10% dilution = 650,000 BTS a day

[Geneko]

Have you seen this thread? https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=10385.15;topicseen

It's a proposal to have the DACs proposed as a deflationary model UNTIL the DAC gets integrated or is completed satisfactorily... if merged it will dilute BTS, otherwise it's asset is removed if it can't function profitably on its own... so essentially only diluting on DACs that are shown to work and have been voted in... It's a trustless way to raise funds through BTS without diluting, people invest their BTS instead and BTS is burned in favor of the new Dac asset. If something brings in value and more value than dilution then you merge it after a vote. Essentially this would balance out any inflation and probably put more deflationary pressure on the currency depending on how competent new DACs are being released. It would be hard to imagine how collusion can steer corruption in this model.

No I didnt. On the first sight it looks brilliant,

Thanks!

[jsidhu]

Collective responsibility is very dangerous thing.

Like this proposed dilution is nothing more than printing press in hands of delegates or way of taxing on share holders. If this become true soon you will have “strategic alliances” between delegates that would reconstruct all politic parties and state related structures of bureaucracy. Their only motivation will be to provide votes for dilution. As they gain power they will “kill and bribe” in order to gain more power and in synergy with whales they will change the rules so soon average share holder will no longer be able to change anything similar to average voter in today’s democracy.

And what are goals of proposed dilution. To provide funding for future development of Dacs.
If you want to support some project or development team you should be able to decide of you own, not to be up voted by majority. If you want money for development you should do something like Kick Starter funding platform or a bounty system for gaining financial support.

Self-management is utopian idea based on collective responsibility. It should be avoided for all cost. Here is one of proven examples: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_Socialist_Federal_Republic_of_Yugoslavia

Unfortunately I was able to experience it from the first hand. The most compiling example is described in Stud Hunt (i.e. Game Theory). Soon everybody is going to hunt a rabbit.

Have you seen this thread? https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=10385.15;topicseen

It's a proposal to have the DACs proposed as a deflationary model UNTIL the DAC gets integrated or is completed satisfactorily... if merged it will dilute BTS, otherwise it's asset is removed if it can't function profitably on its own... so essentially only diluting on DACs that are shown to work and have been voted in... It's a trustless way to raise funds through BTS without diluting, people invest their BTS instead and BTS is burned in favor of the new Dac asset. If something brings in value and more value than dilution then you merge it after a vote. Essentially this would balance out any inflation and probably put more deflationary pressure on the currency depending on how competent new DACs are being released. It would be hard to imagine how collusion can steer corruption in this model.

[Geneko]

Collective responsibility is very dangerous thing.

Like this proposed dilution is nothing more than printing press in hands of delegates or way of taxing on share holders. If this become true soon you will have “strategic alliances” between delegates that would reconstruct all politic parties and state related structures of bureaucracy. Their only motivation will be to provide votes for dilution. As they gain power they will “kill and bribe” in order to gain more power and in synergy with whales they will change the rules so soon average share holder will no longer be able to change anything similar to average voter in today’s democracy.

And what are goals of proposed dilution. To provide funding for future development of Dacs.
If you want to support some project or development team you should be able to decide of you own, not to be up voted by majority. If you want money for development you should do something like Kick Starter funding platform or a bounty system for gaining financial support.

Self-management is utopian idea based on collective responsibility. It should be avoided for all cost. Here is one of proven examples: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_Socialist_Federal_Republic_of_Yugoslavia

Unfortunately I was able to experience it from the first hand. The most compiling example is described in Stud Hunt (i.e. Game Theory). Soon everybody is going to hunt a rabbit.

[yidaidaxia]

2 billion bts * (1+20%) = 2.4 billion. 2.4 billion * 10% / 365 = 657,534 bts

That makes about 650,000 bts a day. To me, this has much much bigger impact than PTS, AGS, DNS merge.

Well, btc currently has about 10% dilution but it's also decreasing along the time.

If we have to pay high to delegates at the moment, at least we should decrease the rate along the time.

That is the limit.. no one will be voted in anywhere near that.

I suggust we need to be very careful about the strategy. If we expect the highest necessary payrate will be almost always lower than 50% based on 10% yearly dilution rate, let's set the limit to 5% each year directly.. which is enough for development and much better for PR. The bad example now is, in keyid/dns chain, the dilution rate is very high, which is bad for PR, in the other hand, toast does not think delegates needs so much pay so request delegates to set payrate to 0% or 1% which I believe makes the delegates feel uncomportable while if the dilution rate is lower then there would be much better for PR and much natural for delegates payrate...

Pls think about that before the final decision.

[BTSdac]

We want transparency, but here is the bottom line for developers:  they are almost always worth their salary in the amount of value they can produce in a year.

Hi BM
I konw delegate need money for more powerfull computer , it can support high TPS, but 3% is also a big volume , delegate also gain fee of translation.  if the purpose of dilution is for delveloping.,how do you collect BTS that have been distributed to delegates ?  of couse  if some delegate join in  delveloping, he can get pay from developing fund ,but delegate gain bts just by runing a node , it is`t a large cost of work. 
of course stakeholder of bts can vote  delegate that have do more deleveping and contribution . maybe it is more efficiency to get pay from a fund
 

[oldman]

Every employee of bitshares will be a delegate. That includes BM, Stan, toast, hopefully Brian and anyone else that is paid a salary by us shareholders. They all have a set pay rate for their delegate, and when they first apply to become a delegate, we shareholders vote them in if we think their salary is fair vs their contribution. We will have some common framework for transparency, I imagine it's gonna be something like they have to make a report of their work each week. Kinda like the current bbx hangouts, but for every employee individually and with a lot more detail. Shareholders can then vote for or against the delegates they like, and if someone uncovers any evidence of a delegate not doing their job properly, they can mount a campaign to get them thrown out.

This sort of flat structure seems incredibly inefficient. Hierarchies are useful. In my view we should keep the delegate count at 101 and separate out their roles from all other business supporting the DAC. They should only be trusted to be a decentralized group of vetted individuals (or small organization) capable of running the servers and with their interests aligned with BTS so that they can keep the consensus engine running. When we have a reliable consensus engine, we can then use generic shareholder voting to decide on all other DAC matters. This includes paying the income to the companies/organizations/individuals that will work for the interest of the DAC. These companies can have whatever organization they need to be efficient, but will obviously need to satisfy certain transparency requirements to the shareholders so that the shareholders can decide whether to keep paying them money. The shareholder voting can also be used decide on other important matters of the DAC other than who to pay money. One of the most important decisions is on whether to activate hard fork features (which bytemaster recently described in another thread). But there can be far more agile decisions (no 75% super majority needed) made for lesser issues by the shareholders directly.

Just because every employee is a delegate doesn't mean they cannot have organizational structure. The delegate slate feature allows a team leader to nominate the other delegates on his team, and they can in turn nominate people even further below them. The way I imagine it will end up looking is that we will have these huge nested delegate hierarchies for the different development projects and marketing and other functions. What makes this system so insane is that it has the ability to basically scale infinitely and every new employee will have the ability to organize itself transparently and frictionlessly into the grander hierarchy. As the DAC grows, the speed at which new people are hired will increase exponentially as long as there is an equal influx of active stakeholders who vote actively in whatever little niche they have an interest.

The ability for the system to self organize with no barriers to entry and perfectly aligning economic incentives is going to cause the speed of growth to be completely absurd. It's mind blowing.

And there is nothing to stop a single delegate from being a self-organizing team or small business.
I expect to see many popular personalities get together to form a single, more electable delegate team as competition heats up.

I think I just felt the world change... again.

[Stan]

Every employee of bitshares will be a delegate. That includes BM, Stan, toast, hopefully Brian and anyone else that is paid a salary by us shareholders. They all have a set pay rate for their delegate, and when they first apply to become a delegate, we shareholders vote them in if we think their salary is fair vs their contribution. We will have some common framework for transparency, I imagine it's gonna be something like they have to make a report of their work each week. Kinda like the current bbx hangouts, but for every employee individually and with a lot more detail. Shareholders can then vote for or against the delegates they like, and if someone uncovers any evidence of a delegate not doing their job properly, they can mount a campaign to get them thrown out.

This sort of flat structure seems incredibly inefficient. Hierarchies are useful. In my view we should keep the delegate count at 101 and separate out their roles from all other business supporting the DAC. They should only be trusted to be a decentralized group of vetted individuals (or small organization) capable of running the servers and with their interests aligned with BTS so that they can keep the consensus engine running. When we have a reliable consensus engine, we can then use generic shareholder voting to decide on all other DAC matters. This includes paying the income to the companies/organizations/individuals that will work for the interest of the DAC. These companies can have whatever organization they need to be efficient, but will obviously need to satisfy certain transparency requirements to the shareholders so that the shareholders can decide whether to keep paying them money. The shareholder voting can also be used decide on other important matters of the DAC other than who to pay money. One of the most important decisions is on whether to activate hard fork features (which bytemaster recently described in another thread). But there can be far more agile decisions (no 75% super majority needed) made for lesser issues by the shareholders directly.

Just because every employee is a delegate doesn't mean they cannot have organizational structure. The delegate slate feature allows a team leader to nominate the other delegates on his team, and they can in turn nominate people even further below them. The way I imagine it will end up looking is that we will have these huge nested delegate hierarchies for the different development projects and marketing and other functions. What makes this system so insane is that it has the ability to basically scale infinitely and every new employee will have the ability to organize itself transparently and frictionlessly into the grander hierarchy. As the DAC grows, the speed at which new people are hired will increase exponentially as long as there is an equal influx of active stakeholders who vote actively in whatever little niche they have an interest.

The ability for the system to self organize with no barriers to entry and perfectly aligning economic incentives is going to cause the speed of growth to be completely absurd. It's mind blowing.

And there is nothing to stop a single delegate from being a self-organizing team or small business.
I expect to see many popular personalities get together to form a single, more electable delegate team as competition heats up.

[Rune]

Every employee of bitshares will be a delegate. That includes BM, Stan, toast, hopefully Brian and anyone else that is paid a salary by us shareholders. They all have a set pay rate for their delegate, and when they first apply to become a delegate, we shareholders vote them in if we think their salary is fair vs their contribution. We will have some common framework for transparency, I imagine it's gonna be something like they have to make a report of their work each week. Kinda like the current bbx hangouts, but for every employee individually and with a lot more detail. Shareholders can then vote for or against the delegates they like, and if someone uncovers any evidence of a delegate not doing their job properly, they can mount a campaign to get them thrown out.

This sort of flat structure seems incredibly inefficient. Hierarchies are useful. In my view we should keep the delegate count at 101 and separate out their roles from all other business supporting the DAC. They should only be trusted to be a decentralized group of vetted individuals (or small organization) capable of running the servers and with their interests aligned with BTS so that they can keep the consensus engine running. When we have a reliable consensus engine, we can then use generic shareholder voting to decide on all other DAC matters. This includes paying the income to the companies/organizations/individuals that will work for the interest of the DAC. These companies can have whatever organization they need to be efficient, but will obviously need to satisfy certain transparency requirements to the shareholders so that the shareholders can decide whether to keep paying them money. The shareholder voting can also be used decide on other important matters of the DAC other than who to pay money. One of the most important decisions is on whether to activate hard fork features (which bytemaster recently described in another thread). But there can be far more agile decisions (no 75% super majority needed) made for lesser issues by the shareholders directly.

Just because every employee is a delegate doesn't mean they cannot have organizational structure. The delegate slate feature allows a team leader to nominate the other delegates on his team, and they can in turn nominate people even further below them. The way I imagine it will end up looking is that we will have these huge nested delegate hierarchies for the different development projects and marketing and other functions. What makes this system so insane is that it has the ability to basically scale infinitely and every new employee will have the ability to organize itself transparently and frictionlessly into the grander hierarchy. As the DAC grows, the speed at which new people are hired will increase exponentially as long as there is an equal influx of active stakeholders who vote actively in whatever little niche they have an interest.

The ability for the system to self organize with no barriers to entry and perfectly aligning economic incentives is going to cause the speed of growth to be completely absurd. It's mind blowing.

[GaltReport]

Will it be possible to delegate your vote to someone to act as your proxy?  For example, if you didn't feel qualified to vote intelligently on a proposal, could you designate BM or some other trusted shareholder as your proxy?

Personally, I would love to see liquid democracy features on the blockchain. I think Key Graph could help with that. I wonder how computationally expensive it would be to do it right though.

Edit: Perhaps we could borrow some ideas for the Electoral College. The DAC can distinguish between regular accounts and electors. Anyone can register to be an elector just like anyone can register to be a delegate. Then using approval voting the regular accounts can vote with their stake on the electors. You rank the electors by approval rating and pick the top N. The regular accounts can then split their voting power and delegate it to any of the electors however they wish as described in my Key Graph post. Then the electors can acyclically delegate their received voting power to each other as they wish with the full power of liquid democracy. The point of this extra step of indirection would be to reduce the number of rows in the eigenvalue problem to N. This means if N is a reasonable number it becomes computationally feasible to calculate the voting power of each elector in a reasonable time, which would then be used to calculate the elector's approval or disapproval of a proposal through the typical way. Note that I would still want the typical stake directly votes on delegate proposals for important matters like hard forks. But for less important matters, I think this would be an acceptable compromise that allows voting to be agile and pragmatic.

Ha, cool.  Thanks, I only now got what Toast was talking about with "that edge stuff"...lol

[Stan]

Lots of independent smart people surrounding BM can step up keep the ball rolling if he decides to go fishing.

Now that is news to me. I did not know BM likes to fish. It was hard  enough to hold him in any higher regard as it was before. Now I will need a new scale... apparently.

Well, his idea of fishing is probably spelled differently, but he has been known to milk cows, swing dance, and pun-tificate.

[tonyk]

Lots of independent smart people surrounding BM can step up keep the ball rolling if he decides to go fishing.

Now that is news to me. I did not know BM likes to fish. It was hard  enough to hold him in any higher regard as it was before. Now I will need a new scale... apparently.

[arhag]

Will it be possible to delegate your vote to someone to act as your proxy?  For example, if you didn't feel qualified to vote intelligently on a proposal, could you designate BM or some other trusted shareholder as your proxy?

Personally, I would love to see liquid democracy features on the blockchain. I think Key Graph could help with that. I wonder how computationally expensive it would be to do it right though.

Edit: Perhaps we could borrow some ideas from the Electoral College. The DAC can distinguish between regular accounts and electors. Anyone can register to be an elector just like anyone can register to be a delegate. Then using approval voting the regular accounts can vote with their stake on the electors. You rank the electors by approval rating and pick the top N. The regular accounts can then split their voting power and delegate it to any of the electors however they wish as described in my Key Graph post. Then the electors can acyclically delegate their received voting power to each other as they wish with the full power of liquid democracy. The point of this extra step of indirection would be to reduce the number of rows in the eigenvalue problem to N. This means if N is a reasonable number it becomes computationally feasible to calculate the voting power of each elector in a reasonable time, which would then be used to calculate the elector's approval or disapproval of a proposal through the typical way. Note that I would still want the typical stake directly votes on delegate proposals for important matters like hard forks. But for less important matters, I think this would be an acceptable compromise that allows voting to be agile and pragmatic. Hmm... is this a bicameral government? Delegates are the Senate and electors are the House of Representatives? Except you can change your vote at any time, your voting power is weighted by your stake, there is no gerrymandering, and the Constitution is enforced by code and not a Supreme Court. And we will soon have the ability for stakeholders to amend the Constitution (hard forks) if they can reach 75% consensus.

[GaltReport]

Will it be possible to delegate your vote to someone to act as your proxy?  For example, if you didn't feel qualified to vote intelligently on a proposal, could you designate BM or some other trusted shareholder as your proxy?

[arhag]

Every employee of bitshares will be a delegate. That includes BM, Stan, toast, hopefully Brian and anyone else that is paid a salary by us shareholders. They all have a set pay rate for their delegate, and when they first apply to become a delegate, we shareholders vote them in if we think their salary is fair vs their contribution. We will have some common framework for transparency, I imagine it's gonna be something like they have to make a report of their work each week. Kinda like the current bbx hangouts, but for every employee individually and with a lot more detail. Shareholders can then vote for or against the delegates they like, and if someone uncovers any evidence of a delegate not doing their job properly, they can mount a campaign to get them thrown out.

This sort of flat structure seems incredibly inefficient. Hierarchies are useful. In my view we should keep the delegate count at 101 and separate out their roles from all other business supporting the DAC. They should only be trusted to be a decentralized group of vetted individuals (or small organization) capable of running the servers and with their interests aligned with BTS so that they can keep the consensus engine running. When we have a reliable consensus engine, we can then use generic shareholder voting to decide on all other DAC matters. This includes paying the income to the companies/organizations/individuals that will work for the interest of the DAC. These companies can have whatever organization they need to be efficient, but will obviously need to satisfy certain transparency requirements to the shareholders so that the shareholders can decide whether to keep paying them money. The shareholder voting can also be used decide on other important matters of the DAC other than who to pay money. One of the most important decisions is on whether to activate hard fork features (which bytemaster recently described in another thread). But there can be far more agile decisions (no 75% super majority needed) made for lesser issues by the shareholders directly.

[Rune]

We want transparency, but here is the bottom line for developers:  they are almost always worth their salary in the amount of value they can produce in a year.

This is only applies to developers that are chosen by you, or other incumbent developers, because you function as trusted entities in this regard and are able to make highly informed decisions about who to hire. Developers chosen directly by stakeholders in a decentralized manner will have to start at a low salary, and have their salary closely monitored, and submit themselves to strict transparency measures. At first I3 will be the primary source of development, but as the DAC grows and its functionality starts to sprawl the decentralized method which require strict transparency will probably scale far better in the long run.

I think it is crucial to get the system for decentralized scaling of development right as quickly as possible, because that is where the real potential lies, and getting it right requires building a highly active and very critical voting culture.