2 Ideas for voting

[Empirical1.2]

There are many dynamics of approval voting that these ideas fail to consider. 

Limiting the number you can approve only decreases security.  Agent 86 and bm fought over that a long time ago

Limiting the number of delegates you can vote for would need to be seriously game-theoried out before implementing.  I suspect it would actually decrease security.

Yeah it's possible. I'd be interested in reading that thread or hearing some reasons why.

The prospect of potentially doubling the required stake to elect 51% of block producers though is interesting.

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Any one have any opinions on idea 1?

By letting a large group of standby witnesses randomly produce a small amount of blocks you can considerably increase the number of more trusted active witnesses required to collude. (& as a result give standby's a small income and keep them active.) 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sortition

In governance, sortition (also known as allotment) is the selection of officers as a random sample from a larger pool of candidates.

Voter fatigue
Supporters also argue that sortition alleviates the problems of voter fatigue and rational ignorance, which is seen as a problem in both representative democracy and direct democracy.

Other concepts such as Witnesses with higher support &/or well established witnesses being less likely to be attackers than new, lower supported witnesses and should therefore be allowed to produce slightly more blocks are also possible ideas.

[Ander]

Limiting the number of delegates you can vote for would need to be seriously game-theoried out before implementing.  I suspect it would actually decrease security.

[sittingduck]

There are many dynamics of approval voting that these ideas fail to consider. 

Limiting the number you can approve only decreases security.  Agent 86 and bm fought over that a long time ago


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[Empirical1.2]

Large voters & proxies such as BM who may say control 4%, should see that if Xeroc has 16% support and the bottom witness they trust Bob only has 7% support that they should vote for Bob giving him 11% support.

Didnt get that bit. You say they "should". Does that mean they should do so voluntarily or is it part of how the system works? Do you mean that the system always votes for the wintess(es) (among all the wittnesses that you trust) with the lowest total vote count? And how does that " Let stake only be allowed to vote for 45% of active witnesses"?

I meant  'let stake only be allowed to vote for 45% of active witnesses' & large stakeholders and proxies would voluntarily make an effort to direct their vote to less supported but trustworthy witnesses, however your adding of  '& let votes go to the witnesses with the lowest total vote count among ones you trust' to the requirement sounds good.

(There's a chance smaller shareholders may just vote for less witnesses to make sure their vote goes to the most popular witnesses they really like, but I definitely wouldn't expect large shareholders and big proxies to do that.)

This should result in up to double the current stake being needed for an attacker to vote in 51% of active witnesses?

[santaclause102]

Large voters & proxies such as BM who may say control 4%, should see that if Xeroc has 16% support and the bottom witness they trust Bob only has 7% support that they should vote for Bob giving him 11% support.

Didnt get that bit. You say they "should". Does that mean they should do so voluntarily or is it part of how the system works? Do you mean that the system always votes for the wintess(es) (among all the wittnesses that you trust) with the lowest total vote count? And how does that " Let stake only be allowed to vote for 45% of active witnesses"?

[Empirical1.2]

I don't know if these stand up to any scrutiny but these are the two ideas.

1. Let a large group of standby witnesses produces a small % of blocks. (To make collusion harder )

In a system with 31 active witnesses and 70 standby witnesses. Let Standby witnesses randomly produce 25% of the blocks.

As a result I think this would mean that instead of needing 16/31 active witnesses to collude that you would need 21/31 active witnesses to collude. 

This has the added benefit of giving standby witnesses a monthly pay of $40 & motivation to stay active and compete.

This has the added benefit of letting us still market a 101 witness system but where the most trusted are producing the vast majority of blocks.

2. Let stake only be allowed to vote for 45% of active witnesses (To make it more expensive to attack BTS)

Large voters & proxies such as BM who may say control 4%, should see that if Xeroc has 16% support and the bottom witness they trust Bob only has 7% support that they should vote for Bob giving him 11% support.

The net result should be the very top witnesses having less votes but the bottom witnesses have about the same as in the current system.

However it should now become up to 2X as expensive to attack BTS.

As an attacker with 12-15% stake could only vote in 45% of block producers and then they would need another 12-15% of BTS stake to get them over the 51% mark.