Quote from: Samupaha on January 02, 2016, 04:29:50 PM
What is exactly the problem you are trying to solve here? I think the system works as it should be working. Those who have the most BTS will have the most voting power.

Bigger problem right now is that we don't have enough high quality committee members. One reason is the lack of GUI for committee, I suspect that many aren't interested using the text client.

Correct if I'm wrong, but I have the understanding that when shareholders vote for committee, they don't vote only for individual members but for size of the committee also. If everybody votes for only three members, there won't be more than three members in the committee, and that's pretty much centralized then.

yep we need the ability to stand as a committee member built in to the gui asap

Quote from: Samupaha on January 02, 2016, 04:29:50 PM
What is exactly the problem you are trying to solve here? I think the system works as it should be working. Those who have the most BTS will have the most voting power.

Bigger problem right now is that we don't have enough high quality committee members. One reason is the lack of GUI for committee, I suspect that many aren't interested using the text client.

Correct if I'm wrong, but I have the understanding that when shareholders vote for committee, they don't vote only for individual members but for size of the committee also. If everybody votes for only three members, there won't be more than three members in the committee, and that's pretty much centralized then.

we have more people that can act as good committee members, such as @clayop, @Bhuz, but they are now not voted in.
on the contrary, we now have 5 inits accounts in the committee that taken the places.



one fact is, among the current 11 active committee members, I am the only one that do not depend on BM's support.
if one owns enough voting power, he can control all, and the necessary voting power is far less than 50%.
we can not call such a  platform a DAC. we need to make it a real DAC, this is the problem I want to solve.
everyone voting 3 committee members will not result in centralization, because it is clearly not always the same 3 be voted.

What is exactly the problem you are trying to solve here? I think the system works as it should be working. Those who have the most BTS will have the most voting power.

Bigger problem right now is that we don't have enough high quality committee members. One reason is the lack of GUI for committee, I suspect that many aren't interested using the text client.

Correct if I'm wrong, but I have the understanding that when shareholders vote for committee, they don't vote only for individual members but for size of the committee also. If everybody votes for only three members, there won't be more than three members in the committee, and that's pretty much centralized then.

Quote from: Empirical1.2 on January 02, 2016, 03:41:46 PM

Quote from: xeroc on January 02, 2016, 03:37:05 PM
I assume all proxies are honest until they fuck something up .. proxies have no way to prevent shareholders removing their votes from them ..

Couldn't a proxy with enough support elect witnesses who refuse to process vote removals?

only in the case of a 51% attack where ALL witnesses are replaced .. and there would definitely be NO financial incentive to do so

Quote from: abit on January 02, 2016, 03:36:51 PM

Quote from: xeroc on January 02, 2016, 03:05:52 PM

Quote from: sittingduck on January 02, 2016, 02:55:38 PM
We had this debate two years ago with agent 86. How we do it now is the same way as corps.  Your approach has weaknesses greater than those you are attempting to fix.

I can confirm this ..
what we need are committee members and or loyal proxies with more (combined) voting power than any attacker .. thats all we need

Imo votes for committee members are different than votes for witnesses.
If one have enough voting power to let herself stay as active witness, she may do something bad with it.
But if one have enough voting power to stay in committee, she'll have less influence since there is at least one more voting round and a review period for decision making.

yes, so I don't think my proposal "has greater weaknesses than attempting to fix", we need to make balance in decision making, if the one with most voting power can control the whole committee, there will be no balance. dictatorship will come... 

Quote from: xeroc on January 02, 2016, 03:37:05 PM
I assume all proxies are honest until they fuck something up .. proxies have no way to prevent shareholders removing their votes from them ..

Couldn't a proxy with enough support elect witnesses who refuse to process vote removals?

I assume all proxies are honest until they fuck something up .. proxies have no way to prevent shareholders removing their votes from them ..

Quote from: xeroc on January 02, 2016, 03:05:52 PM

Quote from: sittingduck on January 02, 2016, 02:55:38 PM
We had this debate two years ago with agent 86. How we do it now is the same way as corps.  Your approach has weaknesses greater than those you are attempting to fix.

I can confirm this ..
what we need are committee members and or loyal proxies with more (combined) voting power than any attacker .. thats all we need

Imo votes for committee members are different than votes for witnesses.
If one have enough voting power to let herself stay as active witness, she may do something bad with it.
But if one have enough voting power to stay in committee, she'll have less influence since there is at least one more voting round and a review period for decision making.

Quote from: xeroc on January 02, 2016, 03:05:52 PM

Quote from: sittingduck on January 02, 2016, 02:55:38 PM
We had this debate two years ago with agent 86. How we do it now is the same way as corps.  Your approach has weaknesses greater than those you are attempting to fix.

I can confirm this ..
what we need are committee members and or loyal proxies with more (combined) voting power than any attacker .. thats all we need

how can you differentiate loyal proxies and attackers? A user with 5% voting power is loyal proxy and with 3% voting power is attacker?

Quote from: sittingduck on January 02, 2016, 02:55:38 PM
We had this debate two years ago with agent 86. How we do it now is the same way as corps.  Your approach has weaknesses greater than those you are attempting to fix.

I can confirm this ..
what we need are committee members and or loyal proxies with more (combined) voting power than any attacker .. thats all we need

We had this debate two years ago with agent 86. How we do it now is the same way as corps.  Your approach has weaknesses greater than those you are attempting to fix. 

we now have voting in Bitshares 2.0, this made the platform far more decentralized than 1.0 stage.
but it is still too centralized, one important reason is the voting rule for committee members, as each account can vote as many committee members as he/she like, a person with 5% BTS can easily control the committee.
if we need real decentralization, we need to change this, I propose to restrict that one account can only vote at most 3 committee members.this will bring more decentralization and prevent dictatorship.
any thoughts?
I will prepare a BSIP issue if this get positive feedback from community.