep research on bitAsset, it is very necessary indeed. However, is there any specific target?  or we can we expect from your future research?

You can find a very brief summary of the project goals here. In a nutshell, we'll do two things:
  • We'll ask BTS-specific questions: How should MSSR be selected? Could dynamic collateral requirements be helpful? What is the right way to eliminate global settlement as an undercollateralization safety mechanism?
  • We'll ask broader price-stable-asset questions, focusing on the fundamental design tradeoffs in the space. My favorite question here concerns risk: there is a complex interplay between the behavior of bitasset shorts and the risk assumed by bitasset longs. The system can only work if the shorts assume most of the longs' risk, and yet in BTS bear markets, the shorts want to assume as little of that risk as possible. However, if the shorts offload the risk back to the longs, then the bitasset may un-peg and thus lose its value proposition, which in turn harms the value of BTS, ultimately hurting the shorts as well. Thus, the system must be designed so that this long-term risk is somehow directly "priced in" to the shorts' incentives.

Will 'privatized' mpa (non committee owned smartcoins) be in scope? Or just normal FIAT pegged MPA?

You're talking about ones like HERO and HERTZ? Insofar as they're governed by the same mechanisms that govern the committee-managed smartcoins, this project will talk about the private MPAs as well.

This is awesome.  On a similar note, I have been research myself into this regarding the evolution of Bitshares from when the peg first broke in 2014 August.  Can someone point out or know by memory how the orgininal Bitshares X worked when the peg was first introduced?  I always felt that was the most viable model for stablecoins.  Not sure why Bytemaster went off of it.

You're talking about the original oracle-free mechanism? I don't recall the specifics, but one of the reasons Dan abandoned it was that it allowed for large deviations from the peg which resulted directly from BTS price swings. In principle, those deviations would eventually correct themselves, but it wasn't meeting the goals of accurate price-pegging. There was certainly some controversy over the change and allegations that it wasn't fully tested.

39
General Discussion / Developing a bitAsset research program
« on: April 26, 2019, 10:16:32 pm »
Greetings, BitShares community!

My name is Philip Brown, and I'm a professor of Computer Science at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs; here is my academic website: http://cs.uccs.edu/~pbrown2/index.html. It's been a long time since I was active around here; so let me give you a quick re-introduction.

I first started exploring the blockchain/cryptocurrency space in late 2013, and stumbled onto bitsharestalk.org because I was intrigued by one of the early Larimer essays about Contract-for-Difference-based stabilized assets. Back then, I was a PhD student studying game theory, incentive design, and feedback control systems, and I saw immediate connections between the concepts I was learning in my program and the things being created in the BitShares world. I was a PTS/AGS holder and early tester of the bitAsset systems, and have been watching and at times participating ever since. At the time, I would have loved to sink my teeth into some deep analysis of the incentive mechanisms in the system. I managed to find time to help write an early FAQ for Bitshares, and I operated a custom trading bot on BTER and the BitShares Dex for a short time, but the demands of my PhD program commanded my attention and I had little choice but to dabble. Fortunately, since then, I graduated with my PhD and am now a professor myself – which means that I get to choose exactly what I want to research.

Today, I'm very happy to announce that I am working towards launching a bitAsset-focused research project! Over the past several months, I've been in conversation with the BitShares Core Team regarding a partnership between my research lab and the BitShares DAC. We're discussing a collaborative project in which I'll direct a PhD student in an in-depth study of the key design tradeoffs in price-stable cryptocurrency systems, beginning with a comprehensive audit and analysis of the BitShares MPA system. I'm very excited to bring my expertise in game theory and incentive mechanisms to bear on these fundamental challenges, and I look forward to a productive collaboration as this unfolds.

More details will follow as the partnership progresses, but I wanted to post this here now by way of announcement and re-introduction. I'm happy to be back!

40
General Discussion / Re: Investigating the reasons for BitUSD GS
« on: December 07, 2018, 05:41:10 pm »
1. Was BitUSD mismanaged? If so, by whom and why?
2. Was it the fault of BSIP42?
3. How will BitCNY be saved from the same fate?
4. Was the GS inevitable?
To break it down:
BSIP42 allowed witnesses to experiment more with price feeding to improve the peg.
Different algorithms have been tried which came with more risks and better peg for certain market conditions.
Market conditions changed drastically. Unfortunately, at that time, the algorithm for price feeding was such
that the peg was holding strong, at a (significantly) increased risk of global settlements.

What the algorithm basically did was move the (margin call) price feed away from market so that margin calls
(which buy at 10% above market) would only trade at current market rates. Hence the price feed was off by
10% in general (more of less). Additionally to that, a stateful feedback loop was integrated to track the *premium*
of bitUSD and move the call price even further.

The consequence was that a huge margin call aggregated during the bear market and those margin calls were
unable to buy back their bitUSD in the internal markets (not even with a 10% penalty) because the call price (feed)
was off too much.

Could a GS have been prevented without BSIP42, I am not sure. It could be because the margin calls could have
been filled more easily. Would there have been traders doing so? No one knows.

My personal conclusion (as a proxy) is to not accept call price (feed) manipulation and instead use other means
to give (and take) incentive to borrow (and short sell) new bitassets (depending on supply and demand).
Those means have been discussed back then too, but an issue in the backend that is currently been worked
on effectively prevents us from using it. Additionally to that, the bear market has continued and moving away from
BSIP42 (in particular for bitCNY) would cause an immediate global settlement, which at least is undesirable for the
vast majority of the bitCNY traders and BTS holders from China.

The ideal "solution" for me would be to sit out the bear market and as soon as collateral ratios in bitCNY pick up again
gradually reduce the impact of BSIP42 and instead replace it with (potentially a mix of) dynamic MCR and dynamic
MSSR.

bitUSD can be revived and when that happens I do not intend to support any witness that feeds a price feed that
goes more than ~2% away from fair market pricing for bitUSD.

Thanks for the writeup. A big problem stablecoins face is that risk is very hard to eliminate, and a change that reduces one risk may very easily increase some other risk. It sounds like what you're saying is that BSIP42 reduced BitAsset short-term volatility, and inadvertently (or maybe deliberately?) increased the risk of a GS. Whether the total amount of risk in the system increased or decreased isn't clear, but since GS is such a drastic operation (essentially everybody loses in a GS), anything which increases the risk of a GS is probably a bad idea.

41
General Discussion / Re: Investigating the reasons for BitUSD GS
« on: December 07, 2018, 05:27:36 pm »

anyway, I think this is much better than just let global settlement happen.


Would you say this is an accurate way to rephrase your statement: "better to lose the peg via a nonconsensus hack than to lose the peg via a GS."

I'm pretty sure that I agree with that sentiment.

That makes it sound like it's worth looking in to a major protocol update which would soften the GS nuclear option in some way.

42
General Discussion / Investigating the reasons for BitUSD GS
« on: December 06, 2018, 03:12:04 pm »
Greetings, Bitshares community!

A very few of you may remember me from the early days of Bitshares; back then, I was a lowly graduate student interested in game theory and cryptocurrencies.

Now, I've worked my way up to professor of Computer Science at the University of Colorado: http://cs.uccs.edu/~pbrown2/. I've been doing a bit of research on stablecoins recently, and I want to gather some perspectives on what went wrong with BitUSD. I think there are some very interesting underlying problems with stablecoins in general (see NuBits for some early examples), and collaboratively-managed stablecoins in particular (see BitUSD), and I'd like to understand these problems very clearly.

So I'd love to get some community input on the reasons that BitUSD's peg mechanism broke and it went into GS. Here are some starter questions, but of course give me your own perspectives even if they don't fit my questions at all:

1. Was BitUSD mismanaged? If so, by whom and why?
2. Was it the fault of BSIP42?
3. How will BitCNY be saved from the same fate?
4. Was the GS inevitable?

And just to be clear about my intentions here, depending on my findings, I plan to write a (possibly series of) academic research papers on the topic of how to properly incentivize stablecoins. I think the incentive issues are very deep and likely very difficult to surmount. Here's an older summary of my concerns: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=9348.msg315532#msg315532

43
General Discussion / Re: When to expect the bitUSD revival?
« on: December 06, 2018, 02:57:21 pm »
Hi Neo, I've been absent from bitshares for quite some time now, and just came back to see what was going on with bitUSD. For some time now, I've been concerned that there are systemic problems that would eventually lead to GS for some bitasset, and I'm very sad to see that the community was not able to correct these problems before a GS happened. I'm going to be looking in to exactly why this happened, and hopefully this kind of thing can be prevented in the future. For now, you'll have to decide how confident you are that bitUSD will recover. I summarize the "global settle" operation here: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=24322.msg307262#msg307262 In essence, when GS happens, the majority of the asset's collateral pool is thrown away. What little collateral is left after GS is not enough to effectively back the asset, so it goes into sort of a shutdown mode.

I think (people more involved in day-to-day can confirm) that BitUSD needs several million dollars to be revived. From what I recall, it will be revived when the value of the collateral pool rises to a certain threshold, either because some gracious whale comes and commits that collateral to the pool, or because the price of BTS rises enough so that the existing collateral is worth enough to back the asset again.

44
Does the project have a website or anything useful like that? I want to learn about the project without having to sift through a morass of telegram spam.
Only:

https://bitsharestalk.io/forums
https://beta.whaleshares.net/

Anything specific you want to know?

The usual stuff for new projects: if 70% to BTS, who gets the other 30? Is there a drop to whaleshares UIA? ICO? What is the intended feature set (fuzzy seems to indicate that it will merge the capabilities of BTS and STEEM)?

Etc etc etc.

45
Does the project have a website or anything useful like that? I want to learn about the project without having to sift through a morass of telegram spam.

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