Author Topic: Idea for the future: Asset tokens backed by decentralised IOUs  (Read 2474 times)

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Offline MrJeans

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I really like this thinking  +5%
So people shorting bitUSD would be leveraging up on some BTS while reducing the volatility of their underlying collaterol, right?

There would need to be a way of vetting the collateral (perhaps liquidity and depth of the markets the collateral trades in, the length of time the collateral has been around.

You wouldnt want someone creating some fake IOU USD and using that as collateral.

Offline cylonmaker2053

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Could you give other example please? I don't understand

the issue shows up whenever we go from crypto world to non-crypto Old World ...right now our bitassets are backed by BTS collateral, so whenever there's a margin call automatically triggered by the system, those collateral assets can be released and transferred to the other party in the trade to whom they're owed. it's a seamless, low cost, near instantaneous process and it's independent of geographic location and its associated jurisdictional issues wrt money transfers.

theoretically, anyone in the world with access to an Internet connection can invest in bitassets, like bitUSD, so imagine someone in Iran doing so and then there being a margin call on the asset they hold...it's easy to dispense BTS to that person, but good luck finding a way to get USD to them.
What I'm suggesting does not require any fiat settlement though. Settlement is only ever in the UIAs representing the exchange IOUs. These would then be separately redeemed by the users for fiat if they desire and are able, or sold for other assets. If the whitelist for these UIAs does not extend to all users, the block-chain could force-sell them for BTS to return to users. In no case is there a requirement to send fiat to a user. I'll write a clearer example of the OP as soon as I get the chance, clear up some of the confusion.

kind of like UIAs being backed by bitUSD instead of USD? i thought the original post was theorizing non-BTS-bitasset collateral

Offline starspirit

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Could you give other example please? I don't understand

the issue shows up whenever we go from crypto world to non-crypto Old World ...right now our bitassets are backed by BTS collateral, so whenever there's a margin call automatically triggered by the system, those collateral assets can be released and transferred to the other party in the trade to whom they're owed. it's a seamless, low cost, near instantaneous process and it's independent of geographic location and its associated jurisdictional issues wrt money transfers.

theoretically, anyone in the world with access to an Internet connection can invest in bitassets, like bitUSD, so imagine someone in Iran doing so and then there being a margin call on the asset they hold...it's easy to dispense BTS to that person, but good luck finding a way to get USD to them.
What I'm suggesting does not require any fiat settlement though. Settlement is only ever in the UIAs representing the exchange IOUs. These would then be separately redeemed by the users for fiat if they desire and are able, or sold for other assets. If the whitelist for these UIAs does not extend to all users, the block-chain could force-sell them for BTS to return to users. In no case is there a requirement to send fiat to a user. I'll write a clearer example of the OP as soon as I get the chance, clear up some of the confusion.

Offline cylonmaker2053

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Could you give other example please? I don't understand

the issue shows up whenever we go from crypto world to non-crypto Old World ...right now our bitassets are backed by BTS collateral, so whenever there's a margin call automatically triggered by the system, those collateral assets can be released and transferred to the other party in the trade to whom they're owed. it's a seamless, low cost, near instantaneous process and it's independent of geographic location and its associated jurisdictional issues wrt money transfers.

theoretically, anyone in the world with access to an Internet connection can invest in bitassets, like bitUSD, so imagine someone in Iran doing so and then there being a margin call on the asset they hold...it's easy to dispense BTS to that person, but good luck finding a way to get USD to them.

Offline fer87

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Could you give other example please? I don't understand

Offline cylonmaker2053

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...actual USD raises some exit node dilemmas, puts us towards the Ripple side of crypto
Could you explain what you mean here?

well i'm all for any innovation such as introducing new collateral types to our products, but the tricky thing with USD is that we'd need exit nodes from our system to dispense USD in event of margin calls. e.g. say you back up EXA.USD with USD, EXA.USD fails and now actual USD is due to token holders. how to dispense funds to people who could be located potentially anywhere on the planet? there certainly are ways to try to do this, like contractually specifying collateral delivery methods/locations, etc. but just gets trickier than our current collateral automation using BTS.

Offline Helikopterben

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...actual USD raises some exit node dilemmas, puts us towards the Ripple side of crypto
Could you explain what you mean here?

This sounds like UIA on the ripple network combined with voting pools, which have been discussed in bitcoin.  The problem he raises is that you will eventually have a gateway default.  However, with your solution, which is much like voting pools, the losses are spread throughout the network of gateways only requiring a "haircut" for all parties involved, if I understand correctly.  Then the faulty exchange can be discarded from the network.  This is a potential solution because risk is lowered significantly, however a system where risk is nearly eliminated (there is no such thing as zero risk) would be preferrable.  I am anxious to see how the new bitAssets perform, then go from there.

Offline starspirit

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...actual USD raises some exit node dilemmas, puts us towards the Ripple side of crypto
Could you explain what you mean here?

Offline cylonmaker2053

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sorry i'm not following, could you boil it down to a simple example? what would be examples of collateral used for EXA.USD ... EXZ.USD if not BTS?
EXA.USD would be a UIA issued by member Exchange A that is redeemable for fiat USD. Its backed by the reputation of Exchange A to make good on that promise. These UIAs don't yet exist, but they might - for reference, see Stan's comments here:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,16736.msg222999.html#msg222999

If we had 10 such member exchanges, each with such a UIA (which they are incentivised to create for more transaction fees), then shorts collectively could form a diversified pool of these IOUs, substantially reducing counter-party risk to any one party. Simplistically, if the pool were equally weighted, a 10% collateral margin would be sufficient to cover the total default of any one of these parties.

In extremis, were the Bitshares network sufficiently large, there could be unlimited such issuers, varying in reputation, across which the shorts could pick and choose to build a diversified pool.

what about bitUSD backing instead? which is really just BTS backing...actual USD raises some exit node dilemmas, puts us towards the Ripple side of crypto

Offline starspirit

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sorry i'm not following, could you boil it down to a simple example? what would be examples of collateral used for EXA.USD ... EXZ.USD if not BTS?
EXA.USD would be a UIA issued by member Exchange A that is redeemable for fiat USD. Its backed by the reputation of Exchange A to make good on that promise. These UIAs don't yet exist, but they might - for reference, see Stan's comments here:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,16736.msg222999.html#msg222999

If we had 10 such member exchanges, each with such a UIA (which they are incentivised to create for more transaction fees), then shorts collectively could form a diversified pool of these IOUs, substantially reducing counter-party risk to any one party. Simplistically, if the pool were equally weighted, a 10% collateral margin would be sufficient to cover the total default of any one of these parties.

In extremis, were the Bitshares network sufficiently large, there could be unlimited such issuers, varying in reputation, across which the shorts could pick and choose to build a diversified pool.

Offline cylonmaker2053

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sorry i'm not following, could you boil it down to a simple example? what would be examples of collateral used for EXA.USD ... EXZ.USD if not BTS?

Offline starspirit

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The basic problem with IOUs backed by single issuers is counter-party risk. So for example, an IOU for USD from an exchange is always subject to the viability of that exchange, and whether you will eventually be able to withdraw.

The solution proffered by BitShares to date has been to eliminate counter-party risk altogether, by backing tokens with BTS. But that also has a weakness - investment risk. BTS can be volatile, and its fundamentals can change dramatically, especially for what amounts today to a micro-cap stock (the future might be very different of course!). The wider market is not currently familiar or confident in the stability of BTS. The way to mitigate this is by stringent collateral requirements. But here there is a trade-off - increasing security for longs means making the product less attractive for shorts.

Another avenue that could be explored is one that seeks to reduce both the counter-party risk and the investment risk. This is done by matching the nature of the collateral as closely as possible to the nature of the asset. (One way to think of this is matching assets to liabilities, reducing the relative risk).

If there were enough IOUs for an asset issued in the UIA market, then any of these IOUs could be used as collateral to back a token in the corresponding asset. A haircut on the value of that collateral would be required to allow for the prospect of issuer default, much in the same way as we allow a haircut on BTS for the volatility risk (a haircut is just another way of saying you need more than 100% of the value held as collateral). But we can go further than this. Shorts could choose which IOUs they want to include as collateral, and in what mix, and because they always bear the first loss on any devaluation of that collateral, it is in their interests to ensure they get the proper mix of quality and diversification.

In the future, suppose there were many exchange or gateway based IOUs for USD, issued as UIAs. Lets label these EXA.USD, EXB.USD, EXC.USD, ... , EXZ.USD. Most will trade close to par. Those that fall below par will have increasing collateral requirements, and shorts will act to move away from these to higher quality IOUs. Thus its the shorts that manage the counter-party risk on behalf of the longs.

In this way a USD token is potentially backed by all the exchange members, with the risk profile managed by users heavily incentivised to maintain quality and diversification.

For high quality IOUs, haircuts might be as little as 10% (this can be adjusted higher if the collateral pool is not very diversified, and lowered as diversification increases). Shorts should be able to earn a reward in the form of a fee from longs (even 1% pa would represent a 10% pa return for shorts) and from market-making. Thus their main reward is an income stream, rather than speculation.

Risk cannot be removed, only changed in form. This is just another way of packaging risk for users of pegged assets.